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Abstract
The implementation of mega projects and events is increasingly becoming part of 
corporate and governmental reality in an effort to create global and frictionless 
operations and infrastructures that result into a new mobility that has been labelled 
as ‘the most powerful and coveted stratifying factor in contemporary society'. The 
successful implementation of such mega projects and events usually relies on the 
highly reliable operations of technological infrastructures and the secure, yet 
flexible, management of information resources across a number of partnering 
organizations. However, the past performance of mega projects and events has been 
greatly criticised for inefficiency, lack of decision-making transparency and an 
overall lack of diligence with regards to the true nature and extent of associated 
risks. A need has been identified to investigate more thoroughly the mechanisms 
employed to manage and communicate risks across a number of vertical and 
horizontal project and event management dimensions. The objective would be to 
capture know-how and lessons learned from past experiences in order to support 
more successful, future mega-project implementations.
The aim of this research is to increase understanding of the risk issues and concerns 
in the management of information systems security (ISS) in a major events context, 
in an effort to deliver highly reliable IS operations. The study is conducted by 
reviewing the analysis, design, management and risk communication processes of ISS 
in the Athens 2004 Olympic Games event. The research methodology adopts an 
interpretive mode of inquiry, where the management of ISS is longitudinally 
evaluated in terms of the organizational scope, context and culture, the 
expectations and motivations of different actors, the meanings assigned to various 
ISS risk signals and events, and the related patterns of behaviour and organizational 
actions and controls. The theoretical foundation that informs the collection and 
analysis of data is that of the Social Amplification of Risk Framework (SARF), which 
suggests that the experience of risk is determined by the direct physical 
consequences of a risk/risk event and the interaction of psychological, social, 
institutional and cultural processes.
Findings from the case study under investigation indicate that a major event 
demonstrates high levels of operational and functional interdependence and 
complexity, directly or indirectly affecting ISS management efforts, decisions and 
communications. Principles of high reliability and mindful management can indeed 
improve overall ISS performance and management of risk, yet the structural and 
cultural aspects of a major event project will amplify/attenuate risk perceptions and 
constrain the effectiveness of such controls. Therefore, there is a need to improve 
understanding of such factors, incorporating this into risk evaluation, management 
and communication practices.
In conclusion, this study shows that the management of IS security and integrity in an 
environment of great organizational reliability demands requires the appreciation of 
structural/functional interdependencies and cultural interactions. By sustaining 
mindful and reflexive processes and structures of risk communication and 
interpretation, ISS assurance and governance practices will allow organizations to 
demonstrate that they can reliably anticipate and contain ISS risks.
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1. Introduction
1.1 Research background and orientation
The need of contemporary organizations to handle their information assets reliably 
has been long acknowledged, as well as the significance of information systems 
security (ISS) practices in ensuring inter- and intra-organizational communications 
integrity.
In more recent years, however, as corporations and governmental organizations 
expand their global and socio-economic reach and interconnectivity, a number of 
high-visibility ISS incidents have been witnessed. These have taken place across 
organizations and governments of varying IS infrastructure maturity, size, function 
and performance, leading to a global attention towards means to regulate and 
standardize information handling practices.
As a result, corporations and governments have not only introduced the issue of ISS 
into their strategic agendas, but have also allocated increasing resources to its 
management1, while identifying a need for organizational structures of ISS 
accountability.
Yet, ISS spending can be costly, while the realized benefits are often elusively 
defined and accounted for. As such, there has been an increased appreciation and 
utilization of risk management practices with respect to ISS, as this is “ a process that 
helps organizations in balancing operational necessities and economic costs 
associated with IT-based systems” , while justifying risk management decisions both 
internally and externally. “The overall mission of risk management is to enable an 
organization to handle information adequately” (Dhillon, 2007:157), and this implies 
a number of issues.
Firstly, the notion of an ‘adequate’ level of risk handling suggests that there is an 
‘acceptable’ level of ISS risk that will be defined according to an organization’s 
mission and priorities. Therefore, risk mitigation solutions must be customized 
according to each organization’s needs. In addition, the above definition of ‘ ISS risk 
management’ suggests that this is a process of assessment, evaluation, and 
prioritization, which aims to determine the nature and extent of uncertainty, and 
thus identify means to control it. In addition, in times when regulatory legitimacy of
1 I.e. Yoran (2009) and Moscaritolo (2009). 
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ISS operations requires decision-making transparency and consistency, risk 
management processes also imply the need for structures of accountability.
Therefore, despite the apparently deterministic nature of risk management 
practices, these involve an inherently subjective and interpretive process, which will 
be also determined by the context within which it is applied.
Meanwhile, extensive literature2 indicates that with an increased organizational 
reliance on IS infrastructures, certain organizational structures will be more prone to 
errors, accidents and disasters than others. In fact, research indicates that such 
organizations often have to operate under a very low, if not zero, tolerance for 
failure3. Thus, increasing numbers of organizations have to demonstrate such highly 
reliable operations.
As such, after an extensive review of related literature4, the researcher has 
identified a crucial need to investigate organizations and their IS infrastructures that 
are required to deliver ‘highly reliable’ and secure IS operations, while operating 
under conditions of considerable uncertainty, budgetary and time constraints. 
Therefore, the initial drive of this study is to increase understanding with regards to 
issues of ISS risk management in organizational environments that are prone to 
accident, yet have a low risk tolerance level.
1.2 The research problem and focus
‘Highly reliable organizations' (HROs) are defined by a number of organizational 
theorists5 as those organizations that succeed in avoiding major errors and disasters, 
despite the fact that they operate under conditions where ‘normal accidents’6 can be 
expected. What drives such exemplary performance is the fact that HROs cannot 
afford to fail, since the impact of an operational failure would have disastrous
2 E.g. Perrow, 1984, 1992; Vaughan, 1996, 1999.
3 I.e. Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007.
4 The literature reviewed for the purposes of this study is further presented in Chapter 2.
5 E.g. Roberts, 1989, 1990a, 1990b; Weick, 1987.
6 A ‘normal accident’ is an unanticipated interaction of multiple failures in a complex system. 
This complexity can either be technological or organizational, and often has elements of both 
(i.e. Perrow, 1984).
D E Afxentiadis (2010) PhD Thesis, London: LSE
outcomes for the legitimacy and survival of the organization, as well as detrimental 
impacts for a wide number of stakeholders and the public.
Weick and Sutcliffe (2007), in fact, suggest that as corporations and governments 
become highly interconnected global entities, there is an increasing need for 
organizations of all kinds to operate under conditions of ‘high reliability’ , namely 
under a low, if not zero, tolerance for failure. The cost could otherwise be too great.
Extending this argument in the field of ISS management, the same could be applied 
here. As organizations reach out to even wider, diverse and interconnected markets, 
they are required to demonstrate that they are reliable guardians of corporate and 
private information.
Therefore, from a ‘rational’7 viewpoint organizational endeavours that involve too 
great an uncertainty and too great a negative impact in case of failure should not be 
pursued. Yet, research and practice demonstrate that this is often not the case.
The researcher suggests that the reasons for this phenomenon partly lie with what 
sociologist Zygmunt Bauman (1998) has labelled as ‘the Great War of Independence 
from Space’ , and IT and business ‘guru’ Bill Gates has called ‘frictionless capitalism’ 
(Taylor, 1998). The phenomenon refers to the emergence of mega (IS) infrastructure 
projects that result in a new socioeconomic mobility, and determine the new 
‘politics of distance’ (Bauman, 1998).
As is later demonstrated in Chapter 2 of this study, mega projects and events8 are 
increasing in number and significance, since they are “central to the new politics of 
distance because infrastructure is increasingly being built as megaprojects” 
(Flyvbjerg et al., 2003:3). Meanwhile their success is so important to their sponsors 
that firms and even governments can collapse when they fail (Merrow, 1988). Yet, 
mega projects and events are inherently risky in nature and usually demonstrate poor 
performance, leading to the identification of the ‘megaproject performance 
paradox’ (Flyvbjerg et al., 2003).
7 The term ‘rational’ in the context of decision making and risk management refers to a 
utility-focused viewpoint, where decisions are made based on cost versus benefit, or risk 
versus benefit considerations.
8 Mega infrastructure projects are defined as projects that are great in scale and impact, 
which primarily aim for increased connectivity, whether that is via physical construction, 
technological or other means (i.e. Flyvbjerg et al., 2003). Mega events Et meetinss, which aim 
to increase connectivity, human interaction and exchange of ideas, are also considered to be 
an increasingly significant subcategory of mega-projects (i.e. Silvers, 2008).
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As more researchers and practitioners point to the above problem, they have also 
identified a need to consider consistently factors that challenge the successful 
performance and delivery of mega project and event organizations. Researchers9 
have pointed towards the urgent need to identify the methodologies, approaches and 
processes that will ensure highly reliable operations of megaproject organizations. 
Yet, it seems that initiatives that will explore and investigate the scoping, delivery 
and economic and socio-political impact of such ambitious and risky endeavours “ are 
still in their very early days” (Silvers, 2008: xviii, 11). Any efforts to understand and 
standardize the practices of mega projects/events require both localized and sector- 
specific pools of expertise as well as integrated, government and industry-wide, 
coordination and commitment.
In response to such an identified need, a number of efforts have been made to map, 
categorize and standardize the phases and functional areas of projects and events. 
These have led to project management frameworks, methodologies and best 
practices such as PMBOK, PRINCE-2 and EMBOK10.
Throughout all of these approaches, the secure yet flexible management of project 
and event information is considered a key administrative functional area. From the 
information generated and utilised during the preparation phase of an event/project, 
to the information generated and distributed during the operational end-phase of the 
project, information remains one of the most critical project assets. It represents the 
business’s intelligence, memory, evidentiary and historical records (Silvers, 2008). 
Project information is an asset that needs to be securely managed, speedily and 
accurately communicated, regularly monitored and updated, and reliably 
maintained.
However, despite, such identified criticality of ISS management practices within a 
mega project/event context, no research seems to have been conducted in this area. 
Given that mega projects and events have only recently received researchers' 
attention, the risk management practices required in order to deliver reliable and 
secure IS operations have not been considered in depth.
9 I.e. Flyvbjerg et al. (2003) and Silvers (2008).
10 I.e. list of abbreviations above.
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Hence, the aim of this research becomes more focused. Its objective is to 
understand11 ISS risk management practices in a major project/event context, where 
stakes and risks are both very high. As argued above, the researcher agrees with the 
view that risk management is an interpretive process whose outcomes will be 
determined by both the physical impact of the risk as well as the processes involved 
in the organizational encounter with that very risk12. Therefore, in order to 
understand the ISS risk management practices of a major project/event organization, 
the researcher reviews the processes of ISS risk analysis, design, management and 
communication in the Athens 2004 (A2004) Olympic Games, and explores the 
underlying causes and the related patterns of behaviour. Eventually, the researcher 
aims to understand how ISS management practices, risk perceptions and behaviours 
evolve and affect a mega event’s capacity to deliver highly reliable IS operations.
Given that organizational encounters with risk involve a dynamic, ongoing process of 
risk attention, sense-making and re-organization13, where risk perceptions and 
actions evolve and change over time, the researcher has opted for an interpretive, 
longitudinal case-study approach. Early involvement in the case-study environment 
and the utilization of a number of research methods have supported a layered data 
collection and analysis method, favouring the need for a rich, in-depth understanding 
of the organizational context, ISS actions, behaviours and outcomes.
1.3 Organization of the study
In order to capture and present the rationale and methods of this research, as well as 
the associated findings and insights with regards to the ISS management practices 
and behaviours in a mega event organization that needs to deliver highly reliable IS 
operations, the researcher has organized her study in the following sections:
11 ‘As explained in section 3.2.2 of this study, the notion of ‘understanding’ refers to Weber’s 
(1962, 1968) ‘Verstehen’ , where research focuses on the meaning and values of acting 
persons in order to arrive at a causal explanation of the course and effects of social action.
12 The concept of ‘organizational encounters with risk’ is introduced by Hutter and Power 
(2005b). It refers to an ongoing process of organizational risk attention, sense-making and re­
organization. This concept is explored further in Chapter 5.
13 I.e. Hutter and Power, 2005b.
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After the research orientation, focus and problem is identified in Chapter 1, the 
literature reviewed for the purposes of this study is considered in Chapter 2. As 
stated in the above paragraphs, the research orientation was the reason to 
investigate existing literature across a number of disciplines, ranging from 
organizational theories to risk/hazard management theories, ISS management and 
project/event management approaches. The reviewed literature is, thus, 
summarized and grouped in research themes and research gaps, directions and 
foundations to this study’s research problem are identified.
The implicit argument is that while ISS scholars have increasingly considered the 
behavioural and social aspects of risk management practices, there is still 
considerable space for inter-disciplinary investigations that will promote the 
utilization of integrative theoretical and methodological frameworks. Such 
frameworks should stress the multiple dimensions to an organizational encounter 
with ISS risk, the significance of context and communication, and the ongoing, 
learning process involved in the delivery of highly reliable ISS operations.
Chapter 3 of this thesis sketches out the methodology of this research. It identifies 
the ontological and epistemological assumptions of this study, and points to the 
associated implications with regards to the applied theoretical perspective. The 
conceptual framework that guides the empirical analysis, namely the Social 
Amplification of Risk Framework (SARF), is presented here. In addition, a contextual 
mode of inquiry is proposed, stressing the need for an investigation into the 
contextual issues of organizational actions, meaning structures, and the way these 
change over time. Finally, the research design is presented in Chapter 3.
The empirical work of this research is covered in Chapter 4. The structural context of 
the organization and event project under study is presented here. The main focus of 
the research findings is on the interpretation of the ISS management implications 
related to the delivery of a highly reliable IS within a particular context. The 
empirical findings are analysed in a chronologically linear fashion, representing the 
various case-study project phases. The conceptual framework utilised for the data 
analysis is the SARF. Emergent issues are also presented here.
The key issues and study insights are presented in Chapter 5. This is done in light of 
the theoretical and philosophical assumptions set out in Chapters 2 and 3. Discussion 
revolves around the three key themes that ‘organizational encounters with risk’ 
define, namely those of risk attention, sense-making and re-organization. The key 
issues and lessons learned presented are always closely correlated with the
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organizational context - that of a major event - and the organizational mission - that 
of highly reliable IS(S) operations.
Finally Chapter 6 concludes the discussion generated in the previous chapters, 
recapitulating key ideas in relation to the nature of ISS, its management and 
associated risk communications, as well as the implications of a major-event, highly- 
reliable organizational context. The main contributions and limitations of this study 
are presented. Any methodological or theoretical concerns related to advancing our 
understanding of ISS management practices are underlined. Finally, future research 
directions are suggested.
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2. Literature Review
2.1 Introduction: the research problem and literature review directions
As indicated in the introductory chapter of this study, the initial drive of this 
research was to understand the ISS management issues and challenges faced by 
contemporary organizations that operate in an inherently risky environment, while 
having a low risk tolerance level. In an effort to do so, literature across disciplines 
was considered that covered topics of ISS and risk management, accident/error and 
hazard management. In addition, organization theories that relate to the conditions 
necessary to deliver highly reliable organizations and IS infrastructures, as well as 
the obstacles to such a performance, were also considered.
The literature review pointed towards a number of industries that demonstrate a 
paradoxical performance, namely an increased recognition of the high - often 
unknown - risk conditions, which however do not hinder organizations from pursuing 
such endeavours that often result in major disasters. One such industry, which has 
been inadequately explored, is that of mega (infrastructure) projects and events.
Given that the literature review also pointed towards the need to investigate risk 
management practices and failures/accidents within their particular organizational 
and contextual settings, the risk management methodologies applied in the mega 
project/ event industry were also investigated in more detail.
Therefore, the research problem became more focused around the ISS risk 
management practices applied in a major-event organization of high reliability 
requirements. This was achieved after an extended body of literature was reviewed 
across a number of practices, while the very findings and observations made during 
the lengthy data collection phase of this study triggered further investigation into 
existing schools of thought and practice across a range of subjects.
As such, it is vital that the literature reviewed for the purposes of this research is 
presented here, as this will greatly justify the research focus, as well as the choice 
of theoretical & methodological directions.
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Although the subjects reviewed range across a variety of topics, three main themes 
were identified, namely:
(a) Information systems security (ISS) risk management;
(b) Technology risk and hazard management; and
(c) Mega project and event management.
The section below of this study is structured along those thematic lines. At the end 
of the literature review chapter, a justification is provided with regards to the 
chosen research topic, as well as the choice of conducting this research across 
disciplines, and ‘bridging’ knowledge and insightful conclusions from various areas of 
expertise.
2.2 Information systems security (ISS): managing information integrity
2.2.1. The demand for and evolution of the ISS discipline
The definition of ISS has evolved over time, reflecting new knowledge and changing 
research, market and legislative demands. Traditionally, ISS has been defined as “ the 
preservation of confidentiality, integrity and availability” (ISO/IEC 17799, 2000) and 
linked to the concept of ‘computer security’ (i.e. Whitman and Mattord, 2005).
Contrasting the traditional definition to the more recent one of ‘ information 
(systems) security’ , Baskerville (1992) notes that there are two significant evolutions. 
Firstly, ‘information security’ introduces the concept of ‘information’ , which has 
meaning and brings strategic aspects to information security, while information 
resides in both electronic and manual forms. Secondly, ‘information security’ 
introduces a human component via the inclusion of not only manual systems, but also 
human processors. This human component highlights the behavioural aspects of 
information security, such as motivation, cognition, and the interplay of the system 
with the organization.
The more recent and expanded in scope notion of ‘ ISS’ points to the current 
inadequacy of the C.I.A. definition. The C.I.A. approach provides a solid technical 
starting point, but fails to address the organizational and ethical issues faced when 
dealing with knowledge workers, who can easily compromise proprietary information
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(Dhillon and Backhouse, 2001). Employee access to information is increasingly 
pervasive throughout organizations as the breadth of technology increases14.
Wenger (2006) suggests that the flattening of organizational structures has had 
ramifications from a security standpoint. “As organizations become leaner and fitter 
using technology to reduce layers of management, they run the risk of removing the 
controls and checks which former supervisory and managerial positions would have 
applied” (UK Audit Commission, 1994:12). The injudicious distribution of too much 
organizational knowledge can result in unwanted accountability for those exposed to 
it (Schultze and Leidner, 2002), as well as greater security risks for the organization.
Given such a new organizational and technological context, the need to expand the 
definition of ‘ ISS’ has been increasingly acknowledged by researchers, practitioners, 
and legislators. In addition to the C.I.A. aspects of information security, Dhillon and 
Backhouse (2000) have proposed adding responsibility, integrity of organizational 
members, trust, and ethical norms and behaviour. These additional principles are 
commonly referred to as R.I.T.E. and stress the human component and behavioural 
aspects of information security.15
Meanwhile, recent legislation such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and HIPAA has 
recognized the strategic value of information and the need to expand officially the 
scope of information security16. Such legislation is in fact stressing the need for 
accountability that adequate controls are in place to protect information from both 
intentional and unintentional, external and internal threats.
In addition, as accountability demands increase and spending in ISS needs to be 
justified, organizations require a means to measure the effectiveness of security 
efforts (Anderson, 2003). The significance of ISS metrics and risk management 
practices is increasing along with the overall need to take a strategic, business- 
driven approach to information security. Trust is implied by way of reasonable 
assurance and accountability, while ethics are implicitly captured in the necessary 
behaviours required for the realization of organizations’ desired outcomes (Spears, 
2006a).
14 I.e. Spears, 2006a; Dhillon and Backhouse, 2001; and Cooper, 1999.
15 According to Rindfleisch (1997) ethical norms can deter insecure practices of trusted 
personnel, while they can direct behaviour in unforeseen contexts where formal rules do not 
exist (Dhillon and Backhouse, 2000).
16 I.e. Geffert, 2004; Spears and Cole, 2006.
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ISS is, therefore, defined as “ the practice of protecting organizational information of 
value from both intentional and unintentional acts that adversely affect its safety 
and providing reasonable assurance of this protection via adequate controls and 
accountability” (Spears, 2006a:6). Respectively, the goal of ISS is to mitigate the 
risks to an organization’s information assets to a level that is acceptable to 
management (Pattinson and Anderson, 2006a).
In parallel to the evolution of the ‘ ISS’ definition, the very approaches and focus of 
ISS research and practice have evolved. D’Arcy and Hovav (2006) identify three ISS 
approaches to date, namely the technical, financial/economic and behavioural ones.
With regards to the technical orientation to ISS, “each major technological advance 
in computing raises new security threats that require new security solutions, and 
technology moves faster than the rate at which such solutions can be developed” 
(Gasser, 1998: 8). As such, according to Dhillon and Backhouse (2001) most of the ISS 
research has been on the formal automated part of an information system. The 
associated literature views information security as a technical issue that can be 
effectively managed by selecting appropriate hardware and software components 
and designing an architecture to protect the information assets of an organization 
(Dutta and Roy, 2003).
The main body of work focuses on the development of technological ISS solutions17, 
while technical ISS researchers have been concerned with ways to incorporate 
security into the design of information systems18. A related stream of technical ISS 
research has examined risk analysis methods for the design of security information 
systems. Dhillon and Backhouse (2001) have suggested that the use of risk analysis 
methods can make information systems more secure if security controls are 
developed and implemented within information systems in a logical and sequential 
manner.
17 Research on the development of technological ISS solutions focuses on topics such as 
restricting information access to authorised parties (e.g. Irakleous et al., 2002; Osborn et al., 
2000), securely transmitting information (e.g. Lou and Liu, 2002), and securely and accurately 
storing information, and timely retrieving information (e.g. Post and Kagan, 1998). A number 
of researchers have also focused on the technical details of various threats to information 
systems, such as viruses (e.g. Cohen, 1984; Bagchi and Udo, 2003), and worms (e.g. Spafford, 
1989; Panko, 2003; Chen, 2003).
18 E.g. Conway et al., 1972; Wang and Wang, 2003; Furnell, 2005; Payne, 2002.
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Finally, more recently, researchers have been proposing taxonomies for information 
security technologies, addressing network, host and application security from both a 
proactive and reactive perspective (Venter and Eloff, 2003). According to Wenger 
(2006: 3) “ the fact that researchers are building such taxonomies indicates that this 
area of the field is starting to mature” .
The financial/economic orientation to ISS covers a growing body of ISS literature 
that explores the financial and economic aspects of ISS, covering topics such as 
information security investment decision-making19, the financial impact of security 
breaches20, and economic analyses of security threats and associated technological 
solutions21.
Finally, behavioural information security is defined as “ the complexes of human 
action that influence the availability, confidentiality and integrity of information 
systems” (Stanton et al., 2004: 1388). It has been driven by studies that indicate that 
technological countermeasures alone do not provide adequate security of information 
resources. Increasing numbers of researchers now agree that the success of 
information security depends in part upon the effective behaviour of the individuals 
involved in its use (D’Arcy and Hovav, 2005).
Depending on the particular focus of behavioural ISS research, it can be distinguished 
into two approaches, namely the socio-technical and socio-organizational approach 
(Wenger, 2006).
The first addresses ISS beyond a purely technical perspective, viewing the ‘user’ as 
more than simply an abstract entity pursuing a specific information asset, but as a 
member of the broader organization. Therefore, this approach considers 
organizational aspects of security, but focuses on the technologies used to address 
them.
The socio-organizational approach takes a ‘softer’ view (Checkland, 1981) and 
emphasizes user participation in information security development, thus increasing 
user motivation to practice security. Organizational and social issues are considered 
as important, if not more important, than technological issues (i.e. Wenger, 2006). 
By adopting this perspective it is that Dhillon and Backhouse (2000) have suggested
19 E.g. Gordon and Loeb, 2002; Cavusoglu et al. 2004.
20 E.g. Ettredge and Richardson, 2003; Hovac and D’Arcy, 2003 and 2005; Yayla and Hu, 2005.
21 E.g. Gopal and Sanders, 1997; Cavusoglu et al. 2005.
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the implementation of principle-based approaches to information security. This 
would include the above mentioned R.I.T.E., thus helping to bridge the gap between 
a narrow IT and a more socio-organizational perspective of ISS.
Therefore, behavioural research focuses on ways to predict and increase ISS 
compliance22, measure the impact of security breach countermeasures on general IS 
misuse behaviours23, as well as on an individual level24.
A variety of theories and evaluation techniques are applied in this domain, which 
have been criticised of suggesting solutions that are more descriptive than 
prescriptive in nature25. In addition, such behavioural theories tend to focus on the 
malicious activities that compromise information security, and often neglect the 
accidental, behavioural events.
Furthermore, researchers26 suggest that results in behavioural ISS research are often 
inconclusive, partly because individual and situational differences moderate the 
impact of various countermeasures, thus suggesting a need to contextualize any 
behavioural findings and associate solutions.
The use of theoretical frameworks that focus more on the contextual, organizational, 
social and cultural concerns surrounding ISS behaviours has been suggested27. 
Therefore, approaches that have otherwise been widely used in Information Systems 
(IS) research such as ‘institutional* and ‘structuration* theory have been more 
recently suggested for the ISS field (Li, 2006).
Overall, as the multi-dimensional complexities of ISS are being realized, there is 
increasing recognition that the approaches and orientations of related research need
22 E.g. Thomson and von Solms, 1998; Stanton et al., 2004 and 2005; Magklaras and Fumell, 
2005.
23 E.g. Straub, 1990; Kankanhalli et al., 2003; Wiant, 2003.
24 E.g. D’Arcy and Hovav, 2005; Gopal and Sanders, 1997; Foltz, 2000; Harrington, 1996; Lee 
et al., 2004.
25 Some of the theories applied in the study of behavioural ISS include the following: (a) 
General Deterrence Theory (Theoharidou et al., 2005; Straub and Welke, 1998; Parker, 1998);
(b) Theory of Reasoned Action (Mishra and Harris, 2006); (c) Theory of Planned Behaviour 
(Mishra and Harris, 2006); (d) Social Bond Theory (Theoharidou et al., 2005; Hirschi (1969) 
and (e) Social Learning Theory (Theoharidou et al., 2005).
26 I.e. D’Arcy and Hovav,2006; Long Li, 2006.
27 I.e. Long Li, 2006; Dhillon, 2007.
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to be integrated28. D’Arcy and Hovav (2006) suggest that the interplay between the 
financial, organizational, best-practices, behavioural, regulatory, technological, and 
industry dimensions of ISS needs to be considered.
2.2.2. The ISS risk management discipline and practices
Apart from the evident evolution in the way computer and information systems 
security are perceived, and the greater recognition of the added value of integrative 
approaches, a further dimension to ISS research has been highlighted - that of ISS 
‘risk’ .
Organizational drivers fo r ISS risk management
The current demand for increased use of risk management methodologies applied in 
the field of information systems security (ISS) is supported by the very goal that ISS 
has evolved into aiming for; namely a balance between security risk and investments 
in their countermeasures (Pattinson and Anderson, 2006).
There is a growing organizational incentive to invest in ISS risk management controls 
as financial losses from ISS breaches are increasing29.The inter- and intra- 
organizational dependencies with regards to ISS are more widely recognized, and 
both organizations and legislators are acknowledging what ISS scholars have always 
stated about the ‘weakest link’ of a security infrastructure. “One weak link in the 
organization compromises all other divisions. One unprotected division endangers all 
of the other divisions in the firm even if they have all invested in security” 
(Kunreuther and Heal, 2005: 196).
The implication of ‘interdependent security’ is of course that “ the economic 
incentive for any division in an organization to invest in risk-reduction measures 
depends on how it expects the other divisions to behave in this respect” (Kunreuther 
and Heal, 2005: 190).
Therefore, although investing in ISS is becoming increasingly critical, it is not a 
straight-forward decision. ISS investments need to be proportionate not only to the 
associated ISS risk, but also to the actions taken throughout the organization. ISS
28 I.e. Pattinson and Anderson, 2006; Jain, 2006; Smith et al., 2006.
29 I.e. Gordon et al., 2005; Whitman, 2003.
D E Afxentiadis (2010) PhD Thesis, London: LSE
risks need to be measured and prioritized, while countermeasures’ efficiency needs 
to be coordinated and monitored.
External drivers fo r ISS risk management
Further to the financial concerns from within organizations, there are also a number 
of external and industry factors driving ISS towards a risk-management approach.
Whether from increased exposure to ISS threats and the associated media coverage, 
or the increased availability of ISS standards and best practices30, organizations are 
becoming more aware of the criticality of ISS investments with regards to the 
integrity of their operations and information handling.
In addition, following a series of massive organizational failures - both by 
corporations and governments - to monitor risks associated with the handling of 
sensitive information, legislators and regulators are increasingly demanding that 
information management becomes an issue of corporate and governmental 
accountability which is closely and transparently managed and monitored31 (Jones 
and Ashenden, 2005).
Therefore, as regulation is becoming tighter and markets are becoming increasingly 
aware of the need to align ISS to strategic organizational goals, ISS compliance and 
governance are becoming issues that, more than ever before, require top 
management support and involvement (Jain, 2006).
However, the use of ISS standards and legislations to guide the information security 
efforts of organizations is not necessarily adequate or simple. Standards are often 
simplified when used (Shedden et al., 2006), while their effective application 
requires a great deal of expertise on the part of the assessor regarding risk and risk 
assessments (Halliday et al., 1996). In addition, standards still suffer from the 
problem of subjectivity, not only with regards to their interpretation, but also in 
relation to their translation within an organizational context (Lichtenstein, 1996).
Similarly, the use of legislation to address ISS risks is positive in the sense that it 
encourages responsibility and accountability, including the documentation of controls 
and the implementation of audit trails (Spears, 2006a). Nonetheless, legislation
30 Information Security is addressed by a series of standards and best practices, such as the 
ISO-27001 & 2, ISO-17799, BS-7799, and the NIST standards.
31 Such legislative demands include initiatives like the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, HIPPA, Basel-2, 
Gramms-Leach-Bliley Act, Data Protection Act, and Solvency-2.
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suffers the same, if not more, problems than standards have with regards to their ISS 
utilization. Legislation can be subjective, often vague, and compliance to it is 
difficult to measure. Most importantly, however, legislation does not address the 
issues of ‘ taking care’ of ISS problems.
There is, thus, a need to have specific measures for information security (Jain,
2006). There is a need for research on the ways to manage ISS risk and increase 
individual information security accountability via effective training, awareness and 
flexible governance structures (Mellor and Noyes, 2006).
The evolution o f the ISS risk management discipline
Having established above the evolving need of the ISS discipline to adopt a risk 
management approach to information security (Shedden et al., 2006: 1), it is worth
considering the research that has been conducted in this particular ISS field.
To begin with, ‘information security risk management' is defined as
“the process that helps in balancing operational necessities and economic 
costs associated with IT-based systems. The overall mission of ISS risk 
management is to enable an organization to adequately handle information. 
There are three essential components of risk management: risk assessment, 
risk mitigation, and risk evaluation” (Dhillon, 2007: 157).
Similarly, and to an extent in parallel, to the greater ISS discipline, ISS risk
management has evolved over time in both its focus and application. According to 
Jones and Ashenden (2005) ISS risk management can be distinguished into four 
phases.
The first phase is that of risk management efforts focusing on individual IT systems 
and their implementation, paying scant attention to the risk associated with the 
people using this, or the processes that underpinned the operation.
As systems became interconnected, it was recognized that attention needed to be 
paid to the points of connection and now risk assessments focused on the risks 
exposed by connecting systems together.
The third phase of ISS risk management is identified as the one where information 
risks on the project level were considered. This was a significant step ahead as the 
people and processes that surrounded the system were now considered.
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The final stage of evolution for risk assessment is for it to be seen as an enterprise- 
wide issue, often covering all aspects of operational risk in an effort to comply with 
corporate governance requirements.
ISS risk management research needs to expand further
Although this evolution of the ISS risk management discipline seems positive, there 
still remain several challenges. Liebenberg and Hoyt (2003) argue that within 
organizations there has been a paucity of research in ISS enterprise risk management 
which needs to be amended. Jones and Ashenden (2005) and Spears (2006a) agree 
and suggest that the discipline needs to broaden further, avoiding the tendency to 
focus primarily on the technical aspects of ISS. Indeed, addressing the behaviour of 
individuals and organizations as a more effective means to reducing information risk 
is picking up ground, while at the same time the related challenge is being 
increasingly appreciated.
Smith et al, (2006:2) agree with the significance of the behavioural aspects of 
information security and proceed to stress that
“organizations need to translate their security framework into an organization 
culture that is by its very nature more security-aware. While the technical 
solutions are critically important, their efficient use depends on the extent to 
which employees are not only trained in using these solutions effectively, but 
also motivated and willing to perform these functions [...] Effective security 
isn’t one person’s job or responsibility; it  is the aggregate concern of all 
employees, and such a concern must be reflected in corporate culture” .
However, creating a culture of internal vigilance where every organizational member 
understands their role in securing the organization’s infrastructure remains a difficult 
matter to tackle. Risk assessment and management practices need to be flexible and 
adaptive to their context. They need to be insightful and mindful of their audience, 
which is diverse and increasingly concerned with the ways in which an ISS risk 
assessment can contribute and is aligned to the business strategy.
As such, consideration of ‘softer’ aspects of ISS risk has been increasingly proposed, 
including the examination of the socio-psychological aspects of ISS risk (Pattinson and 
Anderson, 2006a). Some of the psychological phenomena that have been considered
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in the ISS risk management field are risk homeostasis, risk perception, cognitive 
style, and social inhibition32.
Although it is only very recently that such research efforts have commenced, it  is 
clear that these have to continue since they can improve the understanding and 
management of employees’ motivations and behaviours with regards to information 
security (Pattinson and Anderson, 2006a).
Finally, with regards to expanding ISS research, it has been suggested that in today’s 
world an information security approach requires “a total risk management approach 
which considers security risk controls across three levels, namely that of policies, 
programs, and technical and access controls” (Jain, 2006: 11).
ISS risk management methodologies
Although the aim of ISS risk management is to secure organizational systems and 
processes, what is underpinning it is primarily to build trust. A trust that extends 
“across a broad community so that it  encompasses not only the organization itself 
but goes beyond its boundaries to customers, partners, shareholders, and regulators” 
(Jones and Ashenden, 2005:244).
In an effort to do so, a number of risk management methodologies have been 
developed, which have been mostly derived from the Security Development Life 
Cycle (Jain, 2006) and are commonly used in conjunction with some form of ISS 
standards, baseline guidelines or principles.
As stated above, any risk management process and associated model has three main 
stages, namely risk assessment, mitigation, and evaluation (Dhillon, 2007). These 
imply a series of pro-active - and ideally regularly revised - plans, which should be 
implemented from the early stages of an IS solution (Jones and Ashenden, 2005). 
Such plans can guide the collection of risk information; the scope and frequency of 
risk assessments; the treatment of risk; and the tracking of risks, as well as the 
changes in the business.
32 For more references on ‘risk homeostasis’ see: Wilde, 1994; Filley, 1999; Pattinson and 
Anderson, 2006a and 2006b. References on ‘risk perception’ include Heimer, 1988; Bener, 
2000; Otway, 1980; Lippa, 1994; Pattinson and Anderson, 2006a. References on the ‘cognitive 
style’ include Witkin et al, 1977; Ausburn and Ausburn, 1978; Pattinson and Anderson, 2006a. 
Finally, ‘social inhibition’ references include Latane and Darley, 1969; Pattinson and 
Anderson, 2006a.
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In addition to the proactive identification and mitigation of risks, there are a number 
of methodologies that focus on the management of incidents or disasters in the 
immediate, short- and long-term time frames respectively. Such Incident 
Management, Disaster Recovery, and Business Continuity methodologies include their 
respective plans, which focus on the incident reactive controls in place that will 
contain and manage ISS failures and operational disruptions33.
However, as Jones and Ashenden (2005) point out, ISS risk assessment and 
management methodologies seem to address the pro-active and re-active matters 
separately, omitting their interdependencies. Thus, they support a holistic ISS risk 
management methodology, where proactively understanding the organizational 
context, preparing for the associated risks, and learning from incidents and mistakes, 
form a greater symbiotic cycle.
One further criticism of such ISS risk management methodologies is similar to the one 
highlighted above with regards to the use of ISS standards. Despite the above 
structured approach to dealing with ISS risk, it is widely accepted that such 
methodologies often do not cover how to go about conducting these assessment and 
management efforts (Shedden et al., 2006).
Finally, Jones and Ashenden (2005) identify time, resource and budget constraints as 
factors that may complicate ISS risk decision making and implementation. They also 
identify political and reputational considerations that may complicate the risk 
management processes, and add that “ it may be easier to impose risk management 
techniques downstream in the value chain but harder to achieve upstream” (Jones 
and Ashenden, 2005: 9, 188).
The ‘a rt’ o f managing ISS risks - required skills
Hence, the process of ISS risk management is a complex one, despite the implied 
simplicity by the associated methodologies and frameworks. As Jones and Ashenden 
(2005:25) argue, the management of ISS risks is an ‘art’ rather than a science.
“The risk manager needs a broad set of skills and thought processes to be 
successful. [...] She/he needs to understand risk dependencies between 
information assets, different technology implementations, different 
stakeholder groups within the organization, and the different environments in 
which the organization operates” .
33 I.e. Spencer, 2006; Jones and Ashenden, 2005.
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ISS risk management needs to ‘bridge’ thinking and skills across disciplines and 
boundaries. It needs to be aligned to the organizational structure, and therefore the 
ISS risk manager must understand the context and the implications of technology in 
business terms. “ Information security risk managers need a certain amount of 
business knowledge, coupled with technical understanding and good communication 
skills” (Jones and Ashenden, 2005:26).
In addition, ISS risk managers/experts need to be able to utilize both qualitative and 
quantitative risk analysis methods, while acknowledging the limitations of both these 
approaches34. They also need to be familiar with ISS risk assessment methodologies35, 
and incorporate both ISS audits and assessments as part of their risk identification 
and monitoring efforts (Fagnot and Stanton, 2006).
Finally, ISS risk managers must be appreciative of the organizational ISS culture, and 
identify the best means to communicate ISS risk messages to the end-users, IT 
specialists, Board members, or other third parties.
The ‘soft9 aspects o f ISS controls
This more holistic approach to information security risk has raised attention to 
several ‘softer’ aspects of ISS and their impact and dynamic interaction with 
‘harder’ , more technical aspects36.
As indicated earlier, the human component and behavioural aspects of ISS have been 
increasingly appreciated37 and a number of human factors that have the potential to 
impact upon an organization’s ISS has been identified (Pattinson and Anderson,
2007). Some of these include: (a) the organizational structure and risk culture; (b) 
the individual propensity to take risks; (c) the individual/group perception of risks; 
(d) familiarity with the risk communication; (e) age, gender, position in the 
organization; (f) the amount of education and training; (g) the individual cognitive 
style; and (h) experience.
34 For more information on the quantitative and qualitative risk analysis methods see Jones 
and Ashenden, 2005:215-218.
35 I.e. NIST, 2000.
36 I.e. Dhillon and Backhouse, 1994; Dhillon, 2007.
37 I.e. Spears, 2006a; Pattinson and Anderson, 2005; Schneier, 2000 and 2004; Pincus, 2005; 
Heiser, 2005.
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Similarly, the communication of ISS risks and controls and the contextual surrounding 
of these have been increasingly indicated as crucial factors to the effectiveness of 
any ISS risk management efforts.
In addition, some research is being conducted in the area of ISS risk perceptions, 
although this field remains immature. Efforts are being made to bridge work done in 
the ISS and risk perception fields. The ‘framing’ of ISS messages is considered to be 
a significant tool in the management or risk perceptions, requiring further 
exploration38.
ISS risk communication is also considered to be a means to improving levels of 
organizational trust in ISS controls and controllers. Spears (2006a:6) identifies trust in 
the ISS context to imply “ reasonable assurance and accountability” , while Jones and 
Ashenden (2005:245) describe it  as “ a predisposition to expose oneself to a security 
risk” . As part of the RITE-principles of ISS, Dhillon (2007:322) defines trust as 
assurance that other organizational members will act in accordance with 
organizational norms and accepted patterns of behaviour. Regardless of the exact 
definition of trust in ISS, the linkage between trust, governance, and compliance are 
increasingly stressed as an important factor in an organization’s ability to 
demonstrate integrity and value for its stakeholders.
Trust has been also linked to organizational structures of accountability, 
responsibility and ethics, which in total form the context of any ISS risk and control. 
This organizational context that captures “ the totality of patterns of behaviour that 
come together to ensure protection of organizational information resources” is 
known as the ‘security culture’ of an organization (Dhillon, 2007:221).
Having identified organizations as agents of risk generation, management and 
control, efforts have been made to map organizations’ security culture, and define 
what a robust security culture is, thus providing guiding principles to its 
development39.
38 I.e. Dhillon, 2007; Pattinson and Anderson, 2005 and 2007.
39 E.g. Smith et al., 2006; Wenger, 2006. In addition, Dhillon (2007) argues that culture can be 
studied by analysing the communication processes of an organization. He, thus, suggests using 
Hall’s (1959) ‘Web of Culture’39 in order to map the ways in which different cultural streams 
interact with each other, and the patterns of behaviour they lead to.
D E Afxentiadis (2010) PhD Thesis, London: LSE
Futhermore, in an effort to deal with ISS insider threats40, suggestions have been 
made that organizations need to take into consideration the employees and their 
‘psychological contract’41 and proactively deal with any potential behavioural ISS 
problems (Wenger, 2006). Smith et al. (2006:3) suggest that
“several prerequisites must be met for maintaining an efficacious security 
culture, including decent, regularly paid wages and a stable working 
environment. The workforce must have the skills, knowledge and motivation
to do their jobs in accordance with best practices” .
In addition, ISS awareness and training have been identified as key methods to 
internalize ISS into the organizational culture (Wenger, 2006; Smith et al., 2006). ISS 
researchers suggest that ISS awareness and training should stress that ISS is every 
employee’s responsibility, supporting individual accountability and ownership of 
security. Making employees understand the consequences of their individual actions 
can transform them from passive learners to active ones (Mellor and Noyes, 2006). 
Having established that legacy ISS training practices are ineffective (Bradford, 2003; 
Desman, 2003), increasing research is carried out in this area in order to provide 
guidelines that will turn organizations’ largest security liability - its personnel - to its 
largest asset (Mellor and Noyes, 2006).
Some of the guidelines found across the related research suggest that ISS training 
should be organized, with clear goals and stages, as well as interactive and where 
possible certified and evaluated. Moreover, it should take place across all ISS
domains, while ISS trainers must be appropriately skilled42.
A further means to improve ISS awareness and behavioural practice is through 
learning from incidents (Spencer, 2006). However, as Spagnoletti (2006:2) argues, 
this is a challenging activity since preventing and investigating incidents is a complex 
task in itself.
40 Research and statistics have repeatedly indicated that one of the most significant ISS 
threats for organizations is their employees and ‘trusted’ partners (i.e. Spears, 2006a;
Dhillon, 2001).
41 The ‘psychological contract’ is defined by Wenger (2006:1) as “the employees’ beliefs 
about the mutual obligations between themselves and the organization. It extends beyond the 
specifics that may be outlined in employment contracts [...] and includes expectations for 
continued employment, advancement opportunities, and work environment”.
42 I.e. the NIST SP 800-16 standard, and Pfefer (2003).
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“Computer incidents are a significant example of ‘drift’43 and are strongly 
related to the context in which they take place. In this sense, the design of 
appropriate ISS Management Systems can take a very large advantage from 
the deep understanding of single incidents performed by case studies” .
These can improve management's ability to make decisions about investments on 
security preventing measures at the technical, formal and informal levels.
Hence, Spagnoletti (2006) proceeds with the utilization of the Theory of Crime 
Prevention and Situational Crime Prevention44 to investigate and reduce ISS 
incidents. Some of the findings of this case-study research indicate (a) the 
unpredictability of human behaviour; (b) the significance of improvisation in the 
context of emerging circumstances; (c) the need for interpretive frameworks to 
investigate incidents; and (d) that in-depth case-studies of incidents can represent a 
valuable source of information to design systems and to increase the awareness of 
people.
Finally, as part of the heightened attention towards the ‘softer’ aspects of ISS and 
the management of associated risks, the increased levels of proactive user 
participation in the risk identification and assessment processes have been put 
forward45.
2.2.3. Future and further ISS research
Overall, ISS literature and research have evolved significantly over the past decades, 
in order to meet the changing organizational, market, and threat-profile demands. 
There has been an increasing recognition of the interdependencies of ISS, as well as 
its multiple dimensions, thus stressing the need to take more holistic approaches to 
ISS decision-making and controls. In addition, there has been an increased 
consideration of more structured ways to address and manage ISS risks.
43 l.e.Ciborraj?tal (2000).
44 The ‘Theory of Crime Prevention’ and ‘Situational Crime Prevention’ is based on the idea 
that crime results partly from the opportunities presented by the physical environment. This 
being the case it should be possible to alter the physical environment so that crime is less 
likely to occur. Thus, they refer to a preventive approach that relies upon reducing 
opportunities for crime.
45 I.e. Spears (2006b) and Suh and Han (2003).
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Holistic ISS models and ISS risk management methodologies have, therefore, helped 
towards the identification and creation of ISS risk and control typographies and 
guidelines. Nevertheless, there are several areas of both the ISS and ISS-risk 
disciplines that need to mature further. Among others, some of the themes identified 
include the following:
There is a need to investigate further the informal, behavioural aspects of ISS within 
specific contexts. Such research should cover matters of effective ISS 
communications and better understanding of end-users’ risk perceptions and 
decision-making processes, thus leading to greater compliance levels. Research 
conducted in other disciplines, such as psychology, sociology, and anthropology, 
should be utilised to that direction46.
Furthermore, a need has been identified to investigate means to create an effective 
security culture that is integrated with the work culture and organizational 
structure47, including better recruitment and personnel management methods that 
will enhance any efforts to create an organizational security culture48. Similarly, the 
importance of effective stakeholder involvement in the ISS decision-making process 
has been acknowledged49.
In addition, researchers have pointed out the benefits of integrating research across 
the various ISS levels, aiming to develop an enterprise-wide, total risk management 
approach. ISS risk methodologies should facilitate for the multi-dimensional aspects 
of ISS throughout all their stages50.
Finally, researchers have highlighted the need for theoretically founded 
methodologies in order to investigate ISS incidents51.
46 I.e. Pattinson and Anderson, 2005, 2006a, 2006b; Jain, 2006; Mishra and Harris, 2006.
47 I.e. Smith et al., 2006; Spears, 2006b.
48 I.e. Mishra and Harris, 2006.
49 I.e. Jain, 2006; Mishra and Harris, 2006; Spears, 2006b.
so I.e. Jones and Ashenden, 2005; Jain, 2006; Mishra and Harris, 2006; D’Arcy and Hovav,
2006.
51 I.e. Spagnoletti, 2006.
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2.3 Risk and hazard management: managing uncertainty
As explored in section 2.2 of this study, the notion of risk and the value of risk 
management practices in the information systems security (ISS) field have been 
receiving increasing recognition. The need for holistic risk management and 
communication methodologies that are founded on solid theoretical underpinnings 
and will facilitate the improvement of ISS practices has been highlighted, yet 
inadequately explored.
‘Risk’ , on the other hand, consists of a greater discipline of its own, with sizeable 
research and associated practices.
The purpose of this section is to consider the research and practices in the risk 
discipline, and thus appreciate the ways in which technological risk and hazard 
management have been approached. The researcher’s view is that the ISS risk 
management field can benefit from the cross-disciplinary investigation of concepts of 
technological uncertainty, risk and hazard.
2.3.1. The history and evolution of approaches to risk
“While the idea of risk management can be traced to ancient times [...] and while 
risk has been an essential underpinning to investment and insurance practices for 
centuries, the systematic application of risk to evaluate the technologies and 
products of high modernism is a child of the late 20th century” (Jaeger et al., 
2001:9).
According to Jaeger et al. (2001) in common usage ‘risk’ has a wide range of 
connotations. Despite however usage variation, there are unifying features that 
ground the meaning of risk. All conceptions of risk presuppose a distinction between 
predetermination and possibility (Renn, 1992a). Risk implies both the possibility that 
an event or outcome can happen with the denial that either occurs with 
predetermined certainty. Risk thus necessarily implies uncertainty.
“As a result, humans try to make causal connections between present actions 
and future outcomes, and they exercise agency in attempting to shape the 
causes of future outcomes. [...] However, not all uncertainty is risk. [...] A risk 
is present only to the extent that uncertainty involves some feature of the 
world that impacts human reality in some way. Risk, in human terms, only 
exists when humans have a stake in outcomes” (Jaeger et al., 2001:17).
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Therefore, ‘ risk’ is defined as “a situation or event in which something of human 
value has been put at stake and where the outcome is uncertain” (Rosa, 1998:16).
Such a definition leads to three associated questions with regards to (a) the scope of 
negative effects, (b) the conceptualization of uncertainty, and (c) the rule of 
aggregation for practical purposes. The perspectives adopted in order to respond to 
these three questions of any risk debate differ greatly, indicating the conceptual 
diversity and complexity in addressing risk. The focus and key references of each 
perspective are summarised in Appendix-A1.
A critical investigation of the various perspectives within the risk discipline indicates 
that despite the straightforwardness of technical and economic approaches, their 
narrowness is a virtue as much as it is a shortcoming (Merkhofer, 1984). Society is not 
only concerned with risk minimization (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982). Context 
matters, and therefore a broader scope of undesirable effects needs to be adopted.
According to Fischhoff (1994) the social sciences perspectives on risk can help to 
identify public concerns associated with a source of risk, and explain the context of 
risk-taking situations. In addition, they can assist towards identifying cultural 
meanings and associations linked with special risk arenas. Sociological approaches to 
risk can also contribute to the design of procedures or policies that incorporate 
cultural values within the decision-making processes. Furthermore, they can assist 
with the design of programmes for participation in decision-making, and the 
performance evaluation of risk management controls.
Yet, social perspectives of risk can lead to varying advice from social scientists, while 
they do not offer a common denominator for measuring cultural or social 
acceptability (Kasperson, 2005a). Hence, Renn (2008) suggests that different risk 
situations may require different theoretical frameworks for their analyses, while it is 
crucial to initiate a discourse among the major parties involved in the decision­
making process or affected by the decision outcomes. Participation is a requirement 
for rational decision-making in situations in which risks need to be evaluated 
(Jasanoff, 2004).
Thus, Renn (2008:45) stresses that a dual strategy is needed for risk management. 
The balancing of opportunities and hazards of modern technologies and other human 
activities “ requires a plural, yet integrated, attempt to have technical and social 
sciences join forces to shape a humane future in line with best available knowledge 
and a consensus on social expectations” .
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2.3.2. Systemic risks* and the broadening of risk management
The emergence of *systemic risks’
Beyond the social constructivism versus realism debate in the risk discipline, the 
changing scope and impact of contemporary risks has influenced the focus of the risk 
debate. The profound and rapid technological, economic and social changes that the 
modern world experiences today has lead to the emergence of a new concept of risks 
that have been labelled as ‘systemic risks' (OECD, 2003). They are characterised by 
high complexity, uncertainty, ambiguity, and ripple effects52. Due to these 
characteristics, systemic risks are overextending established risk management and 
creating new, unsolved challenges for policy making in risk management (Klinke and 
Renn, 2006). Their negative effects are often pervasive, impacting fields beyond the 
obvious primary areas of harm. Therefore, “ investigating systemic risks goes beyond 
the usual analysis of causes and consequences, and focuses instead on the 
interdependencies and spillovers between various clusters” (Renn and Klinke, 
2004:41).
As such, systemic risks require that risk analysis and management become 
increasingly important fields to identify new, as yet unknown, risks and to devise 
methods for dealing with them efficiently. Data from different risk sources needs to 
be integrated within one analytical perspective, while a holistic approach must be 
taken with regards to hazard identification, risk assessment, concern assessment, 
tolerability/acceptability judgements and risk management. To handle systemic risks 
interdisciplinary and holistic mechanisms in governance across boundaries are 
required (Klinke and Renn, 2006; IRGC, 2007).
52 The four major properties of systemic risks are defined by Klinke and Renn (2006) as 
follows: (a) Complexity refers to the difficulty of identifying and quantifying causal links 
between a multitude of potential candidates and specific adverse effects, (b) Uncertainty 
reduces the strength of confidence in the estimated cause and effect chain, (c) Ambiguity 
denotes the variability of (legitimate) interpretations based on identical observations or data 
assessments. High complexity and uncertainty favour the emergence of ambiguity, but there 
are also quite a few simple and almost certain risks that can cause controversy and thus 
ambiguity, (d) Ripple Effects indicate the secondary and tertiary consequences regarding 
time and space.
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A broader perspective to risk management
In order to address these emerging systemic risks, scholars have stressed the need for 
risk managers not only to conduct risk evaluations based on systematic and 
experiential knowledge, but also act in situations of ‘non-knowledge’ or insufficient 
knowledge about potential outcomes of human actions or activities.
Therefore, across the various steps of a hazard/risk chain, risk management 
interventions can occur both preventatively and reactively (i.e. Fig. 2.1). In addition, 
risk management refers not only to the implementation of precautionary controls, 
but also to the evaluation and establishment of proactive structures of risk 
preparedness, resilience and robustness.
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Figure 2.1: Seven steps of a hazard/risk chain: the example of nuclear energy 
(Source: adapted from Renn, 2008:7).
By recognizing this broader scope of risk management and the need for collaboration 
and coordinated efforts across a range of stakeholders, over the past decade the 
term ‘governance’ has experienced increasing popularity in the field of risk research.
(Risk governance’ includes, but also extends beyond, the three conventionally
recognized elements of risk handling, namely risk assessment, management and 
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communication. It requires consideration of the legal, institutional, social and 
economic contexts in which a risk is evaluated, and involvement of the actors and 
stakeholders who present them.
Risk governance is of particular importance in, but not restricted to, situations where 
there is no single authority to take a binding risk management decision. In addition, 
it  not only includes a multifaceted, multi-actor risk process but also calls for the 
consideration of contextual factors such as institutional arrangements and political 
culture, including different perceptions of risk. Thus, a risk governance framework 
should also include concern assessment and explicit discussion of stakeholder 
participation (Renn, 2008). It should apply “ the principles of good governance that 
include transparency, effectiveness and efficiency, accountability, strategic focus, 
sustainability, equity and fairness” (IRGC, 2007).
Therefore, the findings from the above review of risk theories (i.e. Appendix-A1) and 
the acknowledgement of the emerging systemic risks across areas of human activity 
encourage an inclusive model of risk governance53; a model that adopts a process- 
based approach to risk and considers both its physical and social dimensions (Renn,
2008).
2.3.3. Managing uncertainty: introducing contextualised risk governance 
Risk governance - a process of interlinked phases
Supporting the utilization of an inclusive governance model, the International Risk 
Governance Council (IRGC) has suggested a framework that is in line with 
professional codices and risk governance legislation. This framework consists of four 
cyclical, iterative and interlinked consecutive phases, namely pre-assessment, 
appraisal, characterization/evaluation, and management. Risk communication is a 
process accompanying all these phases (Fig. 2.2).
53 References relevant to the various models of risk governance include: Benz and Everlein, 
1999; Lyall and Tait, 2004; Bunting et al., 2007; Millstone et al., 2004.
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Figure 2.2: The five  elements o f risk governance (Source: adapted from IRGC,
2007:8)
Further to the two major phases of any risk handling framework, namely those of risk 
appraisal and risk management54, the framework suggested by the IRGC (2005) also 
introduces the phases of risk pre-assessment and characterization /  evaluation 55 The 
objective of such a design is to avoid the naive separation of facts here and values 
there, while also escaping “the solipsism of post-modern relativity by honouring the 
analytical distinctions between the factual world and the world of values even if they 
clearly in teract” (Renn, 2008:48).
The accomplishment is to move towards a more contextualised and holistic 
appreciation of risk governance processes and efforts, stressing the need to gain a 
thorough understanding of a risk and to develop options for dealing with it.
54 ‘Risk appraisal’ refers to the generation and collection of knowledge about a risk, while 
‘risk management’ refers to the decision-making about how to mitigate, control and 
otherwise manage a risk.
55 According to the IRGC (2005), ‘pre-assessment’ aims to capture both the variety of issues 
that stakeholders and society may associate with a certain risk as well as existing indicators, 
routines, and conventions that may prematurely narrow down what is going to be addressed 
as risk. ‘Characterisation/evaluation’ aims to judge a risk’s acceptability and/or tolerability.
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Risk communication, participation ft stakeholder involvement
The ‘risk communication’ element of the risk governance process is one that has 
received considerable attention over the last decade. In fact, it is a topic much 
broader than implied by the risk governance process.
The field of risk communication initially developed as a means of investigating how 
expert assessments could be best communicated to the public, thereby bridging the 
tension between expert judgements and public perceptions. In the course of time, 
this original objective has been modified and, some would argue, even reversed 
(Plough and Krimsky, 1987).
In more recent practices the objective of policy makers and risk experts is for risk 
communication to reflect the nature of the risks under consideration, their context 
and whether they arouse societal concern (Renn, 2008).
With relation to understanding the context of risk communication, Renn (2001) has 
identified three levels that must be addressed during a risk debate, namely (a) 
factual evidence and probabilities, (b) institutional performance, expertise and 
experience, and (c) conflicts about world views and value systems.
In turn, these three levels of risk correspond to the nature of the risk under question 
(Renn, 2007b). Utilizing the risk characterization model summarized in Appendix-A2, 
each type of risk - namely simple, complex, uncertain and ambiguous - maps onto a 
different risk level debate, thus requiring a different communication strategy.
In addition to identifying the objectives and associated strategies of risk 
communication, researchers56 have offered a number of recommendations with 
regards to effectively communicating risk.
Moreover, researchers57 have stressed the significance of evaluating risk 
communication efforts, referring to the need to scientifically assess the content, 
process and effects of an intervention according to defined criteria.
Finally, as the criticality of risk communication to the improvement of risk 
governance and the need for a mutual learning process have been established (Leiss, 
1996), the importance of having stakeholders and public groups participate 
throughout the risk-handling process has been underlined.
56 I.e. Breakwell, 2007; Renn, 2008; Lofstedt, 2005.
57 I.e. Kasperson and Palmlund, 1989; Rohrmann, 1992; OECD, 2002.
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However, risk participation and stakeholder involvement do not imply the inclusion 
of all public actors in all risk controversies. This would be inefficient and a waste of 
time and money (Renn, 2008, Lofstedt, 2003). The involvement process should be in 
proportion to the degree of public demand and conflict intensity. This will directly 
determine the potential benefits resulting from stakeholder and public involvement.
Therefore, the four classes of risk problems presented earlier - namely simple/linear, 
complex, uncertain, and ambiguous - support generic suggestions for participation. 
These have been summarised by (Renn, 2004b) and IRGC (2005) as in Appendix-A2.
Finally, researchers suggest that regardless of the type of risk problem and 
associated type of discourse and remedy, the design of participatory procedures, at 
any phase and at any level of intensity, should display the following features: 
transparency, competence, fairness, efficiency, clear mandate, diversity, and 
professionalism58.
2.3.4. Managing the unexpected: hazards, accidents and errors
As examined in the paragraphs above, it has been suggested59 that risk management 
strategies should vary according to the type of risk a group or organization is dealing 
with. Therefore, interventions to a hazard/risk chain can occur either/both 
preventatively and/or reactively (Fig. 2.1).
While simple risks can be routinely managed and assume that the risk management 
structures are in place to prevent a risk or successfully contain its impact, in the case 
of complex and uncertain risks matters are more complicated. They require 
organizational mechanisms that support information gathering, learning, and risk 
absorption to support either robustness or resilience.
Management of complex and uncertain risks implies management of the unexpected, 
of errors and accidents. It is, therefore, understandable that a considerable body of 
research has focused on the effective management of errors and accidents, an 
unavoidable part of organizational life. Therefore, the notion of risk management 
within an organizational context expands to cover also the notion of ‘safety 
management’ .
58 I.e. Webler, 1995, 1999; Goldschmidt and Renn, 2006; Renn, 2004b, 2008.
59 I.e. Renn, 2008, IRGC, 2005. Also see Appendix-A2.
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“Organizational encounters with risk and error are [...] a routine and 
systematic part of daily organizational life that only occasionally becomes 
visible to outsiders. [...] Unanticipated events that deviate from organizational 
expectations are so typical that they are ‘routine non-conformity’ - a regular 
by-product of the characteristics of the system itself. [...] Complex 
organizations that use or produce risky technologies may have encounters 
with risk daily” (Vaughan, 2005:33).
Yet, research has indicated that accidents have a history of early-warning signs that 
were either misinterpreted or ignored60. Every anomaly has a trajectory, during 
which it is subject to processes of definition, negotiation, and control. How 
anomalies are defined depends upon the occupational context and evaluation 
systems that have been developed to meet unexpected deviation in the work flow. A 
mistake or an anomaly is never defined in isolation, but is always relative to the local 
and institutional context of work61.
Identifying, making sense of, and controlling an incident or accident62 implies an 
organizational ability to synthesize and share incident information effectively, thus 
learning from it. However, it is not uncommon that incidents are only visible with the 
benefit of hindsight that comes from an accident63. This has raised debates with 
regards to the extent that an effective incident management system can prevent all 
accidents and disasters.
In studying risk of complex technologies and organizational structures, there have 
been two disparate theoretical approaches, namely the theory of normal accidents 
and the theory of high reliability:
The foundations of the Normal Accident Theory were laid by Perrow (1984) and 
further consolidated by the work of Sagan (1993). It asserts that accidents are a 
normal consequence of interactive complexity and close coupling of an 
organizational system.
60 I.e. Turner, 1978; Turner and Pidgeon, 1997.
61 I.e. Star and Gerson, 1987; Vaughan, 2005.
62 An ‘incident’ is defined as an unexpected or unwanted change from normal system 
behaviour which causes or has the potential to cause a loss. An ‘accident’ is an incident in 
which a non-trivial loss occurs, while a ‘disaster’ is a very serious incident involving loss of 
life and/or extensive property damage (Cooke and Rohleder, 2006).
63 I.e. Cooke and Rohleder, 2006; Vaughan, 2005.
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The measure of ‘ interactive complexity’ is the number of ways in which components 
of the system can interact. It represents the number of variables in the system, the 
number of relationships between the variables and the number of feedback loops 
through which the variables interact. Typically, interactive complexity increases with 
the technology incorporated into the system.
Respectively, ‘c/ose coupling’ is measured by the speed at which a change in one 
variable cascades through the system to cause changes in other system variables. 
Close coupling represents tightness in the process, which is influenced by such things 
such as component redundancy, resource buffers/slack, and process flexibility.
The idea behind the Normal Accident Theory is that some of the system responses to 
change are unforeseen, are causes of incidents, and can potentially lead to 
catastrophes.
On the other hand, proponents of the High Reliability Theory64 believe that while 
accidents may be normal, serious ones can be prevented by implementing certain 
organizational practices. In particular, Weick and Sutcliffe (2001) suggest that high- 
reliability organizations should implement business processes to instil ‘mindfulness’ 
qualities into the organization. These include preoccupation with failure, reluctance 
to simplify, sensitivity to operations, commitment to resilience, and deference to 
expertise. Meanwhile, Sagan (1993) supports that High Reliability Theory requires 
four essential elements to succeed: (a) high management priority on safety and 
reliability; (b) redundancy and backup for people and equipment; (c) decentralised 
organization with a strong culture and commitment to training; and (d) 
organizational learning through trial and error, supported by anticipation and 
simulation.
However, Sagan (1993), as a proponent of Normal Accident Theory, argues that the 
organizational learning required for the success of high-reliability theory will be 
restricted for several reasons, including the ambiguity about incident causation; the 
politicized environments in which incident investigation takes place; the human 
tendency to cover up mistakes; and the secrecy both within and between competing 
organizations.
64 I.e. La Porte and Consolini, 1991; Roberts and Bea, 2001; Weick and Sutcliffe, 2001 and
2007.
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Apart from the theoretical differences between the two approaches, there are also 
implications on the methodologies they use (Vaughan, 2005). Normal accident 
theorists study failure and emphasize that complex systems will inevitably fail. They 
tend to study incidents after the fact, concentrating on public failures with high 
costs. On the other hand, high reliability theorists study safe systems, emphasizing 
processes by linking them to successes. Rather than after-the-fact analysis, their 
research is done by locating themselves in an organization to interview and watch 
work practices and how risk is managed. Differences between the two approaches 
are quite significant. However, a number of more recent studies tend to blur the 
genres created by the dichotomy65.
Of particular research interest is the work conducted by Cooke and Rohleder (2006), 
who agree that it is not natural for organizations to learn from safety incidents. Even 
if ad hoc learning is occurring it is not enough. Instead they promote the 
implementation of an effective and formal incident learning system. The Theory of 
Incident Learning’ relies on the observation initially made by Turner (1978) that 
disasters have long incubation periods during which warning signals (or incidents) are 
not detected or are ignored. Thus, while the occurrence of incidents may be normal, 
an organization with an effective incident learning system can respond to these 
incidents to prevent serious accidents from occurring in the future. An organization 
implementing an effective and formal incident learning system may evolve into a 
high - re Li abi lity organization over time.
In addition to the incident learning system and process suggested by Cooke and 
Rohleder (2006), further research into organizational accident and error management 
indicates that errors and early warning signs remain not merely undetected, but 
often are misinterpreted66. The reason offered for this is the ‘normalization of 
deviance’ ; a social psychological product of institutional and organizational forces. 
“Anomalies are not interpreted as warning signs but become acceptable, routine and 
taken-for-granted aspects of daily work. The trajectory of anomalies as they were 
identified and their risk measured and assessed, shows the importance of both the 
local organizational and institutional contexts of work” (Vaughan, 2005:34).
65 I.e. Carroll and Perin, 1995; Weick, 1990; Roberts and Libuser, 1993; La Porte, 1994; 
Clarke, 1992 and 1993; Vaughan, 1996, 1999, 2002 and 2005; Schulman, 1993a; and Marcus, 
1995.
66 I.e. Vaughan, 1996; 1999; 2002; 2005.
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It is, thus, concluded that learning from a disaster emerges as a complex, ambiguous 
process that is conditioned by culture and organizational and/or institutional context 
(Jasanoff, 2005). It is not easily forced into univocal, totalizing causal narratives, 
since perceptions vary and the boundary between factual and moral causes (i.e. 
responsibility versus blame) are dynamic. Whether an organization adopts a 
compliance or deterrence strategy, errors are a part of organizational life and 
learning from incidents is a continuous process, which needs to be effectively 
sustained.
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2.4 Megaproject and event management: managing the unknown
Following a review of research conducted in both the ISS and broader risk disciplines, 
one common theme appears to dominate - the significance of context. Whether 
‘context’ is perceived as the organizational, institutional, socio-economic or/and 
cultural environment within which certain ISS or risk management activities take 
place, it is undoubtedly a determining factor in terms of how risks are identified, 
made sense of, and controlled.
In the case of this study, the organizational context - namely that of a major event - 
is a significant component of the research question. As presented in section 1.2, the 
researcher aims to understand ISS risk management needs and practices in a major 
event context, interpreting the organizational capacity to deliver highly reliable IS 
operations.
Thus, apart from investigating the research work conducted in the ISS and risk 
disciplines, it  is also important to consider the significant work conducted in the 
mega project/event fields. This will demonstrate the characteristics and challenges 
of such contexts, and will shed some light on the potential implications that a major 
event context can have on efforts to produce reliable ISS operations.
2.4.1. Megaproiects and events in demand - a ‘performance paradox’
Mega infrastructure projects of every kind have been labelled as “a new political and 
physical animal” (Flyvbjerg et al, 2003:1), forming part of ‘the Great War of 
Independence from Space’ , and resulting to a new mobility that is the most powerful 
and coveted stratifying factor in contemporary society (Bauman, 1998). Mega 
infrastructures aim to increase connectivity, whether that is physical, 
virtual/technological, or socio-cultural, giving rise to the new ‘politics of distance’ . 
Megaprojects are central to this, since infrastructure is increasingly built as 
megaprojects (Flyvbjerg et al, 2003).
In addition to such projects, there is an increasing demand for major events, a form 
of megaprojects, which aim to connect people at a specified time and place for a 
variety of purposes. Similar to projects, events touch virtually every life on the 
planet generating economic and socio-cultural value through the development and 
enhancement of business and personal relationships, facilitating fraternal and 
familial reunion, and increasing community pride and improving quality of life (IFEA:
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2005). Events are produced every day for all manner of purposes and attracting all 
sorts of people. There is, therefore, an increasing recognition that this is a 
significant line of business that carries great obligations and is becoming increasingly 
greater in scope and complexity (Silvers, 2008).
The physical and economic scale of today’s megaprojects and events are such that 
whole nations may be affected in both the medium and long term by the success or 
failure of just a single project. As Merrow (1998) suggests, the success of these 
projects is so important to their sponsors that firms and even governments can 
collapse when they fail.
However, a study by the Major Projects Association (1994) concludes that too many 
projects proceed that should not have done so, often with a significant cost-overrun 
calamity that extends beyond the public sector.
While many more and much larger projects and events are being proposed and 
implemented around the world, it is becoming clear that cost overruns and lower- 
than-predicted revenues frequently place project and event viability at risk, 
redefining them from effective vehicles to economic growth to possible obstacles to 
such growth67. The reasons behind this ‘megaproject performance paradox’ are 
multiple. Among others, researchers have identified a biased motivation to generate 
optimistic demand forecasts, to ‘cook’ project costs and benefits, and to use the 
alibi of economic growth. Megaproject and event development today is not a field of 
‘honest numbers’ (Williams, 1998). It is a field where one group of professionals and 
experts will call the work of another not only ‘biased’ and ‘seriously flawed’ but a 
‘grave embarrassment’ to the profession (Huszar, 1998). “Megaproject development 
is currently a field where little can be trusted, not even numbers produced by 
analysts” (Flyvbjerg et al, 2003:5).
In addition, Flyvbjerg et al. (2003) identify a lack of accountability in the project 
decision-making process, which aggravates matters. Project stakeholders do not 
always adequately represent publics, thereby highlighting the need to properly 
involve publics in the decision-making in carefully designed deliberative processes 
from the beginning and throughout large-scale projects68.
67 I.e. Morris and Hough, 1987; Flyvbjerg et al, 2003.
68 I.e. Ryan and Destefano, 2000; Weeks, 2000; Dryzek, 2000. 
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Furthermore, it  is often evident that “once the promotion process of a project/event 
is off to a successful start, it is hard to stop again [...] It takes outsider forces to stop 
this process” (Flyvbjerg et al.; 2003:39). As such, in megaproject development it is 
crucial that outside checks and balances are institutionalised to restrain and govern a 
process that otherwise tends to become an anarchic and self-serving means for rent- 
seeking by special interest groups (Khan & Jomo, 2000).
Similarly, “ in the majority of instances of cost changes in projects, the responsible 
authorities did not recalculate the project viability” (Flyvbjerg et al., 2003:42). A 
review of the World Bank’s project portfolio documented an increasing number of 
poorly performing projects, identifying as the main cause the over-optimistic 
estimates of project viability in the planning phases. There has been a widening gap 
between forecast and actual viability, resulting to the World Bank demanding not 
only far more accuracy in estimates of viability, but also more honesty that will be 
improved through accountability controls (World Bank, 1994).
In another report by the World Bank (1992) it was indicated that out of 92 projects, 
only a handful was found to contain ‘thoughtful’ risk analysis showing ‘good 
practice’ . Further studies have indicated that
“ the most consequential problem regarding risk analysis in megaproject 
feasibility study and decision making [...] is the neglect of relevant downside 
probabilities in the calculation of project viability [...] Threshold levels need 
to be established for costs, revenues, environmental impact and viability, 
namely levels that, if crossed, redefine the project as a new project that 
must be appraised and approved anew” (Flyvbjerg et al., 2003:80).
It is not uncommon that the riskiness of megaprojects is attenuated. This is 
particularly evident in the case of major events, where the emotional bias 
surrounding these often blinds stakeholders and the public from appreciating fully 
their riskiness.
“ ‘What could be risky about an event? Events are fun! [...] This is a typical 
attitude encountered all the time [...] People do not see anything that could 
go wrong. But when explained to what could go wrong, the most common 
response is an awestruck ‘ I had no idea!’ [...] Risk management is one of the 
most primary responsibilities of event organizers, yet so often ignored or 
misunderstood, particularly by inexperienced planners, because one cannot 
envision what one has not been exposed to - they do not know what they do 
not know” (Silvers, 2008:1).
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Therefore, a main instrument for reducing the costs of project and event risk is to 
prepare a risk management plan as part of a feasibility study by fully identifying the 
scope for risk management, and to communicate that it is much wider than what is 
normally appreciated. In addition, “ feasibility studies and risk analyses should be 
carried out together with considerations regarding the possible institutional, 
organizational and financial set-ups for the project. Especially so, as institutional 
change may be a prerequisite for risk reduction” (Flyvbjerg et al., 2003:85).
Finally, researchers identify a further reason for the ‘megaproject performance 
paradox’ , namely that of a lack of learning and project/event post-auditing 
capability. “The reason for the lack of learning is that projects and their impacts are 
rarely audited ex post, and without post-auditing learning is impossible” (Flyvbjerg 
et al., 2003:49). It is suggested that megaproject and event developments require 
close scrutiny in the years to come after their completion, in order to investigate 
accurately what their economic and other impact truly is. Moreover, Flyvbjerg et al 
(2003:55-57) suggest that “ it is remarkable how few studies have been carried out 
that compare predicted impacts with actual outcomes. [...] More comparative 
research is needed on predicted versus actual outcomes” . Wood et al. (2000) concur 
with this view and support that with regards to impact assessments, monitoring and 
auditing, it is critical that an institutional framework is developed. “The objective 
should be [...]to define appropriate project goals and then set up the organization 
that can effectively adapt and audit the project to achieve the goals in an ongoing 
process from project design through construction to implementation” (Flyvbjerg et 
al., 2003:57-58). In fact, a few are those who advocate in favour of a set of 
legislations, standards and best practices that will help project and event 
professionals manage exposure to the possibility of loss, damages etc (Silvers, 2008; 
Flyvbjerg et al., 2003).
Given the focus of this research, namely ISS risk management practices within a 
major event context, the researcher continues by examining the objectives of event 
management, the associated processes, functions and challenges.
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2.4.2. Project and event management
Major events: definition and literature
Events, namely the gathering of people at a specified time and place for a variety of 
purposes, include a broad range of genres69. Yet, it is the purpose of the event that 
will dictate the decisions about what will be included in the event and the definition 
of success for the event (Frame, 2003).
Although ‘major events’ do not have an official and clear definition, certain universal 
characteristics can be identified. According to Hiller (2003) such an event is of short, 
fixed term and high-profile, with a significant impact primarily on the local but also 
global community. Debates about such events span from the pre-event to post-event 
usage of resources and impacts on the various stakeholders, while they are often 
promoted and considered as instruments of boosterist ideologies and economic 
growth.
Due to the legacy that a major event will create within a particular context - 
whether that is on an infrastructural, economic, resources/skills, or socio-cultural 
level- it involves considerable political decision-making with national or international 
governing bodies which get directly or indirectly involved.
Finally, a major event is commonly not an annual event, but one that is unique in 
nature, related to the specific location(s) and time that it is hosted. It is, thus, very 
particular to its context.
Therefore, similar to megaprojects, major events are great in scope, with a global 
impact and exposure, and set within an inter-disciplinary, diverse organizational, 
cultural and socioeconomic context. They require a significantly long process to 
prepare, a significant amount of resources, their operations need to be reliable and 
sustainable, and the associated costs and benefits are realized by a number of very 
diverse stakeholders.
Nonetheless, major events have certain characteristics different to those of other 
events and mega projects, which add to the importance of risk management (Hatton, 
2000). Some of these include: large crowds; use of volunteers and inadequately 
trained staff; untried venues and sites; quick decisions and inadequate time, 
particularly as the event gets closer; complex and specialist activity; thrills and
69 I.e. Silvers, 2008:8.
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spills; a need for good community relations; untried communications; new event 
companies; and little ‘continuing work’ control over subcontractors and suppliers.
Three types of major events are identified, namely cultural (e.g. Expos), political 
(e.g. IMF/World Bank conferences), and sporting (e.g. Olympics) (COHRE, 2007). Such 
events are not merely experiences, but represent ambitious dreams, which involve 
awesome responsibilities, great expectations, benefits and risks. Major events cannot 
fail. There is too much at stake70.
Thereby, as major events are increasingly frequent in a globalised world, one would 
expect that there must be a significant body of literature with regards to the 
successful preparation and delivery of major events. However literature is very 
limited, focusing only on three areas, namely the facilities and event management 
aspects71; the sociological, political and cultural aspects and impacts of a major 
event72; and to a lesser extent, the operational strategies of major events73. There is 
extremely limited research and reference to the telecommunications and IT 
infrastructure of major events, none of which truly considers this critical component 
of a major event both in its scope and context74.
As for the Olympic context, which is under investigation in this study, research also 
remains limited focusing more on the high-level organizational structure behind such 
events, the marketing opportunities, and the socioeconomic impacts on the hosting 
city75. The technological aspects of such a major event, or any other such event for 
that matter, have been only briefly and superficially considered by journalists before 
each event. The technology that supports - in fact makes or breaks a major event - 
has only been treated as a news item, not a research one.
70 I.e. Silvers, 2008; Hatton, 2000.
71 Event literature on facilities and event management aspects covers topics of design and 
construction, marketing, crowd and audience management, physical security and safety, 
funding, and operations management (i.e. Westerbeek et al, 2005; Berlonghi, 1995; Stedman 
et al., 2001; Tarlow, 2002).
72 I.e. Roche M, 2000; Horne and Manzenreiter, 2006.
73 Literature on major event operational strategies cover topics of finance, ticketing, 
transport, venues, communications, equipment and personnel (i.e. Masterman, 2004 and
2009).
74 I.e. Stavroulakis, 2002; Cheng, 2008.
75 I.e. Theodoraki, 2007; Chappelet and Bayle, 2004; Masterman, 2009.
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Therefore in conducting this research, in depth knowledge about the challenging 
preparation and successful delivery of major events can only be retrieved from a 
much wider body of research related to event management.
Event management - EMBOK
‘Event management’ is the process by which an event is planned, prepared, and 
produced. According to Silvers (2008), as event projects are becoming increasingly 
woven into the various aspects of our lives, the level of expected professionalism 
from event managers has increased significantly, while penalties for not meeting 
event expectations and requirements will increase in frequency and severity. 
However, there is no single source or organization collecting event data. In addition, 
the event industry is both horizontal and vertical. “ It is unfortunate that the entire 
events industry has yet to come together, recognize its commonality and combined 
economic influence, and conduct the necessary research necessary to quantify the 
actual number of events and their true event spends” (Silvers, 2008:11). Event 
professionals and stakeholders urgently need better tools to ensure the safe and 
successful delivery of (major) events, including methodologies, best practices and an 
expanding body of ongoing and systematic research and literature.
Given the great similarities between project and event management, perhaps the 
most holistic approach to event management that indeed applies principles of 
project management, is that of EMBOK (Event Management Body of Knowledge)76.
EMBOK takes a process view of event management (i.e. Fig.2.3), supporting a 
sequential and iterative system that promotes a dynamic approach to the changing 
nature of events and the risks that emerge. The stages to this process are defined 
below in Table 2.1.
76 I.e. Silvers, 2003, 2008; Silvers et al, 2006. 
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Identify
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Analyze
Figure 2.3: The process system of the EMBOK model (Source: Silvers, 2008:12).
Table 2.1: Stages and definitions to the EMBOK event management process
EMBOK Event Management 
Process Stages Definition
1 Assessment A two-step process of ‘ identification’ and then ‘analysis’ .
2 Selection The stage where the methods/tactics that w ill achieve the goal and objectives are chosen.
3 Monitoring
A process where the progress of the selected tactics is 
tracked, including the performance of risk control actions. 
The assessment and selection processes are reiterated as 
needed.
4 Documentation
The recording, reporting, maintaining and archiving of 
project records and documentation, thus providing valuable 
data and evidence which lead to a robust management 
process.
5 Communication The timely information acquisition and distribution, plus the appropriate consultation in decision making.
In addition, similar to any other project, event management has five phases (i.e. Fig. 
2.4), namely initiation, planning, implementation, the event, and closure (i.e. PMI, 
2000).
These “ phases are sequential, highlighting the criticality of time in any event 
project as it gathers momentum toward the event itself. The progression is 
also cyclical, with the results of the evaluation phase contributing to the 
research phase of the next event. [...] Effective event management relies on 
engagement at each juncture of this continuum throughout the life of the 
event project” (Silvers, 2008:13-14).
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Figure 2.4: The five stages of a project and/or event (Source: adapted from Silvers, 
2008:13).
Perhaps, however, the most important aspect of EMBOK is that it recognizes the 
importance of risk management throughout the above event management process 
and stages, and it  includes ‘ risk’ as a domain equal to other typical domains of event 
management (i.e. Table 2.2). The proponents of the EMBOK model stress that it is 
“ of prime importance to illustrate the full scope of the responsibilities and therefore 
risk management obligations, assigned to event organizers” (Silvers, 2008:12).
EMBOK identifies five functional domains to event management, each of which has 
specific characteristics and is affected by and subject to different objectives, 
procedures, constraints, and standards during the different phases and processes. 
These are summarized in Table 2.2 below.
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Table 2.2: EMBOK functional domains of event management (adapted from Silvers, 
2003).
«V|%
V / . Event Management Knowledge Domains
Administration Design Marketing Operations Risk
Fu
nc
tio
na
l 
Un
its
Financial Content Marketing Plan Attendees Compliance
Human resources Theme Materials Communications Decisions
Information Program Merchandise Infrastructure Emergency
Procurement Environment Promotion Logistics Health & Safety
Stakeholders Production Public Relations Participants Insurance
Systems Entertainment Sales Site Legal
Time Catering Sponsorship Technical Security
The ‘classes’ of each domain - which can vary in priority from one event to the next - 
can be further subdivided into ‘elements’ . For example, the human resources class 
can be subdivided into volunteers, motivation, and leadership.
The purpose and value of such a taxonomy is to indicate the multiple event 
management areas, all of which have a varying significance in the successful 
preparation and delivery of an event. Each domain will require a diverse set of skills 
and resources and will have to deal with a set of associated challenges, resource 
constraints and risks.
In addition, the above taxonomy can be useful in conducting ongoing analyses with 
regards to the functions of each domain (a) across the various event project stages 
(i.e. Fig. 2.4) and (b) for each event management process phase (i.e. Fig.2.3). Such 
analyses can help identify objectives, tactics, required resources, constraints and 
interdependencies, hence improving event risk understanding, mapping and 
management.
According to the EMBOK proponents77 this model can be valuable in several ways. 
Firstly, it can illustrate the complexity of the profession while providing conceptual 
clarity and reducing the likelihood of overlooking or discounting factors that may 
have a significant impact on the ability to manage risks associated with an event 
project. Furthermore, the EMBOK framework stresses that the risk management
77 I.e. Silvers, 2003, 2008; Silvers et al, 2006.
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process is a sequential and cyclical one, as well as an iterative one, since each and 
every aspect of an event has an impact on the whole event. Therefore, it  serves as 
the strategic framework for consistent and comprehensive risk management for 
events. Finally, the EMBOK framework will facilitate effective competency and 
conformity assessments, as well as knowledge transfer systems.
2.4.3. Risk management and communications in projects and events
Event management literature does not cover specifically the area under investigation 
in this study, namely the ISS or ISS risk management practices within a (major) event 
context.
However, it  is understood that from the 35 event functions identified in Table 2.2, 
there are several that directly or indirectly relate to ISS risk management practices, 
whether by defining the scope and/or context of such a function.
In addition, as indicated above, event management literature has considered the 
topic of risk management, its function and challenges.
Risk management at event projects
Starting with the issues directly related to risk management in event projects, it is 
important to understand the definition of ‘ risk’ within the event management 
discipline.
“ ‘Risk’ is any condition or occurrence that might affect the outcome of an 
event or event activity and might expose an event organization to loss 
measured in terms of probability and consequences. [...] An event itself is a 
speculative risk78; its production incurs liabilities yet has the potential for 
economic, political, and/or social rewards. One needs to look at the worst 
that can happen and the best that can happen in order to be prepared for 
anything in between” (Silvers, 2008:4).
Therefore, the definition of risk in events identifies that there is both an objective 
and more uncertain and ambiguous dimension to the perception of risk, stressing the
78 A ‘speculative risk’ is one where there is both a possibility of loss and a possibility of gain. 
This contrasts to the definition of an ‘absolute risk’ where there is only the possibility of loss 
(i.e. Silvers, 2008:4).
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need for preparedness, stakeholder involvement and context understanding 
(Berlonghi, 1990).
Understanding the dimensions of risk at events will have to identify (a) what is at 
risk, and (b) what are the risks.
“The relative severity of the risks will be different in different contexts and 
different event genres. [...] Inexperience, lack of expertise, and insufficient 
planning and resources have a significant impact on the level of risk 
associated with an event. This expands exponentially as the size and scope of 
the event increase” (Silvers, 2008:5-7).
Hence, the objectives of risk management in an event include the protection of 
event assets, the minimization of legal and financial liabilities, the control of 
potential loss, the proper management of growth, and the responsible and reliable 
operations. Risk management includes legal, ethical, and operational responsibilities, 
while the role of risk management is to prevent and reduce loss by “ making events as 
safe and secure as possible” (Berlonghi, 1990:4).
Risk management in an event is a process (i.e. Fig.2.5) that must be ongoing and 
dynamic
“because the risks surrounding the meetings and events are constantly 
emerging, growing, subsiding, changing, and fluctuating in terms of urgency 
and priority. The risk management process must also be proactive and 
cyclical, facilitating communication, forecasting, and forward planning” 
(Silvers, 2008:25).
Furthermore, Silvers (2008:33) stresses that aside from the activities of the event 
risk management process, event personnel and risk managers must appreciate that 
one does not ‘control’ what can or will happen at an event.
“ Event management, and consequently risk management, encompasses the 
initial and iterative planning and then it is all about change management. And 
there are always changes or incidents occurring at an event. [...] You have no 
control over changes happening, only your ability to react effectively to those 
changes. You must be proactive about the ability to be reactive” .
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Figure 2.5: The risk management process (Source: Silvers, 2008:25).
The effectiveness of change management relies upon the availability and 
quality/type of information, familiarity, good judgement, and being prepared, not 
paralysed. Gladwell (2005) suggests that in the throes of an event the efficacy of 
change and risk management decisions is determined by the depth and breadth of 
our experience and knowledge.
Control in events is about incorporating preventative measures and then focusing on 
preparedness. “The more you are aware of what could go wrong, the better prepared 
you can be to react and respond properly and effectively to an incident of 
occurrence” (Silvers, 2008:33).
In addition, Smith and Merritt (2002) suggest that effective risk communication 
should facilitate collaboration and the acquisition of proactive data that will help 
predict and prepare for risks, and getting risk messages before, not after, something 
has happened. They argue that communication procedures and methods should be 
embedded throughout the event project, to ensure the right information gets to and 
is received from the right people at the right time. Similarly, the risk manager needs 
to involve stakeholders from an early stage of the event project and support the 
creation of a teamwork environment that will become even more important as the 
event project goes into production.
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Integrating risk management with administrative event management activities
From the above it is made clear that risk management needs to be integrated into 
the event project lifecycle and techniques as early as possible, consisting a key part 
of all administrative activities and the event’s organizational structure.
“An event is a project, and the administrative functions such as time 
management, financial management, human resources management, 
procurement management, and the systems used to implement and integrate 
them, are typically included within the discipline of project management. 
The tools, techniques, terminology, processes, and procedures used by the 
project managers in many other industries serve the event organization 
equally well, particularly in the pursuit of effective administrative practices 
and risk management. [...] The integration of risk management throughout the 
organizational structure and project planning helps manage the scope of an 
event and its exposure to risk” (Silvers, 2008:157-158).
The scope and context of the administrative functions of an event project will also 
determine the nature and severity of associated risks. The challenges and risks of the 
administrative safeguards of an event are considered in more detail below.
Time management: Every event project has a limited time dimension into which all 
the tasks required to produce it must be scheduled. Being a limited and finite 
resource, time restrictions will determine the tempo of the event management 
processes, as well as define certain critical milestones and areas of risk79. Event and 
production schedules may be seen as time maps showing the scope and intensity of 
activity required in order to achieve objectives throughout the life-cycle of the event 
project (e.g. Fig.2.6).
Time management starts with the early stages of event project and activities scope 
definition, while Silvers (2008) suggests that when creating timelines it is vital to 
identify the various related activity-stakeholders, and to seek input especially from 
those responsible for delivering the various tasks. Event activities and tasks need to 
be identified in as much detail as possible, along with the associated dependencies 
and milestones. All these elements of a time plan need to be closely monitored, 
since milestones and deadlines often become the triggers and thresholds for risk
79 I.e. Silvers, 2008:158 and Kendrick (2003). 
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response actions. Therefore, it is understood that time management is closely 
related to activity and task management.
>
4->
>
Planning H Implementation ClosureInitiation Event
S tart Finish
Figure 2.6: Activity dimension of the event timeline (Source: Silvers, 2008:159).
In addition, time management is also related to resource management.
“Time is linear an irreplaceable; the only way to expand time is to 
compensate by adding other resources, in other words, do more, be more 
productive within the time given. However, as Lewis (1997) points out, 
effective resource allocation is contingent upon the skill levels, capabilities, 
capacities, and outputs of the particular people and suppliers” (Silvers, 
2008:160).
Kendrick (2003) further suggests that estimating the time it will take to complete 
tasks can be a significant challenge, since such kind of planning if often prone to 
optimism, over-confidence, lack of information, and scope creep. Yates (2003) calls 
this the ‘planning fallacy’ .
Financial management: Similar to other event resources, the budget needs to be 
planned and integrated into the project timeline. It needs to be monitored closely to 
ensure decisions minimize financial risk, maximize opportunities, and maintain the 
integrity of the event.
D E Afxentiadis (2010) PhD Thesis, London: LSE
However, and perhaps more importantly, in a time-finite event project costs increase 
the closer one gets to the event80, and last-minute changes can be expensive because 
there is little time or suppliers impetus for price negotiations. Therefore, spending 
upfront can prevent having to spend even more money at the back end.
As for risk management expenditure, Silvers (2008: 165) points that “ risk 
management activities are often viewed as an expense that can be reduced when 
budgets must be cut because they seemingly do not directly contribute to the event 
content, environment, or experience” .
Human resources management: Human resource management is viewed by many 
researchers and professionals as the most critical, as well as the most problematic.
“ It is the most critical because it is the people who convert the other factors 
into ‘real’ resources. [...] From a manager’s perspective, all the other kinds of 
resources become valuable only if the people in the organization use them 
effectively. [...] However, despite the critical importance of human resources, 
the recognition of and importance attached to it are much lower that one 
would expect” (Chelladurai and Madella, 2006: ix).
Similarly, the human resource risks in an event are commonly overlooked81.
Human resource management encompasses the formulation of the appropriate 
organizational structure, policies, and procedures for the recruitment, orientation, 
motivation, training, compensation, supervision, and discipline of employees, 
contracted workers, and volunteers.
Effective human resource management is key to building the organizational structure 
and culture that will serve the needs of both the event enterprise and the people 
within it. Getz (1997), however, warns that organizations that are less bureaucratic 
and formal and instead have a team-oriented structure - frequently the case of event 
organizations - although they may benefit from a certain level of camaraderie and 
efficiency, they can also subvert policy and control processes. This can be further 
aggravated by the often small and insular community of event workforce, leading to
80 I.e. Bowdin et al, 2006.
81 For more information on common event human resources management risks see Silvers 
(2008:167).
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cases of conflict and dispute which need to be timely and impartially managed, 
without disrupting the event operations.
A further important issue in event human resource management involves knowing 
who is hired and for what position. Hiring and induction may include background, 
criminal and credit checks for certain positions, in order not to compromise overall 
levels of competence, safety and security. According to Berlonghi (1990) walk-up and 
last-minute volunteers should not be allowed.
Finally, inexperience is cited as one of the biggest risks in events management. This 
can be overcome by training, mentoring and practice within the event context, that 
will eventually lead to experience82.
Procurement management: According to Monks (1996) good procurement 
management will facilitate risk management by determining the risks associated with 
the individual vendors or suppliers and the business interaction with them. Third 
parties need to be carefully selected and contracted, possibly with the help of 
product specialists, the product users, and those administering the contracts and 
payment functions.
It is vital that the procuring organization has properly determined the need and 
scope of contracted goods and services. Meanwhile it also needs to understand which 
of the goods and services are critical to the event, in order to ensure quality control 
and that contingency plans are in place83.
Systems management: Finally, and more pertinent to this research, event 
management literature identifies ‘systems management’ as one of the key 
administrative safeguards to event risks. Under the event management perspective, 
systems management involves the implementation and coordination of the various 
event systems using suitable technology to integrate the needs of the event project 
and enterprise.
According to Silvers (2003, 2008) in order for event systems to meet their 
administrative and operational efficiency and effectiveness potential, users must be 
able to recognize the impact of their actions (or inactions) on those systems. Event
82 I.e. Chelladurai and Madella, 2006; Silvers, 2008; Berlonghi, 1990.
83 For more information on common event procurement risks see Silvers (2008:174).
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organizations need to embrace that event systems need to be continually improved 
in order to achieve increasing safety, security and sustainability. Weaknesses in the 
implementation of a system are a risk, and steps must be taken to either improve 
training in the use of the system or improve the system itself.
One of the critical areas in which development of a system will facilitate effective 
event risk management is decision making. A system will provide its users with the 
tools and information to make a good decision at the right time - this is particularly 
important in times of crisis. However, event management literature also identifies 
that decision-making systems need to exist within a greater policies and procedures 
framework, which defines roles and responsibilities, chain of command, and allows 
users to share their experience and expertise with the right authority. The 
implemented systems need to reflect this greater organizational structure and 
mission, and must be incorporated into a greater security system that includes the 
physical, behavioural and procedural loss prevention tactics (Silvers, 2008).
In addition to managing the administrative safeguards of an event, the event risk 
professionals need to be involved as early as possible with a number of other 
operational, risk and marketing event activities, and monitor the performance of 
associated risk controls. Some of these functional areas include: event loss 
prevention and security84, preparedness and emergency management85, 
communications management, including also information and stakeholder 
management86, marketing and public relations management87, and site security and 
attendee access management88.
84 I.e. Silvers, 2008; Berlonghi, 1990; Broder, 2000; Smith and Merritt, 2002.
85 I.e. Silvers, 2008; Crown, 2005; Regester and Larkin, 2008; Au et al., 1993.
86 I.e. Silvers, 2003 and 2008; Silvers et al., 2006; Alexander, 2002; Kennedy, 2006; Berlonghi, 
1996; Chelladurai and Madella, 2006; O’Toole, 2006.
87 I.e. Silvers, 2008; Kotler et al, 1996; Regester and Larkin, 2008; Glaesser, 2006.
88 I.e. Silvers, 2008; Garber, 2004.
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2.5 Conclusion: moving towards a cross-disciplinary research
The literature review for the purposes of this study was a process carried out 
throughout the various research phases. It informed the study’s focus with regards to 
the research problem (i.e. Chapters 2 and 3); its directions with regards to the 
underlying theoretical and methodological assumptions (i.e. Chapters 3 and 4); and 
the insights and conclusions with regards to its findings (i.e. Chapters 4 and 5).
The research initiated with an interest in organizational ISS management practices in 
environments with great levels of operational uncertainty, as well as great demands 
for operational reliability and information integrity. Hence, the research initiated 
and continued with a parallel investigation of two themes: (a) the practices of ISS 
management and (b) organizational theories examining issues of operational 
reliability, organizational uncertainty, as well as the management of hazards and 
accidents.
With regards to ISS management practices, the literature presented above indicated 
the emergence of a more recent discipline within ISS - that of risk management, 
primarily in order for ISS practitioners to improve the prioritization and justification 
of ISS management decisions and controls. However, research also demonstrated a 
lack of maturity of this field.
The parallel investigation of themes related to organizational risk/hazard 
management and operational reliability, indicated a greater risk field to the one 
explored in ISS, suggesting the benefits of a cross-disciplinary research.
The study of the approaches to risk and the organizational theories that focus on 
managing this and delivering operational reliability pointed to a number of critical 
parameters to the individual and organizational experience of risk.
Firstly, the risk literature review verified the increasingly appreciated significance of 
the human dimension/behaviour with regards to experiencing and encountering risk. 
Despite the real - i.e. physical impact - dimension of risk, it has been demonstrated 
that risk is also greatly subjective in terms of its perception, and hence associated 
communication focus. Therefore, issues of human psychology, cultural and 
organizational context have been underlined.
In addition, the need for more communicative, participatory and inclusive 
approaches to dealing with risk has been highlighted89. Moreover, as the multi­
89 I.e. Renn, 2008; Morgan et al, 1992; Breakwell, 2007. 
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dimensional nature of risk has been put forward, the need for holistic and integrative 
theoretical and methodological frameworks has been proposed90.
Finally, the above literature review has indicated the dynamic and changing nature 
of risk, which implies the need for an ongoing, repetitive risk management process, 
which supports learning and gradual optimization in order to deal not only with the 
complex and uncertain, but also the ambiguous and unexpected91.
Further to the review of literature in the fields of ISS and risk/hazard management, 
an investigation was conducted into the characteristics and risk management 
challenges of the organizational environment under study, namely that of a major 
event organization. Such environments demonstrate high operational uncertainty as 
well as high demands for operational reliability. In fact, the literature review 
revealed that this was not only an organizational context inadequately explored - 
especially so in terms of IS and ISS management practices - but also one that 
demonstrated poor past performance and an increasing demand for investigation and 
performance improvement.
The research focus was thus made concrete. If the organizational management of risk 
and the delivery of operational reliability are as complex as implied by the extensive 
associated literature, then what are the risk management practices and challenges 
faced by a major-event organization - which is inherently risky and with high stakes - 
in relation to ISS?
The literature review not only provided a greater focus to this research, but also 
pointed to the directions taken and assumptions made in order to answer the 
research question. These will be further explored in Chapter 3 of this study. In 
summary, however, the literature review established that in order to answer the 
research question, a cross-disciplinary approach was required. This should aim to 
understand in depth92 major event organizations, their scope, context, and the ways 
in which ISS risks are perceived, managed and communicated in order to deliver 
highly reliable operations. The multiple dimensions and dynamic nature of an 
organization’s risk experience were appreciated and incorporated into the study’s 
explorative framework of analysis.
90 I.e. Klinke and Renn, 2004, 2006.
91 I.e. Vaughan, 2005; Cooke and Rohleder, 2006; Hutter and Power, 2005b.
92 Hence opting for an interpretive case-study approach.
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3. Research Methodology and Conceptual Framework
3.1 Introduction
The previous chapter of this study reviewed the various schools of thought across 
three disciplines - namely Information Systems Security (ISS), risk and hazard 
management, and event (risk) management - and identified the potential benefits of 
a cross-disciplinary research, with the ‘notion’ of risk as the common denominator.
The above literature review indicated an overall orientation across the three 
disciplines towards the ‘softer’ , human/behavioural aspects of the risk experience, 
underlining the significance of parameters such as the organizational/structural, 
technological and cultural context, the criticality of communications and inclusive, 
integrative frameworks of risk analysis.
It was noted earlier that with the growing appreciation of the multiple and dynamic 
dimensions to risk involved in the management of ISS, reliable organizational 
operations, and event management, there has been a recognition of the need to 
understand practices and challenges across the three disciplines, while investigating 
the associated processes of change.
The researcher agrees with a number of scholars across the three disciplines93, who 
have stressed that with regards to perceiving, managing and communicating risk 
there is a need to investigate human and social reality within its particular 
contextual/organizational settings. Therefore, this research is supporting the 
identified need to increase the use of interpretive approaches for the analysis of 
organizational risk experiences, with a particular focus on the implications of 
context.
Yet, such a research orientation implies a number of underlying ontological and 
epistemological assumptions with regards to the topic of risk, as well as having 
implications on the research framework of analysis and methodology.
The purpose of this chapter is to consider the assumptions underlying the research’s 
theoretical perspective, as well as examine any conceptual and methodological 
implications. This chapter is, thus, organized into the following sections. Section 3.2 
focuses on the ontological and epistemological beliefs shaping this research, as well
93 E.g. Pattinson and Anderson, 2005, 2006a, 2007; Dhillon, 2007; Renn, 2008; Berlonghi,
1990; Silvers, 2008.
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as the implications associated with the study’s theoretical perspective and 
methodology. Section 3.3 continues with a presentation of the research argument, 
the conceptual framework for conducting the argument, and the associated 
methodology. The research design is covered in Section 3.4, while Section 3.5 draws 
out the conclusions and contributions of this chapter.
3.2 Research assumptions and implications
3.2.1. Ontological and epistemological assumptions
The conceptual framework that informs the research across its various stages, as well 
as the methodology used for collecting and making sense of research data, is based 
upon fundamental assumptions with regards to the research’s ontology, epistemology 
and human nature. Burrell and Morgan (1979:3) have summarised this as indicated in 
Figure 3.1 below.
Subjectivist approach Objectivist approach
to social sciences to social sciences
ontology
epistemology
human nature
methodology
Nominalism
Anti-positivism
Voluntarism
Ideographic
Realism
Positivism
Determinism
Nomothetic
Figure 3.1: Scheme for analysing assumptions about the nature of social sciences 
(Source: adapted from Burrell and Morgan, 1979:3).
As Crotty (2003:10) suggests “ontological and epistemological issues tend to emerge 
together” . The two sit alongside each other and inform the theoretical perspective 
(i.e.Fig.3.2), “ for each theoretical perspective embodies a certain way of 
understanding what is (ontology) as well as a certain way of understanding what it 
means to know (epistemology)” .
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Ontology Epistemology
Theoretical
Perspective
Methodology
Methods
Figure 3.2: The five elements that inform a research and its approach (Source: 
adapted from Crotty, 2003:4).
Given that the central concept under investigation is that of ‘ risk’ , and the research 
focuses on the risk meanings/perceptions, behaviours and controls associated with 
delivering reliable ISS operations, the researcher considers necessary to examine the 
ontology and epistemology of ‘ risk’ . This is key to the definition of the research’s 
underlying assumptions and frameworks of analysis. The risk ontology and 
epistemology will define the scope of this risk investigation.
The scope of risk investigation - the ontology and epistemology of ‘risk'
Supporting the approach adopted by a number of risk scholars94, this study suggests 
that
“ risk is in part an objective threat of harm to people and in part a product of 
culture and social experience. Hence, hazardous events are ‘ real’ : they 
involve transformations of the physical environment or human health as a 
result of continuous or sudden releases of energy, matter, or information or 
involve perturbations in social and value structures” (Kasperson, 1992:154).
‘Risk’ involves a “ situation or an event where something of human value is at stake 
and where the outcome is uncertain” (Rosa, 2003:56). This definition comprises of 
three elements: (a) risk expresses some state of reality of human concern or interest;
94 E.g. Renn, 2008; Rosa, 1998, 2003; Kasperson, 1992. 
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(b) some outcome is possible; and (c) it  seems impossible to talk of risk in the 
absence of the notion of uncertainty.
Therefore, the proper scope of risk investigation is where there is a conjunction of 
uncertainty and human stakes (i.e. Fig.3.3).
NO
Human
stakes
YES
Figure 3.3: Risk defining dimensions (Source: Rosa, 2003:58).
By defining risk as an as an objective state of the world, the logical consequence is 
that
“ risk exists independent of our perceptions and our knowledge claims, 
subjective judgements, about what is at risk and how likely a risk will be 
realized. Furthermore, placing risk into an ontological category leaves open 
the question of our knowability of given risks: the question of the 
epistemology of risk. [...] It neither inherently defines away, nor contradicts, 
the variety of paradigms in the risk field [...] In effect it defines paradigmatic 
debates over risk as an issue in epistemology” (Rosa, 2003:60-61).
Therefore, the concept of ‘risk’ adopted is a synthetic one. As Rosa (2003:50) 
suggests it is misleading to view risk through the lens of either domain separately. 
The view of risk comprises both an ontological and an epistemological domain. “As an 
objective threat or harm to people, risk enjoys an ontological realism. As an element 
of the world subject to interpretation, filtered by social and cultural factors, risk 
enjoys an epistemological liability” .
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Uncertainty
YES NO
Indeterminacy
(quantum
mechanics)
4
............................
Determinism
(celestial
mechanics)
3 2
Risk Fate
! (decision (myth)
I science)
This position taken by Rosa (2003) is not, however, one of phenomenology and strong 
constructivism95, but one of hierarchical epistemology, which does not deny the 
fallibility of all knowledge claims, but denies that all knowledge claims are equally 
fallible. Hence, Rosa’s logic makes the ontology and epistemology of risk logically 
independent, but complements of one another. He has, thus, given this combination 
of ontological realism and hierarchical epistemology the acronym HERO (Hierarchical 
Epistemology and Realist Ontology). HERO admits to differences in the types, the 
quality, and the aptness of our knowledge.
Therefore, while the ontological approach to the study of risk is one of realism, the 
epistemological assumptions present characteristics of ‘hierarchical constructivism’ , 
where meaning is indeed constructed out of something (the object), yet not all 
knowledge claims are of equal validity.
“ Indeed, if all knowledge claims were equally fallible (or equally valid), we 
all would be living behind a veil of ignorance where there would be no 
knowledge at all. Instead, [...] knowledge claims, while always short of 
absolute truth, admit to degrees of approximation to what is true” (Rosa, 
2003:63).
Hence, coming back to Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) scheme for analysing assumptions 
about the nature of social sciences, the ontology of this study is one of realism. With 
regards to epistemology, on the other hand, the research leans towards an anti- 
positivist stance, proposing an orientation of constructivism - hierarchical 
constructivism.
At this point it is worth stressing further that a realist ontology does not contradict 
an epistemology of (hierarchical) constructivism. Realism has been often identified 
with objectivism, yet this position has been widely criticised96. As Crotty (2003:11) 
suggests, “ the existence of a world without a mind is conceivable. Meaning without a 
mind is not. Realism in ontology and constructionism (or constructivism) in 
epistemology turn out to be quite compatible” .
Therefore, the above assumptions and the reviewed literature both point towards the 
need to understand risk experience across various levels of analysis. The meanings 
assigned to risks by various actors require an in-depth empirical investigation, which
95 Such an approach would assume that all claims to knowledge about worlds are relative, and 
therefore one claim is generally as good as any other.
96 I.e. Guba and Lincoln, 1994; Merleau-Ponty, 1962; Heidegger, 1962; Crotty, 2003.
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does not necessarily aim to predict, but rather to describe and explain. Such an 
approach is particularly relevant in the case of subject matters such as the one under 
investigation, that still have a lot of maturing to do.
The above philosophical orientations have implications for the theoretical and 
methodological perspectives adopted in this study. These will be considered in the 
section below.
3.2.2. Implications on the study’s theoretical perspective and methodology
As suggested by Crotty’s (2003:4) model depicted in Figure 3.2, a researcher’s 
ontology and epistemology inform the choice of theoretical perspective and 
methodology. The theoretical perspective is defined as “ the philosophical stance 
informing the methodology and thus providing a context for the process and 
grounding its logic and criteria” , while the research methodology refers to “ the 
strategy, plan of action, process or design lying behind the choice and use of 
particular methods and linking the choice and use of methods to the desired 
outcomes” (Crotty, 2003:3).
According to Burrell and Morgan (1979) the above two elements of any research are 
also determined by assumptions with regards to human nature. This can be either 
deterministic, where people and their activities are regarded as completely 
determined by their situation, or voluntarist, where people are considered to be 
completely autonomous and free-willed. This research is inclined to neither of these 
two extremes, but rather regards human activities as a consequence of a complex 
interplay of situational and voluntary factors.
The above ‘risk’ definition and the research focus on organizational encounters with 
ISS risk in an environment of great uncertainty and high stakes, point towards the 
need for an in-depth understanding of the dynamic and ongoing processes involved in 
identifying and making sense of ISS risks, and organizing for reliable operations.
This research primarily aims to describe and explain the identified organizational risk 
experience. The identification of patterns of behaviour and organization that provide 
some predictive value for future cases is a secondary objective.
Therefore, the theoretical perspective of this research is one of interpretivism, 
“ looking for culturally derived and historically situated interpretations of the social 
life-world” (Crotty, 2003:67). As for the associated methodology, this has a primarily 
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ideographic focus. The research does not aim to test hypothesis (i.e. nomothetic 
approach), but to understand the underlying causes and the related patterns of 
behaviour leading to the reliable, or not, ISS operations.
More specifically, the definition of ‘interpretivism’ to which this research is aligned 
is the one offered by Weber (1962; 1968). He suggests that social sciences are 
concerned with Verstehen (i.e. understanding) and there is a need to focus social 
inquiry on the meanings and values of acting persons in order to arrive at a causal 
explanation of the course and effects of social action. Therefore, Weber (1962) aims 
to explain as well as understand. As Weiss (1986:68) suggests, “Verstehen is for the 
purposes of explanation” . To achieve this, however, “Verstehen has to be 
substantiated by empirical evidence” (Crotty, 2003:69).
According to Weber (1949: 90-94), the amassing of such empirical data can be done 
with a heuristic device that will operate as the principal diagnostic tool. Such a ‘tool’ 
is a conceptual or mental construct that guides the social inquirer in addressing real- 
life cases and discerns where and to what extent the real deviates from the ideal.
What we understand today as the Verstehen or interpretivist approach to human 
inquiry has appeared historically in many guises, such as hermeneutics, 
phenomenology, and symbolic interactionism. The theoretical orientation of this 
study falls in line with symbolic interactionism that stems from the pragmatist 
thinking of social psychologist George Herbert Mead (1934). According to Blumer 
(1969:2), a student of Mead, interactionism makes the following assumptions:
• ‘that human beings act toward things on the basis of the meanings that these 
things have for them’ ;
• ‘that the meaning of such things is derived from, and arises out of, the social 
interaction that one has with one’s fellows’ ;
• ‘that these meanings are handled in, and modified through, an interpretive 
process used by the person in dealing with the things he encounters'.
The methodological implication of this approach is that it “ directs the investigator to 
take, to the best of his ability, the standpoint of those studied” (Denzin, 1978:99). 
This role taking is an interaction, while it is symbolic for it  is possible only because 
of the symbols that humans share and through which they communicate.
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Across the various schemes of symbolic interactionism97, the one that describes best 
the approach of this study, is that of negotiated order theory. Negotiated order 
theory - explored primarily by Strauss (1978, 1982) - disputes that social settings are 
definitively structured and social actors have very clear-cut roles. Instead, societal 
arrangements and procedures are considered to be constantly reworked by those who 
live and work within them. There is an ongoing, albeit often tacit, process of 
negotiation and adjustment of action.
Meaning in this theory is dynamically (re)created and (re)negotiated, and therefore 
depends on the context of the communicative acts (Flower, 1994; Clausen, 2007). 
Thus, communication is an ever-evolving process of the co-creation of meaning 
(Yoshikawa, 1987) that allows for ambiguity and paradox in intercultural encounters 
(Fang, 2003).
Furthermore, Strauss (1978) suggested that negotiations have temporal limits, and 
they are renewed, revised, and reconstituted over time. In addition, he argued that 
structural changes in an organization require a revision of the negotiated order. As 
Gerson (1976) has noted, individuals and society continually generate each other 
through a process of negotiation, while “ real constraints direct and channel the 
actions of individuals and organizations” (Fine, 1984:24).
At this point, it should be also noted that proponents of the negotiated order 
perspective can examine either negotiations that occur among individuals or those in 
which negotiators represent larger social units such as organizations or organizational 
segments98. However, “ negotiated order theorists reject the naive radical 
phenomenological position that all negotiations are feasible. Some actors have more 
power and greater control than others” (Fine, 1984: 251). Therefore, a number of 
scholars99 suggest that because of the importance of the negotiation setting, any 
system that does not look at the context and suggests means of controlling it will be 
unacceptable to interactionists. This view has a number of methodological and 
theoretical implications.
With regards to the methodological implications, a careful consideration of the 
structural and negotiation contexts leans towards the application of qualitative 
approaches to aid in the implementation and utilization of research findings.
97 I.e. Crotty, 2003.
98 I.e. Maines, 1977.
" i .e .  Beyer and Trice, 1982; Fine, 1984; Currie, 1999.
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Therefore, the metaphor of organizational negotiated order is most useful as a 
sensitizing concept of understanding a social scene, rather than as a device for 
hypothesis generation.
As for further theoretical implications, the theory of negotiated order stresses some 
key concepts in ‘organizing’ . These are the concepts of meaning, interaction/ 
communication, change and context, as well as the interplay between these factors 
to organizing. Currie (1999) suggests that in organizational environments of a 
negotiated order, dynamic processes of sense-making and change can be managed 
only through a sensitivity to and appreciation of context. Thus, the key concepts of 
negotiated order have also greatly influenced dynamic interpretive approaches such 
as this of ‘contextualism’ by Pettigrew (1985), which focuses his analysis on the 
context, process and content of organizing and organizational change. Pettigrew 
regards problem-solving and decision-making processes as containing elements of 
‘muddling through’ and views organizations as systems of political action.
However, Pettigrew's (1985) contextualist approach has a number of drawbacks100 . 
Despite the fact that Pettigrew claims that connections between the outer and other 
contextual levels of an organization are a vital element to his approach, inadequate 
emphasis is put on these. In addition, although Pettigrew emphasizes the utility of 
understanding the socio-political elements of the context, his approach falls short of 
providing a means of identifying the various interest groups which wield power.
In the field of IS research, Walsham (1993) has attempted to address several of these 
problems with regards to the contextualist approach, and has suggested the 
additional utilization of approaches to study the context and the process of change. 
He, thus, proposes the use of a sociological model to conceptualize the linkage 
between context and process in social systems.
Given this research’s focus on understanding the organizational processes of change 
that establish reliable ISS operations in a major event context, the researcher leans 
towards Walsham’s approach to contextualism, where a model of context and 
process are introduced, as well as a model to link the two.
Therefore, this study adopts a contextualist analysis perspective, which identifies 
vertical and horizontal levels of analysis and the interconnections between those
100 I.e. Dhillon, 1995:51-52.
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levels through time101. As Walsham (1993) suggests, the concept of ‘context’ is a 
static one and needs to be repeatedly considered to review the type, extent and 
reasons for change. Therefore, it is critical to consider the evolution of context over 
time, as well as its links to the process under study.
For the purposes of analysing the organizational context of change across various 
levels, the approach used is a scheme offered by Mintzberg (1979, 1981) that can 
provide a rich description of the organizational structural context and situational 
factors. As summarised in Table 3.1, Mintzberg’s scheme considers the basic parts of 
the organization, the processes of activity coordination, the parameters used to 
design their structures, and the contingency or situational factors.
Table 3.1: Mintzberg’s scheme o f organizational context levels (Source: adapted 
from Theodoraki, 2007:23-25).
Contextual Elements Parameters
Parts of the 
Organization
1. The Operating Core: where the operators (i.e. 
those who perform the basic work of producing 
products or rendering services) are found.
2. The Strategic Apex of Managers: those who oversee 
the systems operation.
3. The Techno-structure o f Analysts or Technical 
Staff.
4. The Support Staff.
5. The Ideology or Culture of the Organization: this 
encompasses the traditions and beliefs of an 
organization.
Coordinating
Mechanisms
The structure of an 
organization can be 
defined as the total 
of the ways in 
which its labour is 
divided into distinct 
tasks and then its 
co-ordination 
achieved among 
those tasks.
1. Mutual adjustment, whereby coordination is 
achieved by the process of Informal 
Communications.
2. Direct supervision as coordination is achieved 
through Orders.
3. Standardization of Work Processes.
4. Standardization of Outputs.
5. Standardization of Skills.
6. Standardization of Norms (common beliefs).
101 In contextualist analysis (i.e. Pettigrew, 1987), the vertica l level refers to the 
interdependencies between levels of analysis based upon phenomena at a further level. The 
horizontal level of analysis involves the connection between phenomena in historical, present 
and future time.
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Contextual Elements Parameters
Parameters 
of Design
The essence of 
organizational 
design is the 
manipulation of a 
series of parameters 
that determine the 
division of labour 
and the
achievements of 
coordination.
1. Job Specialization: this is performed horizontally 
and vertically, of unskilled and professional jobs. 
Managerial jobs are typically the least specialised in 
the organization.
2. Behavioural Formalization: this is achieved through 
the imposition of operating instructions, job 
descriptions, rules and regulations. Behaviour 
formalization is most common in the operating core 
of the organization. At the strategic apex the work 
is the least programmed.
3. Training through Use of Formal Instructional 
Programmes: this aims to transfer skills, knowledge 
and indoctrination.
4. Unit Grouping: this refers to the choice of the 
bases by which positions are grouped together into 
units.
5. Unit Size: this is the number of positions contained 
in a single unit.
6. Planning and Control Systems: these are used to 
standardize outputs, evaluate performance, and 
plan action.
7. Liaison Devises: these are the series of mechanisms 
used to encourage mutual adjustment within and 
between units.
8. Decentralization: the vertical or horizontal 
diffusion of decision-making power.
Situational
Factors
Situational factors 
influence the choice 
of the design 
parameters.
1. The Age and Size of the Organization: these affect 
the extent to which the organization’s behaviour is 
formalized and its administrative structure 
elaborated.
2. The Technical System o f the Organization: this 
influences especially the operating core and those 
staff units most clearly associated with it.
3. The Environment of the Organization: this can vary 
in its complexity, in how static or dynamic it  is, in 
the diversity of its markets, and in the hostility it  
contains for the organization.
4. The Power Factors of the Organization: these 
include external control, personal power needs, 
and fashion.
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For the purposes of analysing the process of organizational change, the researcher 
utilizes a number or organizational metaphors. As Walsham (1993:27) suggests, a 
metaphor is “ a powerful and interesting approach to the ‘reading’ of organizations” . 
Morgan (1986:12-13) agrees, and argues that “ the use of metaphor implies a way of 
thinking and a way of seeing that pervade how we understand our world generally. 
[...] Many of our taken-for-granted ideas about organizations are metaphorical, even 
though we may not recognize them as such” .
Therefore, similar to Walsham (1993), the researcher utilizes a synthesis of 
organization metaphors to understand organizational processes of change. The 
metaphors that are taken into consideration in the current study are three - the 
cultural, political action and communication metaphors of organization. Briefly, 
these suggest the following with regards to organizations.
The cultural metaphor of organizing suggests that culture is an active, changing 
phenomenon, while organizations do not have a single, unified culture, but rather a 
system of subcultures and a set of complementary perspectives (Riley, 1983). “The 
organizational culture metaphor emphasizes that organizations are not just settings 
of instrumental action but of expressive behaviour as well” (Fine, 1984:256). Scholars 
using this metaphor are explicitly concerned with how it can be applied to help 
managers control their environments - not necessarily in any direct way, but in terms 
of the symbolic consequences of their actions and their influence on culture. It thus 
offers a macro-level sensitizing tool for interpretive, symbolic interactionist studies. 
It directs research towards investigating how and why cultures and subcultures are 
created, maintained and changed over time. It also points towards investigating how 
the various subcultures interact with one another.
The political action metaphor of organizing adopts a more interpersonal, micro-level 
view to organizing, suggesting that organizations are loose networks of people with 
divergent interests who gather together for the sake of expediency (Morgan, 1986). 
Political action is seen as an endemic and continuous process, while ‘power’ is the 
medium through which conflicts of interest are resolved. The process of exercising 
power is not exempt from moral judgements. From an organizational management 
point of view, the metaphor of political action points towards investigating the 
balance between management control and individual and group autonomy across 
multiple levels of the organization.
Finally, the communication metaphor of organizing suggests that all organizational 
activity involves communicating. Therefore, this metaphor views organizations as the
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Interface of communication and interaction between various actors or groups in an 
effort to coordinate organizational activities.
The communication metaphor has evolved over time (Clausen, 2007) from a linear 
and mechanical process of information transmission102 to a model that includes 
sociological factors in communication and highlights the importance of culture. In 
particular, culture may be a filter through which people construct (encode) and 
receive (decode) messages. Thus, communication models include sender, message, 
channel, noise (e.g. the perceptions or cultural backgrounds of the communicators), 
receiver, feedback and cultural context103. By introducing elements of the culture 
metaphor into the communication one, there are implications with regards to 
management and control. Communication is no longer linear and controllable; rather 
managers can influence its evolution, while they need to be considerate of varying 
communication methods and needs across groups. Having already recognized the 
significance of the cultural context in an organization, the communication metaphor 
that the researcher adopts is the latter one.
Overall, with regards to the above metaphors to organizing (or process models), 
although they involve distinctly different concepts, “ they should not be seen as 
separate and non-overlapping; indeed they are inextricably interlinked” (Walsham, 
1993: 48). Across the above three metaphors, or ways of seeing organizations, there 
are a number of common and research complementary concepts. Firstly, all three 
metaphors suggests that organizations change, while they stress the importance of 
meaning and the dynamic, ongoing processes involved in (re)creating this. 
Furthermore, all above metaphors suggest that an organization and its management 
need to take into consideration its context, whether that is the political, cultural or 
communications context. Finally, with regards to implications for decision-making 
and management all metaphors suggest that organizations are not rational entities 
that can be directly controlled - only influenced. This clearly has implications on the 
degree to which predictions can be made, as well as the methodological perspectives 
used to analyse organizations. Organizations need to be considered across various 
(vertical) levels of analysis as well as over time (i.e. horizontal analysis). Therefore, 
the above three metaphors reinforce the contextualist analysis view adopted in the 
current study, as well as point towards a need for longitudinal case-studies104.
102 I.e. Shannon and Weaver, 1949; Laswell, 1948;
103 I.e. Jandt, 1998; Dahl and Habert, 1986.
104 I.e. Walsham, 1993; Pettigrew, 1990.
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All above process models/organizational metaphors need to be explicitly or implicitly 
encompassed in the sociological framework that will link the context and process. As 
Walsham (1993) suggests, the key feature of contextualist analysis is the linkage 
between context and process. This is key in order to understand in the current study 
the organizational impact of ISS management, which is constrained by the context as 
well as a factor in maintaining/altering that context.
Therefore, given the focus of this research on organizational encounters with (ISS) 
risk, the chosen framework is a risk one, namely that of the Social Amplification of 
Risk (SARF). The SARF, which was summarized earlier in Appendix-A1, is a heuristic 
tool that appreciates the dynamic organizational interactions - both at a social and 
individual level - across the various contextual levels of risk perception (i.e. Fig.3.4). 
It considers the processes involved in identifying risk, (re)creating meaning, as well 
as the ripple effects and impact of these. This ‘risk encounter' process is one that 
may initiate a new process/cycle of organizational interactions. The SARF and its 
application by this study will be considered in the following section.
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3.3 The research argument, conceptual framework and methodology
3.3.1. The research argument
After a review of organization theories and the practices associated with the 
management of ISS, technological hazards/risks, and major events/projects, the 
researcher has identified that as organizations become increasingly complex and 
interconnected, their ability to control - or rather influence - the processes of 
change is increasingly compromised. Yet, economic, political and social demands are 
increasing with regards to organizations and governments delivering highly reliable 
ISS operations.
This research argues that the process of ISS (risk) management is one of 
organizational change. A change whose outcome is not always controllable, and 
which is constrained by - as well as affects - the context within which it takes place. 
Therefore, the researcher suggests that in order to understand the organizational 
capacity to manage ISS reliably, researchers and practitioners alike must pay closer 
attention to the structural, political and cultural context of the organization.
The perceptions of risk and ISS behaviours that the organization aims to manage need 
to be considered across various levels of analysis - both vertical and horizontal. In 
addition, the processes of risk attention and sense-making need to be also 
understood in order to improve organizational communications105 and risk controls.
The research, therefore, proposes the following elements of interest:
• The structural context (scope) of an organization and its impact on ISS risk 
perceptions (i.e. meanings), behaviours, and management efforts to deliver 
highly reliable ISS operations.
• The cultural and political context of an organization and its impact on ISS risk 
perceptions, behaviours, and management efforts to deliver highly reliable ISS 
operations.
• The nature of ISS risks and their impact on risk perceptions, behaviours and 
management efforts to deliver highly reliable ISS operations.
• The expectations, obligations, motivations and roles of different ISS management 
process stakeholders with regards to delivering highly reliable operations.
105 ‘Organizational communications’ cover inter-, intra- and external organizational 
communications.
D E Afxentiadis (2010) PhD Thesis, London: LSE
• The organizational processes of ISS risk attention, sense-making and re-organizing 
under ‘routine’ versus ‘emergency/incident’ conditions.
Throughout all these elements of interest the concept of ‘time’ is key, since the 
researcher wishes to also consider how the above elements change over time. As 
suggested earlier (i.e. section 2.3.4), the organizational process of delivering highly 
reliable ISS operations is a learning one. Therefore, the above research elements will 
not only be considered in terms of their interaction at a specific point in time, but 
also over time, thus reviewing the organizational capacity to learn and improve ISS 
behaviours and practices.
A number of conceptual and methodological approaches will be utilized in order to 
analyse the elements of interest identified above. These will be examined below.
3.3.2. The conceptual framework for conducting the argument
As presented earlier, the current study adopts an interpretivist analysis approach in 
order to investigate the organizational process of change relating to the delivery of 
highly reliable ISS operations in a major event context. Therefore, breaking down the 
research question into its context, process and content components, the following 
emerge:
The organizational context under investigation is that of a major event, namely the 
A2004 Olympic organization. As suggested earlier this will be described in detail with 
the use of Mintzberg’s scheme of organizational context levels. The parameters 
considered by this scheme are summarised in Table 3.1.
The organizational process of change under investigation is the preparation and 
delivery of a secure IS infrastructure that will support the A2004 operations. The 
analysis of this is based on the assumptions of three organization process 
models/metaphors (i.e. section 3.2.2), which suggest that an organization is a 
communication network whose outcome is determined by the structural 
characteristics of the network as well as the cultural and political interactions, 
expectations, motivations and behaviours.
In order to link the context and process the Social Amplification of Risk Framework 
(SARF) is utilized in this study, encompassing the above assumptions and supporting 
the investigation of dynamic organizational interactions related to the risk attention,
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sense- and decision-making processes, as well as the impact of these. The SARF is 
summarized in Appendix-A1, yet it will be considered here in some more detail.
Lastly, with regards to the content of the change process, this will have to be 
assessed against the organizational objective with regards to the change process 
outcome - namely the delivery of highly reliable IS(S) operations. Therefore, it will 
be necessary to consider in more detail the notion of ‘high reliability'. This will be 
done by drawing upon the work of high reliability theorists.
Therefore, the following paragraphs will consider in more detail the conceptual 
framework of SARF and the parameters to highly reliable organizations, in order to 
then proceed with presenting the method used to apply these frameworks to the 
research question and argument.
3.3.2.1 Linking the context and process of change: the SARF
The various scholars who developed the SARF106 aimed to develop an integrative 
theoretical and empirically operational framework capable of accounting for findings 
from a wider range of studies. They aimed to understand risk perceptions and 
behavioural patterns at both a social and individual level, by considering the dynamic 
processes of risk identification, sense-making, and communication. In particular, the 
SARF’s focus was on processes by which certain hazards and events that experts 
assess as relatively low in risk can become of a particular concern and socio-political 
activity within a society (risk amplification), while other hazards that experts have 
judged to be more serious receive comparatively less attention from society (risk 
attenuation).
The theoretical starting point is the assumption that ‘ risk events’ , which might 
include actual or hypothesized accidents and incidents, will be largely irrelevant or 
localized in their impact unless human beings observe and communicate them to 
others (Luhmann, 1979). The SARF suggests that
“ risk, risk events and the characteristics of both become portrayed through 
various risk signals which in turn interact with a wide range of psychological, 
social, institutional or cultural processes in ways that intensify or attenuate 
perceptions of risk and its manageability. The experience of risk, therefore, is
106 I.e. Kasperson et al, 1988; Renn, 1991; Kasperson, 1992; Burns et al., 1993; Kasperson and 
Kasperson, 1996.
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not only an experience of physical harm but the result of processes by which 
groups and individuals learn to acquire or create interpretations of risk. [...] 
Within this framework, risk experience can be properly assessed only through 
the interaction among the physical harms attached to a risk event and the 
social and cultural processes that shape interpretations of that event, 
secondary and tertiary consequences that emerge, and the actions taken by 
managers and publics” (Kasperson et al, 2003:15).
Therefore, the fundamental concept used in the SARF is that of a ‘risk sign’ and its 
associated perceptions and behaviours. The underlying organization metaphor of this 
framework is the communication/amplification one. Kasperson et al (1988:181-182) 
argue that regardless of the mechanistic description of the amplification metaphor, 
“ the process of transmitting is far more complex. [...] The information system and 
characteristics of the public response that compose social amplification are essential 
elements in determining the nature and magnitude of risk” . As Renn and Rohrmann 
(2000) have suggested, risk signs are dynamically filtered through a number of 
contextual levels of risk perception (i.e. Fig.3.4).
Proponents of the SARF suggest that by understanding the properties of the risk sign 
along with the organizational context within which this is interpreted and controlled, 
it  is possible to improve the appraisal, evaluation/characterization, management and 
communication of a risk. This applies both in cases of proactive risk management and 
reactive incident/event management.
Thus, in terms of applying this conceptual framework to the investigation of ISS, this 
approach views organizations and their IS(S) as communication networks where 
people do the processing. Understanding the processes of risk attention and sense- 
making will lead to better re-organization, improving ISS management practices. At 
this point, the SARF’s stages and mechanisms of amplification will be presented in 
more detail.
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Figure 3.4: Four context levels of risk perception (Source: adapted from Renn and 
Rohrmann, 2000).
SARF - the stages of amplification
The SARF suggests that an IS may amplify/attenuate risk events in two ways - by 
either intensifying/weakening signals that are part of the information that individuals 
and social groups receive about the risk; or by filtering the multitude of signals with 
respect to the attributes of the risk and their importance.
Kasperson et al (1988) suggest that risk signals are subject to predictable 
transformations as they filter through various amplification stations (i.e. Fig.3.5).
Individual stations of amplification are affected by considerations - well documented 
by the psychometric tradition - such as risk heuristics, qualitative aspects of the 
risks, prior attitudes, blame and trust. These same individuals are also members of
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cultural groups and other social units that codetermine the dynamics and social 
processing of risk107.
For social stations of amplification, the likes of institutional structure, functions and 
culture influence the amplification/attenuation of risk signals. Even the individuals in 
institutions do not simply pursue their personal values and social interpretations; 
they also perceive the risks, those who manage the risks, and the risk ‘problem’ 
according to cultural biases and the values of their organization or group108.
Thus, Kasperson et al (1988) suggest that some key amplification steps consist of the 
following:
• Filtering of signals (e.g. only a fraction of all incoming information is actually 
processed);
• Decoding of the signal;
• Processing of risk information (e.g. the use of cognitive heuristics for drawing 
inferences);
• Attaching social values to the information in order to draw implications for 
management and policy;
• Interacting with one’s cultural and pier groups to interpret and validate 
signals;
• Formulating behavioural intentions to tolerate the risk or to take actions 
against the risk or risk manager;
• Engaging in group/individual actions to accept, ignore, tolerate or change the 
risk.
107 I.e. Vaughan, 1995; Palmer et al, 2001.
108 I.e. Rayner, 1992; Peters and Slovic, 1996. 
D E Afxentiadis (2010) PhD Thesis, London: LSE
A M P L I F I C A T I O N  A N D  A T T E N U A T I O N
Risk and 
risk events
SOURCES OF 
INFORMATION
INFORMATION
CHANNELS
SOCIAL
STATIONS
INDIVIDUAL
STATIONS
INSTITUTIONAL 
AND SOCIAL 
BEHAVIOUR
Cognition 
in social 
context
Decoding
individual
senses
Social
protest
Political 
and social 
action
News
media
Personal
experience
Attention
filter
Intuitive
heuristics
Indirect
communi­
cation
Opinion
leaders
Informal
social
networks
Direct
communi­
cation
Attitude/
attitude
changes
Voluntary
organiza­
tions
Cultural and 
social 
groups
Government
agencies
Professional
information
brokers
Evaluation
and
interpretation
Organiza­
tional
responses
u
RIPPLE
EFFECTS
Society
*V°%>
4 ?  v oca/ %
I
Directly
affected
persons
'echf'0
^ocie^
Feedback and iteration
Figure 3.5: Conceptual framework o f social amplification of risk (Source: Kasperson et al, 1988).
IMPACTS
Loss of 
sales
Financial
losses
Regulatory
actions
Organiza­
tional
changes
Litigation
Increase or 
decrease in 
physical risk
Community
concern
Loss of 
confidence in 
institutions
D E Afxentiadis (2010) PhD Thesis, London: LSE 90
Consequently, secondary impacts are perceived by individuals and social groups so 
that another stage of amplification may occur to produce third-order impacts. The 
impacts thereby may spread, or ‘r ip p le to other parties, distant locations or future 
generations (i.e. Fig.3.5). This rippling of impacts is an important element of risk 
amplification since it suggests that the processes can extend or constrain the 
temporal, sectoral and geographical scales of impacts. It also points out that each 
order of impact may not only allocate social and political effects but may also trigger 
or hinder managerial interventions for risk reduction.“The concept of the social 
amplification of risk is, therefore, dynamic, taking into account the learning and 
social interactions resulting from experience with risk” (Kasperson et al, 1988:183).
SARF - the mechanisms of amplification
The social amplification of risk involves two major stages: the communication of 
information about the risk or risk event, and the response mechanisms of society.
As indicated by Slovic (1986), direct experience with risky activities or events can be 
either reassuring or alarming. However, many - if not the majority of - risks are not 
experienced directly. When direct personal experience is lacking or minimal, 
individuals learn about risk from other persons and from the media. Information 
communication becomes a key ingredient in public response and acts as a major 
agent of amplification. Attributes of information that may influence the social 
amplification include the volume of information, the degree to which the information 
is disputed, the extent of dramatization, and the symbolic connotations of the 
information109.
The interpretation and response to communicated information form the second 
major stage of the social amplification of risk. These mechanisms involve the social, 
institutional and cultural contexts in which the risk information is interpreted, its 
meaning diagnosed and values attached. The SARF scholars hypothesize five 
pathways to initiate response mechanisms110.
The first mechanism of response is that of heuristics and values. As presented in 
Appendix-A1 of this study, individuals use simplifying mechanisms to evaluate risk 
and to shape responses. These processes, while permitting individuals to cope with a
109 I.e. Kasperson et al, 1988; Mazur, 1981; Blumer, 1969.
110 I.e. Kasperson et al, 1988; 2003.
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risky world, may sometimes introduce biases that cause distortions and errors111. 
Similarly, the application of individual and group values will also determine which 
risks are deemed important or minor and what actions, if  any, should be taken. Most 
information to which the average person is exposed will be ignored. However, the 
attention and selection process is not random. According to Chaiken and Stangor 
(1987) the major criteria for selection are ability and motivation112. If both these 
criteria are met, a complex procedure of information selection and processing takes 
place after the initial attention-drawing stimulus113.
In order to economize information processing, individuals are likely to evaluate 
whether it is necessary to study the content of the information in detail or to make a 
fast judgement according to salient cues in the message received114. These intuitive 
heuristics explain why individuals do not base their risk judgements on expected 
values. There is ample evidence for clear violations of logical rules in common-sense 
reasoning when it  comes to processing probabilistic information. Biases have been 
identified in people’s ability to draw inferences from probabilistic information115. 
Some of these are summarized below in Table 3.2.
In addition to the cognitive heuristics and biases, more recent research has brought 
to the fore an additional heuristic, that of affect/emotion, and its interplay with 
cognition116. The affect heuristic suggests that people may judge the risks and 
benefits of hazards by accessing a pool of positive and negative feelings that they 
associate with the hazards. According to Finucane et al (2000) the existence of such 
a heuristic would explain the empirical observation where perceived risk and 
perceived benefit are inversely related in people's minds.
111 I.e. Kahneman et al, 1982.
112 Ability refers to the physical possibility of the receiver to follow the message without 
distraction. The conditions necessary to satisfy the criterion of ability are: (a) information 
must be accessible, (b) the receiver must have the time to process the information, and (c) 
other sources of distraction should be absent. Motivation refers to the readiness and interest 
of the receiver to process messages. The factors influencing the motivation of the receiver 
include: (a) the relevance of the information content, (b) the extent to which the information 
can trigger personal involvement, (c) the receiver’s prior knowledge or interest in the 
subject.
113 I.e. Renn, 1992b, 2008.
114 I.e. Renn and Levine, 1991; Renn, 2008.
115 I.e. Kahneman and Tversky, 1973, 1979; Slovic et al, 1976, Slovic, 1972.
116 I.e. Finucane et al, 2000; Slovic, 1997; Alhakami and Slovic, 1994; MacGregor, 2003.
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Table 3.2: Biases related to drawing inferences from probabilistic information.
Availability bias Events that come immediately to people’s minds are rated as more probable than events that are of less personal importance.
Representativeness
bias
Singular events experienced in person or associated with the 
properties of an event are regarded as more typical than information 
based on the frequency of occurrence.
Hindsight bias
Being told that some event has happened increases people’s feeling 
that it is inevitable. In retrospect, people tend to believe that they 
(and others) had a much better idea of what was going to happen 
than they actually did have. Such misperceptions can seriously 
prejudice the evaluation of decisions made in the past and limit what 
is learned from experience (i.e. Fischhoff, 1974).
Anchoring effect
Probabilities are estimated according to the plausibility of contextual 
links between cause and effect, but not according to knowledge 
about statistical frequencies or distributions. People will use an 
anchor as a first approximation to the judgement. This anchor is then 
adjusted to accommodate the implications of additional information. 
However, the adjustment will be crude and imprecise and will fail to 
do justice to the importance of additional information.
Selection bias Information that challenges perceived probabilities that are already part of a belief system will either be ignored or downplayed.
Without ruling out the use of cognitive heuristics by individuals, researchers117 
suggest that judgements of risk and benefit are guided and linked by affect. Reliance 
on affect ebbs and flows according to various contextual factors. Finucane et al 
(2000) suggest at least two conditions under which affect plays an important role and 
intensifies in people's minds the inverse relationship between perceived risk and 
perceived benefit. This is when (a) risk and benefit judgements are taken under time 
pressure, and (b) when manipulating affect by providing risk and benefit information.
Another important finding in the field of risk perception is that heuristics and biases - 
both cognitive and affect - are applicable to both experts and laypersons. Therefore, 
the importance of social values in risk perception and acceptance has become 
apparent118.
This also applies at the stage of decision-making, where the presentation of the risk 
information is rife with subjectivity. Numerous research studies have demonstrated 
that different ways of presenting - framing - the same risk information can lead to 
different evaluations and decisions119. We thus know that every form of presenting
117 I.e. above footnote.
118 I.e. Slovic, 1987b, 1997; Thompson and Dean, 1996.
119 I.e. McNeil et al, 1982; Tversky and Kahneman, 1981; Gregory et al, 1993. 
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risk information is a frame that has a strong influence on the decision-maker. “There 
are often no ‘ right frames’ or ‘wrong frames’ - just ‘different frames’ ” (Slovic, 
1997:281).
Therefore, contrary to the traditional view of risk characterised by event 
probabilities and consequences, the subjective and contextual factors described 
above are no longer secondary or accidental dimensions to risk. Extensive research 
has indicated that gender, race, political worldviews, affiliation, emotional affect 
and trust are strongly correlated with risk judgements. In fact most people, including 
laypersons and experts, demonstrate a mix of all value clusters depending upon 
context and social relations120.
The second mechanism of risk sign interpretation and response in the SARF is that of 
social group relationships. Risk issues enter into the political agenda of social, 
political and organizational groups. The nature of these groups will influence 
member responses and .the types of rationality brought to risk issues. If a risk 
becomes a central issue in a political or social debate, it will be vigorously brought to 
more general public attention, often coupled with ideological interpretations of 
technology or the risk management process121. Such social alignments can become 
anchors for subsequent interpretations of risk management and may become quite 
firm in the face of conflicting information. Therefore, the social group relationships 
amplification mechanism consists of institutional structures, functions and cultures.
Research in the field of risk perception has indicated that the seriousness and higher- 
order impacts of a risk event are determined, in part, by what that event signals or 
portends122. Therefore, the third mechanism of response in SARF is that of the signal 
value. The informativeness or ‘signal value’ of an event appears to be systematically 
related to the characteristics of the event and the hazard it reflects. Risks or a risk 
event can signal the degree to which it is controllable, familiar, competently 
managed etc. Fischoff’s and Slovic's research123 has indicated that risks in the upper 
right-hand sector of the classic dread/knowledge psychometric factor space (i.e.
120 I.e. Slovic, 1997; Renn, 2008.
121 I.e. Rayner and Cantor, 1987; Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982; Johnson and Covello, 1987.
122 I.e. Slovic, 1987b; 1992; Kasperson et al, 1988.
123 I.e. Fischhoff et al, 2000; Slovic et al, 1980; Slovic, 1987, 2000.
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Fig.3.6) have a signal value in terms of serving as a warning for society, providing 
new information about the probability that similar or even more destructive mishaps 
might occur with this type of activity.
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Figure 3.6: Factor-analytic representations of risk characteristics (Source: adapted 
from Slovic e t al, 1980).
The fourth SARF mechanism of risk response is that of imagery and stigmatization. 
Stigma refers to the negative imagery associated with undesirable social groups or 
individuals (Goffman, 1963). However, environments, technologies and organizations 
can also be associated with negative images. According to Slovic (1987a), since the 
typical response to stigmatized persons or environments is avoidance, it is reasonable 
to assume that risk-induced stigma may have significant social and policy 
consequences.
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Research has demonstrated the importance of stigmatization as a principal route by 
which risk amplification can generate ripples and secondary consequences124. Stigma- 
induced effects are associated with risky technologies, products, projects or services, 
and can be substantial. Gregory et al. (1995) suggests that those that are stigmatized 
share several features.
“The source of the stigma is a hazard with characteristics such as dread 
consequences and involuntary exposure, that typically contributes to high 
public perceptions of risk. Its impacts are often perceived to be inequitably 
distributed across groups. [...] Often the impacts are unbounded, in the sense 
that their magnitude or persistence over time is not well known. [...] 
Management of the hazard is brought into question as concerns surface 
regarding competence, conflicts of interest or a failure to apply needed 
safeguards and controls” (Kasperson et al, 2003:27-28).
Accompanying the process of stigmatization - or marking125 - will often be a story or 
narrative that interprets the evolution of the stigma and assigns responsibility or 
blame for its presence.
SARF scholars suggest that understanding stigma effects is crucial in anticipating 
which new technologies, controls, policies etc. will be stigmatized through 
amplification processes. Stigma effects have broad implications for risk management 
and risk communication efforts, since they can greatly enlarge the potential of 
rippling126 (Kasperson et al, 2001).
The final mechanism to amplification identified by the SARF is that of social trust127. 
More recent and broad research has indicated that recurrent failures in risk
124 I.e. Flynn et al, 2001.
125 I.e. Kasperson et al, 2003:29.
126 I.e. Kasperson et al, 2001.
127 Definitions and functions of trust vary. It has been suggested that trust facilitates the 
working of the political system (Inglehart, 1988), is an important dimension of social capital 
(Coleman, 1990; Putnam, 1993, 1995b), and also functions to reduce complexity in our social 
environment (Barber, 1984), hence making life more predictable. Earle and Cvetkovich (1995) 
suggest that trust is the similarity in our basic values, rather than attributes of technical 
competence, that underlies whom we trust or distrust. Renn and Levine (1991), on the other 
hand, have argued that trust underlies confidence, and, where this is shared across a 
community, one has credibility. They thus suggest five attributes to trust, namely 
competence, objectivity, fairness, consistency, and faith.
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management stem in no small part from a failure to recognize the more general 
requirements of democratic society, and especially the need for ‘social trust’128.
“ Risk control efforts have frequently gone awry due to a lack of openness and 
‘transparency’ , a failure to consult or involve so-called ‘interested’ and 
‘affected’ persons, a loss of social trust in managers, inadequacies in due 
process, a lack of responsiveness to public concerns, or an insensitivity to 
questions of environmental injustice” (Kasperson et al, 2003:31).
Slovic (1993, 2000) has argued that trust emerges slowly, is fragile, easily destroyed, 
and once lost it  may prove to be extremely difficult to recover. He posits an 
‘asymmetry principle’ to explain that it  is easier to destroy than to create trust. He 
suggests that negative (trust-destroying) events are more visible or noticeable than 
positive (trust-building) events. Negative events often take the form of specific, 
well-defined incidents such as accidents, while events that are invisible or poorly 
defined carry little weight in shaping our attitudes and opinions.
The SARF scholars argue that from a policy implication point of view, the research on 
trust suggests that we need to frame the principal goals of risk communication 
around building trust through participation. However, one needs to be considerate 
towards the impacts of candid communications. These can signal honesty for some
while invoke greater distrust in others. Therefore, effective risk communication may
follow only if a resolution of conflict is obtained first129. SARF proponents raise
caution of broad ‘stakeholder’ participation methods, which are often seen
uncritically as essential to the wider processes of risk assessment and management 
and a route to success130.
Overall, SARF scholars suggest that issues of social trust are important components of 
the dynamics of social amplification.
“ Distrust acts to heighten risk perceptions, to intensify public reactions to risk 
signals, to contribute to the perceived unacceptability of risk, and to 
stimulate political activism to reduce risk. [...] Trust is highly interrelated 
with other components and mechanisms in what we think of as ‘amplification 
dynamics’ ” (Kasperson et al, 2003:32-33).
128 I.e. Kasperson et al, 2003; 1992; 1999; Cvetkovich and Lofstedt, 1999.
129 I.e. Renn et al, 1995; Arvai et al, 2001.
130 I.e. Kasperson et al, 2003; Kasperson, 2003; Stern and Fineberg, 1996. 
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The SARF scholars conclude that understanding the phenomenon of risk amplification 
is a prerequisite for assessing the potential impacts of projects and technologies, for 
establishing priorities in risk management, and for setting health, safety, operational 
reliability and other related standards (Kasperson et al, 1988).
3.3.2.2 Assessing the content of change: highly reliable organizations
As stated earlier, the focus of this research is to understand an organization’s 
capacity to deliver highly reliable ISS operations in an inherently risky, high 
performance demand environment. It is, thus, imperative that the concept of ‘high 
reliability’ is clearly defined.
‘High reliability’ in the organization theory discipline refers to an organization’s 
ability/objective to succeed in avoiding significant operational failures and disasters 
in an environment where ‘normal accidents’ can be expected due to risk factors and 
complexity131. The organizations that aim for high reliability tend to be those that 
cannot afford to fail, since otherwise their existence and/or legitimacy, would be 
compromised.
As described in section 2.3.4, scholars acknowledge that organizational encounters 
with error and the unexpected are an inescapable part of organizational reality132. 
Therefore, they do not suggest that highly reliable organizations are error-free. 
Instead, they suggest that organizations which operate risky/hazardous technologies 
and have a low tolerance for failure create strategies that are focused on operational 
robustness and/or resilience, anticipating and containing errors133.
Thus, high reliability - and normal accident - theorists134 acknowledge that ‘high 
reliability’ involves a set of organizational design (OD), organizational culture (OC), 
and operations management (OM) controls, which can have an error anticipation (A) 
or containment (C) focus (i.e. Table 3.3).
131 I.e. LaPorte and Consolini; 1991; Weick and Sutcliffe, 2001 and 2007.
132 I.e. Turner, 1978; Turner and Pidgeon, 1997; Vaughan, 2005.
133 I.e. Sagan, 1993; Roberts and Bea, 2001; Wildavsky, 1988; Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007.
134 I.e. Sagan, 1993; Roberts, 1990a; Weick and Sutcliffe, 2001 and 2007.
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Table 3.3: Controls required fo r the delivery o f highly reliable operations.
High Reliability Controls ControlFocus
1
Reduction of
interactive
complexity
Reduce the number of variables in the system, the 
number of relationships between the variables, and the 
number of feedback loops trough which the variables 
interact.
OD
(A+C)
2 Reduction of process tightness
Increase component redundancy, resource buffers/slack, 
and process flexibility. OD (A)
3
Prioritization of 
safety Et
reliability across 
the organization’s 
leaders Et political 
elites
Organizational leaders should clearly communicate that 
short-term efficiency w ill take the second seat to very 
high reliability operations. In addition, they must be 
prepared to spend on significant levels of redundancy 
and training.
OC (A) 
OD (A)
4 Redundancy
Implement multiple and independent channels of 
communication, decision-making, and implementation. 
Technical controls and key personnel should be 
duplicated and overlap where possible.
OM (A) 
OD (A)
5 Decentralization
Reduce where possible the number and severity of 
organizational component failures, by decentralizing 
decision-making authority with regards to safety issues.
OD (A) 
OM (A)
6 Reliability culture
Personnel must be able to correctly and quickly identify 
problems, while responding appropriately.
Recruiting, socializing, and training personnel are 
required, in order for them to know when to use formal 
rules and when to improvise.
OC (A)
7
Continuous 
operations Et 
training
Maintain continuous operations and training in order to 
avoid routinization and lack of challenge that lead to 
complacency.
OM (A) 
OC (A)
8 Organizationallearning
Develop a strong capability to learn by regularly 
adjusting procedures and routines, and support learning 
through a process of tria l and error.
OM (A)
9 Preoccupation with failure
Encourage personnel to pay close attention to weak 
signals of failure, while clearly stating the mistakes that 
they should not dare make. Support variety of error 
detection and reporting mechanisms, while encouraging 
personnel to question their own/other’s expectations.
OC (A) 
OM (A)
10 Reluctance to simplify
Encourage personnel to question the existing categories 
and expectations, while also seeking the viewpoint and 
expertise of other organizational groups/individuals.
OC (A)
11 Sensitivity to operations
Encourage personnel to give undivided attention to 
operations, small deviations and interruptions. 
Inter-disciplinary and -departmental meetings can help 
to that end.
OM (A) 
OC (A)
12 Commitment to resilience
Encourage personnel to be attentive to expanding their 
knowledge and technical facility, while elaborating their 
response capabilities.
OC (C)
13 Deference to expertise
As the tempo of operations increases and unexpected 
problems arise, decisions must be able to migrate both 
up and down in the organization, where expertise lies.
OM (C) 
OC (C)
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Overall, if we consider the parameters to highly reliable operations suggested by the 
various high reliability, normal accident, and mindful organizing approaches, a 
variety of control requirements need to be in place in order for an organization to 
deliver highly reliable operations. As summarised in Table 3.3, these controls will 
often overlap yet vary in their focus, indicating that there is a need for a multi­
layered controls approach to high reliability.
For the purposes of this study, while the focus remains on the organizational 
processes of risk identification, sense-making, response and re-organizing, the 
outcome of these processes is assessed against the parameters of the organization’s 
high reliability objective.
In fact, this study will later consider the value of the above high reliability 
parameters as an audit tool that will direct organizations towards assessing and 
evaluating the efficiency and effectiveness of their controls and culture.
3.3.3. The method for conducting the argument
As suggested earlier, this research takes an interpretivist analysis approach and, in a 
fashion similar to Walsham’s (1993) research, it utilizes three different conceptual 
schemes to investigate and later discuss the elements of context, process and 
content/outcome of a major event ISS management project.
The research analysis starts with the presentation of the organization’s structural 
context. Given that the investigation of context will be static unless examined 
repeatedly across time, Mintzberg’s scheme is utilised across the various stages of 
the ISS management project. The reasoning behind this approach is that the 
organizational structure and context change across project phases in parallel to 
changes in work activities and situational factors.
Once the contextual setting to each project phase is defined, the study continues 
with the investigation into the process of ISS risk amplification. At this stage of 
research analysis, the processes and parameters involved in the creation of ISS risk 
meaning, perceptions, and eventually behaviours are considered. The various 
mechanisms of amplification identified by the SARF contribute towards defining how 
the organizational context interacts with ISS risk perceptions and behaviours.
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Finally, following the identification of ISS risk perceptions and behaviours, the 
impact and ripples of the risk amplification process is considered in terms of the 
organizational level of ISS high reliability.
The basic objective of the method presented above and summarised in Table 3.4 is to 
provide a means of evaluating organizational reality and guiding the researcher 
during empirical work. Although the researcher’s objective is to develop a rich 
description and understanding of the various parameters to the organization’s 
encounter with ISS risk, she remains open to any further conceptual elements that 
may emerge as research progresses.
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Table 3.4: Levels o f research analysis.
Contextualist
Analysis
Dimension
Analytical Level Elements of Analytical Level
Parts of the 
organization
The IS(S) operating core; the strategic apex of IS(S) 
managers; the IS(S) technical staff; the IS(S) support 
staff; the organizational IS(S) culture/ideology.
Context 
of change
Coordination
mechanisms
The informal IS(S) communications; the IS(S) direct 
supervision and orders; the standardised IS(S) work 
processes; the standardised IS(S) outputs; the 
standardised IS(S) skills; the standardised IS(S) norms.
Parameters of 
design
IS(S) job specialisation; IS(S) behavioural formalization; 
IS(S) training; IS(S) unit grouping; IS(S) unit size; IS(S) 
planning & control systems; IS(S) liaison devices; IS(S) 
decentralization.
Situational
factors
The age & size of the IS(S) organization; the technical 
system of the IS(S) organization; the environment of the 
IS(S) organization; the power factors of the IS(S) 
organization.
Process
1st stage of
amplification:
risk
communication
The source(s) of ISS information; the ISS information 
channel(s); the individual/social station ISS messages; 
the factors determining individual/social risk 
perceptions.
of change
2nd stage of 
amplification: 
risk response
Individual/social ISS behaviours; social ISS impacts; 
stakeholder ISS impacts; professional group ISS impacts; 
local community ISS impacts; individual ISS impacts.
Organizational 
design (OD) 
controls
IS(S) interactive complexity; IS(S) process & resource 
tightness; IS(S) redundancy; IS(S) technological control 
decentralization.
Content
Operations 
management 
(OM) controls
IS(S) communication channel redundancy; IS(S) roles fit 
responsibilities duplicity and overlap; IS(S) decision 
making decentralization; IS(S) continuous training & 
operations; IS(S) continuous learning & adjustment of 
procedures and training; variety of IS(S) error detection 
& reporting mechanisms; inter-disciplinary & - 
departmental meetings to cross-check operational IS(S) 
expectations & experience; migration of IS(S) decision 
making to expertise.
of change
Organizational 
culture (OC) 
controls
Communication of ‘high reliability’ IS(S) mission 
objective; training for correct identification & response 
to IS(S) problems; IS(S) messages communicated via 
recruitment, training & socializing; lS(S) routinization fit 
complacency avoidance; acknowledgment of IS(S) 
expectations’ limitations; vigilance/attention to weak 
IS(S) risk signals; encourage communications with other 
experts/occupations; communication of IS(S) operations 
priority; encourage the expansion of lS(S) knowledge 
base and skills; encourage reporting any suspicious IS(S) 
activity; encourage the delegation to expertise & the 
seeking of assistance.
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3.4 The research design
3.4.1. The research strategy
This research adopts a longitudinal in-depth case study approach, aiming to observe 
the patterns of behaviour and events that unfold over a period of time. As suggested 
by Walsham (1993) and Pettigrew (1990), the best research method for contextualist 
studies focusing on processes of change is indeed longitudinal case-studies, since 
such an approach can
“explore the contexts, content, and process of change together with their 
interconnections through time. [...] The longitudinal case study method 
provides the opportunity to examine continuous processes in context and to 
draw in the significance of various interconnected levels of analysis. Thus 
there is scope to reveal the multiple sources and loops of causation and 
connectivity so crucial in identifying and explaining patterns in the process of 
change” (Pettigrew: 1990:268, 271).
As suggested by Creswell (1998), the choice of a case-study strategy is based on a 
number of reasons, all of which match the objectives of the current study. Firstly, 
the research argument needs to be studied in a natural setting, focusing on 
contemporary events, without, however, requiring to control such events. In 
addition, the ‘case’ under study is one of a ‘bounded system', bounded by time and 
place, while its investigation is expected to advance the knowledge of the 
phenomenon, context and theory under consideration. This is especially true in the 
case of instrumental case studies135, such as the current one, where the case itself 
provides a supportive role and facilitates understanding.
With the use of extensive, multiple sources of information in data collection to 
provide the detailed in-depth picture of the ‘case’136, the researcher spends 
considerable time describing the context or setting for the case, along with the 
detailed events during the investigation period. Thus, “ the investigator narrates the 
study through techniques such as a chronology of major events followed by an up- 
close or a detailed perspective about a few incidents” (Creswell, 1998: 63). In the 
final interpretive phase of a case study, the researcher highlights lessons learned 
(Lincoln and Guba, 1985), and links “emerging conceptual and theoretical ideas
135 I.e. Stake, 1995.
136 I.e. Yin, 1989.
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inductively derived from the case both to stronger analytical themes within the case 
and wider theoretical debates in the literature” (Pettigrew, 1990:280).
Case-studies are criticised on two grounds. Firstly with regards to the challenge of 
identifying a case and its boundaries - how it might be constrained in terms of time, 
events, and processes (Creswell, 1998). More importantly, however, case studies are 
criticised on grounds of non-representativeness and lack of statistical 
generalizability, a term that holds little meaning for most qualitative researchers137.
As Walsham (1993:15) suggests “ from an interpretive position, the validity of 
an extrapolation from an individual case or cases depends not on the 
representativeness of such cases in a statistical sense, but on the plausibility 
and cogency of the logical reasoning used in describing the results from the 
cases, and in drawing conclusions from them” .
3.4.2. The unit of analysis
The current study focuses on the IS aimed to support the Athens 2004 (A2004) 
Summer Olympic Games during the event time. This IS solution is otherwise known as 
the ‘Games-IS* and it aimed to capture and report every moment of the event’s 
action, communicating this to the world via a number of media, including television 
and the Internet. This IS solution involved a complex mix of technology, processes 
and people, was great in scale, covered a variety of clients, sites and systems, while 
it also was a multi-supplier project with many varied dependencies.
One of the key areas upon which this project focused on was that of security and risk 
management, aiming to deliver highly reliable, secure IS operations.
Although Olympic sports events are repeated at regular intervals and some 
knowledge transfer can be assumed from one event to the next, the management of 
ISS had not been strategically considered prior to the A2004 event. The particular 
event was the first one in the history of Olympic events to consider ISS and risk 
management as fundamental processes in the successful delivery of highly reliable IS 
operations.
As is described in the following section of this study, the first elements of the 
organization that would prepare and operate the Games-IS infrastructure were put in 
place approximately four years in advance of the event. The first elements of the ISS
137 I.e. Glesne and Peshkin, 1992.
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management project organization, on the other hand, were put in place two years 
prior to the A2004 Games. The researcher joined the organization at that stage and 
continued her research, data collection and analysis for the entire two-year period of 
the Games-ISS project; from initiation to closure. Therefore, the case-study 
boundaries were relatively clearly defined - both the timeframe and scope.
As presented above, the focus of the research is the process of risk management and 
organizational change involved in preparing and delivering highly reliable ISS 
operations138. This is the process under investigation and the two-year period (from 
June 2002 to September 2004) during which data was collected and analysed. 
Organizational structures, activities, priorities, the cultural and political context 
changed during that period, as well as ISS perceptions, behaviours and controls.
The A2004 Olympic organization, the IS integration and ISS management projects 
under study are unique as they were specific to their time, space and context. Yet, 
major project and event organizations and their requirement for highly reliable IS(S) 
infrastructures are certainly not unique. As covered in section 2.4 of this study, 
organizations and their deliverables are increasingly organized in megaproject and 
event structures. In addition, complex and great in scale IS infrastructures that are 
implemented by various partners, for diverse clients, and with highly reliable 
security requirements, are not at all uncommon. Yet, such case studies have been 
rarely investigated; in fact, there is no evidence of prior research with a focus 
similar to the one presented in the current study.
Therefore, the researcher considers that the investigation of the A2004 Olympics ISS 
case-study operates instrumentally to facilitate greater understanding with regards 
to a major-event organization’s capacity to deliver highly reliable ISS operations. The 
organizational structure, scope, outer and inner context will be considered in 
relation to the organization’s objective to deliver highly reliable ISS.
138 As quoted by one of the managers overseeing the Games-time IS integration, this was an 
organization that within a period of two years had to “get from zero to hero”.
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3.4.3. Data collection methods
From early on in the data collection research stage, the researcher had to address 
issues of site and information access, and rapport. Initial access to the case study 
environment initiated by approaching executive members of the ATHOC (Athens 
Olympic Committee) and the IOC (International Olympic Committee) approximately 
six months prior to entering the organization for in-depth data collection. Informing 
them of the researcher’s interests and requirements, members of the two 
organizations provided some background information on the structure, mission and 
high-level plan of the A2004 IS Integration project. They agreed to provide the 
researcher access to the ATHOC organizational environment, where data collection 
could officially commence.
Therefore, the on-site data collection started in June 2002, observing daily activities 
and focusing data collection on understanding better the greater organizational 
structure, the project plan, partners’ roles, responsibilities, interests and 
expectations.
As is demonstrated in Chapter 4 of this study, given that this was a project 
organization with distinct project phases, deliverables and deadlines, the pace of 
organizational change was relatively fast. As was foreseen, the organization grew 
quickly in scale and complexity, while partnering organizations and teams had to 
increasingly coordinate their mutual and/or interconnected activities. Direct access 
to people and information was harder to obtain, with direct implications onto the 
data collection activities of the researcher139.
Research data had to be collected from both primary and secondary sources, while 
the data methods varied depending on the focus of analysis, the availability and 
number of respondents (sample size). Therefore, both quantitative and qualitative 
data was collected, although the research focuses primarily on the latter type. Data 
collection methods are summarized in Table 3.5. In addition, the researcher 
maintained her own personal log of daily project activities, observations and views. 
These were later compared to findings associated with workers’ perceptions, 
observed behaviours and incidents.
139 During the period of data collection the researcher held the following positions in 
chronological order: (a) March 2002 - June 2002: independent observer (reporting to the IOC); 
(b) June 2002 - June 2003: independent observer (reporting to ATHOC); (c) June 2003 - 
September 2004: ISS Risk Associate Et Transfer of Knowledge Consultant (reporting to 
SchlumbergerSema/Atos Origin).
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Table 3.5: Data types and collection methods
Prim ary Sources Secondary Sources
Interviews 
(structured Et semi- 
structured)
>90 Policies & Procedures >150
Meeting Minutes >80 Audit-Trail Logs >50
Questionnaires >120 Performance Metric Reports >100
Device Logs >100 Audit Reports >160
Incident Logs >20,000 SL2002 ToK Documents >15
Incident Reports >20 Training Material >10
Focus Group Meetings >10 AAR Reports >20
Daily/Monthly Journals 
(Field Note Observations)
24 Marketing Presentations
>20
Publications/Press Articles >150
IT Design Documents >20
Strategy Plans Et Guidelines >10
In relation to the interviews conducted (i.e. Appendix-A3), a number of ISS 
management process stakeholders were identified depending on their organizational 
(formal and informal) role and responsibilities, while interview topics and degree of 
structure depended on the project phase and emerging issue under investigation. 
Therefore, interviews at the early project stages were concerned more with the 
formal organizational structure, mission, activities, responsibilities, and decisions.
The longer the researcher remained in the organization, the more she could 
appreciate many of the above issues by purely observing behaviours and reviewing 
secondary information sources. Thus, interviews gradually became more structured 
and focused on risk perceptions and behaviours associated with ISS risk 
communications, decisions and incidents.
During interviews verbatim notes were taken, while the recorded responses were 
analysed as soon as possible, focusing on identifying new patterns, topics and 
directions of inquiry. Apart from the interview responses, the researcher would 
include into her field notes the behavioural response of the interviewees.
At this point it has to be noted that given the interactive intimacy of interviewing,
data collection via this method often required a certain rapport to be built between
the researcher and respondent, which would facilitate the required discussion
openness. This was particularly so as interviews became more structured and 
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investigated topics in considerable detail. The required rapport was built up over the 
extended period of field work and the regular contact with the respondents, while 
the researcher consciously avoided communicating her own views.
In addition to one-to-one interviews, a number of focus group meetings were 
organized following operational incidents in order to obtain a rounded view of the 
incident, as well as to encourage participation from people reluctant to be 
interviewed on their own, or who felt they had nothing to say. Once again, 
behavioural responses of the focus group members were also considered.
With regards to questionnaires, these were utilized to assess workers’ perceptions of 
risk, behaviours and decisions, as well as the appropriateness and effectiveness of ISS 
management controls. They were repeatedly completed by the same or additional 
respondents, in order to determine any changes in perceptions. In addition to scoring 
a particular questionnaire statement, respondents were encouraged to provide any 
further comments, elaborating their views.
Finally, in each organizational group an informant was identified who at different 
project stages helped validate the findings and the emergent concepts. This 
approach was particularly useful in assessing the political and cultural context, while 
identifying themes that would have to be further investigated.
3.4.4. Data analysis and presentation methods
Like any other longitudinal case-study research, this study involved a continuous 
‘ learning process’ of data gathering and analysis140. In addition, given the 
contextualist analysis approach of this research, information was collected and 
analysed across a number of levels of analysis as well as over time. The various 
themes and issues identified from the collected primary and secondary information 
sources were categorised on basis of the analysis levels identified in Table 3.4.
Such a layered method of analysis has been supported by a number of scholars141, 
suggesting that not only can it provide an in-depth description of the environment 
under study, but also it  can increase model predictability. By investigating the 
interactions of various parameters across different levels of analysis (i.e. Table 3.4) 
and by including the time dimension as a systematic focus of the analysis, the
140 I.e. Horlick-Jones et al, 2003.
141 I.e. Breakwell and Barnett, 2003; Pidgeon, 1999.
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relationships of constructs can be investigated at one time and over time. Therefore, 
data analysis of this research was focused on the examination of both coterminous 
and sequential change.
The interpretation of the research findings was undertaken in line with the 
ontological and epistemological assumptions of this research, thus aiming to generate 
meaningful principles which can be applied in other settings.
As for the credibility of the data analysis and transferability of interpretations these 
were operationalised via the prolonged engagement in the field and the triangulation 
of data sources (i.e. Lincoln and Guba, 1985).
Finally, with regards to the presentation of the collected and analysed data this was 
done through the use of narratives - specific to the various project phases. Such 
narratives focus on the contextual settings of the organizational process of ISS 
management, as well as provide an in-depth description of ISS incidents and their 
impacts. The narratives are augmented by tables and figures.
3.5 Conclusion
The main contribution of this chapter is to present clearly the research argument and 
the researcher's sociological and philosophical beliefs and assumptions that guide the 
choice of theoretical perspective and methodology.
This chapter stresses that organizational encounters with risk and ISS management 
processes of change are characterised by complex and dynamic social interactions. 
Such interactions require to be investigated across various levels of analysis, while 
the associated relational rules need to be understood within their contextual setting 
and over time.
Therefore, this chapter argues in favour a contextualist, layered approach to 
interpreting ISS and risk management, which is driven by empirical investigation. The 
following chapter presents the empirical findings of this study.
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4. Empirical Findings
4.1 Introduction
The in-depth case study described in this chapter concerns the lifecycle of the A2004 
Games-ISS project, which aimed to design, build and operate a highly reliable ISS 
management solution for the A2004 Olympic Games.
As presented earlier, the case study investigation was a longitudinal one, 
commencing with the data collection approximately four months prior to the formal 
initiation of the A2004 Games-ISS project and continuing throughout the project’s 
lifecycle to event-time and project conclusion. Therefore, the environment under 
study was one of continuous change and increasing maturity142 across various levels, 
with the Games-ISS project aiming to deliver by event-time a highly reliable ISS 
management solution. Indeed, it  was this process of organizational change and the 
organization’s mission and strategy that led the researcher to choose this case study. 
The analysis of the changing formal and informal organizational structures143, 
activities and context provides insight into the delivery and management of highly 
reliable ISS.
This chapter presents the organizational scope, structure, socio-political and 
technological context that determined the event organization’s capacity to deliver 
highly reliable ISS. These factors are examined within a wider contextual and 
organizational level, taking into consideration the impact of/on the greater A2004 
Games-IS Integration project and A2004 Games Event.
Thus, section 4.2 utilizes Mintzberg’s (1979) scheme of organization structural 
context to describe the Olympic and A2004 Event organization, and the A2004 
Games-IS Integration project organization. The A2004 Games-IS processes and 
infrastructure are presented along with the growing significance of the ISS 
management function and associated project. Section 4.3 presents an analysis of the
142 The term ‘maturity’ in this research draws from Weick and Sutcliffe’s (2001, 2007) work of 
organizational and operational mindfulness. The authors suggest that controls of 
mindful/highly-reliable organizing are classified into varying categories of maturity, ranging 
from ‘non-existent’ (immature) to ‘existent’ (mature) (i.e. Appendix-A10).
143 The term ‘formal’ organizational structure and controls refers to the fixed set of rules of 
intra-organizational procedures that govern the ways in which collaboration and coordination 
will serve one (or more) common goal. The ' informal’ organization is the natural means to 
augment the ‘formal’ organizational structure, communications and controls (i.e. Dhillon, 
2007:3-5), and it is the dynamic and interlocking social structure that governs how people will 
work together in practice.
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case study. It uses the conceptual framework developed in section 3.3.2 in order to 
examine the delivery and management of highly reliable ISS. Section 4.4 identifies 
the emergent issues for discussion, and section 4.5 concludes the interpretation of 
the ISS management practices in the A2004 IS-Games project organization.
4.2 The organization and project contextual background
4.2.1. The Olympic event organization and the A2004 Olympic Games 
The parts of the Olympic event organization
The preparation and running of any Olympic Games event involves the contribution of 
a number of organizations, all of which are guided by the Olympic Charter. The 
latter is the codification of the fundamental principles of Olympism, rules and bye- 
laws adopted by the International Olympic Committee (“ IOC” ), governing the 
organization, action and operation of the ‘Olympic Movement’144.
The five main constituents of the Olympic Movement are the IOC, the temporary 
Organizing Committees for the Olympic Games (“OCOGs” ), the International Sports 
Federations (“ IFs” ), the National Olympic Committees (“ NOCs” ) and the National 
Sport Federations (“ NSFs” ).
All the above organizations within the Olympic System are non-profit ones according 
to the laws of the country where their headquarters are located. However, over 
approximately the past twenty years, the Olympic Movement has been increasingly 
confronted by four other types of actor whose legal nature is different. These are 
depicted in Figure 4.1 below.
144 According to the Olympic Charter (IOC, 2007:11), “Olympism is a philosophy of life, [...] 
blending sport with culture and education”, while “the goal of Olympism is to place sport at 
the service of the harmonious development of man with a view to promoting a peaceful 
society concerned with the preservation of human dignity” .
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Olympic
Charter
IOC
International
Sponsors
Government
NOCs
(202)
OCOGs
(3 or 4)
IFs
(35)
NSFs
Clubs
Athletes
Sponsors & 
national 
media
Leagues of 
athletes or 
teams
-  - ►
Figure 4.1: The Olympic System and the new actors encirclins it  (Source: adapted 
from Chappelet and Bayle, 2005:19-21).
Utilizing Mintzberg’s scheme of contextual analysis (i.e. Table 3.1) for the Olympic 
organization and System, the Olympic System’s ideology is summarised by the 
objectives of the Olympic Movement. The majority of the Olympic constituents - 
particularly those that work at the top - work voluntarily with their main goal the 
performance of their mission. They thus have members and stakeholders rather than 
customers and clients; they depend on many volunteers, and usually have a two-level 
governance made up of elected officials and hired managers. As such, they are often 
more open to public scrutiny than profit-foe used companies.
However, most Olympic sport organizations have progressed from an administrative 
logic to a marketing approach and then to a strategic one.
“The strategic and performance management approach aims to define a 
project, to structure it in a way that will permit it to be successful, and then 
to evaluate it once it is completed in order to draw useful conclusions for the 
continuation of this project or development of new ones” (Chappelet and 
Bayle, 2005:ix).
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This shift in management approach has been led by the IOC, which has increasingly 
identified the need for sustainable and performance-controlled Olympic Games.
According to IOC's Director of Technology,
“costs have been steadily increasing over the past 15-20 years, and it seems 
that each OCOG is aiming to outperform the previous one in scale and services 
they provide. This is not the goal of the IOC. We do not want Olympic projects 
to creep into something we cannot manage. [...] The growing size of the 
Games has made it imperative for us to seek the expertise and economic 
assistance of our sponsoring partners. But sponsorships do not come easy. We 
need to provide sustainable Olympics, transfer knowledge and resources from 
one event to the next - which we haven’t done as much as we needed to in 
the past. Our role in the IOC is to ensure that all necessary services and 
infrastructures are in place for the Games. Beyond that, anything additional 
has to remain manageable and not jeopardise the entire project” (i.e. 
Appendix-A3:1).
Understandably, the Olympic marketing programme has become the driving force 
behind the promotion, the financial security, and stability of the Olympic Movement. 
The latter generates revenue through broadcasting, The-Olympic-Partners (TOP), 
domestic sponsoring, ticketing, and licensing.
With regards to the operational core of the Olympic System, the IOC has no 
financial responsibility whatsoever in respect to the Games’ organization and staging. 
It merely governs the organization and operation of the Olympic Movement, 
stipulating the conditions for the celebration of the Games. The organization 
primarily responsible for the operational functions of the event145 and the 
preparation and organizing of the Games is the OCOG. Among others, the OCOG is 
responsible for the sourcing of volunteers - an integral part to the hosting of any 
Olympic Games. Volunteers are utilised across a number of technical and operational 
support positions, while their training depends on their allocated responsibilities. In 
addition to the OCOG, the NOCs and IFs will assist by specifying the rules of and 
requirements for the hosting of each sport event, and the TOPs will provide their 
know-how and technology to support the Games’ operational services.
145 For more information on the operational functions of an Olympic Games see Theodoraki 
(2007).
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The technical and support s ta ff of the Olympic System is comprised by professional 
workers that are sourced from a number of organizations such as the TOPs and 
various IOC subsidiary organizations146.
The Olympic System organizational actors identified above were also evident in the 
case of the A2004 Olympic Games under study. The Athens 2004 OCOG was that of 
ATHOC, while the Athens Olympic Broadcasting (AOB) was the Host Broadcaster of 
the Games. The AOB produced the international television and radio signal of the 
Games, delivering it to the venues and the International Broadcasting Centre (IBC). 
The AOB also provided the broadcast services and equipment to the various IOC 
broadcasting partners, such as the NBC and CBC networks.
The TOP sponsors included among others Kodak, Xerox, SchlumbergerSema (later 
Atos Origin), Panasonic, Samsung and SWATCH. The National Sponsors were relatively 
limited in the A2004 Games, owing to the small size of the domestic economy.
However, as argued earlier (i.e. section 3.2.2) and as Mintzberg’s (1979) scheme of 
organization contextual analysis suggests, although an organigram may show the 
division of labour and how authority flows among divisions, it  does not capture 
informal relationships and does not necessarily show work flows either.
146 IOC subsidiary organizations include the OBS and OGKS. 
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T h e  O lym pic  E v e n t an d  th e  A 2 0 0 4  p ro je c t  phases an d  fu n c tio n s
As stated above, the most critical organization in the planning and delivery of an 
Olympic Games event is that of the OCOG. It utilises the IOC’s project management 
framework of the Masterplan  in order to coordinate work activities across the  
numerous partners and divisions. A temporary organization in nature, the OCOG’s 
planning processes evolve to match the tasks at hand. Table 4.1 summarises the  
project phases and activities. These also applied to the case of the A2004 Games.
Table 4.1: (A2004) Olympic event project phases, activities and outputs.
(A2004) Project Phase
■
Activities
1
Foundation Planning 
phase
(Games-98 to 
Games-66 months)
This phase initiates when the host city is selected.
The board is formed, top management staff is recruited, the 
need for Games-related legislation is identified, corporate 
governance structure is selected, and the image of the Games 
is envisioned.
2
Operational Planning 
phase
(Games-72 to 
Games-12 months)
The OCOG progressively creates more detailed planning for the 
Games operations, which aims to move the organization 
towards a state of readiness to deliver the Games.
The focus is on functional planning, although gradually moving 
to a venue-based focus.
3
Test-Event Planning 
phase
(Games-20 to 
Games-10 months)
The OCOG and its partners test its Games-time preparations. 
This involves planning to conduct venue-based test events. The 
focus is shared between functions and venues. Feedback and 
lessons learned from these events are incorporated into the 
Games planning documents.
4
Operational 
Readiness Planning 
phase
(Games-12 to 
Games-1 month(s))
Simulation exercises and rehearsals take place across functions 
and venues. The focus is increasingly becoming venue-based.
5 Operational phase(Games)
During a period of approximately 2 weeks, the Games are 
executed and the focus is venue-based. Few functions retain a 
central management and monitoring capability.
In A2004 the Games took place on the 13-29 August 2004.
6 Dissolution phase(Games+12 months)
Venues are reinstated to their owners. The OCOG is dissolved, 
and any assets are liquidated.
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There were 53 functional areas in the A2004 Organizing Committee (ATHOC)147, 
where each had to include in its functional plans the scope and level of service along 
with elements of time, resource, budget, and (workforce or volunteer) training 
planning. Plans were communicated among functions in order to identify 
interdependencies, risks and issues, supporting the integration process.
According to ATHOC’s Director of Technology,
“ by reviewing each other’s plans, the entire organization is being educated on 
the operations necessary to run an Olympic Games. [...] Appreciating the scale 
and complexities of a project such as the hosting of a Games event requires a 
lot of time, structured communications and coordination. Before each 
function understands what it needs to do, it has to appreciate the greater 
picture; and that is not an easy task. This is where the transferred IOC 
knowledge can come in handy. It is unfortunate that the IOC transfer of 
knowledge programme did not initiate prior to the Sydney Games in 2000” 
(i.e. Appendix-A3:24).
As the OCOG organization moves to a venue-based focus148, similar to the functional 
plans, the venue operating plans bring together and integrate the operations of each 
functional area required to operate the venue. This is also when volunteer 
requirements are specified in greater detail. In the case of the A2004 Olympic Games 
the venues were 60 in total, 35 of which were competition venues, hosting a total of 
28 sports, or 300 sport events.
According to the Games-IS Chief Integrator i.e. Appendix-A3:9), as an OCOG and its 
partners move from one project phase to the next, higher understanding is secured 
given that the detail of operations and responsibility boundaries are made clear. 
Similarly, staff confidence gradually increases.
Utilizing Mintzberg’s scheme of organization structural context, the key coordinating 
mechanisms, design parameters, and situational factors of the A2004 OCOG (ATHOC) 
are summarised by the researcher as in Table 4.2.
147 I.e. Theodoraki E (2007).
148 The shift to a venue-based focus and operations is known within the Olympic context as 
‘venuisation’.
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Table 4.2: Athens 2004 Organizing Committee (ATHOC) organizational characteristics across project phases.
Age
Foundation 
Planning phase
(G-98 - G-66 months)
Operational 
Planning phase
(G-72 - G-12 months)
Test-Event 
Planning phase
(G-20 - G-10 months)
Operational 
Readiness 
Planning phase
(G-12 - G-1 months)
Operational 
(Games) phase
Dissolution phase
Size Medium Medium Medium Large Large Small
Environment Simple/dynamic Complex/dynamic Complex/ relatively stable
Complex/ 
relatively stable
Complex/ 
relatively stable Simple/ stable
_Resource
Dependence High High High High High Moderate
Power
....  I1"'
High external 
control
High external 
control
High external 
control
High external 
control
High external 
control
High external 
control
Strategic Capacity Low Low Low Low Low Low
Job Specialization Little Moderate Moderate Great Great Little
Unit Grouping
..................
Functional-based Functional-based Functional- & venue-based
Functional- & 
venue-based Venue-based Functional-based
. . .  ~ . Liaison Devices Few Moderate Many Many Few Few
Behavioural
Formalization Little Moderate Much Much Moderate Little
Centralization Centralization Somedecentralization
Some
decentralization Decentralization Decentralization
Selective
decentralization
Training Little Some Some Much Little Little
Basic Organizational 
Part Strategic apex
Strategic apex/ 
operating core/ 
technical staff
Technical staff/ 
operating core
Technical staff/ 
operating core Operating core
Technical staff/ 
operating core
Basic Coordination 
Mechanism
.  ................................
Mutual adjustment Standardization of outputs
Standardization of 
work processes
Standardization of 
work processes Mutual adjustment
Standardization of 
outputs
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4.2.2. The A2004 IS organization and the Games-IS Integration project
One of the functional areas of the A2004 Games organizational system was that of 
information technology. This involved the implementation and operation of two 
separate solutions. The purpose of the first, labelled Admin-IS, was to support the 
Games’ administrative and preparation activities by ATHOC and its partners.
This IS came into existence soon after the establishment of ATHOC, approximately 
seven years prior to the A2004 Games. The IT solution and respective organization 
was developed ad-hoc by ATHOC personnel in order to meet the organization’s needs 
at the time. The Admin-IS was exclusively managed and monitored by the ATHOC IT 
Department personnel.
The second IS solution, which is the one this research focuses on, was labelled 
Games-IS (or Games-network), since it was deployed during the Games. The key 
functions of the Games-IS involved three mission-critical IT-enabled services:
• the support of planning and operation activities related to a number of ATHOC 
Games management functions, such as accreditation, sport entries and 
qualification, transportation and accommodation schedules, medical encounters 
reports, protocol for VIP activities, arrivals and departures, and staff and 
volunteer management;
• the capture of the Olympic sport competition timings and scores, and their on- 
venue communication;
• the diffusion of Olympic Games event information, including the real-time 
delivery of competition results and athlete information to commentators, and the 
provision of related information to the media, athletes, judges, coaches and 
sponsors via on-site kiosks.
The Games-IS solution constituted a major IS integration project, where a number of 
partners and functional teams had to coordinate their activities to deliver and 
operate the end solution during the 17 days of the A2004 Games event. The IS- 
Integration project started approximately 3.5 years in advance of the Games. The 
organization responsible for leading the integration and project management, as well
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as managing the IT operations, was the IOC's information technology TOP sponsor, 
SchlumbergerSema149.
The Games-IS objectives, processes and solutions
According to the SchlumbergerSema Games-IS Chief Integrator, the objective of the 
Games-IS Integration project is
“ the seamless integration of Olympic technologies, processes and people, 
delivering high quality Olympic services and results. [...] This is a highly visible 
project, and the services we support are critical to its success. We get no 
second chance. The project end date does not move. The performance cannot 
be compromised. We must succeed. The solutions we develop, integrate and 
operate have to be reliable and available throughout the duration of the 
Games.[...] The one thing that absolutely cannot happen is that competition is 
interrupted” (i.e. Appendix-A3:9).
As suggested above, the role and responsibilities of SchlumbergerSema was not 
merely that of system integration. The key IS services expected of the TOP IT sponsor 
included: partner management; systems integration; change control; information 
security; and Olympic operations (i.e. Appendix-A4).
In addition, ATHOC and SchlumbergerSema had been directed by the IOC that 
“successful Games mean reliable Games, without increasing their complexity and 
cost” 150(i.e. Appendix-A3:1). The IOC urges its TOP sponsors to demonstrate ways of 
cost containment through the transfer of knowledge and the reuse of past-event 
technologies. Therefore, in terms of IS solutions and services, a successful Games is 
not only one that demonstrates high reliability, but also cost and resource 
effectiveness and efficiency.
149 In September 2003, Schlumberger Ltd. sold the majority of its SchlumbergerSema business 
to Atos Origin, including the Major Events Division. However, the change of executive 
management, corporate logo and marketing strategy of the IOC TOP sponsor did not take 
effect until January 2004, when the business deal was finalised.
150 The budget allocated to the preparation and operation of the Olympic Games IT 
infrastructure has steadily increased over the years, currently being the second greatest cost 
after the construction of Olympic venues. In 2002, the IOC IT Director estimated the GAMES-IS 
cost of a Summer Olympic event to start at approximately $400 million.
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As suggested in Appendix-A4, the eventual A2004 Games-IS solution was a complex 
one, of great size and many interfaces and service dependencies. The IT-supported 
processes to be delivered by the Games-IS solution could be best understood through 
a brief presentation of the three main systems and their applications deployed on the 
Games-network (i.e . Table 4 .3 ). A high level architectural diagram showing the data 
flows between the Games-IS systems can be found in Appendix-A5.
Table 4.3: The systems and applications deployed on the A2004 Games-network.
A2004 Games Systems I Description
Results System
The system supporting the results transmission process. It was 
divided into two subsystems:
1. There was one Timing and Scoring (TEtS) system for each 
A2004 sport (28 in total), which was responsible to capture 
all data from different types of devices at the competition 
venues, as well as all manually entered data.
2. The On-Venue Results (OVR) system, running at each of the 
competition venues, collected T&S data in order to 
calculate results of each sport event, and then distributed 
the results to other systems in various formats.
Results data was distributed in two different ways:
(a) real-time to the Commentator Information System; TV 
Graphics, and Scoreboards; and
(b) non real-time to the Central Information Repository, Print- 
Distribution, Results Distribution, Info2004, and Internet 
Data Feed.
The design, development and operation of the Results Systems 
were the responsibilities of Olympic A2004 Sponsor, SWATCH.
The Results Systems interfaced (pushing or pulling information) 
with 11 other applications.
Information Diffusion 
System (IDS)
The IDS gathered and distributed event-related information to 
multiple clients.
The information had to be accessed:
on line from hundreds of information points located across the 
Olympic venues;
by members of the Olympic Family at venue-located kiosks; 
real-time by commentators (i.e. information about the 
competitions in progress);
by journalists who received official result printouts at their 
desks;
by Press Agencies at the Media Centre.
by the INFO-2004 application which published information
received from different subsystems.
Overall, the IDS consisted of six applications, while these 
interfaced with 28 other applications.
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The GMS assisted in the gathering of information about the people 
attending the event and their needs.
It was divided into several loosely coupled, departmentalized 
applications, whose utilization started prior to the Games.
Games Management
System (GMS) GMS applications included and supported functions such as:
accommodation; accreditation; arrivals & departures; medical; 
sport entries and qualification; staff information systems; staff 
scheduling; and transportation.
The GMS system interfaced with 24 other applications.
The Games-IS applications had been re-used from previous Olympic events, although 
certain attribute and interface adjustments had to be completed in order to 
accommodate the evolving needs of the Olympic System organizations.
As the SchlumbergerSema/Atos Origin Major Events Marketing Vice President 
suggested,
“ the Olympics are not an opportunity for us to showcase innovative 
technology. We want to deliver a reliable solution on time; and we want to 
minimize risk and cost. This is why we do not re-invent the wheel151. The 
technology that supports the applications of the Games network has been 
used and tested before. We are merely adjusting this to new requirements. 
[...] The only area in which we use the latest most innovative technology is 
monitoring. There, we want the best there is. This is where we spent most of 
our budget - monitoring solutions; and of course testing. We test and re-test. 
We probably spend more than 80% of the project’s time on testing. The risk- 
taking is disproportionate to the amount of time we spend testing” (i.e. 
Appendix-A3:79).
Indeed, in the A2004 Games-IS Integration project the majority of time and resources 
was spent on testing, since systems were developed by different teams or 
organizations, supported by different technologies and vendors, and required the 
controlled management of their overall procurement, integration, and support.
151 IBM, the IOC TOP IT sponsor prior to SchlumbergerSema/Atos Origin, faced problems during 
the Atlanta 1996 Games when their innovative IT generated athlete information inaccuracies. 
IBM was forced to issue a public apology after this incident, and opted not to renew their 
contract with the IOC.
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Therefore, from the above analysis it is evident that the Games-IS solution was one 
of great scale and complexity, with a variety of project challenges. As the Games-IS 
Chief Integrator suggested “ the Olympic Games project is the school of project 
management. There is no learning ground quite like this one” (i.e. Appendix-A3:82).
Meanwhile, the SchlumbergerSema Major Events Marketing Vice President seemed to 
recognize that “aside from the strong technological element of the Games IS 
solution, the success of this project is primarily dependent upon people and 
processes. Humans are vital, and all these people working together are like an 
orchestra. Technology should hum away tunefully and effectively in the background” 
(i.e. Appendix-A3:92).
Hence, understanding the organizational context and business requirements, while 
finding effective ways to coordinate and manage work activities, resources and risks, 
are all vital to the success of such mega-project IS endeavours.
In the case of the A2004 Games, the organizations involved in the design, 
implementation, testing and operation of the Games-IS are summarised in Appendix- 
A6.
The coordinating mechanisms of the Games-IS project organization
In the diverse, complex and tightly coupled A2004 Games-IS organizational structure 
and technological solution, coordinating work activities, labour and resources were 
key to the success of the project.
The Olympic ideology united diverse teams and individuals and helped towards 
establishing common beliefs and organizational objectives (i.e. standardization of 
norms). Partnering organizations were not contractually bound with one another; 
however a clear and mutual need for a reliable end product and operations drove 
teams towards coordinating their activities.
In addition, the strict project time schedule and the great level of deliverable 
interdependency put great pressure on teams to avoid delaying decision-making and 
solution implementation. Teams often had to comply with dominant project 
directions, not due to mutual agreement, but because of the common understanding 
that any issues and problems would surface - and ideally corrected - during the long 
solution testing and re-testing phase of the project.
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Therefore, Games-IS project tasks were coordinated primarily through the 
standardization of outputs, which was achieved through a long process of 
repetitive and extensive testing, as well as the compliance to the ATHOC-managed 
Masterplan. Orders were rarely given in the Games-IS project organization. 
SchlumbergerSema/Atos Origin, the Games-IS Integrator and Games Operations 
Manager, did not have contractual superiority and power over other organizations of 
the Games-IS organization (i.e. Appendix-A4). As suggested by the Atos Origin Games- 
ISS Manager,
“ in this project organization policies and procedures cannot be enforced 
similar to a big corporation. We have a consortium of partners with which we 
have no contractual relationship. When we issue a policy we cannot say ‘my 
way or the highway’ . [...] We have to convince our partners of implementing 
our policies. We have to test and monitor their performance. We can never 
take anything for granted. [...] We also need to understand who matters the 
most in this project. We are not working for our IT partners. In all honesty, 
we are not even working for ATHOC or the IOC. We are working for the 
broadcasters since they are the ones that generate the greatest Olympic 
revenue” (i.e. Appendix-A3:66).
Furthermore, as the Games-IS Chief Integrator suggested “undoubtedly the most 
significant task and phase of this project is the testing. [...] The design and 
implementation of the solution takes little time compared to the time and resources 
we spend on testing. [...] This is the most critical success aspect of the project. 
Detecting solution defects, understanding what is normal, and managing changes in a 
controlled manner is what the success of the Games IS most depends upon” (i.e. 
Appendix-A3:74).
Indeed, testing was conducted across various solution levels, from the IT components 
to the organizational procedures and staff operational readiness. The aspects of 
A2004 Games-IS testing are summarised in Table 4.4.
D E Afxentiadis (2010) PhD Thesis, London: LSE 123
Table 4.4: A2004 Games-IS testing strategy
Type of Games-IS 
Testing Description of Testing Timing of Testing . .
Unit/Standalone
Testing
Conducted for each Games-IS application 
and completed by the application 
provider.
Games-24 to -16 months
Interface Testing
Conducted for each Games-IS application 
interface and conducted by the 
application provider and systems 
integrator.
It intended to verify the uninterrupted 
and unchanged information 
communication between applications.
Games-16 to -14 months
End-to-End Testing
Tested each logical flow of the system, 
verifying that all required and expected 
outputs occurred. Normal and abnormal 
cases were tested.
Conducted by the application provider 
and systems integrator.
Games-14 to -12 months
Homologation Testing
Involved user acceptance tests, where 
the IOC and IFs verified that all 
application and systems outputs were as 
required.
Actual events were simulated to ensure 
the results system conformity to the 
running of real, live events.
Games-12 to -8 months
Test-Events (TEs)
Pre-Olympic events at the Olympic 
venues started 1 year prior to the 
Games. The real, live events acted as 
tests of system performance and 
functionality.
Games-12 to -2 months
Technical Rehearsals 
(TRs)
Involved system testing to breaking 
point, focusing on capacity testing, 
abnormal scenarios, fail over tests, 
exception cases, and overall readiness of 
systems and people. TRs were organized 
and conducted by the systems integrator 
and application provider.
Games-4 to -2 months
However, aside from focusing on the outputs, further coordination mechanisms were  
evident in the Games-IS project environment. The Games-IS Chief Integrator 
highlighted that
“most of the staff on the Games-IS project is young, inexperienced workers.
They have the basic necessary knowledge to do their job, but they learn even
more on the job; and we encourage this by supporting a culture of team -w ork
and transfer of knowledge. Our workers have to work with one another, and
due to the nature of the project they also have to get involved in w hat others
do, too. We also have approximately 30 to 40 people on the team that have 
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worked on previous Games, who act as mentors to younger or Olympic- 
inexperienced staff. [...] In contrast, perhaps, to any other conventional 
organization, in the Games we encourage people to work and talk with one 
another. [...] Informal communications are very important to the project. This 
is how the staff creates a working relationship with one another, and finds out 
about the problems and progress of other teams” (i.e. Appendix-A3:77).
Therefore, standardization o f skills and mutual adjustments through the process of 
informal communications, were two further mechanisms of work coordination in the 
Games-IS project organization.
The design parameters o f the Games-IS project organization
The organizational design of the Games-IS project was closely aligned to the five 
services provided by the Games-IS Integrator, as in Appendix-A4. An organigram of 
the Games-IS project organization is available in Appendix-A7, indicating the 
organizational job specialization. Given that this was an IT solution project, most 
staff had a strong technical background, although across different technological 
areas. In most cases, managers too had a technical background, but primarily more 
senior or Olympic experience, often operating as mentors for their younger or 
inexperienced team members.
As suggested earlier, it is interesting to note that the operating core of the Games-IS 
Integration project team consisted of primarily young, Olympic inexperienced staff.
The average worker of the Games-IS staff was in their mid/late twenties, while for 
28% of the staff this was their first ever job. Olympic experienced workers - 
operating as mentors for their inexperienced colleagues - amounted to 12% of the 
staff.
During the initial design and implementation stages of the project, technical staff 
were greatly focused on their responsibilities and team activities. However, as the 
project progressed and moved to integration, testing and operational phases, the 
focus changed from functional to venue-based and operational, and project workers 
increasingly interacted with other teams as well as their own team members.
This gradual change in job specialization and focus also affected the behavioural 
formalizations observed in the project organization. Job descriptions and 
responsibilities did not change formally, but rather more organically, according to 
the project phase and demands. It is worth noting however at this point, that
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restlessness was observed among project workers as the project progressed. The 
reasons suggested for this by a number of project staff was the speed of 
organizational change - from the physical location of work to the exponential growth 
of teams - along with the increasing levels of performance pressure.
As suggested by one of the Games-IS Network Administrators during a project phase 
of increasing venuisation152, “the organization changes so quickly that it  almost feels 
like there is no organizational history - this organization has no resemblance to how 
it  was 6 months ago. I have never seen this before. The atmosphere may be relatively  
casual and informal, yet lately everything has been changing so fast, that everyone is 
feeling increasingly restless.” (i.e . Appendix-A3:78).
The above interview statem ent is not only indicative of the behavioural formalization  
mechanisms and lia iso n  dev ices  in the A2004 Games-IS project organization, but also 
of the u n it  groupings a n d  s ize . Figure 4 .2  below shows the size of the integrated  
Games-IS project organization from its creation to its dissolution. More detailed data 
can be found in Appendix-A8.
Total Games-IS W orkers
4000
3500
3000
2500
2000
Total Games-IS 
Workers
1500
1000
500
00 0 0
QC bpQ.
Figure 4.2: Number o f Games-IS project organization workers during project 
lifespan.
152 The term ‘venuisation’ is one used within the Olympic Games context to refer to the 
preparations involved in moving operations from the central OCOG headquarters to the 
Olympic competition and non-competition venues.
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With regards to the training of the Games-IS personnel this was conducted only prior 
to major Test-Event and operational phases of the Games-IS and organization. From 
Figure 4.2 it is evident that training became increasingly challenging as Games-time 
approached. Not only did the number of Games-IS staff greatly increase prior to the 
Games, but also the number of IT volunteers - from a few dozens in August 2003 to 
over 2300 in August 2004. In addition, it is worth noting that by Games-time the 
Games-IS staff included over 46 nationalities.
Formal training involved the communication to all paid-staff and volunteers of role- 
specific operational policies and procedures. However, the majority of knowledge 
obtained and communicated throughout the project lifecycle was done tacitly, via 
the experience obtained from repetitive operational testing, and the mentoring 
provided by Olympic experienced managers and supervisors.
Finally, Games-IS work activities were planned and controlled according to the 
project Masterplan (managed by ATHOC), while levels of decentralization increased 
as the project progressed to Games-time and workers moved to the venues (i.e. 
venuisation). However, in contrast to most other ATHOC functions, the IT operations 
were to a great extent managed and monitored centrally - from the Technology 
Operations Centre (TOC). This was done in order to consolidate events and 
information from across the competition and non-competition venues, and thus 
efficiently allocate required resources - especially in the case of a crisis.
The situational factors o f the Games-IS project organization
As indicated above, as the project progressed the organization quickly grew in size - 
particularly towards the later stages of the project. Such steep growth often led to 
personnel restlessness and stress, and in fact increasing personnel turnover rates. 
The IOC Director of Technology suggested that “ this is a frequent phenomenon and 
project challenge. The image of the Olympics will attract a lot of workers - 
particularly younger ones. However, the Games project is one with an expiry date, 
and soon Olympic personnel will start looking for other jobs. This phenomenon is 
more evident as Games-time approaches, and this is a considerable project risk as 
workers who leave will be difficult to replace at the last minute. Most importantly it 
will be difficult to train a new worker since a lot of the knowledge obtained is tacit 
and learned from experience in the Olympic environment” (i.e. Appendix-A3:1).
It is not, however, only the size of the project organization that changed within a 
short timeframe, but the overall environment of the organization. Throughout the 
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project lifecycle the levels of organizational complexity and dynamism changed and 
peaked during the period of Technical Rehearsals (TRs), when the technology was 
fully integrated, pushed to its limits, and personnel and procedures were tested for 
operational readiness under extreme conditions. Almost two months prior to the 
Games, the environment became more stable, roles and responsibilities more clear, 
and the technology - relatively - fixed.
However, as Games-time approached, the visibility of the event increased to the 
outside world. This was partly due to an increased interest by the media, but also 
due to the increased marketing and promotion efforts of the Olympic sponsors, 
vendors and partners. Potential customers and journalists were regularly invited to 
the Olympic venues and Games-IS working premises to attend solution and corporate 
marketing presentations. In fact, it was commonly observed that prior to Games-time 
most Games-IS managers spend considerable of their time hosting their visitors, and 
otherwise only dealt with operational emergencies.
An observation worth noting, is that given the above mentioned increased media 
visibility and the increased job uncertainty after the completion of the Games, the 
Games-IS project environment became more political, with tensions often witnessed 
within and between teams. Among others, this involved new structures of blame 
allocation when problems emerged.
The A2004 Games-IS project phases, activities and outputs
The A2004 Games-IS Integration project - managed by the TOP IT sponsor 
SchlumbergerSema/Atos Origin - adopted a typical design, build, test and operate 
approach. The project phases and activities are summarised below in Table 4.5. The 
characteristics of the associated project organization across project phases is 
summarised in Table 4.6, indicating the processes of organization structural and 
contextual change.
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Table 4.5: A2004 Games-IS Integration pro ject phases, activities and outputs.
A2004 Games-IS 
Project Phase Activities
1
Project Initiation  
phase
(April 2001 - 
August 2001)
This phase initiated with the recruitment of the project senior 
management staff, sourced from the TOP IT sponsor. The key 
ATHOC project-related personnel were identified and the project 
Masterplan was jo intly reviewed and agreed.
2
Analysis St Design 
phase
(September 2001 - 
April 2003)
The project integrator created increasingly detailed functional 
plans, identifying the required resources, related in ter­
dependencies and risks. Technology and process interfaces were 
identified and assessed. Risk strategy decisions were made with 
regards to the solution and process design.
3
Implementation Et 
Testing phase
(August 2002 - 
December 2003)
The project integrator implemented the designed system and 
network solutions and tested the delivered applications with 
ATHOC, IOC and other partners. Testing involved delivery 
acceptance, standalone, interface, and end-to-end testing. 
ATHOC and the Games-IS integrator planned for the venue-based 
test events. The focus was shared between functions and venues.
4
Operational 
Rehearsals phase
(August 2003 - 
June 2004)
Simulation exercises and rehearsals took place across functions 
and venues. Testing involved homologation testing (i.e. Table 
4.4), venue-based Test Events and simulated and/or real 
operational stress tests. Detected defects were corrected via a 
controlled change management process. The focus became 
increasingly venue-based.
5
Operational phase
(July 2004 - 
August 2004)
The Games-IS was fixed approximately 50 days prior to the Games, 
and the venues and network went live (i.e. 24x7 operations) 1 
month prior to the opening of the A2004 Games. Operations were 
transferred to the venues, although centralized monitoring was 
conducted from the TOC. The A2004 Games event lasted 2 weeks 
(13th-29th August 2004).
6
Dissolution phase
(September 2004 - 
October 2004)
The venues were reinstated to their owners, in preparation for the 
A2004 Paralympics event. Lessons learned sessions were held over 
a period of a few days, where A2004 Games-IS performance was 
discussed and documented. After that, the A2004 Games-IS 
organization was quickly dissolved.
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Table 4.6: A2004 Games-IS o rgan iza tio na l charac te ris tics  across p ro je c t phases.
Aoe
s
Project Initiation 
phase
(G-40 - G-36 months)
Analysis 6t Design 
phase
(G-35 - G-16 months)
Implementation & 
Testing phase
(G-24 - G-8 months)
Operational 
Rehearsals phase
(G-12 - G*2 months)
Operational
phase
(G-1 month - Games)
Dissolution phase
(G+2 months)
Size Small Medium Medium Large Large Small
Environment Simple/dynamic Complex/dynamic Complex/dynamic Complex/dynamic Complex/ relatively stable Simple/stable
Resource
Dependence High High High High High Moderate
Power
■
High external 
control
High external 
control
High external 
control
High external 
control
High external 
control
High external 
control
Strategic Capacity Low Moderate Low Low Low Low
Job Specialization Little Moderate Moderate Great Great Little
Unit Grouping Functional-based Functional-based Functional- & venue-based
Functional- & 
venue-based Venue-based Functional-based
Liaison Devices Few Moderate Many Many Few Few
Behavioural
Formalization Little Moderate Great Great Moderate Little
Centralization Centralization Centralization Somedecentralization Decentralization Decentralization Centralization
Training Little Little Some Much Little Little
Basic Organizational 
Part Strategic apex
Strategic apex/ 
operating core/ 
technical staff
Technical staff/ 
operating core
Technical staff/ 
operating core Operating core
Technical staff/ 
operating core
Basic Coordination 
Mechanism Mutual adjustment
Standardization of 
outputs
Standardization of 
outputs
Standardization of 
work processes Mutual adjustment
Standardization of 
outputs
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4.2.3. The A2004 Games-ISS organization and project
As covered in Appendix-A4 of this study, the delivery of ISS was one of the key 
Games-IS Integration project deliverables, aiming to protect the Games-IS 
infrastructure and operations from any undesired and/or uncontrolled phenomena 
which could impact the Olympic Games.
In fact, with the completion of the A2004 Games, senior members of the Games-IS 
organization suggested that one of the project’s greatest success stories was the 
delivery of a risk-based secure infrastructure (i.e. Appendix-A3: 92, 95, and 96).
However, the strategic significance of ISS to the success of the A2004 Games-IS was 
not appreciated to that extent from the early days of the project. The initial 
‘METE/?’153 contract between the IOC and its TOP IT partner did not cover any ISS 
requirements. Neither did the initial contract and agreed Masterplan between 
ATHOC and SchlumbergerSema. As the IOC IT Director and SchlumbergerSema Chief 
Integrator154 later suggested, it was the increased global security awareness at the 
aftermath of the 9/11 attacks that raised the agenda for ISS in the Olympic Games.
According to SchlumbergerSema’s ISS Risk Manager,
“ in the Salt Lake Games we did not have enough time to strategically 
incorporate ISS into our design. The Games were only a few months after the 
9/11 attacks. We only had enough time to add a few last minute security 
monitoring solutions; but no time to customize these. It was pretty much fire­
fighting - and it was very costly and inefficient. [...] After the completion of 
the Games in Salt Lake we initiated discussions with the IOC and ATHOC about 
strategically incorporating ISS into the IT Masterplan. It was not until June 
2002 that we officially approached ATHOC with an ISS vision for the Games” 
(i.e. Appendix-A3:4).
Therefore, contrary to other A2004 Games-IS aspects - where knowledge and 
technologies were transferred from previous Games - the objectives, plan and 
deliverables of ISS had to be defined within the A2004 context.
153 METER was the contractual agreement between the IOC and SchlumbergerSema (and later 
Atos Origin) that specified the IT services to be sponsored by SchlumbergerSema along with 
the Olympic promotional opportunities and privileges that the IT provider would benefit from.
154 I.e. Appendix-A3:1 and Appendix-A3:9 respectively.
D E Afxentiadis (2010) PhD Thesis, London: LSE 131
The Games-ISS project was one that received little strategic direction from the IOC 
and ATHOC, and was primarily defined by the TOP IT sponsor and its hired 
specialists. In line with the IOC’s direction to deliver reliable and sustainable IT 
solutions, the Games-ISS project was expected to protect the Games-IS assets, 
information and processes with the adoption of a risk-based, cost-effective approach. 
However, a definition of the Games ISS risks, principles, baseline and priorities were 
not pre-defined. These had to be collaboratively defined by the various Games-IS 
partners, while the Games-ISS project was overall managed and directed by 
SchlumbergerSema’s/Atos Origin Games-ISS Risk Manager.
Therefore, similar to the greater Games-IS project, the Games-ISS service was one 
that required a thorough understanding of the organizational/project context, 
business requirements and functional priorities. The organizations involved to varying 
degrees in the design, implementation, testing, management and monitoring of the 
Games-ISS solution were similar to these presented in Appendix-A6. The group overall 
responsible of delivering and managing the A2004 Games-ISS was the 
SchlumbergerSema/Atos Origin Games-ISS function. Interactions with other groups 
included mainly other SchlumbergerSema functions, ATHOC, SWATCH, IT vendors, 
Olympic broadcasters, and IT volunteers.
Table 4.7 below summarizes the key Games-ISS project modules as these were 
defined by SchlumbergerSema across the project length. The TOP IT sponsor 
proposed a comprehensive security plan that considered risks and ISS management 
controls across three dimensions - namely processes, technology and people. The ISS 
risk management methodology suggested by SchlumbergerSema/Atos Origin was 
aimed to support the centralized view of the organization's ‘Security Posture’ , 
therefore bringing value to the organization by improving ISS decision making, 
incident management and resource allocation.
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Table 4.7: The A2004 Games-ISS modules and vision.
Games-ISS 
Project Module Description Objectives ft Approach The Challenges
1 ISS Processes
ISS processes were envisioned to 
involve a mixture of controls 
associated with:
• the establishment of a risk 
management methodology;
• the creation and implementation of 
ISS policies and procedures;
• the identification and management 
of legal, forensic and ethical issues.
The objective was to have an overall view of the
Games-IS Security Posture. This was achieved via:
• a combination of risk modelling and risk 
mitigation strategies;
• an ISS risk decision focus on solution 
functionality and business criticality;
• the implementation of ISS architectural 
principles;
• the establishment and compliance monitoring 
of ISS policies and procedures;
• the establishment and communication of ISS 
metrics and KPIs;
• the implementation of a SIM solution.
• Limited knowledge was 
transferred from previous 
events with regards to 
Games-ISS processes and 
risks;
• No available industry 
standards 6t best practices for 
such an organizational 
context;
• ISS policy and procedure 
compliance could not be 
imposed upon partners that 
were not contractually bound 
with the Games-IS Integrator.
2 ISS Technology
ISS technology involved a mixture of 
preventive, detective and corrective 
controls across the following areas:
• applications, systems and network 
infrastructure;
• access controls;
• physical and environmental 
security;
• disaster recovery and redundancy.
The objective was to have a centralised and 
aggregated view of the entire Games-IS 
infrastructure, thus supporting efficient ISS 
monitoring and problem resolution.
The approach taken included:
• the integration of technological ISS controls as 
early as possible across applications, systems 
and networks;
• the implementation of a SIM solution;
• building in redundancy and eliminating single 
points of failure.
• The Games-ISS project 
initiated after all other 
Games-IS activities, including 
design and implementation.
• The Games-IS was great in 
size, complexity and module 
interdependence.
•  ISS monitoring alerts had to 
be reduced to a manageable 
number.
3 ISS People & Culture
A secure organizational culture was 
envisioned to support a two-way 
communication between the ISS 
management and Games-IS workers 
via:
• security user awareness;
• role-specific security training;
• security notices and feedback.
A secure culture was defined as one where all IS 
workers were familiar with the ISS policies and 
procedures that applied to their role, thus 
contributing to the maintenance of security, 
while reporting any ISS incidents and suspicious 
activity.
• Training had to be offered to 
a large number of IS-workers 
in a very short timeframe;
• The majority of Games-IS 
workers was last-minute 
volunteers.
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The coordinating mechanisms of the A2004 Games-ISS project organization
The lack of an A2004 Games-IS M asterp lan  that incorporated ISS at the outset of the 
Games-IS Integration project, the very limited ISS experience from previous events, 
and the relatively delayed initiation of the Games-ISS project, all resulted in 
increasing the challenge of coordinating ISS management efforts across the various 
concerned organizations. In fact, coordinating the Games-ISS project was not only 
challenging with regards to partnering organizations, but also across the various 
SchlumbergerSema functional groups.
Across the various Games-ISS project stages different organizational coordination 
mechanisms were utilised. Thus, upon initiation of the project a strategic vision and 
direction was collaboratively achieved through the s tan dard iza tion  o f  norm s across 
senior members of key project partners (i.e. IOC, ATHOC, SchlumbergerSema, 
SWATCH). The approach taken was one that did not merely focus on the 
implementation of ISS technical controls (as had happened in SL200), but also 
stressed the importance of auditable ISS policies, robust operational procedures and 
a security-aware organizational culture.
Once a draft Games-ISS project plan was created specifying the various A2004 ISS 
domains, roles and responsibilities, coordination was primarily achieved through the 
s tan d ard iza tio n  o f  w ork processes, as per planning process requirements.
With the incremental implementation and testing of the Games-IS and ISS 
infrastructure, efforts were made to define ‘normal’ (i.e. expected and permitted) 
network activity, thus increasingly achieving coordination through the 
s tan dard iza tion  o f  ou tputs.
Prior to the A2004 Games, the communication of policies and procedures, and the ISS 
role-specific training of all Games-IS workers, aimed to also coordinate teams 
through the s tan dard iza tion  o f  norms, stressing the transversal nature and 
organization-wide responsibility for ISS.
As for operational and Games-time, activities were coordinated through the 
s tan dard iza tion  o f  outpu ts  - particularly among manual workers, while white-collar 
workers also coordinated their activities through a s tan d ard iza tio n  o f  skills.
Throughout the project lifecycle, d ire c t supervision  by the Games-ISS team was 
limited only within the organizational boundaries of SchlumbergerSema/Atos Origin, 
where power structures and lines of authority were more clearly defined. However,
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even in this context, direct supervision was not a particularly effective  coordination 
mechanism. This will be further explored later in this chapter.
Finally, within the Games-ISS team , most activity coordination took place via 
informal communications and m utual adjustment.
T h e  design p a ra m e te rs  o f  th e  A 2 0 0 4  Games-ISS p ro je c t  o rg a n iz a tio n
The m ajority of A2004 Games-ISS management tasks were completed by the Games- 
ISS team , which until Games-time was comprised solely of SchlumbergerSema/Atos 
Origin ISS specialists and professionals.
The jo b  s p e c ia liz a tio n  among this core operating Games-ISS team  was along the 
areas identified in Appendix-A7, and as summarised in Table 4.8.
Table 4.8: A2004 Games-ISS core team job  specialization
Games-ISS Area Focus Objective
No. of 
Skilled 
Staff
1 Secure Network
The secure design, 
implementation, 
testing and operation 
of the Games-IS 
network.
The objective was to establish 
and implement a number of ISS 
network architectural principles 
(i.e. aligned to risk; defence in 
depth; redundancy; least 
privilege; centralized, real-time 
management 6t monitoring).
2
2 Secure Systems
The secure 
implementation, 
testing and operation 
of the Games-IS 
systems.
The objective was to identify 
system vulnerabilities and 
mitigate associated risks.
A tool to centrally manage and 
monitor all Games-IS systems was 
implemented.
2
3 SecureApplications
The security testing of 
all Games-IS 
applications.
The objective was to identify all 
application security 
vulnerabilities and configuration 
problems, assessing the 
associated residual risk.
1
4
ISS Risk 
Management 
and Assurance
The establishment and 
communication of a 
Games-ISS baseline, 
policies and 
procedures, training 
material and risk 
management 
methodology.
The objective was to establish a 
risk-based approach and 
methodology to Games-ISS that 
would raise security awareness; 
monitor ISS baseline and policy 
compliance; assess residual risks 
and security posture; and inform 
risk management decisions.
2
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The team members had strong technical backgrounds and their jobs demonstrated  
vertical specialization, although during operational times they had to exchange 
knowledge and considerably support one another in their roles. The Games-ISS area 
that demonstrated less of a vertical job specialization and b e h a v io u ra l 
fo r m a liz a t io n  was that of ISS risk management and assurance, adopting a more 
strategic, business-aligned approach to information security.
The Games-ISS team expanded in s ize  prior to the A2004 Games, incorporating 
members of the ATHOC Admin-ISS team (i.e . Fig.4 .3 ). This expansion took place in 
order to support the 24-by-7 operations during Games-time. During the Games, the  
expanded Games-ISS team (labelled as TOC-SEC team ) was broken down to three  
subsequent teams (of six each), which covered the Technology Operating Centre 
(TOC) operational shift requirements. Each team was comprised by a m ixture of 
Games-ISS and Admin-ISS members.
20
14
No of GAMES-ISS Staff
CL
Figure 4.3: Number o f Games-ISS I  TOC-SEC team members during pro ject lifespan
Prior to the A2004 Games all members of the TOC-SEC team were trained on the 
related ISS policies, operational procedures, technologies and methodologies.
ISS tra in in g , however, was not only available for the TOC-SEC team . Job-specific ISS 
training was delivered to almost all - approximately 3500 - Games-IS workers. This 
training focused on ISS policies and operational procedures, and the effic ient 
detection and management of ISS incidents during Games-time.
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With regards to Games-ISS planning and control systems, these were far fewer in 
number and degree of formalization than for the rest of the Games-IS services. This 
was greatly due to the lack of prior Olympic ISS experience, methodologies and an IT 
Masterplan that incorporated ISS deliverables. However, the definition of a Games- 
ISS baseline at the early stages of the project, and the subsequent definition of 
architectural principles, ISS policies and procedures, operated as planning and 
control mechanisms. The definition and regular measurement of ISS metrics also 
operated as a performance control system. Overall, however, as the Atos Origin 
Games-ISS Manager stated,
“ it is the next Games that will benefit the most from the work our team has 
done here. We have already applied the Athens methodologies and lessons 
learned in Turin, and after that Beijing. This will save us time, money and 
effort. It will make a great difference” (i.e.Appendix-A3:95).
Therefore, given the lack of mature planning and control systems for the A2004 
Games-ISS project, the utilization of liaison devices was critical for the mutual 
adjustment within and between Games-ISS units. Mentoring, physical proximity in the 
working environment, spontaneous discussions and meetings, and an overall 
atmosphere of team working, knowledge sharing and flat organizational structures 
assisted communications and the coordination of activities.
Finally, with regards to degrees of decentralization within the Games-ISS 
organization this was relatively low. Prior to the Games, ISS decision-making power 
remained primarily with the Games-ISS Manager, and in certain occasions with 
ATHOC. However, during Games-time decision-making remained with the Games-ISS 
team member that had the greatest expertise on the matter under consideration. 
Therefore, decision making during Games-time was decentralized as needed - 
especially in cases of crisis and incident management.
The situational factors of the A2004 Games-ISS project orsanization
Utilizing Mintzberg’s scheme of organizational context levels (i.e. Table 3.1) it was 
also made evident that the degree of behavioural formalization in the Games-ISS 
organization depended on its size and project phase. As ISS technology, policies and 
procedures matured, and ISS training was delivered to Games-IS workers, the ISS 
project organization became increasingly formalised. The same applied within the 
Games-ISS team as this expanded prior to the Games. In addition, going-live required
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that decision making and incident management had to follow certain chains of 
command - although these were not inflexible.
In addition, as the Games-IS technological solutions matured they became 
increasingly fixed, and changes could be no longer implemented unless a strict 
change management procedure was followed. As such, the majority of IS(S) incidents 
during Games-time were in fact change requests.
Interestingly, an area where there was an evident change in organizational 
behaviours across project phases was that related to the power factors and 
environment of the organization.
The Games-ISS environment was one of great complexity at the early stages of the 
project due to the lack of previous Olympic knowledge, experience, and business 
requirements. This became increasingly clear, yet more dynamic controls had to be 
implemented within tight timeframes and touched upon every other changing and 
maturing aspect of the Games-IS solution.
However, what also changed was the degree of hostility (or friendliness) towards the 
Games-ISS project and team. As the objectives of the Games-ISS team became 
increasingly clear, their efforts to ‘control’ the Games-IS environment was often met 
with hostility and resistance, particularly by experts in other IT areas. In addition, it 
often appeared that ISS controls compromised the availability of Games-IS services, 
which generated considerable resistance from the Games-IS management as well.
Power struggles were, therefore, increasingly witnessed as ISS controls were 
implemented or resisted. These were once again reduced nearer to Games-time, 
when after a prolonged period of implementation and testing, problems were usually 
resolved and a common ground was found.
However, while power struggles across functions were gradually reduced, the 
opposite happened within the Games-ISS team. As the project approached its end, so 
did employment contracts, and team members were increasingly concerned with 
self-promotion and extending their contracts, often opposing or sabotaging the 
project contribution and actions of other team members155.
155 All above observations with regards to the parameters of organizational context will be 
further elaborated in sections 4.3 and 4.4.
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The A2004 Games-ISS project phases, activities and outputs
Similar to the Games-IS project, the Games-ISS project adopted a design, build, test 
and operate approach. However, the lack of a Games-IS Masterplan that included ISS 
implied that during the first stages of the Games-ISS project a number of 
negotiations had to take place with regards to business ISS requirements, roles and 
responsibilities, project deliverables and approach.
In addition, the delayed initiation of the Games-ISS project compared to the IS- 
Integration one, resulted in a continuous effort by the Games-ISS team to catch up 
with the activities of the IS-Integration project, condensing the initial project phases 
and overlapping others (i.e. Appendix-A9).
The characteristics of the Games-ISS project organization across project phases are 
summarised by the researcher in Table 4.9, indicating the processes of organization 
structural and contextual change. Activities and challenges of the A2004 Games-ISS 
project with regards to identifying, making sense of, and reliably managing ISS risks 
are further explored per project phase in section 4.3 of this study.
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Table 4.9: A2004 Games-ISS organizational characteristics across project phases.
Project Initiation
(G-26- G-23 months)
Analysis St Design
(G-22 - G-12 months)
Implementation St 
Testing phase
(G-14 - G-7 months)
Operational 
Rehearsals phase
(G-12 - G-2 months)
Operational phase
(G-1 month - Games)
Dissolution phase
(G+1 month)
Size Small Medium Medium Medium Large Small
Environment Complex/dynamic Complex/dynamic Complex/dynamic Complex/dynamic/ occasionally hostile
Complex/relatively 
stable Simple/stable
_Resource
Dependence High High High High High Moderate
Power High external control
High external 
control
High external 
control
High external 
control
High external 
control
High external 
control
Strategic Capacity Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate Low Low
Job Specialization Little Moderate Moderate Moderate Great Little
Unit Grouping Functional-based Functional-based Functional- & venue-based
Functional- 6t 
venue-based Venue-based Functional-based
Liaison Devices Few Moderate Many Many Few Few
Behavioural
Formalization Little Moderate Great Great Great Little
Centralization Centralization Centralization Somedecentralization
Some
decentralization
Some
decentralization Centralization
Training Some Little Some Much Little Little
Basic
Organizational Part Strategic apex
Strategic apex/ 
operating core/ 
technical staff
Technical staff/ 
operating core
Technical staff/ 
operating core Operating core
Technical staff/ 
operating core
Basic Coordination 
Mechanism
...................................
Standardization of 
norms
Standardization of 
work processes
Standardization of 
outputs
Standardization of 
work processes and 
norms
Mutual adjustment Standardization of outputs
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4.3 A2004 Games-ISS project empirical analysis
The previous section of this study presented the organizational structure and context 
of the A2004 Games-ISS and greater in scope Games-IS Integration projects. From this 
analysis it is evident that the two project organizations aimed to deliver clarity and 
reliability out of an organizational environment of great operational and 
technological complexity, uncertainty, and functional and partner interdependence. 
Thus, the project roadmaps considered in section 4.2 demonstrate the changes of the 
organizational situational factors, design parameters and work coordination 
mechanisms as these occurred across the various project phases. Yet, the question 
remains with regards to the processes and mechanisms of the above organizational 
changes, as well as the content of these.
Assuming that organizations represent socio-political communication networks (i.e. 
section 3.2.2), the researcher focused her data collection efforts on understanding 
the processes in which ISS risks were identified, assessed by the various Games-ISS 
project-related functions/groups, and eventually managed across the various project 
phases. The process of communication is considered key in understanding the Games- 
IS(S) project organization's capacity to achieve its business objectives, namely the 
reliable - and sustainable - operation of the A2004 Games-IS(S) infrastructure.
Therefore, the following section of this study focuses on the risk communication 
processes of the project organization under investigation, as well as the impact of 
such communication and management controls with regards to achieving highly 
reliable ISS operations. In order to link these processes and their impact to the 
organizational context, these are dynamically considered per project phase.
At this point it must be noted that since the ISS management of the A2004 Games IT 
infrastructure was the responsibility of the Games-ISS team, from a risk perception 
point of view, they were labelled as the ISS ‘experts'. The rest of the Games-IS 
partners and teams that were directly or indirectly involved in the Games-IS 
encounter with ISS risks were labelled as ISS ‘ laypersons’ .
4.3.1. A2004 Games-ISS project ‘ Initiation'
The A2004 Games-ISS project started over a year after the related A2004 Games-IS
Integration project due to the untimely recognition by the IOC and ATHOC of the
strategic significance of ISS services and management for the IS infrastructure of an
Olympic Games event organization. As identified by the IOC’s Technology Director 
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“ previous to the 9/11 terrorist attacks we had not considered the importance 
of information security. [...] We had never before included information 
security in the IT Masterplan. [...] After the 9/11 events we found ourselves 
asking our IT partners and the various OCOGs if they had done enough to 
avoid security incidents that would interrupt and compromise the Games. We 
never received conclusive answers” (i.e. Appendix-A3:8).
Following such an increased appreciation of a strategic approach to ISS management 
in the Olympic Games, the IOC directed ATHOC and the rest of its technological 
partners to address jointly issues of ISS. Given the lack of ISS expertise on a 
strategic, technology-integrative level across the IOC and ATHOC, it was agreed that 
SchlumbergerSema - the A2004 Games-IS integrator and IS provider - was the best 
candidate to address the A2004 Olympic ISS needs. ATHOC and SchlumbergerSema 
agreed that it was imperative to address ISS and clearly scope any related activities 
and project. As such, a two-day workshop was organized in June 2002 by the two 
organizations, with SchlumbergerSema preparing the agenda and presentations. The 
workshop participants included senior management of the IOC, ATHOC and its IT 
partners, and senior SchlumbergerSema corporate and A2004 Games-IS project 
functional management.
The topics considered included past ISS lessons from the SL2002 Games; ISS issues to 
expect in A2004; SchlumbergerSema’s ISS vision; the technologies of ISS; the factors 
for and indicators of Games ISS success; and means to maximizing the organization’s 
ISS benefits. The workshop was structured in a manner that would encourage upon its 
conclusion the definition of actions and next steps. It was hoped that the attendance 
of senior management from across organizations would contribute to that direction.
During the ISS workshop a number of ISS messages were communicated, originating 
primarily from the SchlumbergerSema ISS risk expert. These messages and the rest of 
the communication process parameters are summarised in Table 4.10 below.
ATHOC, the IOC and IT partners were encouraged to provide feedback to the 
workshop presentations and messages as well as to jointly explore the ISS 
expectations for the A2004 Games. ATHOC overall indicated to be receptive to the 
expert ISS risk messages, although the SchlumbergerSema ISS risk expert later stated 
that
“ the workshop did not go as I had expected and wanted to. They knew little 
about their environment and did not understand what their ISS needs were. I
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hoped for more feedback and concrete future direction” (i.e. Appendix- 
A3:26).
Overall, the ISS risk messages communicated by the SchlumbergerSema ISS risk 
expert were met with agreement and it  was approved by the end of the two-day 
workshop that SchlumbergerSema was an appropriate candidate to provide ATHOC 
with strategic ISS consulting services.
However, what was contested by ATHOC at the end of the workshop was whether 
they should pay an additional fee for such a service, claiming that the security of the 
Games systems and network was the responsibility of the Games-IS Integrator and 
should be covered within the existing contract. As suggested by the Games-IS Chief 
Integrator,
“ the ISS workshop increased confidence in SchlumbergerSema’s capability to 
reliably integrate and operate the Games-IS. [...] There were no objections 
with regards to the messages communicated during the workshop. What was 
debated was who was going to pay for i t ” (i.e. Appendix-A3:9).
Due to time limitations and the scope of the workshop, it was agreed that this 
discussion would continue among the appropriate persons at a later point in time. 
With the conclusion of the workshop it  was agreed that SchlumbergerSema would 
provide a formal proposal to ATHOC - no later than early September 2002 - for the 
provision of A2004 ISS services as presented during the workshop.
After a series of negotiations between SchlumbergerSema’s ISS expert and ATHOC’s 
IT department, the A2004 Olympic ISS Services Proposal was formally documented 
and submitted to ATHOC in early September 2002. The proposal re-iterated the ISS 
messages communicated during the June 2002 ISS workshop and stressed the need for 
a business-aligned A2004 ISS plan: “ ISS business requirements aim to avoid over and 
under securing assets, thus leading to the maximization of returns of ATHOC’s ISS 
budget” .
Negotiations throughout September 2002 resulted in SchlumbergerSema agreeing to 
include the ISS risk expert in its Games-IS Integration project payroll, rather than 
ATHOC paying for the proposed ISS services. The ISS risk expert would commence 
work in October 2002. The ‘Analysis and Design’ stage of the Games-ISS project was 
initiated.
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Table 4.10: The A2004 ISS risk am plification process during project ‘In itiation*.
ISS Risk Eve■»t/Sign, Communication, Perception and Impact
ISS risk event /sign June 2002: ISS Workshop
Source SchlumbergerSema: ISS Risk Expert
Message ISS attacks are extremely common
Channel Interactive face-to-face workshop
Receiver ATHOC, IOC, Games-IS and IT Partner senior management.
Noise: socio-political 
context
• Increased ISS awareness of ATHOC 6t IOC after the 9 /11  
events.
• Increased ISS awareness of SchlumbergerSema after the 
SL2002 Games.
• Inadequate support of ATHOC ISS section by its senior 
IT/Technology management.
• Unclear contractual agreement between ATHOC/IOC and 
SchlumbergerSema with regards to the provision of Games- 
ISS services.
1
Expert view St 
risk characteristics
• Familiarity, old risk: There is evidence that other 
organizations have been impacted by ISS attacks;
• Controllable: ISS attacks cannot be avoided altogether, but 
they can be controlled;
• Not known to those exposed: ATHOC Et Games-IS may be 
already exposed to risk sources, yet they do know what 
their exposure is.
Layperson view St 
risk characteristics
In agreement with expert view. No/limited prior knowledge on 
the subject.
Risk perception 
impact
• Increased awareness across management groups with 
regards to the need to strategically address Games ISS.
• Increased trust in the skills and competence of 
SchlumbergerSema team and experts as the Games-IS 
Integrator and Operations Manager.
• Agreement between ATHOC and SchlumbergerSema that ISS 
needs to be addressed in the A2004 Games, yet negotiations 
with regards to ‘who w ill cover the cost’ . The issue of cost- 
coverage attenuates the urgency of defining A2004 ISS 
objectives, roles, responsibilities and deliverables.
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ISS Risk Event/Sign, Communication, Perception and Impact
ISS risk event/sign June 2002: ISS Workshop
Source SchlumbergerSema: ISS Risk Expert
Message
• ISS project needs to initiate as soon as possible during the 
early Games-IS Integration project phases.
• Olympic ISS needs to be addressed strategically and 
holistically;
• It is imperative that ISS is aligned to business requirements.
Channel Interactive face-to-face workshop
2-4
Receiver As in message #1 of the Games-ISS project ‘ Initiation’ stage.
Noise: socio-political 
context As in message #1 of the Games-ISS project ‘ Initiation’ stage.
Expert view & 
risk characteristics
• Dread, controllability: An ISS event/incident is possible, if 
ISS recommendations are not implemented soon;
• Dread, risk known to experts: There is evidence of damage 
from previous experience.
Layperson view El 
risk characteristics
In agreement with expert view. No/limited prior knowledge on 
the subject
Risk perception 
impact As in message #1 of the Games-ISS project ‘ Initiation’ stage.
ISS risk event/sign June 2002: ISS Workshop
Source SchlumbergerSema: ISS Risk Expert
Message
Olympic ISS vision - a risk management, business-aligned and - 
interactive approach, utilizing ISS metrics to monitor ISS 
performance and transfer knowledge. “ There is no space for 
error”.
Channel Interactive face-to-face workshop
5 Receiver As in message #1 of the Games-ISS project ‘ Initiation’ stage.
Noise: socio-political 
context As in message #1 of the Games-ISS project ‘ Initiation’ stage.
Expert view El 
risk characteristics
Catastrophic, dread: If you do not adopt the Olympic ISS vision, 
there w ill be ISS problems and incidents.
Layperson view El 
risk characteristics
In agreement with expert view. No/limited prior knowledge on 
the subject.
Risk perception 
impact As in message #1 of the Games-ISS project ‘ Initiation’ stage.
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4.3.2. A2004 Games-ISS project ‘Analysis and Design*
With the arrival of the SchlumbergerSema Games-ISS risk professional in the ATHOC 
Headquarters and the Games-IS project environments, the ISS expert spent the first 
few weeks negotiating and establishing lines of authority and report. It appeared 
that ATHOC expected the ISS risk expert to work full-time with the ATHOC ISS 
Section to address ISS issues, while the SchlumbergerSema Games-IS Integration 
project team initially expected the ISS risk expert to fully dedicate his time and 
efforts on the Games-IS environment, reporting to the Games-IS Technical team 
manager. Neither of these assumptions was in line with the expectations of the 
newly recruited SchlumbergerSema ISS risk expert.
Following a series of informal and formal meetings the SchlumbergerSema ISS expert 
established that he would collaboratively work with the ATHOC team, yet retain his 
independence as an expert, providing an A2004-wide156 ISS strategy, guidelines and 
support. The ISS risk expert stressed that his primary responsibility was the security 
of the Games-IS solution and that he did not wish to interfere with the authority of 
the ATHOC ISS Section Manager.
In addition, the newly recruited Games-ISS expert had to clarify his role and 
responsibilities within his own organization. He explained to the Games-IS Integration 
Chief the strategic significance of ISS and the ‘greater-than-technology’ scope of ISS 
management. This was not met initially with agreement and the Games-ISS risk 
expert had to ask for the support of SchlumbergerSema executive and corporate 
management in order to achieve the desired authority and reporting structure within 
the Games-IS Integration project. This led to the Games-IS Integration management 
team labelling the ISS Risk expert as a ‘diva’ . Yet, the support shown towards him by 
the SchlumbergerSema executive management team indicated to the rest of the 
Games-IS function managers the existing degree of trust in the skills and competence 
of the ISS Risk Manager. Thus, the Games-IS Integration team accepted the new 
organizational structure.
Having established his organizational independence, role and responsibilities, the 
Games-ISS Risk Manager started working on producing a number of deliverables, 
which were not, however, aligned to those proposed earlier in the A2004 Olympic ISS 
Services Proposal document (i.e. section 4.3.1).
156 I.e. both for the Admin and Games networks. 
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4 .3 .2 .1  Games-ISS deliverab les , controls and incidents
During the ‘Analysis’ phase of the Games-ISS project (October 2002 to April 2003), 
most Games-ISS project activities were focused on defining an Olympic ISS strategy 
and baseline, while there was also a lot of interaction and guidance provided to the 
ATHOC ISS Section. As stated by the Games-ISS Risk Manager
“ ISS on the Admin network is not our responsibility. However, matters are not 
that simple. Although the Games and Admin networks are meant to be 
separate and independent, in reality they are not. The entire planning and 
decision making on the issue of separating the networks has been wrong; but 
it  is too late to do anything now. [...] We have to put logical security controls 
between the two networks, and we have to guide ATHOC in implementing ISS 
best practices on their network too. Otherwise, the Admin network could 
represent a vulnerability for the Games network; and we cannot afford that” 
(i.e. Appendix-A3:26).
As Games-ISS activities became increasingly design-focused (from April 2003 to 
August 2003), the interactions and deliverables associated with the ATHOC ISS 
section were reduced. The Games-ISS team became increasingly concerned with the 
ISS of the Games network and the preparations required for venuisation.
During the ‘Analysis and Design’ phase of the Games-ISS project activity coordination 
between and within teams was achieved primarily through the production and 
communication of strategic ISS planning and baseline documents. These aimed to 
standardise ISS work processes and norms, while their scope and content was defined 
by the Games-ISS expert. These documents were not developed linearly, but mostly 
in parallel and over several rounds of peer-reviews.
Games-ISS controls had not yet been implemented and Games-ISS incidents were not 
reported or relevant, given that the Games network environment was not yet 
operational. The only ISS controls to be implemented and ISS incidents to be 
reported were related to the Admin network or under the jurisdiction of ATHOC, 
such as the physical security of venues and technology secure areas (TSAs). 
Nevertheless, such ISS controls and incidents also had a direct impact on the Games- 
IS solution, since the power outages and lax physical security controls at the ATHOC 
headquarters and venues - which also hosted the Games-IS environment - implicated 
the reliability and security of the Games-IS(S) solutions and operations.
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Each Games-ISS deliverable, control and incident - whether that was targeted to the 
Games-IS or Admin-IS groups - communicated a number of ISS messages across 
various project management and functional groups. These are considered in more 
detail below, along with their impact on ISS risk perceptions and levels of 
organizational reliability and operational preparedness. First, however, the 
‘contextual noise’ of the ‘Analysis and Design’ Games-ISS project phase is 
considered.
4 .3 .2 .2  C ontextual noise - o rg an iza tio n a l p o litics , c u ltu re  an d  p ro je c t
phase challenges
Apart from the organizational/structural changes related to the Games-IS Integration 
and Games-ISS projects that were summarised in Tables 4.6 and 4.9 respectively, a 
number of other contextual themes were evidenced during the Games-ISS project 
‘Analysis and Design’ phase. These were directly related to the organizational 
culture, politics and project challenges experienced during this phase, and formed 
the contextual noise of ISS risk management and communication efforts.
The first such theme to be identified was related to the contrasting organizational 
cultures of ATHOC and SchlumbergerSema. According to the IOC Technology Director,
“ there is no ideal OCOG organizational structure and therefore there is no 
point for us to try and specify one. We have to allow OCOGs the flexibility to 
organize themselves as they see appropriate. [...] In ATHOC they take too long 
to make a decision, and by the time decisions are authorised they are no 
longer time relevant. [...] All formal decisions are taken by higher 
management levels, which results in transforming the decision-making process 
into a highly political one. [...] Their team spirit is very low and they do not 
realize the greater picture and the ways in which their activities are 
interconnected. The organizational structure and culture of the ATHOC is a 
bureaucratic one, resembling inefficient hierarchical public sector 
organizations; and this comes as no surprise since most members of ATHOC 
management have such background” (i.e. Appendix-A3:13).
The above, accurately described, inefficiency of ATHOC work coordination and 
decision making processes, as well as the lack of performance and product delivery 
monitoring was also widely acknowledged among ATHOC employees and partners.
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The poor work coordination and communication structures in ATHOC were also 
blamed on the level and type of ATHOC personnel skills and competence. Olympic- 
experienced workers from both the IOC and SchlumbergerSema noted that the 
Olympic Games do not attract enough expert and skilled professionals, due to the 
temporality of the project organization and the absence of career promotion 
opportunities. The Games-ISS Risk Manager noted that
“small countries like Greece do not have the available resources required for 
a project of such scale; but resource availability is not the only problem in 
A2004. Resource availability and management has been overall poor. Because 
the local market is small, there has not been enough interest from sponsors to 
finance the A2004 Games. As a result, the majority of the ATHOC workforce is 
not adequately skilled; they cannot pay for more expensive workforce. [...] 
ATHOC needs people with more experience and technical knowledge. [...]
They should have integrated more international, skilled experts into their 
workforce” (i.e. Appendix-A3:38, 39).
However, the lack of ISS prioritisation by ATHOC management was not only the result 
of ATHOC internal politics and perceptions, but also the perspective adopted by the 
IOC. According to the IOC Technology Director,
“ information security is not of primary concern for us. It is not mandatory, 
not a priority. What matters is what is visible. What matters more is obtaining 
and broadcasting the results. [...] Information security was not a priority for us 
until Schlumberger entered the picture and a different approach was taken 
with regards to risk management and information security” (i.e. Appendix- 
A3:13).
As suggested by the above statement, the organizational culture within 
SchlumbergerSema differed to that of ATHOC and the IOC with regards to ISS 
concerns. ISS was perceived and marketed as a business enabler that was not merely 
a technological concern, but rather had strategic management implications.
In addition, the overall SchlumbergerSema organizational culture was different from 
that of ATHOC. The SchlumbergerSema workforce was comprised by a mixture of 
Olympic experienced and inexperienced personnel, with the former provided 
mentoring to the latter. The Olympic experienced workforce held mostly 
management positions, which resulted in a strategic outlook to work coordination 
activities and the relatively clear definition of workforce roles and responsibilities.
The outcome was an organizational environment of trust and relative job 
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satisfaction, as Olympic inexperienced workers were encouraged to learn through 
trial and error and knowledge sharing. Therefore, during the ‘Analysis and Design’ 
stage of the Games-IS and Games-ISS projects, the overall environment was one of 
team-working, where personnel were required to be delivery-focused. This was also 
evident within the Games-ISS team, while other teams also seemed to be 
appreciative of the Games-ISS Risk Manager’s skills and competence.
Despite, however, the positive SchlumbergerSema working environment, frustration 
was also evident within this organization. The demanding workload, where multiple 
tasks had to be implemented at the same time, and the coordination of activities 
across various functions and organizations - since SchlumbergerSema was the Games- 
IS Integrator - created considerable stress.
This was also evident within the Games-ISS team, where the Games-ISS Architect 
stated:
“ ISS touches upon every other technological and management aspect of the 
Games network. In creating a Games-ISS strategy and architecture all this 
information needs to be taken into consideration and made sense of. This is 
easier said than done. Things keep changing and new information and 
requirements or constraints keep surfacing. We cannot plan everything from 
the beginning. We do not know everything that is needed from the start. We 
find it along the way. The complexity of it all is too great, and it can get very 
frustrating” (i.e. Appendix-A3:41).
Therefore, aside from the cultural and structural differences across the various 
A2004 IT organizations, it was evident that the nature and complexity of the project 
determined to a great extent the ways of working and organizing. Furthermore, the 
SchlumbergerSema Games-ISS Risk Manager identified a number of additional local- 
market factors affecting the success of an Olympic event, such as the market 
availability of sponsors, budget, and skilled human resources, the type and size of 
economy, the availability of volunteers, and to a lesser extent the local culture (i.e. 
Appendix-A3:45).
In addition, he suggested that the nature of the project also determined the level of 
ISS and operational reliability risks. Specifically, he argued that
“ there will come a time when the Olympic Games will fail. It is 
mathematically certain. [...] In major events such as this it is impossible to 
control and mitigate all risks. Regardless of all the proactive, detection
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mechanisms and controls one puts in place, something is bound to go wrong.
What then matters is to have in place the right mechanisms to contain the 
disaster and its impact. [...] To contain and minimize impact you mainly 
require three things - the necessary resources, competence, and the right 
culture” (i.e. Appendix-A3:19, 42).
The contrast between ATHOC and SchlumbergerSema in the A2004 Olympic Games, 
refers to an extent to an issue witnessed across Olympic events, namely the contrast 
and power struggle between local and foreign/expert groups. Daily observations of 
the ATHOC Headquarters work environment, where SchlumbergerSema, SWATCH and 
other local and foreign technology partners were based, indicated that although 
ATHOC personnel welcomed the foreign expertise, they also felt threatened by it.
The IOC Technology Director verified the existence of this phenomenon - to varying 
degrees - across OCOGs. However, he also noted that
“over time their priorities will converge and team-bonds will strengthen. [...] 
There may be two distinct teams and perspectives right now, but the Test 
Events will act as a wake-up call - both prior and especially after - that will 
bring the two teams together” (i.e. Appendix-A3:13).
Indeed, the proximity of the first Test Events (TE-1) in August 2003, and the 
necessary process of venuisation - where operations moved to the competition 
venues - acted as a significant positive force of change in terms of coordination 
efforts and service delivery. Venuisation signalled the need to finalise a period of 
decision-making debates and negotiations, and concentrate on control 
implementation and efficient problem resolution. This change was evidenced across 
all A2004 technology organizations and partners. The ones less prepared for it - such 
as ATHOC - were the ones that demonstrated the greatest changes in organizational 
structure and culture, as well as the greatest levels of stress and frustration.
4 .3 .2 .3  Param eters  and mechanisms o f  ISS risk a m p lifica tio n
Given the above ISS management activities and contextual noise observations of the 
Games-ISS ‘Analysis and Design’ project phase, a number of Games-ISS risks were 
identified, communicated and managed during this period.
Utilizing the SARF conceptualization of the risk communication and amplification 
process parameters and mechanisms (i.e. section 3.3.2.1), the researcher identified 
during this project period 12 areas of formally acknowledged and communicated 
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Games-ISS risks (i.e. Table 4.11). These ISS risks and the associated messages are 
considered in more detail below.
Table 4.11: Games-ISS risks identified  and communicated during the ‘Analysis and 
Design ’ project phase.
Games-ISS Risk Area
1 Lack of an Admin and Games networks ISS strategy.
2 Lack of a holistic approach to Games-ISS; addressed as a purely technical issue.
3 Poor and inadequate ISS management efforts on the Admin network.
4 Poor physical security of Olympic venues and TSAs.
5 Problematic ISS monitoring capability in the SL2002 Games.
6 Late involvement of ISS experts in Games-IS ‘Analysis and Design’ activities.
7 Known ISS risks present within the Games-network due to the prioritization of the network’s availability and stability.
8 Games-ISS network design and controls do not reflect different levels of trust across the various network communications.
9 ISS of the Games-IS considered the sole responsibility of the Games-ISS Team. There is a lack of ISS audience-specific operational policies and procedures.
10 Unclear ISS technical requirements covering concerns of critical asset and service redundancy and loose-coupling.
11 A lack of ISS assurance controls.
12 A lack of ISS incident management controls and processes.
With the arrival of the SchlumbergerSema Games-ISS Risk expert, it was identified 
that the two distinct A2004 Games IT networks - namely the Admin and Games 
networks - and the two separate organizations preparing and managing each, had to 
collaboratively define an ISS strategy. The Games-ISS Risk Manager communicated 
that although the two solutions remained separate, the quality of service of each 
affected the other. Therefore, a common ISS vision and strategy would facilitate 
efficient ISS management practices across the two networks. Lack of such 
collaboration and coordination would lead to incomplete information about ISS 
vulnerabilities (i.e. a lack of risk knowledge to those exposed), and hence a lack of 
risk controllability.
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The above ISS message was directly communicated by the Games-ISS Risk Manager, as 
well as personally experienced by the ATHOC ISS team, which admitted their lack of 
adequate ISS resources and expertise to implement an Admin-network ISS strategy 
and understand the ISS approach and activities undertaken by the Games-network 
organization. Informal meetings between the Games and Admin network ISS 
professionals, the production and content of the O lym pic ISS S tra teg y  and O lym pic  
ISS Roles and  Responsibilities  documents, and the formation of inter-organizational 
and -departmental virtual ISS teams, all operated as further signals communicating 
the above ISS message. These encouraged the collaboration between the two 
network and organization environments.
However, as suggested by the SARF, the communication and sense-making of risk 
messages is a process of iteration and feedback. Although the above ISS activities 
established a level of tru s t from across organizations/functions towards the Games- 
ISS Risk Manager, the above deliverables did not generate enough momentum and the 
Admin-network environment remained greatly disorganized and ISS unreliable. 
Therefore, it seemed that the lack of adequate, competent and experienced 
resources within the ATHOC organization a tte n u a te d  the level of perceived ISS risk.
ISS management on the Admin network remained a low priority until a series of 
Admin-network incidents that compromised the availability, quality and security of 
the network, and the accelerating process of venuisation, changed risk perceptions. 
These ISS risk and project events indicated to ATHOC IT management that ISS had to 
be urgently addressed and coordinated with the Games-ISS team. This led to the - 
otherwise delayed - production of numerous Admin-network ISS planning documents.
More resources were allocated to the ATHOC ISS section, and an ISS audit was 
conducted by external consultants.
A further ISS risk message to be communicated by the Games-ISS Risk Manager during 
the early days of his project involvement related to the nature of ISS management. 
Across a number of occasions he stressed that ISS management was not a purely 
technical issue, but a strategic and management one. The ISS opinion lead er  
stressed that the Games-ISS function required some organizational independence, 
reporting directly to senior project management, and collaborating with a diverse set 
of groups, experts and functions. He communicated that the Games-IS organization 
had to adopt a strategic and holistic approach to ISS that would be endorsed by 
project top management. Controls would have to be ‘in depth1 and ‘across layers'. It 
was suggested that the lack of such an approach would lead to incomplete knowledge 
of ISS vulnerabilities, making it impossible and/or inefficient to control these. In 
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addition, it was stressed that with the lack of a holistic approach to ISS management, 
the poor ISS performance in one area could compromise other areas too.
The trust demonstrated towards the Games-ISS Risk Manager by SchlumbergerSema 
executive management and the past ISS experience in the SL2002 Games, persuaded 
the Games-IS project management teams with regards to the legitimacy of the 
messages communicated by the ISS expert. However, as suggested earlier, it is 
interesting to note that the organizational and structural independence granted to 
the Games-ISS Risk Manager was not fully accepted by the rest of the Games-IS 
management team, who labelled the former as ‘a diva’ .
On the other hand, it  was observed that the same sentiment was not shared by the 
rest of the technical experts of the Games-IS organization. The latter group 
increasingly collaborated with the Games-ISS team and demonstrated great levels of 
appreciation and acknowledgment of the Games-ISS team’s skill levels and vision. 
Therefore, despite the power struggle across the Games-IS management structures, 
the project organization overall accepted the ISS messages of a holistic and strategic 
approach to ISS.
During this period, the members of the Games-IS Operations group were the ones 
that interacted the least with the Games-ISS experts, indicating a relatively low 
level of awareness over ISS controls and requirements. As is demonstrated in sections 
4.3 and 4.4, this resulted in the Operations group acting as an ISS risk 
amplification/attenuation station during the following project phases.
The third ISS risk to be identified and communicated during the Games-ISS project 
‘Analysis and Design’ phase was that related to the interdependence and interaction 
of the Admin and Games networks. A series of new Admin and Games-IS business 
requirements demonstrated to Games-IS project management that the Admin 
network represented an ISS vulnerability to the Games network. This implied that 
connections with the Admin network were not to be trusted, since its ISS 
vulnerabilities were unknown to those exposed, uncontrollable, and with a 
potentially delayed effect. Also, the lack of adequate proof that the Admin-ISS was 
strategically managed by ATHOC suggested that any ISS risks would not be easily 
reduced and would potentially pose catastrophic and dreadful consequences to the 
Games network.
In addition, a series of Admin-network highly visible performance and security 
incidents amplified concerns, leading the Games-IS teams towards implementing a
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series of logical ISS controls to segregate the two networks and strictly monitor the 
connectivity with the ‘marked/stigmatised’ Admin network.
The fourth ISS risk to be identified during the project phase under consideration was 
related to the poor physical security of Olympic venues and technology secure areas 
(TSAs). Attention to this risk was raised both through a series of reported incidents as 
well as being directly visible to anyone who visited these areas. Although this risk 
became an increasing concern within both the Admin- and Games-ISS groups, it 
seemed that the former was often overwhelmed with the number of problems they 
had to resolve, and thus did little with regards to resolving the problem.
Such lack of proactive risk management generated a number of ripples and 
determined ISS actions of the Games-IS groups. Identification of the particular risk by 
the Games-ISS team led to significant concern since they perceived that there was 
little that they could do to resolve this problem as physical security was not within 
the jurisdiction of SchlumbergerSema, but within that of ATHOC. Physical security 
vulnerabilities were identified as potentially catastrophic, involuntary and not easily 
reduced. Therefore, the Games-ISS team resorted in putting pressure on ATHOC to 
address the issue, as well as designed ISS logical controls that would mitigate most of 
this risk. It was, thus, suggested that Games-IS systems had to limit functionality to 
what was absolutely necessary, while mapping system vulnerabilities and criticality 
to levels/zones of physical security.
A further ISS risk that was identified during the project ‘Analysis and Design’ phase 
was that related to ISS monitoring. The Games-ISS Risk Manager stressed throughout 
the particular project phase the significance of ISS monitoring and the need for an 
information integrating and consolidating solution. Hence, he stressed the need for a 
SIM solution, and underlined that past, SL2002 Games experience indicated that ISS 
monitoring information would become too great and uncontrollable as the Games-IS 
operations expanded. Therefore, the risk was an old one, known to experts, and 
controllable if risk mitigation solutions were timely implemented.
The need for a SIM solution was communicated by the Games-ISS Risk Manager across 
a number of formal and informal meetings with Games-IS project management and 
SchlumbergerSema executive management, as well as in a number of strategic 
planning and design Games-ISS documents. The SIM solution - that was initially not 
budgeted for by the Games-IS project - was presented as a means to obtain real-time 
understanding of the IT infrastructure’s ISS posture, support efficient ISS risk decision 
making and incident management. After a series of negotiations, the budget for a
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Games-IS SIM solution was approved, and design activities were incorporated into the 
Games-network ISS architecture.
It is interesting to note, that the approval of the considerable SIM budget was only 
achieved after the Games-ISS Risk Manager presented this as a corporate-wide 
SchlumbergerSema opportunity to collaborate with another pioneer in the IT 
industry, as well as a cost that would be justified by the re-utilization of the 
technology in future Olympic events. Therefore, framing the risk and associated 
control costs and benefits determined the impact of the particular risk 
communication.
The sixth ISS risk to be identified during the ‘Analysis and Design’ stage of the 
Games-ISS project was related to the late ISS expert involvement in the A2004 
Games-IS project. The impact of this decision was clearly demonstrated with the 
identification of new Games-network business requirements that had significant ISS 
planning (costing and designing) implications.
The identification and acknowledgment of this risk by both the Games and Admin IS 
management teams was used by the Games-ISS Risk Manager to justify his 
involvement with the activities of various Games-IS functions. In addition, he 
suggested that any further top management ISS decision making delays and lack of 
commitment could lead to further future ISS risks and increased costs. Thus, 
although negotiations between the Games-ISS Risk Manager and rest of the Games-IS 
management team continuously took place during this project phase, his budgetary 
and authority requests were, overall, granted and not delayed.
On the other hand, however, the ATHOC Admin-network environment had a delayed 
response to the risk signal communicated by the Games-ISS Risk Manager. This was 
greatly due to ATHOC's organizational problems identified section 4.3.2.2 above. It 
was not until the ATHOC IT Manager was replaced and the demands of venuisation 
preparations underlined for ATHOC’s Technology Department management the 
content of the above ISS risk message.
The seventh Games-ISS risk identified and communicated during this project phase 
was related to the ISS implications if the Games-network was not to remain closed to 
the outside world and strictly controlled with regards to its Admin network and 
extranet connections. This risk was communicated across a number of formal and 
informal meetings between the Games-ISS team and other Games-IS functions, as 
well as documented across a number of Games-ISS and Technical design documents.
D E Afxentiadis (2010) PhD Thesis, London: LSE 156
In addition, the same documents communicated that within the Games network 
there were known system vulnerabilities. By focusing on and prioritizing the Games 
network’s “ high availability and utmost stability” , the Games systems were lagging 
ISS patches and were more vulnerable than most standard systems. It was, thus, 
communicated that system images had to be strictly defined and controlled, as well 
as the Games network had to remain closed.
Furthermore, the problematic Admin network availability and quality of service 
incidents stressed the unreliability of the Admin network, and the need for the 
Games network to implement logical ISS controls to remain closed, thus retaining the 
maximum possible operational independence.
Thus, the message with regards to the criticality of keeping the Games network 
closed and tightly controlled at its perimeter was widely communicated and 
accepted across the Games-IS functional teams, although not all teams seemed to 
appreciate the full scope of related ISS vulnerabilities. If perimeter security were to 
be compromised, the consequences could be dreadful and catastrophic. However, if 
the specified controls were implemented, the ISS risks could be controllable and 
known.
Closely related to the above area of ISS risk was the issue of trust across the various 
Games-network connections. The Games-ISS team stressed - particularly through a 
series of solution design and strategy documents - that not all Games-network 
internal and external communications enjoyed the same levels of trust. Therefore, it 
was necessary that implemented technical/logical ISS controls reflected the level of 
necessary trust and were aligned to the criticality of the information and service 
supported by the particular network communication. Lack of such business-criticality 
and trust proportionate controls could lead to the compromise of not only the 
Games-IS network and services, but also the quality of communications of other, 
trusted and valued parties, such as the Olympic broadcasters. That would be 
catastrophic. Thus, the Games-ISS team closely collaborated with the Games-IS 
Network experts to identify and design the necessary ISS controls.
One further area of ISS risk identified during the Games-ISS ‘Analysis and Design’ 
project stage was that related to the need for audience-specific operational policies 
and procedures. It was communicated that an incomplete set of Games-ISS 
operational policies and the inefficient communication and application of these could 
compromise the organization’s IS and ISS performance and services. The creation of 
audience/function-specific ISS policies was considered necessary in order for each
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work group to clearly understand its ISS role and responsibilities, creating ISS 
accountability and awareness across the organization. It was communicated that ISS 
management was not the sole responsibility of the Games-ISS team, but an 
organization-wide one. Compliance with the Games-ISS policies was not only a 
matter of implementing technical ISS requirements, but also an issue of 
organizational behaviour and culture. In addition, it was also stressed that any 
exceptions to the approved Games-ISS policies and procedures should be 
communicated, managed and monitored.
Therefore, during the Games-ISS ‘Analysis and Design’ phase, seven policies were 
defined, each identifying a separate set of audience-specific ISS risk areas and 
associated controls. These ISS policies were overall positively received by the various 
related groups, while any concerns and foreseen exceptions were discussed with the 
Games-ISS team. This was particularly the case for Games-IS Technical teams, 
several of which had requested from the Games-ISS team a set of ISS requirements 
that would guide their IT designs and solution configurations.
Overall, the risk signal associated with the presence and enforcement of Games-ISS 
operational policies and procedures communicated that defining and complying with 
a Games-ISS baseline contributed towards better identification, management and 
monitoring of ISS risks. ISS risks would become known to experts, potentially 
observable, and controllable. Lack of enforced ISS policies and procedures would 
have the exact opposite effects.
A further area of ISS risk identified in the Games-IS environment by the Games-ISS 
and Games-IS Technical experts - primarily through a series of formal and informal 
inter-disciplinary and inter-departmental meetings - was related to the secure 
design and configuration of Games-IS technical solutions. Apart from typical ISS 
controls of application and system access restrictions, the prioritization of Games-IS 
availability and stability made imperative the need for critical asset redundancy and 
loose coupling of Games-IS services and business units (i.e. Olympic venues).
The need for redundancy was greatly acknowledged by all Games-IS functions, and 
was therefore included in the Games-IS budget and designed into the Games-IS 
systems and network. However, the loose-coupling of Games-IS services and venues 
was appreciated to a lesser extent by the various non-ISS Games teams. This was 
proposed via a series of ISS network and network area segregation controls, and the 
implementation of network traffic restrictions. Such controls had not yet been 
designed and implemented by the Games-IS Network team, nor could the Games-ISS
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team fully provide detailed requirements as there was still poor understanding of 
‘ordinary/normal' activity within the Games-network. Therefore, this was identified 
as an area of ISS risk that was greatly unknown and unobservable during this project 
phase, but with expectations to become increasingly known and controllable through 
a process of testing and operational rehearsals. Thus, it was stressed that over the 
next project stages of preparation considerable efforts would have to be made in 
order to understand ‘normal’ and acceptable Games-network traffic, implementing 
not only controls of IS redundancy, but also loose service and venue coupling.
Closely related to the risk signals communicated by the creation of the Games-ISS 
operational policies and procedures and the specification of technical ISS design and 
configuration requirements, was the risk signal associated with the need for ISS 
assurance controls. Throughout all key Games-ISS planning and design documents it 
was communicated that a lack of ISS assurance controls would lead to inefficient ISS 
control enforcement, incomplete knowledge of the Games network ISS posture, and 
inefficient ISS problem detection and resolution. A lack of adequate ISS assurance 
controls would compromise the efficiency of other ISS management efforts, since it 
would not be possible to monitor these and verify their levels of performance. That 
would respectively compromise ISS risk decision making and efficient incident 
management. Therefore, it was recommended that ISS guidelines, policies and 
procedures should act as compliance audit checklists, while the combined utilization 
of ISS metrics and an integrated ISS monitoring solution (i.e. a SIM solution) would 
operate as a further means to ISS assurance.
Given that ISS assurance controls were still in their design phase and had not yet 
been implemented in the Games-IS environment, no particular feedback was 
provided by other Games-IS teams. Games-IS top management had overall expressed 
their interest in the findings and effect of such controls, but other technical Games- 
IS staff were rather indifferent towards these controls and identified area of risk.
Finally, as venuisation preparations intensified, the Games-ISS Risk Manager 
increasingly stressed the need for efficient and effective ISS incident management 
processes and structures. Similarly, the Games-Network ISS Strategy and the Games- 
ISS operational policies and procedures highlighted that ISS management did not only 
involve activities of proactive risk management, but also effective containment of ISS 
incidents that would prevent the compromise of the Games network availability and 
stability. Thus, it was identified that an ISS incident management procedure, team 
structure and escalation process would have to be defined and aligned to the - wider 
in scope - Games-IS problem resolution procedure.
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This direction was met encouragingly by the Games-IS Operations group that 
acknowledged that the scale and complexity of the Games-network made it likely 
that not all risks would be known to the Games-IS experts prior to the Games, or that 
there could be unforeseen last minute changes and new risks. During the particular 
project phase, however, the rest of the Games-IS functional groups were more 
preoccupied with the timely design and implementation the Games-IS infrastructure 
necessary for the first round of Test Events (i.e. in August 2003), than with the 
mechanisms and procedures of incident containment. Therefore, beyond the Games- 
IS Operations team and Games-ISS Team, the intensity and prioritisation of activities 
during the particular project phase operated as factors a tte n u a tin g  the importance 
of containment controls.
4 .3 .2 .4  O rgan izational ISS re lia b il ity  and o p era tio n a l preparedness
Given the above ISS activities, contextual noise and process of ISS risk identification 
and message interpretation during the ‘Analysis and Design’ phase of the Games-ISS 
project, the researcher also examined their impact on levels of organizational 
reliability and operational preparedness.
A high reliability questionnaire was developed by the researcher as in Appendix-A10, 
and was repeatedly completed by a number of ATHOC Admin-network and 
SchlumbergerSema Games-network professionals that represented different 
organizational functions. They were all requested to assess the level of 
organizational ISS maturity with regards to reliable organizational design, culture and 
operational management. The responses to this questionnaire are examined below, 
while the growth rate of ISS reliability maturity levels is summarised in Appendix- 
A10: Table A10.2.
From these findings it is evident that during the period of intense Games-ISS design 
activities (i.e. April to June 2003) all questionnaire respondents agreed that the 
majority of Games-ISS controls of reliable organizational design were in place, yet 
had not yet matured and were not Games-IS universally applied.
During this period it was also evident that the majority of the Games-IS project 
management team and Operations team also identified a number of ISS controls that 
were either non-existent or they were unaware of their status. This could possibly 
indicate that during the particular project phase the Games-ISS team primarily 
collaborated and coordinated efforts with other technical functions, but not the
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management structures as yet. Communication channels between the ISS experts and 
other Games-IS functions had not yet developed fully.
It is interesting to note, however, that during the period immediately prior to 
venuisation and the first Operational Rehearsals (i.e. August 2003) a positive progress 
is overall observed with regards to the maturity of the existing controls. This is 
probably explained by the approval of Games IS and ISS designs during that period, as 
well as the start of the Games-ISS project ‘ Implementation’ phase.
In addition, as time progressed less reliable ISS organizational design controls were 
identified whose status was unknown to the questionnaire respondents. This 
indicates the increasing levels of communication and collaboration between various 
functions - and in particular with the Games-IS Technical teams - and the transfer of 
knowledge and expertise among them. The IT-Helpdesk team, on the other hand, 
remained uninformed with regards to the status of several ISS organizational design 
controls.
Therefore, from April to June 2003 the number of non-existent ISS organizational 
design controls was reduced, while control maturity improved. By July 2003 all 
identified ISS organizational design reliability controls were in place, yet their 
maturity levels - although improving - remained poor. In addition, perceptions seem 
to have converged as time progressed, indicating increasing levels of effective ISS 
risk and control management communications.
With regards to ISS controls of reliable operational management, an agreement is 
observed across Games-IS functions that the majority of these were non-existent or 
lacked substantial maturity prior to venuisation. Interestingly, the persons least 
knowledgeable of the ISS operational management controls were members of the 
Games-IS Operations functions. This finding falls in line with observations during the 
particular project phase where ISS communications were primarily with the Games-IS 
Technical groups in order to define the acceptable ISS baseline and designs. ISS 
operational management controls had not yet been developed and the associated 
communications with the Operations functions had not yet been made.
As venuisation preparations peaked prior to the first Test Events (i.e. August 2003)
ISS operational management controls improved. Nonetheless, the majority of Games- 
IS functions seem to have remained unaware of these developments and still 
perceived such controls to be greatly non-existent. The only exception to this 
observation was the Games-IS Technical team. This finding is compatible with the 
researcher’s observation made during that phase, where the Games-ISS team was 
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primarily interacting with the Technical teams, defining acceptable ISS designs and 
ways of working. Other ISS communications had not yet matured. Similar to controls 
of reliable ISS organizational design, the persons least knowledgeable of the Games- 
ISS operational management controls were those that had an operational focus.
Therefore, over time, ISS operational management controls improved (i.e. Appendix- 
A10: Table A10.2), yet were still largely non-existent, and were not communicated to 
the majority of Games-IS functions.
In relation to ISS controls of a reliable organizational culture, prior to venuisation 
findings demonstrate that the distribution of maturity estimates ranged from non- to 
greatly-existent, indicating that different controls presented different levels of 
maturity.
An analysis of the questionnaire responses suggests that the most mature control of 
reliable ISS culture was related to the clear decision making structures and the 
existence of formal and informal communication structures and mechanisms. The 
least mature or non-existent controls were related to the availability of ISS training 
and incident response capabilities. These findings can be justified by the fact that 
during the particular Games-ISS project phase the focus was on the definition of an 
acceptable ISS baseline and designs, and not on operations and formal ISS training. 
ISS work was mostly coordinated via informal processes of mutual adjustment and 
the gradual standardization of IS and ISS work processes via the delivery of 
documented strategic and design guidelines.
With the Operational Rehearsals approaching, the majority of Games-IS functions 
identified a small improvement of reliable ISS organizational culture controls. Action 
had been taken to implement such controls - for example the delivery of ISS training, 
although these remained greatly immature.
Yet, it is interesting to note that with venuisation an increased number of 
questionnaire respondents identified organizational ISS culture controls whose status 
remained unknown to them. This potentially points to the fact that with the 
approaching venuisation there was a greater recognition of the presence or absence 
of such controls. The lack of visible and mature controls may have acted as a stress 
factor for the non-ISS functions that identified several unknown control areas.
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Apart from classifying reliable ISS controls into categories of organizational design, 
operational management and organizational culture, these can be also classified into 
anticipation- and containment-focused controls.
Therefore, with regards to ISS controls of reliable anticipation157, prior to 
venuisation all Games-IS functions agreed that the majority of such controls were 
either non-existent or very immature and with no uniformity across the Games-IS 
environment. In addition, the Games-ISS experts identified that the status of ISS 
anticipation controls that were not directly under their direct jurisdiction, remained 
unknown to them.
With venuisation the majority of ISS anticipation controls were implemented; 
however they were still greatly immature. It is worth noting that all Games-IS 
functions agreed that the maturity of ISS communication controls across teams had 
improved, along with the identification of Games-IS technical requirements and 
interdependencies. However, formal training and publication of ISS operational 
policies and procedures remained greatly undeveloped.
The status of reliable ISS containment158 controls demonstrated little maturity prior 
to venuisation. Games-IS operational functions seem to have been the ones least 
aware of the ISS containment controls in place, indicating a lack of communication 
between the expert Games-ISS team and the Operations team. This can be partly 
justified by the preoccupation of the Games-ISS team with design activities during 
this project stage.
Similarly, the Games-ISS expert also identified a set of controls whose status he was 
unaware of. These involved Games-IS design and implementation controls, such as 
the existence of single points of failure in the Games-network. This indicates a lack 
of adequate communication with the Games-IS Technical teams.
With venuisation, some positive progress was observed in relation to ISS containment 
controls across all Games-IS functions, however these still lacked uniformity. The 
most confident function with regards to the implementation of containment controls
157 According to Weick and Sutcliffe (2001, 2007) reliable anticipation controls focus on 
activities prior to the occurrence of an (ISS) incident, and cover three areas, namely a pre­
occupation with failure, a reluctance to simplify and normalise, and a sensitivity to 
operations (i.e. section 3.3.2.2).
158 According to Weick and Sutcliffe (2001, 2007) reliable containment controls focus on 
activities after the occurrence of an (ISS) incident, and cover two areas, namely a 
commitment to resilience and a deference to expertise (i.e. section 3.3.2.2)..
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seems to have been the Games-IS Technical one. This can be potentially justified by 
the intense Games-IS design and implementation activities of the Technical teams 
during venuisation preparations. Otherwise, ISS containment controls remained 
invisible outside the Games-ISS team.
Therefore, between April and June 2003, as venuisation preparations were initiated, 
ISS containment controls improved. Yet, the status of several of these controls 
remained unknown outside the confines of the Games-ISS team and the closely 
collaborating Games-IS Technical teams159.
Some further observations of interest were made during this project phase with 
regards to the findings from the ‘Maturity of Reliable ISS Organization’ 
questionnaire. When assessing the maturity level of ISS reliability controls within a 
particular Games-IS area, it seemed that members of the same team, or closely 
collaborating teams, assigned similar scores. Furthermore, it was observed that 
laypersons often provided similar scorings.
Finally, it was observed that persons and teams whose activities focused on a 
particular functional area, allocated higher maturity scores to the associated controls 
than laypersons did. Therefore, it could be argued that during the ‘Analysis and 
Design’ stage of the Games-ISS project either ISS control experts operated as risk 
attenuators, or that ISS control laypersons operated as risk amplifiers.
159 As indicated in Appendix-A7, the various functions of the Technical group included: the 
Network, Windows 2000, Unix and Databases teams.
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4.3.3. A2004 Games-ISS project ‘ Implementation and Testing*
Following the period of Games-ISS ‘Analysis and Design’ , which provided some clarity 
with regards to the A2004 Games-ISS needs, priorities and vision, the implementation 
of the Games-ISS controls started with the shift to venuisation, a couple of months 
prior to the first Test Events (i.e. TE-1: August 2003).
The objective of the Games-IS(S) ‘ Implementation’ phase was to configure the IT 
infrastructure as designed and agreed during the earlier project stage, while 
‘Testing’ - over a series of operational and non-operational phases of the project - 
the reliability, stability and security of the Games-IS.
At this point, it is worth noting that the implementation activities of the rest of the 
A2004 Games-IS project had commenced almost ten months earlier, primarily with 
the implementation and testing of the Games-IS applications and the associated 
systems and network that supported these. As stated by the Games-ISS Architect
“ the design and implementation of the Games-ISS controls are conducted at a 
stage in the greater project when other decisions have been long made. In 
many cases we have to find ways around existing infrastructure in order to 
make the Games network secure. [...] It is not always easy, or cheap” (i.e. 
Appendix-A3:41).
Therefore, between June and July 2003 the Games-ISS team was intensely involved in 
the implementation of ISS controls as defined and designed during earlier project 
stages. From August 2003 onwards - when the Test Events (TEs) commenced - the 
controlled trial and error operations acted as a feedback mechanism to the 
previously defined Games-IS(S) infrastructure designs, policies and procedures. This 
led to a series of negotiations, control changes and improvements.
In addition, the increased Games-ISS workload of the project ‘ Implementation and 
Testing’ phase resulted in new members - of specific expertise - being added to the 
Games-ISS team (i.e. Table 4.8).
4 .3 .3 .1  Games-ISS d eliverables , controls and  incidents
Most of the Games-ISS ‘ Implementation and Testing' project phase activities were 
repetitive and spanned across the particular project phase.
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Overall, a number of observations can be made with regards to the Games-ISS 
activities and risk events during the ‘ Implementation and Testing’ phase. Firstly, the 
Games-ISS team became increasingly disengaged with the activities of ATHOC’s 
Admin-ISS team. The increasing workload of the Games-ISS team and the inefficient 
decision-making process of ATHOC resulted in SchlumbergerSema formally suggesting 
the recruitment of independent ISS experts/consultants to help out ATHOC with its 
Admin-ISS planning and implementation activities.
Instead, the Games-ISS team increasingly interacted and collaborated with other 
Games-IS functions, IT partners (e.g. SWATCH, KOEP), and IT customers (e.g. 
broadcasters).
In addition, the Test Events raised awareness with regards to new ISS risks (i.e. Table 
4.12) and stressed the need to coordinate the implementation of Games-ISS controls 
with other functions. The Test Events also raised awareness with regards to the 
levels of operational complexity and uncertainty, often leading to new negotiations 
and tensions between teams.
One of the lessons learned from the progressive ‘ Implementation and Testing’ 
activities was that a number of changes and Games-IS(S) reconfigurations would have 
to be implemented. These would have to be controlled via change management and 
ISS assurance procedures.
Finally, it was observed that as this project phase came to an end (i.e. end of 
January 2004), increased pressure was put on all Games-IS functions to proceed with 
implementing the IS(S) controls that had been negotiated throughout 
‘ Implementation and Testing'. Decisions were reached, action was taken, and the 
Games-IS(S) environment became increasingly stable. Any further tests beyond that 
point would focus on the impacts of increased operational scale and complexity.
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4 .3 .3 .2  C ontextual noise - o rg an iza tio n a l p o litics , c u ltu re  and p ro je c t  
phase challenges
While during the ‘Analysis and Design’ phase of the Games-ISS project it was 
observed that the Games-ISS team operated either in relative independence from the 
other Games-IS functions, or in a relatively stress-free environment of collaboration, 
things changed during the ‘ Implementation and Testing’ phase of the project.
Approaching venuisation demanded that Games-IS functions work with one another 
more closely and within tight timeframes. The interdependence of deliverables 
across teams became more apparent, and effectively coordinating efforts was critical 
to the success of the ‘ Implementation’ stage. In addition, the significance of timely 
and accurately sharing information with regards to new requirements and 
configurations was also made evident.
Thus, the ‘ Implementation’ stage of the Games-IS(S) projects required a different set 
of skills to the previous ‘Analysis and Design’ project phase. However, the swift 
change in the ways of working that came with venuisation did not always allow 
enough time for the Games-IS(S) staff to adjust. Stress levels increased and 
differences surfaced with regards to the ways of working and task priorities. While in 
the previous project phases Games-IS teams had created a positive environment of 
team-working, the Games-ISS Risk Manager suggested that venuisation “ is a time 
when we have to learn to say ‘no’ to some requests. We have to prioritise. We 
cannot keep everyone happy, and we will have to do some things on our own too”
(I.e. Appendix-A3:54).
Moving towards venuisation also created a number of frictions internal to Games-IS 
teams, including the Games-ISS team. While existing staff retained their roles and 
responsibilities as before, venuisation implied that they would also have to take on 
some new roles and responsibilities specific to the operational Test Event phases.
This often led to tensions within teams as decision-making structures appeared to 
change. Similarly, when new team members joined the existing Games-IS(S) teams, 
older members often felt threatened by the lack of hierarchical structures within the 
increasingly operations-focused teams.
Apart from such matters of internal team power struggles, levels of job satisfaction 
dropped during the ‘ Implementation’ phase of the project. Games-IS staff 
complained not only of increased stress levels, but also of great frustration due to 
the increasing complexity of operations and the great extent of required changes. 
Members of the Games-ISS team - as well as other teams - suggested that the 
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continuously changing environment and the repetitive revision of implemented 
controls left them with a reduced sense of achievement. According to the Games-ISS 
Network Analyst frustration was caused by a further factor:
“ it is impossible to get complete and accurate information. This leads to 
wrong assumptions and wrong configurations; and wrong configurations lead 
to many errors, many corrections, and many changes. And all of this seems 
never ending” (i.e. Appendix-A3:72).
In fact, the Games-IS Chief Integrator suggested that
“ during the ‘ Implementation and Testing’ phase of the project planning skills 
are not as important as during ‘Analysis and Design’ . During this stage the 
most valuable staff is that which has strong technical skills or good 
communication skills - ideally one has both. [...] During ‘ Implementation’ and 
‘Operational Rehearsals' staff across the various teams can develop strong 
relationships that are not necessarily related to organizational position and 
role. And these relationships are very important when things go wrong 
because you know who you can trust; and you will trust someone who is 
competent in what they do, or one that you know you can communicate with” 
(i.e. Appendix-A3:74).
A further observation made during the ‘ Implementation and Testing’ phase of the 
Games-IS(S) projects was that the repetition of activities and constant revision of 
deliverables also led to increased levels of boredom. In fact, boredom was also 
observed during operational Test Event phases; especially so at the competition 
venues, where workload was usually less to that of TOC-based staff.
Aside from the above changes in the working environment of the Games-IS(S) groups 
caused by the venuisation of operations, a further observation during this period was 
the intensification of intra- and inter-organizational negotiations. While the Games- 
ISS team became increasingly disengaged with ISS activities of the Admin-network, 
they interacted more with other teams and organizations, communicating their ISS 
design and procedural requirements as well as incorporating other groups’ 
requirements into their ISS management solutions.
Such interactions, however, often led to tension, disagreement and - occasionally - 
blame attribution. Tension was least observed with Third Parties (i.e. broadcasters), 
as their operational demands were of the highest priority to the Games-IS 
organization. Although the Third Parties repeatedly demonstrated non-compliance
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with the Games-ISS device configuration, connectivity and procedural requirements, 
such incidents were relatively tolerated and it was accepted that ISS controls would 
be gradually implemented.
Negotiations internal to the Games-IS organization, on the other hand, were less 
compromising. The Games-ISS team repeatedly had intense disagreements with the 
Games-IS Operations groups160 and the Games-IS Network group. These were related 
to the non-compliance of the Operations groups with the Games-ISS procedures, and 
the non-compliance of the Network group with the Acceptable Usage and Secure 
Network operational policies, as well as the network ISS design and configuration 
requirements. These tensions peaked with the debate over the implementation of 
Access Control Lists (ACLs) on the Games network. The Games network performance 
problems observed after the implementation of ACLs during the TE-2, led to the 
teaming of the Operations and Network groups, blaming the Games-ISS team and the 
ACLs for the poor network performance. The Games-ISS team responded to such 
accusations by stating that the problematic implementation of ACLs was due to the 
incorrect build and configuration of devices across venues by the Operations groups, 
and the poor ACLs and network configuration by the Network group. The Games-ISS 
team stressed the criticality of ACLs on the Games network, yet it appeared that the 
particular control had been stigmatised. The Games-ISS Network Analyst suggested 
that
“ it is convenient for the Network team to blame the Security one. The 
Operations team management, on the other hand, is not at all technical to be 
able to understand what the real problem is. [...] Nobody likes to be told that 
they cannot be trusted and restrictions have to be put in place. Implementing 
any type of security control at the perimeter of the Games network is easier 
than implementing a control inside the network” (i.e. Appendix-A3:72).
Eventually, by the end of the Games-IS(S) ‘ Implementation and Testing’ phase, ACLs 
were partly implemented. This was greatly due to the increasing pressures to 
stabilize the Games network by the end of the particular project phase, and the 
commitment from Games-IS project top management with regards to ISS 
management. In addition, it was agreed that the Games Network team would recruit 
more engineers to assist with the improvement of the Games network design and 
configuration, including the implementation of ACLs.
160 As indicated in Appendix-A7 the Games-IS Operations function included the following 
teams: Venue Management; IT-Helpdesk; Software Distribution; PC-Factory, etc.
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The commitment to Games-ISS by SchlumbergerSema (and later Atos Origin) top 
management was not only demonstrated by their support of implementing the ACL 
controls. The Games-ISS project was one that received great publicity and promotion 
during the preparation stages of the project, since it was viewed as a business area 
that could strategically benefit not only the A2004 Games but also the IT sponsor’s 
corporation. Therefore, top management demonstrated particular interest towards 
the choice and functionality of the SIM solution, as well as the ISS metrics framework 
and dashboard. However, such interest was not encountered within the Games-IS 
organization, where most teams - and even most Games-ISS team members - worked 
independently of the SIM and ISS metrics initiatives.
Specifically, aside from the Games-ISS Risk Manager and ISS Risk Analyst, the rest of 
the team members did not demonstrate any interest in the ISS metrics dashboard and 
findings, although they knew of their existence. Similarly, apart from the Games-ISS 
Risk Manager and the Games-ISS Systems Analyst who was working on the 
customization of the SIM solution, no other team member demonstrated any 
particular interest in the technology. Instead, they were using other technologies and 
tools to manage and monitor ISS in the Games network environment. The Games-ISS 
Architect repeatedly stated that
“ I do not know why we are implementing the SIM solution on the Games 
network. Surely it can be useful, but by the time it is ready to use, it will be 
too late. In the meantime we are doing all the monitoring with our existing 
devices” (i.e. Appendix-A3:69).
Likewise, the Games-ISS Risk Analyst suggested that
“we currently cannot use the SIM solution. It generates too many security 
events and it is impossible to make any sense out of it. There is a lot of 
customization that still needs to be done. [...] Perhaps the implementation of 
such a great and complex security solution is not best suited for an 
environment like ours, where everything changes the entire time and we are 
short of time. [...] For these Games, the greatest benefit from the SIM solution 
will be a marketing one. So far it has not affected how the team works and 
monitors the environment; but it seems that it is all we are advertising” (i.e. 
Appendix-A3:68).
Finally, the last few issues that seemed to have affected the organizational context 
during the Games-IS(S) ‘ Implementation and Testing’ project phase were related to 
the changes in corporate management, namely the take-over of SchlumbergerSema’s 
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Major Events division by Atos Origin, and the subsequent resignation of the Games-ISS 
Risk Manager. Both events created considerable speculation with regards to the 
project’s future and priorities, and the role and responsibilities of the remaining 
Games-ISS team’s members. However, despite the temporary distraction from daily 
project activities, activities continued as planned, top management commitment to 
ISS seemed unchanged, and the duties of the resigning ISS Risk Manager were 
smoothly handed over to his replacement.
4 .3 .3 .3  P aram eters  and mechanisms o f  ISS risk a m p lifica tio n
During the ‘ Implementation and Testing’ phase of the Games-ISS project the focus of 
ISS activities was on the installation and configuration of ISS technological controls, 
and the communication and enforcement of procedural and awareness/training ISS 
controls.
The ‘ Implementation’ of ISS controls and the ISS events and incidents experienced 
during ‘Testing’ pointed to the presence of risks or risk events, communicating 
messages about their nature and the effectiveness of the implemented controls.
As earlier in this study, utilizing the SARF conceptualization of the risk 
communication and amplification processes, the researcher identified twenty areas 
of Games-ISS risks that were detected and communicated during the ‘ Implementation 
and Testing’ project phase (i.e. Table 4.12). Some of these were also identified in 
prior stages of the project (i.e. Table 4.11). This is to be expected as the risk 
communication process is often one of repetition and feedback. In fact, the trial and 
error processes of the A2004 IS Test Events provided further feedback with regards to 
ISS risks, leading to a series of negotiations, control changes and improvements.
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Table 4.12: Games-ISS risks identified  and communicated during the
‘Im plem entation and Testing ’ project phase.
Games-ISS Risk Area
1 A lack of prioritization of secure configuration requirements among Games-IS functions.
2 Unknown physical security at venues, implicating ISS management decisions with regards to the appropriateness of logical ISS controls.
3 Problematic ISS practices of Admin network.
4 Inadequate consideration of ISS containment and incident management controls.
5 Inadequate organizational appreciation that ISS is a common responsibility with regards to both ISS risk anticipation and containment.
6 Inadequate consideration of Third Party connectivity ISS requirements and practices; potentially compromising the ‘closed network’ principle of Games-network.
7 Lax access and authorisation controls of Games applications and systems for Games-IS internal users.
8 Inadequate controls managing and monitoring unauthorised devices on the Games- network.
9 Internal threat is evident - unauthorised activity on the Games network. Internal communications are not controlled and restricted.
10 Inefficient allocation of ISS incident management resources and efforts.
11 Lack of means to adequately assess and understand the location, extent and impact of a detected ISS vulnerability. Poor containment controls.
12 Necessity, yet ISS risk mitigation inadequacy of malicious software protection controls - particularly for laptops.
13 Inadequate consideration of IT volunteers as an ISS threat source.
14 ISS alerts are too many and, thus, not manageable.
15 Inadequate incorporation of ISS into the procedures and controls of the Operations team functions.
16 Inadequate incorporation of ISS function into the change management procedures.
17 Inadequate customization of ISS management and monitoring devices.
18
Lack of a centralized and accurate information repository with regards to the 
configuration of Games systems and the ‘ordinary’ communications within the Games 
network.
19 Lack of mechanisms to standardise configurations across the Games network.
20 Inadequate and ineffective means to measure and monitor the performance of ISS controls.
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From the early stages of the Games-ISS ‘ Implementation and Testing’ phase it was 
made evident to the Games-ISS team that the secure configuration of the Games 
systems and network had not been - thus far - a priority among the Games-IS 
Technical function. Technical teams had inconsistently and inadequately addressed 
ISS issues, with the greatest ISS awareness indicated among individuals that had 
worked in previous Olympic event projects.
Towards the end of the ‘Analysis and Design’ stage, and throughout the 
‘ Implementation and Testing’ stage the members of the Games-ISS teams closely 
collaborated with the various Technical teams communicating that the secure 
configuration of the Games-IS devices was critical to the reliability of the Games 
network operations. Such communications were made via formal and informal 
meetings, documented ISS policies and ISS design requirements. However, the extent 
of the risk and the significance of risk mitigation controls were not stressed until 
after the first Test Events (TE-1). During TE-1 a series of ISS incidents indicated that 
compliance to secure configuration policies was poor, while further guidelines had to 
be communicated by the Games-ISS experts. Informal and formal communications 
stressed that it could be no longer assumed that the Games network was a closed 
one, nor could it be assumed that authorised Games users would not abuse their 
access and other privileges. The risk message was not only communicated to the 
Technical teams but also senior project and SchlumbergerSema corporate 
management. It was suggested that Games systems had to be urgently security 
hardened. Omitting to do so could lead to the realization of catastrophic, 
uncontrollable and unknown risks on the Games-IS infrastructure.
The use of a worm scenario attack and the simulation of a related hacking exercise 
convincingly framed the risk and SchlumbergerSema senior management authorised 
the costly - yet necessary - system security upgrades. Any hesitation by the Games 
Integration and Games Application Development teams due to increased project costs 
and testing man-hours was removed, and by early October 2003 it was agreed that all 
Games systems would be security patched and hardened161. The timeframe for the 
implementation of all these controls was defined as the end of the calendar year 
(December 2003), while responsible parties were identified across teams that would 
coordinate with the Games-ISS experts the required control implementations.
161 The security hardening and patching of all Games systems included: (a) an upgrade with 
the latest security fixes; (d) the hardening of Games-IS device BIOS settings by removing all 
unnecessary device services; and (c) the implementation of stricter user access controls.
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Similarly, it was suggested that Games network connections and communications had 
to be further restricted and monitored. The great number of Games network 
unauthorised connections and communications during the August 2003 Test Events 
demonstrated to the Games-ISS experts the urgency of implementing tighter network 
ISS controls and access restrictions such as port security and ACLs.
Thus, over a series of formal and informal meetings, as well as via a number of 
formal risk assessment reports, it was communicated that Test Events demonstrated 
that security on the Games network was very poor and violations of acceptable 
activity and behaviour too numerous. In fact, it was communicated that violations 
were so numerous that they were impossible to monitor and contain, thus 
uncontrollable. In addition, it was suggested that unless the specified network ISS 
controls were implemented, there would be no other means to reduce the associated 
risks effectively, while other ISS controls - such as the hardening of Games systems - 
would be cancelled out.
The response to the above communications with regards to Games network ISS was 
one of alarm with regards to the Games-IS project management who had assumed 
that the Games network would be a closed one. Also, for those who had been 
previously involved with the SL2002 Olympic event, the communication of a 
vulnerable, not-closed Games network was also alarming. However, the rest of the 
Games-IS Technical teams - the majority of which did not have any prior Olympic 
experience - appeared to be attenuating the associated risk. Both during and after 
the TE-1, when the Games ISS experts communicated the need to secure the network 
and restrict unauthorised network activity, Technical teams - and in particular 
Network engineers - ignored expert ISS directions. The Games-ISS Network Analyst - 
who prior to joining the Games ISS team was a member of the Network team - 
suggested that
“partly they are security ignorant and partly they see this as a game. They 
control the entire network and they do not like to be told what they can and 
cannot do. It is a power thing. It happens everywhere. They do not necessarily 
mean harm, but they do enjoy toying with us” (i.e. Appendix-A3: 63).
Thus, although management commitment was present with regards to securing the 
Games network, the compliance of Games engineers was not easily achieved. The 
associated risks had to be repeatedly communicated and a number or ongoing 
negotiations had to take place in order for Games network security to improve. The 
Games Network team suggested that ISS network controls were unnecessary -
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particularly the internal network communication restrictions, that the Games-ISS 
team had provided inadequate or inaccurate ISS guidelines, or that the proposed ISS 
controls negatively impacted the performance of the Games network. Therefore, the 
Games Network team appeared to act as a risk attenuating social station, while 
negatively marking the network ISS controls proposed by the Games-ISS team.
The debate between the Games-ISS and Network teams peaked during the second 
round of Test Events when the poor performance of the Games network was blamed 
on the implementation of related ISS controls (i.e. ACLs). The Operations team, 
which oversaw and managed the operations at the TOC and venues during the Test 
Events, sided with the Network team during the TE-2. The lack of adequate time to 
investigate in detail or fix the reasons for the poor Games network performance led 
to a decision by the Operations team management where the ACLs were removed 
from the network. In addition, it was decided that port security would be partly 
deactivated, thus allowing uncontrollable connection of Third Parties onto the Games 
network. It was thus evident that during operational phases ISS risk decisions were 
greatly affected by the organization’s immature containment controls and 
procedures, as well as the emotional factor of time-pressure.
Although the ISS risks of not implementing strict ISS controls - both at the perimeter 
and internally to the Games network - were known and repeatedly communicated, it 
was not until the later stages of the ‘ Implementation and Testing’ project phase that 
their implementation commenced. This was greatly due to the increased corporate 
and management pressure to resolve the issue and secure the network, as well as the 
management decision to recruit additional network experts that would specifically 
work on the standardization of ISS network design and controls. It was agreed that 
significant efforts had to be made with regards to identifying and creating 
mechanisms that would standardise the Games network’s configuration.
Furthermore, the increasing maturity of effective Games network and system ISS 
controls by the end of the ‘ Implementation’ project phase was also an outcome of 
continuing efforts by the Games-ISS team to analyse and document ‘ordinary* 
activity within the Games-IS infrastructure.
The first Test Events (TE-1) and the numerous ISS events and incidents that occurred 
during these due to the great number of unauthorised devices and Games network 
communications also pointed to a further ISS risk; the, thus far, low prioritization of 
ISS containment controls. Similar to the risk identified during the ‘Analysis and 
Design’ Games-ISS project phase (i.e. Table 4.11:12), it was identified that ISS
D E Afxentiadis (2010) PhD Thesis, London: LSE 175
incident management controls and processes were still immature and inefficient. ISS 
incidents were not correctly identified and labelled, thus leading to their 
misallocation with regards to the responsible ISS incident resolution and containment 
party.
A further factor contributing to the poor ISS incident management and containment 
efforts was the lack of adequately customized ISS monitoring tools and the lack of 
adequate knowledge with regards to the build of Games devices and the ‘ordinary’ 
Games network traffic. With vast amounts of information to process and a lack of 
means to assess and prioritise this information, the Games-ISS experts - as well as the 
IT-Helpdesk and Games Operations team - were often observed to allocate their 
incident management resources inefficiently. There were inadequate means to assess 
and understand the location, extent and impact of a detected ISS vulnerability. For 
example, it was impossible to assess accurately the potential ISS impact of an 
unauthorised device connecting on the Games network, or the detection of a virus 
infected device.
In addition, it  was observed that ISS containment controls and processes were often 
ineffective due to the poor decision making of non-experts. In times of operational 
crisis, decisions were often left to senior operational management, rather than 
seeking the expertise of technical engineers. Such an instance was during the first 
Test Events when the ATHOC ISS team detected some Admin-network devices that 
were virus infected. Although the Admin and Games networks were two virtually 
separated networks with their interface protected by a series of network design and 
ISS management and monitoring controls, the Games Operations manager on shift 
hastily decided to shut down the connection between the two networks. Although he 
was advised by the Games-ISS team that there was no need to do so, the associated 
risk was amplified by the decision making non-expert and the communication 
between the two networks was terminated. It was not until several hours later, when 
the Games-ISS Risk Manager was called on shift and all necessary virus infection 
checks had been completed on the Games network, that the link between the two 
networks was reactivated.
The particular incident demonstrated to the Games-ISS team that the Games system 
and network interdependencies, as well as the associated ISS controls, were not 
adequately understood by all teams involved in the ISS incident management process, 
thus impacting the efficiency of ISS risk containment activities. In addition, it 
demonstrated that ISS decision making was not always delegated to where expertise 
lay, particularly in times of emergency.
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Thus, following the TE-1, the Games-ISS team increasingly sought to closely 
collaborate not only with the Games Technical teams, but also with the Operations 
team, thus establishing efficient incident management procedures.
However, prior and during the TE-2 the efforts made in order to improve the ISS 
incident management process and interactions with other Games-IS teams, did not 
have an immediate effect. A number of ISS incidents took place during that period, 
where the Operations team violated Games-ISS policies and best practices162. Such 
ISS incidents indicated that the Games-ISS experts were inadequately involved in 
Games-IS decision making, while ISS laypersons had not fully appreciated their role in 
maintaining secure Games-IS operations.
In fact, it was the repeated trial and error process of Test Events that demonstrated 
to Games-IS teams - particularly the Games Technical and Operations teams - that 
the Games-ISS team had to be involved in technical, operational and change 
management decisions. In addition, the Test Event trial and error process also 
demonstrated that IS and ISS decision making had to be delegated to where expertise 
lay, particularly in times of emergency.
Thus with the Games-ISS team stressing the need to improve ISS containment 
controls and the various ISS incidents underlining this message, there was eventual 
change in decision making behaviours and operational IS and ISS procedures. 
Ineffective ISS incident and change management procedures had been proven to lead 
to risks unknown to those exposed, that were often uncontrollable and with 
potentially dreadful consequences.
In addition, the above developments and ISS incidents had communicated a further 
message, namely that ISS anticipation and containment was not the sole 
responsibility of the Games-ISS team, but in fact the common responsibility of all 
Games-IS functions and partners.
Among others, this also included Third Parties who required connecting onto the 
Games network in order to obtain and broadcast sport event results data. Throughout 
the TE-1 and TE-2 it was made evident that Third Parties had been inadequately 
addressed by the Games-IS organization, including the Games-ISS team. Few 
preparations had been implemented with regards to their connection to the Games 
network. No network ISS connectivity, device secure build and configuration
162 E.g. the Operations team proceeded with device configuration changes, or authorised the 
removal of ACLs from the Games network without first consulting with the Games-ISS team.
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requirements had been provided to them, nor had any formal discussions taken place 
between Third Parties and the Games-ISS team. Furthermore, the A2004 broadcasters 
had not received any Games IS(S) training. As such, during the TE-1 it was quickly 
identified that Third Parties posed a great ISS risk to the Games network, since no 
port security had been implemented yet. In addition, Third Party devices - which 
connected onto the most critical of all Games-network VLANS - were not security 
audited and hardened prior to connecting onto the Games network. However, it was 
not only the logical ISS controls that were lacking; no ISS operational procedure had 
been established to address the necessary steps that Third Parties, the Operations/ 
IT-Helpdesk and Network teams had to comply with.
The non consideration of the ISS risks and issues associated with Third Parties by the 
various Games IS(S) teams prior to the TE-1 is perhaps surprising given the 
significance of Olympic broadcasters. When questioned about it, the Games-ISS Risk 
Manager suggested that
“prior to the August (2003) Test Events we were all focused on the internal- 
facing Games-IS preparations that we had to do. We had considered how to 
protect the perimeter of the Games network and how to secure it from other 
non-trusted or semi-trusted networks. But we neglected to consider what 
happens with Third Parties that bring their devices into our trusted 
environment. [...] This is possibly the highest ISS risk management priority for 
us now. We need to understand their needs and we need to make them 
understand our ISS requirements” (i.e. Appendix-A3:60).
Therefore, it appears that the intense preparations and heavy workload prior to 
venuisation did not allow the Games IS(S) teams to identify the Third Party 
connectivity risk issue. In addition, focus on the perimeter of the Games network led 
the Games-IS and ISS teams to overlook the insecure connection of Third Parties 
within the trusted Games network environment. The ISS risks related to Third Parties 
were hidden.
As soon as the Games-ISS Risk Manager identified the Third Party risk issue during the 
TE-1, he communicated to the Games IS Operations, Network and management teams 
that the impact of the identified risk could be catastrophic with grave consequences 
for the Games-IS operational reliability and security. He quickly proceeded with 
drafting a set of Third Party Connectivity Requirements which were communicated 
to all Third Parties, ATHOC, SWATCH and the SchlumbergerSema Games Operations 
and Network teams. ISS controls were not implemented until the next round of Test
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Events in October/November 2003, when port security was applied. Yet, compliance 
to the Third Party Connectivity Requirements remained patchy until the end of the 
Games-ISS ‘ Implementation and Testing’ phase. This was partly due to the delayed 
creation of a Third Party Connectivity policy and procedure (i.e. not until January 
2004) and the gradual compliance of Third Parties to the provided ISS connectivity 
requirements. Given that the facilitation of broadcasting was a key operational 
aspect of the Games network, when A2004 broadcasters were not compliant to the 
ISS requirements the Games IS(S) teams did not disallow these connections. The 
Games-ISS Risk Manager argued that
“we cannot threaten broadcasters that they cannot connect to the Games 
network during Test Events because they are not meeting our security 
requirements. In a sense, within the Olympic context if you do not broadcast 
a result you also do not have a result. Making things easy for our broadcasters 
is our top priority; but we also need to ensure that the network also remains 
stable and secure. [...] We do not negotiate with Third Parties during Test 
Events; we cannot afford to. However, after the Test Events we have several 
meetings with them when we try to explain to them what it is we need and 
why we need it. We tell them that if their connection onto the Games 
network is not secure not only could they compromise the network's 
reliability and the quality of information that they get, but they can also 
affect the quality of results information that other broadcasters get; and we 
cannot allow that. Nor can our other broadcasting partners. We tell everyone 
the same, and eventually they will all comply with our requirements” (i.e. 
Appendix-A3:66).
Indeed, by the end of the Games ISS ‘ Implementation and Testing’ phase the 
majority of Third Party connectivity risk issues had been satisfactorily addressed.
In addition to Third Parties, ISS risks were identified in relation to a further group of 
Games-IS workers, namely IT volunteers. The risk signal was an IT volunteer related 
incident that took place during TE-1. An IT volunteer, who was located at one of the 
competition venues, worked as an IT-Helpdesk Assistant. During his shift and when 
there was little venue IT-Helpdesk activity, the volunteer accessed through his 
workstation the database that supported the entire Admin and Games networks 
incident management system and stored all user credentials and incident 
information. His unauthorised activity was detected by the SchlumbergerSema IT 
Helpdesk Venue Manager, who warned the volunteer to refrain from such 
unauthorised behaviour. The volunteer, however, persisted and attempted accessing 
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and extracting information from the database. The incident was detected again by 
the Venue IT-Helpdesk Manager who raised the issue with the central IT-Helpdesk 
operations at the TOC, without however notifying the volunteer. The central IT- 
Helpdesk decided to lock the volunteer’s account, claiming technical problems. The 
volunteer logged a ticket reporting account connection problems, which was 
escalated to ATHOC IT. The latter group investigated the issue with regards to the 
reported technical problems and identified that the volunteer’s account was instead 
locked because of his unauthorised activity. Circumventing SchlumbergerSema 
Operations management and without notifying the IT Helpdesk, the ATHOC IT 
Manager called the volunteer, apologized to him for the inconvenience, informed him 
of the true reason for his account’s deactivation, and finally congratulated him for 
his interest in security. He then demanded of the IT Helpdesk to reactivate the 
volunteer’s account. This was when the incident was escalated to the Games-ISS Risk 
Manager.
The particular incident escalated to a major political debate between ATHOC IT and 
SchlumbergerSema as well as internally to the latter organization. The Games-ISS 
Risk Manager sent one of his team members at the venue to investigate further and 
discuss with the IT volunteer, who appeared impenitent and suggested that if he 
were to be given access to the Games network he would repeat his unauthorised 
activity, considering it his obligation to hack the Games system and identify its ISS 
vulnerabilities. Alarmed by this response, the Games-ISS team demanded that the IT 
volunteer’s account be not re-activated. ATHOC IT strongly disagreed with this 
decision suggesting that IT-literate volunteers were a precious commodity for the 
A2004 Olympic project, and they could not afford questioning their sense of 
volunteering. They eventually blamed SchlumbergerSema of inappropriately dealing 
with this entire incident, while the IT volunteer remained at the venue idling. The 
Games-IS Operations team, on the other hand, shifted blame to the Venue IT- 
Helpdesk Manager who had detected the volunteer’s unauthorised activity in the first 
place, while the Games-ISS team suggested that the incident should have been 
brought to their attention sooner than it did. All this resulted in the Venue IT- 
Helpdesk Manager resigning and suggesting to the rest of his SchlumbergerSema 
colleagues that the Games-IS management and ISS teams did not support their own 
people when they faced difficult and emergency situations.
The above incident communicated a number of ISS risk messages not only for IT 
volunteers, but also in relation to the efficiency of incident management and 
escalation procedures, and with regards to the incident detection mechanisms.
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With regards to IT volunteers, the incident demonstrated to the Games-IS functions 
that IT volunteers could not be trusted and they should not be placed in critical IT 
positions unless the appropriate logical ISS controls had been first implemented. Such 
controls included the restriction of application and system access privileges, the 
implementation of strong password policies and user-specific access privileges, and 
the segregation of duties. In addition, the incident raised awareness with regards to 
the need to conduct background checks of volunteers, and the need to train them in 
Games-ISS policies and procedures. Replacing volunteers at critical IT positions with 
paid personnel was considered by SchlumbergerSema but eventually rejected as a 
very costly solution.
The above incident, on the other hand, was clearly interpreted differently by ATHOC 
IT, which suggested that IT volunteers were a critical resource for the A2004 
Olympics, and therefore should be treated with particular leniency from the various 
Games-IS project functions. Following the incident, ATHOC IT did not wish to discuss 
the matter further with SchlumbergerSema, and throughout the rest of the project IT 
volunteers were not considered an ISS risk source to them. This was in clear contrast 
with the perceptions of Games-ISS experts who communicated the exact opposite 
view both internally to the Games-IS organization and externally - such as to the 
press. Therefore, ATHOC IT clearly acted as a social station of risk attenuation.
In addition to the risk messages communicated in relation to IT volunteers, the above 
incident indicated to the Games-IS Operations (including IT-Helpdesk) and ISS teams 
that ISS incident management and escalation procedures were problematic and had 
to be further formalised. The volunteer incident was escalated to the Games-ISS 
team only after it had become a crisis and tension had already been created between 
SchlumbergerSema and ATHOC IT management. It was not identified from the early 
stages of incident detection that this had to be reported to the Games-ISS team. 
Thus, following the incident, the Games-ISS Risk Manager and Analyst initiated a 
number of meetings with the Games Operations and IT-Helpdesk teams to discuss 
what had gone wrong and what could be improved in future cases. These meetings 
were important not only in terms of improving future incident management 
performance, but also in minimizing the negative impact of the incident on the 
morale of SchlumbergerSema employees. The Games-ISS Risk Analyst argued that
“you could say that this incident turned into a bit of a scandal within
SchlumbergerSema. Everyone found out about it and the Game-ISS and
Operations teams were accused of not supporting their people when needed.
[...] We cannot allow such accusations. We do not want people to think that 
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we are interested in such blame-game. If this goes on, they will not report 
any of the errors and security incidents that they observe” (i.e. Appendix- 
A3:59).
Eventually, the Venue IT-Helpdesk Manager retrieved his resignation and intra- 
organizational tensions were relieved. Yet, it was understood among Games-IS 
functions that the ISS risks related to IT volunteers were a sensitive matter that 
could not be openly discussed with ATHOC, which perceived this as an Olympic value- 
threatening and ideological hazard163.
A further risk identified by the researcher at that stage, which however seemed to 
be considered as relatively unimportant across the Games-IS teams, was associated 
with the evident levels of boredom during Test Event phases. It was not only the IT 
volunteer that was bored during TE-1 and opted to spend his time hacking the Games 
systems. The researcher observed that during Test Events and in particular during 
periods of little event and incident activity, the Games-IS(S)employees, partners and 
volunteers were bored and distracted by other activities that not only were not 
related to the Games-IS operations, but also were irrelevant to their job 
descriptions. Thus, at a period when Games-IS workers were required to give their 
full attention to operations, they were observed playing electronic games, watching 
television or observing the sport events. This phenomenon was aggravated at venues, 
where Games-IS monitoring activity was less than that at the TOC. Venue Games-IS 
workers often left their positions and desks and idled around the venue premises, 
watching the sport events or chatting with others. This observation of boredom and 
routinization was also captured in the responses to the researcher’s Maturity of 
Reliable ISS Organization ft Operations questionnaire, where all respondents 
acknowledged that to some extent their teams were indeed bored during operational 
phases. The greatest levels of boredom were recorded among IT-Helpdesk personnel 
operating at competition venues.
When this observation was discussed with a number of Games-IS managers, they all 
acknowledged that this was indeed inappropriate, yet was acceptable as long as 
logged incidents were resolved within the SLA-specified time. The Games-ISS Risk 
Manager, on the other hand, disagreed. He suggested that
163 According to Kasperson and Kasperson (1991) highly attenuated risks represent ‘hidden 
hazards’ . Ideological hazards remain hidden because they lie embedded in a societal web of 
values and assumptions that attenuates consequences, elevates associated benefits, or 
idealizes certain beliefs. Value-threatening hazards alter human institutions, lifestyles, and 
basic values.
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“ this is unacceptable - especially when entire functional teams are distracted 
with issues that are not related to their operational roles and responsibilities. 
We all need to be in front of our monitors looking out for any suspicious 
activity. We cannot just wait for an incident to be logged and then respond to 
a ticket. [...] The extent to which each team consciously focuses on operations 
has to do with the team’s attitude as well as the monitoring technologies that 
they have in place. If your technology allows you to look for activity that is 
out of ordinary, then there is more that you can do. If, however, your 
monitoring technology will only tell you that something is wrong after it has 
gone wrong, then you just wait for something to go wrong in order to get to 
work” (i.e. Appendix-A3:62).
However, little was done to address this risk issue. The Games-ISS Risk Manager 
reprimanded any Games-IS workers in the TOC that did not seem focused on their 
operational responsibilities, yet the state of each individual's mental alertness was 
difficult to detect and accordingly readjust. Thus, during the particular phase, no 
considerable control was implemented with regards to avoiding routinization and 
boredom.
A further ISS risk that was identified during the ‘ Implementation and Analysis’ stage 
of the Games-ISS project was related to the lack of adequate and effective means to 
measure the performance of ISS controls and compliance to ISS operational policies 
and procedures. This ISS issue had been identified by the Games-ISS Risk Manager 
prior to the commencement of the Test Events, yet was vividly demonstrated when 
during the Test Events there were limited means to prioritise ISS risks and know with 
certainty which of all specified ISS controls had been implemented or not. Therefore, 
the risk profile of each Games-IS asset, venue and communication was either 
unknown or uncertain.
However, the collection of all necessary information with regards to the performance 
of and compliance with the specified ISS controls required the collaboration and 
input from other Games-IS functions and technologies. This input had not been 
provided prior to the TE-1 as the various Games-IS functions were more concerned 
with implementing as much as possible prior to the operational phase. In addition, 
the Games-ISS team had not adequately specified the ISS areas where assurance and 
control performance information had to be collected for.
Following the TE-1 though, priorities changed. The Games-ISS Risk Analyst worked 
almost full time on defining more formal ISS operational policies and procedures, and
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collaborated with other Games IS functions - such as the various Technical and 
Operations teams - in order to identify means to collect the necessary ISS metrics 
information. Incrementally, she also conducted a series of monthly ISS compliance 
audits with regards to ISS policies and procedures. On the other hand, the Games-ISS 
Network Analyst reviewed the implementation of the Games network ISS controls and 
provided guidance as to future directions. Similarly, the Games-ISS System Analyst 
collected information on the build of Games devices and guided other teams on 
implementing systems' ISS controls. All the above information was gradually 
incorporated into the Games-ISS Metrics Dashboard that was communicated to most 
Games-IS project management team members. Finally, by the end of the 
'Implementation and Testing’ phase, the Games-ISS team recruited an ISS Systems 
Tester to commence vulnerability assessments on the Games system configurations, 
thus verifying the level of residual ISS risk.
Overall, throughout the various efforts to collect and analyse Games-ISS performance 
and compliance information, the Games-ISS team communicated that this process 
aimed to identify the areas of non-compliance and poor performance in order to 
either release more resources towards the management of the identified ISS risks, or 
re-assess the level of residual ISS risk. All Games-ISS members stressed that this was 
not a process of blame allocation, but one of collaboration and effective risk 
management. Lack of the necessary assurance would lead to poor ISS risk decision 
making and possibly the realisation of uncontrollable and dreadful risks.
One last area of ISS risk to be identified during the ‘ Implementation and Testing’ 
phase of the Games-ISS project was related to the physical security of venues and 
Technology Secure Areas (TSAs). Similar to previous project phases, venuisation did 
not adequately improve the physical security of venues. The majority of A2004 
Olympic venues were still being constructed and as such physical security controls 
were minimal.
In order to create the risk and threat profile of the various Games systems, the 
Games-ISS team required to know where each of the Games devices would be 
located, and what the physical security controls would be. This information - owned 
and managed by ATHOC that was also responsible for the construction and physical 
security of venues - was not readily provided. This was partly due to the 
unavailability of this information, and partly due to ATHOC’s reluctance to provide 
this in hope that the SchlumbergerSema Games-ISS team would assist them with the 
Admin network ISS issues.
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Under these conditions, the Games-ISS team had to make assumptions with regards 
to the physical security of venues. Given ATHOC’s delays in most other areas of event 
preparation and venuisation, the Games-ISS Risk Manager chose to assume that 
physical security would not be tight until the last stages of the project. This implied 
that logical ISS controls had to be tightened, creating additional reasons for Games 
devices to be securely configured and stripped off any unnecessary and insecure 
device services (e.g. deactivation of removable media). This message was 
communicated to all Games-IS Technical and Operations teams that had to 
implement strict device access and network connectivity technical controls and 
operational procedures. They did not have to be convinced of the need to do so as a 
response to poor physical security, since they could all witness in person the 
problems in this area. In addition, they were all aware of ATHOC’s project 
preparation delays, which created further distrust with regards to the timely 
implementation of adequate physical security controls.
Overall, during the Games-ISS ‘ Implementation and Testing’ project phase 
venuisation and the trial and error process of Test Events further verified ISS risks 
that had been identified during earlier project phases. In addition, the Test Events 
signalled new ISS risks that had previously not - or inadequately - been considered.
From the above analysis it is evident that processes of ISS risk amplification or 
attenuation took place, not only affecting ISS risk perceptions, but often creating 
ripple effects and impacting the ways in which the Games-IS organization managed 
risk. Risk perceptions often differed between ISS experts and laypersons, thus 
determining the risk communication tactics that the ISS risk experts chose.
Therefore, risks relating to the secure configuration of Games systems and network 
were amplified by the Games ISS experts, communicating messages of dread, 
uncontrollability, and operational disaster. This was in direct response to the risk 
attenuation tendencies of the Games-IS Operations and Technical teams. In addition, 
it was observed that senior and corporate management commitment to Games-ISS 
assisted towards the gradual implementation of the ISS controls proposed by the 
Games-ISS experts.
Other ISS risks, on the other hand, often seemed to be attenuated by the Games-ISS 
experts. This was particularly evident for ISS risks that were not related to the 
deliverables and operations internal to the Games-IS organization. Therefore, ISS 
risks associated with Third Parties (i.e. Olympic broadcasters) connecting onto the 
Games network were indeed considered critical, yet the associated communications
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and negotiations were less controversial and the Games-ISS team willingly agreed to 
address the related ISS risks in a step-by-step approach.
Similarly, another external-facing risk that was consciously attenuated by the Games 
IS(S) organization was that related to IT volunteers. Given ATHOC’s intensely risk 
attenuating behaviour towards the particular issue, SchlumbergerSema chose not to 
make any further risk communications towards ATHOC. Instead, they focused on the 
logical and procedural ISS controls that they could implement in order to mitigate 
the risk to an acceptable level.
On the whole, it can be argued that during the Games-ISS ‘ Implementation and 
Testing’ phase ISS risks that were directly related to the operations of the Games-ISS 
team were in their majority neither amplified nor attenuated. ISS risks that were 
related to the operations of other Games-IS functions were often amplified by the ISS 
experts and attenuated by the other functions, while ISS risks that were related to 
parties external to the Games-IS organization were often attenuated with regards to 
external communications, although they were commonly acknowledged within the 
Games-IS organization.
Finally, the repetitive nature of the Test Events and the trial-and-error process of 
implementation provided increasing clarity over the nature of ISS risks. As examined 
below, this supported the effectiveness of ISS risk communications, as well as 
facilitated increasing and maturing levels of organizational and operational ISS 
reliability and preparedness.
4.3.3.4 Organizational ISS reliability and operational preparedness
Similar to the ‘Analysis and Design’ phase of the Games-ISS project, a number of 
individuals, who represented the various Games-IS functions, were requested to 
score the levels of organizational ISS reliability and operational preparedness across 
various stages of the project’s ‘ Implementation and Testing’ phase. The findings of 
these questionnaires (i.e. Appendix-A10) were often discussed with the questionnaire 
respondents, requesting further justification of their assessments.
Prior to the August 2003 Test Events (TE-1)
From the data collected it is evident that during the period leading up to the first 
Test Events (TE-1: August 2003), all identified Games-ISS controls of reliable 
organizational design had been implemented, although the majority of these 
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controls demonstrated poor maturity levels, with patchy implementation. All 
questionnaire respondents identified that the organizational design control ranking 
highest during this phase was related to the implementation of redundancy for all 
critical IT assets. The lowest ranking controls, on the other hand, were related to the 
adequacy of resource buffers, the duplication of ISS controls and the loosely-coupled 
design and configuration of the Games network. The lowest ranking score during this 
period was provided by the members of the Games-IS Operations team - particularly 
the IT-Helpdesk - demonstrating perhaps the poor communication with the Games-ISS 
team.
With regards to the maturity of the Games-ISS controls of reliable operational 
management, this also demonstrated an improvement from previous project phases - 
in fact greater to that of the organizational design controls. This could be probably 
explained by the venuisation that took place during late July 2003, and the 
increasing demand for decentralised Games-IS operations. Thus from July to August 
2003, ISS controls of reliable operational management improved from immature and 
non-existent, to significantly consistent. The highest ranking controls were related to 
the clear communications from management with regards to the operational and ISS 
priorities, as well as the need to give undivided attention to operations. The lowest 
scores were allocated to the existence of diverse ISS error detection and reporting 
mechanisms, and the existence of formal mechanisms to enhance ISS learning. 
Overall, the Games-ISS team members scored lower the maturity of ISS operational 
management controls to the rest of the Games-IS functions. This perhaps suggests 
that the intensifying venuisation preparations created a false confidence among ISS 
laypersons that attenuated the associated ISS risks.
The controls related to the reliable ISS organizational culture demonstrated the 
greatest improvement of all, with the vast majority of related controls considered to 
be mature and consistent. Across the various respondents, the highest ranking 
controls were related to the clear communications from management with regards to 
the organizational priorities, and the communication between diverse groups and 
organizations with regards to the resolution of ISS problems. The lowest ranking 
controls were related to the efficient identification and classification of ISS events 
and incidents, and the clear communication and awareness of the operational ISS 
policies and procedures.
It is also interesting to note that the Games-ISS experts gave the lowest scores with 
regards to a mature and reliable ISS organizational culture. When questioned about 
this, the Games-ISS Risk Analyst suggested that
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“ this is probably because the other groups have not yet realized the full 
significance of ISS and how it affects their roles and responsibilities. They 
know that some ISS controls are in place, they have done their ISS training, 
and they probably think that this is all to it. But I am less optimistic. [...] The 
security culture has not yet matured in the organization” (i.e. Appendix- 
A3:59).
Overall, during the ‘ Implementation’ period prior to the TE-1 both anticipation and 
containment ISS controls were assessed to have improved by a similar rate, 
demonstrating increasing levels of maturity and consistency (i.e. Appendix-A10). In 
addition, the team that seems to have observed the greatest improvement of both 
ISS anticipation and containment controls during this period is the Operations team 
and its IT-Helpdesk function. However, the IT-Helpdesk function also remained the 
only one to demonstrate complete lack of awareness with regards to some of the ISS 
reliability controls.
Nonetheless, it  is observed that with venuisation the gap in ISS reliability perceptions 
between various Games-IS functions narrowed down. This finding is compatible with 
the above mentioned improved score of mature and consistent ISS communications 
between Games-IS experts and laypersons.
Prior to the October 2003 Test Events (TE-2.1)
The August 2003 Test Events (TE-1) was the first occasion when IS and ISS controls 
were put to the test operationally and problems with regards to the Games-ISS 
culture, policies, procedures and technical design and solutions were made apparent.
With regards to the maturity of reliable ISS organizational design it appears that 
that TE-1 and the ISS issues identified after these operated as a risk amplification 
mechanism, raising awareness over the nature of ISS risks and the effectiveness of ISS 
controls. Both Games-ISS experts and layperson suggested a drop in the improvement 
rates of reliable Games-ISS controls.
From discussions with the Games-IS Chief Integrator, Technical Manager and IT 
Integration Manager, it was evident that the great number of unauthorised devices 
and activity on the Games network during the TE-1, as well as the related ISS risk 
assessment reports that were generated in September and October 2003, all 
indicated that the Games network was still lacking in terms of a secure 
organizational and IT infrastructure design controls. Characteristically, with the 
communication of the ISS risk assessment results, all questionnaire respondents - 
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including the Games-ISS team - lowered their scores with regards to the non­
existence of single points of failure across the network. In addition, out of all 
functions the Operations Team Manager demonstrated the greatest drop in his 
assessments of reliable ISS organizational design controls suggesting that
“we now realise that that ISS management is a more complex issue than we 
first appreciated. [...] We are now working closer with the Games-ISS team to 
define secure operational procedures; and this does not only relate to the 
management of ISS incidents and problems, but also how we build and patch 
our systems, how we configure devices prior to shipping them to the venues” 
(i.e. Appendix-A3:65).
Unlike controls related to reliable ISS organizational design, controls of reliable ISS 
operational management improved over the period following the TE-1, although this 
improvement was relatively small, yet consistent across Games-IS functions. It is 
worth noting that a new low ranking control was related to the duplication and 
overlap of IS and ISS personnel where operations were critical. Over discussions with 
the Games-ISS Manager, the Operations Manager and IT-Helpdesk Manager, they all 
agreed that the TE-1 demonstrated that IT volunteers could not be trusted and were 
not suitable for critical IT and operational positions. Yet, due to the project cost 
implications of recruiting and training more Games-IS personnel at the current 
project phase, all above parties were pessimistic with regards to fully mitigating this 
risk in future Test Events.
Assessments with regards to the maturity of a reliable ISS organizational culture 
after the TE-1 were more or less similar to those prior to the TE-1. The groups that 
scored the reliability of the organizational ISS culture lower than before were the 
Technical and Operations groups, indicating their management’s appreciation of the 
cultural ISS problems existing within their teams, which were demonstrated by a 
series of ISS incidents both during and after TE-1. Across all Games-IS functions, it 
was commonly agreed that the most recent ISS incidents had demonstrated that ISS 
roles and responsibilities were not fully appreciated by the various Games-IS 
functions and individuals, while the IT-Helpdesk Manager highlighted that IT 
volunteers had been completely neglected thus far with regards to receiving any 
Games-ISS training. Therefore, once again, ISS incidents seem to have operated as 
signals of ISS risk, demonstrating that prior assessments of ISS control efficiency had 
been exaggerated.
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Overall, in the period following the TE-1 and prior to the October 2003 Test Events 
both anticipation and containment ISS controls demonstrated a slow down in terms 
of their maturity. All Games-IS functions identified that perhaps they had 
overestimated the effectiveness of these controls prior to the TE-1. The groups to 
demonstrate the greatest reduction in their maturity assessments were the Technical 
and Operations (including the IT-Helpdesk) groups, where most ISS incidents were 
observed. This reduction in maturity estimates resulted in more consistent ISS 
reliability scorings across all Games-IS functions, including the ISS experts.
Prior to the December 2003 Test Events (TE-2.2)
Subsequent to the August 2003 Test Events (TE-1), the next phase of ‘ Implementation 
and Testing’ (and operational rehearsals) was that of the October/November 2003 
Test Events (TE-2.1). Following these and in preparation for the December 2003 Test 
Events (TE-2.2), the maturity of reliable ISS organizational design controls 
demonstrated no change. While some ISS controls had been implemented, the 
majority of these were postponed such as the implementation of ACLs and the secure 
connection of Third Parties. Thus, single points of failure persisted in the Games 
network, while it  was demonstrated that the Games network had serious design and 
configuration problems that would have to be resolved. The groups allocating the 
lowest scores with regards to the maturity of reliable ISS organizational design 
controls were the Operations and IT-Helpdesk teams.
In relation to controls of reliable ISS operational management, these also 
demonstrated minimal improvement, with a consensus in scorings across the Games- 
ISS functions. All groups identified that ISS management priorities were becoming 
increasingly clear, while operational ISS policies and procedures were frequently 
updated and accordingly communicated to the necessary parties.
Controls of reliable ISS organizational culture were the ones that demonstrated the 
greatest improvement during the particular project stage, although this was 
relatively moderate. Once again, the teams allocating the lowest scores with regards 
to the maturity of the organization’s ISS culture were those of the Operations and IT- 
Helpdesk teams. Persisting problems with Third Party connectivity and a lack of 
clarity over the associated procedures were blamed for these relatively low scores.
Overall, during the period prior to the TE-2.2 both ISS anticipation and containment 
controls demonstrated only a small improvement. The groups that provided the 
lowest maturity scores in either case where those of the Operations and IT-Helpdesk
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teams. All other teams appeared to converge with the Games-ISS experts. The above 
findings support prior observations with regards to the increasing tensions between 
the Games-ISS and Games Operations teams, while also demonstrating the poor 
maturity of operational ISS procedures.
With the completion of the Games-IS(S) project implementation and Testing* phase
The last stage of the Games-IS(S) project ‘ Implementation and Testing project phase 
was the one subsequent to the December 2003 Test Events (TE-2.2).
As considered earlier in this study, during this period implementation activities of ISS 
controls were intensified. Supporting such observations, the scores provided by all 
Games-IS functions with regards to the maturity of reliable ISS organizational design 
controls increased over this period. However, all teams identified that although 
progress was evident, considerable work had to be done with regards to the 
complete elimination of single points of failure in the Games network and the 
improvement of the network’s design and configuration.
Controls of reliable ISS operational management, on the other hand, did not 
demonstrate any improvement over the particular period. Across all teams 
decentralisation of decision making during operational phases was still not optimal, 
while formal mechanisms that facilitated learning from trial and error activities 
seemed to have become more lax.
With regards to controls of reliable ISS organizational culture, all teams suggested 
that there was no improvement during this period. The only exceptions to this were 
the Games-IS Operations and IT-Helpdesk teams that suggested that such controls 
had improved. The latter groups suggested that with the formalisation of a number 
of ISS procedures - and in particular the Third Party connectivity procedure - ISS roles 
and responsibilities were more clearly communicated and understood, while any 
associated problems could now be easily identified and allocated to the appropriate 
party for resolution.
On the whole, controls of ISS anticipation and containment demonstrated a small 
improvement during the last stages of the project ‘ Implementation and Testing’ 
phase. The groups identifying the greatest of these improvements were the 
Operations and IT-Helpdesk teams that had now clarified ISS operational procedures 
and had improved their understanding with regards to operational ISS roles and 
responsibilities.
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4.3.4. A2004 Games-ISS project Operational Rehearsals*
The Games IS(S) project phase of ‘Operational Rehearsals’ was distinguished in two 
parts. The first - between August 2003 and January 2004 - overlapped with the 
‘ Implementation and Testing’ project period. During that phase a series of Test 
Events took place164 with the Games IT infrastructure supporting a limited number of 
operational venues and sport events. The aim of that first phase of ‘Operational 
Rehearsals’ was to implement the designed IS and ISS controls, testing that design 
assumptions and directions had been correct, while implemented solutions and 
controls were effective, acceptable, secure and reliable.
The ISS deliverables, implemented controls and incidents that took place during the 
first stage of the ‘Operational Rehearsals’ were examined in the previous section of 
this study (i.e. section 4.3.3). The current section will consider the ISS deliverables, 
controls and incidents that were observed during the second phase of the Games IS(S) 
‘Operational Rehearsals’ .
4.3.4.1 Games-ISS deliverables, controls and incidents
The objective of this second phase was to increase gradually the number of 
operational venues and sport events per each round of remaining Test Events, thus 
increasing the operational scale and complexity that the Games IS(S) solutions had to 
support. The appropriateness of the Games IS(S) designs and implemented controls 
was expected to have been already established from the first rounds of Test Events 
(i.e. TE-1 and TE-2). Thus, further Test Events aimed to test performance, reliability 
and operational preparedness levels in an environment of increasing operational 
demands.
The Test Events that took place between February and June 2004 (i.e. TE-3 to TE-4) 
were also complemented by two rounds of Technical Rehearsals (i.e. TR-1 and TR-2). 
The latter tests did not involve actual sport events, but simulated ones. The 
Technical Rehearsals aimed to run a series of ‘what-if’ scenarios and evaluate the 
levels of IS stability, reliability and security. They also aimed to evaluate the levels 
of organizational and operational preparedness in case of a crisis.
The complete schedule of Test Events and Technical Rehearsals that took place 
between August 2003 and June 2004 is summarised below in Table 4.13.
164 I.e. TE-1 to TE-2:2.1-2.3.
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Table 4.13: The A2004 Olympics Test Event and Technical Rehearsal clusters.
Phases of 
Operational 
Rehearsals
Dates of Operational Rehearsals No. of Operational Competition Venues
No. of Sports 
Events
TE-1 - 6 - 30 August, 2003 6 7
TE-2
TE-2.1 20 October - 2 November, 2003 2 2
TE-2.2 15-31 December, 2003 2 2
TE-2.3 14 January -1 February, 2004 2 3
TE-3
TE-3.1 4 - 22 February, 2004 4 4
TE-3.2 12 -28 March, 2004 9 11
TR-1 - 29 March - 1 April, 2004 9 9
TE-3
TE-3.3 15-30 April, 2004 3 5
TE-3.4 15-30 May, 2004 2 2
TE-4 - 4 -12 June, 2004 4 4
TR-2 - 15 - 17 June 2004 17 35
Overall, it  is observed that during the second phase of ‘Operational Rehearsals’ (i.e . 
February to June 2004) Games-ISS activities were particularly focused on ISS 
assurance and control fine-tuning. Games-ISS technical and procedural controls were 
regularly revised and communicated to other Games-IS functions, partners and 
customers.
The significance of change and configuration management procedures was made 
evident as the organization grew steeply in size and operational complexity, and 
coordination activities became increasingly challenging. A number of ISS incidents 
and re-occurring errors also demonstrated a need for effective coordination 
mechanisms within and across teams.
Similarly, the Games-ISS team expanded in size during the particular project phase. 
Two further ISS specialists were recruited to focus on Games systems and 
applications security testing, while during ‘Technical Rehearsals’ the ATHOC Admin- 
network ISS experts gradually joined the operations-focused Games-ISS team . This 
new team that operated from the TOC was renamed into the ‘TOC-SEC’ team .
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4.3.4.2 Contextual noise - organizational politics, culture and project
phase challenges
Similar to the ‘ Implementation and Testing’ project phase, venuisation and 
‘Operational Rehearsals’ required of the Games-IS functions and partners to 
collaborate more closely and coordinate their activities. Increasing levels of stress 
were identified prior to and during the project milestones such as the final round of 
TE-3 and the TRs.
The increased stress levels and demand for operational preparedness and reliability 
often led to intense arguments between Games-IS functional groups, such as the 
between the Games-ISS and Games Technical teams. Arguments often led to the 
allocation of blame, the stigmatization of technologies, groups or individuals, the 
increased levels of frustration and the loss of job satisfaction.
As operations expanded, so did operational complexity and a great number of 
configuration changes were continuously required. The great number of such 
changes, as well as their frequency often led to errors and miscommunications that 
aggravated the tense working environment.
In order to avoid such errors as well as to gradually stabilise the Games-IS 
environment, groups were increasingly requested to document all change requests, 
while impact assessments had to be carried out. However, this change in working 
practices often led to aggravated tensions. This in fact was one of the reasons for 
intense arguments between the Technical and Games-ISS teams, with the latter 
denying any changes without first receiving all necessary documented information. 
Such tension was partly overcome by the support provided by senior project 
management.
In addition to the above changes in the working environment, the increasing size of 
the organization represented further challenges for the Games-IS functions. Certain 
teams - such as the Network, Venue-IT Managers (VITM), and IT-Helpdesk teams - 
demonstrated great and continuous increases in their man-force, without however 
providing the new team members with adequate - if any - induction and roles and 
responsibilities training. Similarly, new team members did not receive consistent 
training on the incident management procedures or the Games-ISS policies and 
requirements. This resulted in poor incident management practices across the 
Games-IS organization165.
165 E.g. wrong incident profiling and delayed problem resolution. 
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Closely related to the above observation is the patchy performance of Venue-IT 
teams, and the concern expressed by the Games-ISS team after TR-1 and TR-2 with 
regards to not having adequately skilled persons at venues in order to efficiently and 
effectively resolve any ISS issues. Therefore, it was observed that IS and ISS venue 
incidents were often directly assigned for resolution to the TOC teams, rather than 
venue teams attempting to resolve these. This behaviour increased the workload for 
the Games IS(S) teams operating at the TOC. Meanwhile, Venue-IT teams were often 
observed to either be too relaxed and bored, or too stressed and lacking clear 
thinking.
At this point, it is significant to note that following the TE-4, TR-2 and the delivery of 
the audience-specific Games-ISS trainings, ISS operations at venues improved 
considerably. Among others, compliance of Third Parties to the Games-ISS 
requirements significantly improved after the completion of the training sessions. 
The Games-ISS Risk Analyst attributed this improvement to the training of Venue-IT 
Managers (VITMs) and IT-Helpdesk operators, who began enforcing the Games-ISS 
Third Party secure connectivity procedure.
The growth in Games-IS organizational size also affected the Games-ISS team. Two 
new Games-ISS members were added to the team, while from the TR-1 onwards 
ATHOC Admin-ISS team members started joining the Games-ISS team to form the 
TOC-SEC operational group. This growth in size was often problematic, with the 
Games-ISS team members suggesting that they had a relatively limited understanding 
of the activities of each team member, especially so for the two new Games-ISS 
experts (i.e. the Games ISS Application and System Testers). ISS risks identified by 
each Games-ISS team member were not communicated across the team, and it 
appeared that the Games-ISS Manager was the only person to be aware of most of 
those risks. In addition, there was no Games-ISS risk registry. The Games ISS Risk 
Management document166 included incomplete information. This was partly due to 
the increasing frequency of TEs and TRs that did not provide Games-ISS experts with 
adequate time to record and communicate their findings to their colleagues. In 
addition, it appeared that the significance of such a Games-ISS risk information 
repository was inadequately stressed across all Games-ISS team members.
166 The A2004 Games ISS Risk Management document operated as an information repository 
where all Games-ISS risks, controls, vulnerabilities, test-scenarios and audit/ISS-metrics 
findings were supposed to be logged. This document was regularly updated and it was 
expected to operate as a tool that would assist ISS risk management decision making during 
Games-time. The document was owned and updated by the Games-ISS Risk Analyst.
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The formation of the TOC-SEC operational team presented a few more challenges to 
the Games-ISS team which soon appreciated that there was inadequate knowledge of 
each team’s respective requirements and solutions. This led to a series of TOC-SEC 
cross-training sessions, stressing the need to operate in line with a unified ISS 
incident management procedure. Indeed, from TR-1 to TR-2 TOC-SEC performance 
improved, although certain problems remained, such as the over-utilization of the 
Games-ISS Analyst experts.
One further issue that required the Games (Atos Origin) and Admin (ATHOC) ISS 
teams to collaborate more closely was the problematic venue physical security. 
Physical security issues were not perceived by Atos Origin as their responsibility, yet 
they affected the quality of their deliverables and the associated ISS risk levels. The 
problems identified by the Games-ISS team were repeatedly reported to the ATHOC 
ISS Section and ATHOC IT Department, yet little seemed to change from one round of 
operational rehearsals to the next. Involvement of the ATHOC ISS team into the 
venue ISS audits, demonstrated to ATHOC first hand the problems encountered, and 
the problems were thus escalated to senior ATHOC management. However, once 
again, improvements were relatively small.
Finally, similar to the previous project phase, during ‘Operational Rehearsals’ the 
Games-ISS Risk Analyst faced difficulties collecting information for the Games-ISS 
Metrics Dashboard, since the rest of the Games-IS(S) members did not consider this a 
priority and did not provide adequate assistance. Indeed, the significance of ISS 
metrics seemed to lose momentum during the second phase of ‘Operational 
Rehearsals’ ; these were only communicated to senior project management. The 
Game-ISS Risk Analyst attributed this to the organizational prioritization of 
operational preparedness and potentially to the change of Games-ISS team manager 
in January 2004.
However, the corporate structure of the Games-IS organization remained committed 
to and interested in Games-ISS practices, continuing the related promotional efforts. 
In fact, the Games-ISS Manager was increasingly involved with press and customer 
communications, promoting the Atos Origin Games-ISS risk management model and 
the newly developed SIM solution. This significantly contradicted priorities among the 
Games-ISS team members who did not - so far - utilise the SIM solution, as this was 
still under development and new to them.
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4 .3 .4 3  Parameters and mechanisms o f ISS risk am plification
During the second round of Games IS(S) ‘Operational Rehearsals' the focus of ISS 
activities was on fine-tuning ISS technological controls, policies and procedures. This 
fine-tuning process was a highly interactive and repetitive one, incrementally 
increasing the levels of operational scale and complexity. It was based on trial and 
error mechanisms and aimed to deliver mature levels of ISS operational preparedness 
and organizational reliability prior to the August 2004 Olympic Games. Therefore, 
this was the period when the Games-ISS team had to ensure that ISS communications 
were effective, thus contributing to the optimisation of the ISS technological and 
procedural controls.
As in the previous project phases, the researcher utilized the SARF in order to 
capture the areas of ISS risk identified and communicated by the Games IS(S) project 
organization during the second phase of ‘Operational Rehearsals’ . These ISS risks are 
summarised in Table 4.14 below. Once again, similarities are identified with regards 
to ISS risks detected during earlier stages of the Games IS(S) projects (i.e. Tables 
4.11 and 4.12).
Therefore, following the completion of the TE-2, one of the first ISS problems to be 
identified by the Games-ISS team was the poor levels of compliance with ISS 
policies and procedures. In fact, all Games-ISS team members acknowledged that 
during the particular project phase there were very few mechanisms in place to 
verify ISS compliance levels. The Games-ISS Manager noted that
“we do not know where we stand. We need to start implementing more ISS
assurance controls that will verify our level of ISS posture” (i.e. Appendix-
A3:75).
As such, from February 2004 onwards the Games-ISS team invested considerable 
amounts of their time and resources creating ISS checklists, audits and test 
scenarios, frequently interacting with other Games-IS functions and partners. In 
addition, two new members were added to the team in order to conduct Games 
systems and applications ISS testing respectively. The Games-ISS Risk Analyst 
suggested that the presence of ISS assurance controls operated as a feedback 
mechanism to the ISS management and communication processes, informing the 
update of ISS policies and procedures, technical controls and further 
communications. However, she also noted that the implementation of ISS assurance 
mechanisms was not always supported by all Games-IS(S) personnel, who seemed to 
consider it a low priority relatively to the logistical and device installation activities 
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required prior to each round of operational rehearsals. This, however, was to change 
as further rounds of Test Events indicated that incidents - such as mis-configurations 
- were often repetitive and caused by the inadequate existence of ISS assurance 
controls and checks (i.e. Appendix-A3:81).
Table 4.14: Games-ISS risks identified  and communicated during the ‘Operational 
Rehearsals’ (February to June 2004) pro ject phase.
Games-ISS Risk Area
1 Patchy compliance with ISS policies and procedures.
2 Inadequate knowledge of the Games-ISS policies and procedures content by many Games-IS workers and partners.
3 Security vulnerable Games systems and applications.
4 Persisting unauthorised Games network communications.
5 Inconsistent compliance of Third Parties with the Games network secure build and connectivity policy and procedure.
6 Insecure build of Games laptops; they are also inconsistently updated with anti-virus definitions.
7 Mis-configurations of ISS management and monitoring devices and ISS controls.
8 Inadequate/non-existent information on the physical layout of venues and the physical placement of Games IT devices.
9 Ineffective communication between Games ISS team and Venue workers.
10 Incorrect configuration of IT devices at venues and absence of any configuration checks by venue IT teams.
11 Poor physical security of venue IT areas and devices
12 Poor performance of Games ISS monitoring platform
13 Mis-configuration and disconnection of Games ISS devices generating inadequate alarms.
14 Poor incident management collaboration between Venue-IT workers and TOC-SEC team
15 Poor incident management collaboration and coordination within the TOC-SEC team
16 Problematic incident profiling and resolution assignment of IS(S) incidents by non experts
17 Inadequate duplication of TOC-SEC team skills, resulting in inefficient incident management practices.
18 Problematic update of Games ISS anti-virus solution, negatively impacting the performance of OVR systems.
Once further ISS assurance controls were established it was made evident to the 
Games-ISS team that poor ISS policy and procedure compliance was greatly due to 
the inefficient communication of these across the various Games-IS functions and 
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partners. As suggested in an ISS Venue Audit Report completed by the Games-ISS Risk 
Analyst and communicated to the Games-IS management team, “ not everyone seems 
to be aware of the presence or content of ISS policies and procedures. This is 
especially the case for persons working at competition venues” . The cause of the 
problem was partly the mechanism of ISS policy and procedure communication. Until 
April 2004, each Games-IS function manager was sent an electronic copy of the 
Games-ISS policies and procedures that were relevant to their team’s activities. 
Beyond that point, each function manager was responsible of communicating the 
content of these policies to their team members. However, these communications 
usually were nothing more than a mere announcement that new ISS policies were 
released and that each individual was responsible of familiarizing themselves with its 
contents; most individuals did not.
In addition, as Games-IS functions increased in scale, the new team members were 
often not informed of the Games-ISS requirements. This partly explains a further ISS 
risk observation with regards to the poor communication of ISS policies and 
procedures to Venue workers. The majority of new Games-IS workers were 
employed to man the Games-IS team across the competition and non-competition 
venues. They were therefore located across the various, decentralised Olympic 
venues and did not have daily face-to-face communication with their colleagues, 
function management and Games-ISS team. Thus, the Games-ISS Venue Audits 
demonstrated that Games-IS employees, volunteers and partners operating from 
venues had the poorest knowledge and understanding of ISS polices and procedures. 
The significance of ISS requirements had not been attenuated by them, it had been 
inefficiently communicated to them.
Following the identification of the particular problem by the Games-ISS team, the 
latter communicated more closely with the management of other Games-IS functions 
in order to raise their awareness over the particular problem. In addition, during ISS 
audits the Games-ISS experts would communicate the content of the ISS policies and 
procedures to the persons and teams audited. Furthermore, Venue-IS workers were 
requested to refer to the Games-ISS policies and procedures when in doubt, or to 
directly contact the Games-ISS team. More importantly, however, the Games-ISS Risk 
Analyst commenced the preparation of audience-specific Games-ISS manuals, 
checklists and trainings. The preparation of this work was coordinated with the 
Games Operations team, while the training presentations were delivered from May 
2004 onwards to small-sized audiences, encouraging questions and interaction. The 
Games-ISS training presentations did not only address the audience-relevant ISS
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policies and procedures, but also raised awareness over ISS threats and best 
practices. Presentations concluded with a message of collaboration, stressing that 
secure IS practices were a common, organization-wide responsibility. Overall, these 
presentations were well received, particularly so where the ISS training presenter 
encouraged interaction and asked or gave real, A2004 Games-IS examples.
However, reception of Games-ISS training messages was occasionally problematic. 
During periods of intense negotiations between the Games-ISS team and other teams 
- such as the Technical ones - members of the training audience would react 
negatively. Such reaction was not as much directed towards the content of the 
training presentations, but more towards the training presenter and the Games-ISS 
team in general.
The ISS risk that created the most intense of arguments and negotiations during the 
‘Operational Rehearsals’ phase was related to the implementation of network access 
controls. Throughout operational rehearsals it was identified that Games systems 
and applications had several ISS vulnerabilities. These were either detected during 
the various rounds of ‘Operational Rehearsals’ , or by the Games-ISS experts that 
conducted security tests. The Games-ISS team collaborated with the various Games 
Technical teams to mitigate as many as possible of the system and application ISS 
vulnerabilities, however not all could be addressed within the remaining project 
timeframe. They, therefore, suggested that the implementation of Games network 
security controls was imperative in order to mitigate or contain the security 
vulnerabilities. However, the constantly changing ISS requirements and the growing 
size of the Games Network team implied that the implementation of ACLs was very 
problematic, with several configuration errors impacting the operational 
performance of the network. Such problems and errors were identified during Test 
Events and under conditions of time pressure, when it appeared difficult to 
coordinate a secure solution. Therefore, the ACLs were repeatedly removed and - as 
in the Test Events conducted during earlier project phases - they were stismatised.
ACLs were labelled as unnecessary and dangerous, and a cause of operational 
disasters. The Games-ISS team on the other hand, was labelled as paranoid and 
regimental.
The truth of the matter was that network communications within the Games 
network remained undisciplined, and several unauthorised activities were 
repeatedly observed. In addition, the implementation of ACLs was often the only 
technical means to contain a system or application security risk. The tension 
between the Games-ISS and Technical/ Network teams was overcome to a great 
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extent with the engagement of senior project management in the debate. The 
support they demonstrated towards the activities of the Games-ISS team led to the 
increased coordination between the various teams. In addition, the Games- ISS team 
Manager instructed his network ISS experts to conduct more checks themselves with 
regards to the correct implementation of ACLs and not leave this activity entirely to 
the Network team engineers. Where mis-configurations were identified, the Games- 
ISS team Manager personally raised the issue with the Network or Technical Team 
Manager and oversaw the problem’s resolution. Thus, this added level of authority 
appeared to ease the intensity of arguments, and gradually the Games ACLs were 
correctly implemented across venues. Furthermore, the Games-ISS team delivered a 
relevant training to all Games Network engineers, familiarizing them with the 
Games-ISS network requirements and procedures.
Another persisting ISS problem identified during the second round of ‘Operational 
Rehearsals’ was that related to the secure connectivity of Third Parties onto the 
Games network. Once again, this problem was evident during Test Events, when 
Third Parties connected onto the Games network. Despite direct communications 
between the Games-ISS team and Third Party representatives with regards to ISS 
requirements, Third Parties consistently did not comply with these. Third Parties, 
therefore, appeared to attenuate the associated ISS risks. The Games-ISS team 
proceeded with defining a few more Third Party secure device build and connectivity 
checklists, policies and procedures, and the Games-IS Chief Integrator suggested that 
these are communicated via ATHOC. It was hoped that adding this level of 
communication formality would convince Third Parties that ISS was not an issue to be 
considered lightly. However, compliance to the related ISS requirements remained 
low. Later, during venue ISS audits, it was identified that this was partly due to the 
poor knowledge of the related policies and procedures by Games-IS venue workers, 
who had to conduct the related compliance checks. This problem was greatly 
overcome by implementing a number of ISS controls. Firstly, the Games-ISS team 
provided to each Venue-IS team a Third Party Secure Device and Connectivity 
Checklist. In addition, rather than completely delegating the responsibility of these 
checks to the Venue-IS workers, the Games-ISS team was also centrally involved in 
this process. Finally, a set of ISS trainings to Third Parties and the various Venue-IS 
experts also seemed to significantly improve the levels of compliance.
A further ISS risk that persisted during this project phase was related to the insecure 
build of Games laptop devices. Throughout the various rounds of Test Events it was 
made evident that laptops connecting onto the Games network were not always built
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according to Games-ISS requirements. In addition, these Games devices were not 
always updated with the latest anti-virus definitions.167 These problems were not 
detected via any specific ISS incident, but rather via Games-ISS monitoring activity 
during operational rehearsals. Given the mobility of such devices, it was considered 
imperative by the Games-ISS team that all users connecting their laptops onto the 
Games network were identified, and the devices were securely configured. Thus, the 
Games-ISS team took action by first identifying all Games-IS workers, partners and 
Third Parties that were using a laptop. Once this was done, a newly drafted Secure 
Laptop Policy and Procedure were communicated via email to all laptop users and 
the Operations team. Accompanying these was a Secure Laptop Checklist that was 
utilised by the various organizations to securely build their devices, while the IT- 
Helpdesk and Games-ISS teams used these to conduct device audits. However, the 
uptake of this policy and associated process was overall slow, and it was not until 
before TR-2 when compliance levels improved. This was greatly due to the inefficient 
communication of the Secure Laptop Policy and Procedure to the Venue-IS workers. 
As identified earlier, Venue-IS workers were often not aware of the Games-ISS 
policies and procedures applicable to their roles and responsibilities, and thus did not 
apply the necessary ISS assurance checks. However, as soon as the Games-ISS training 
sessions commenced, a considerable improvement was evidenced with regards to 
secure laptop compliance levels.
The secure build and connection of Games laptops was not the only security issue 
concerning these devices. Most physical security incidents were also related to the 
theft of laptop devices; clearly the mobility of these contributing towards the ease of 
theft. This problem was partly addressed by distributing K-locks to Games laptop 
users. Other than this control, however, the overall level of physical security at the 
Olympic venues remained relatively poor, although some improvement was witnessed 
as venue construction preparedness matured.
Another ISS risk that was related to Atos Origin’s dependence on the deliverables of 
ATHOC IT was related to the provision of adequate and accurate information with 
regards to the physical layout of venues and the physical location of Games IT 
devices. This is a problem that persisted from previous project phases. Since no 
particular improvement was evident, the Games-ISS team chose to overcome this
167 On a daily basis the Games anti-virus servers pushed the latest definitions to all Games 
devices at a specific time during the day. If laptop devices were not connected onto the 
Games network during that particular time of the day, they would not be updated with the 
latest anti-virus protective controls.
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problem by identifying themselves the venue physical security controls. This was 
done during the Venue ISS Audits, which indicated that physical security controls 
were poor thus far; both in terms of robust venue construction and access controls.
The issues were raised with the ATHOC-ISS team that was encouraged to participate 
in the venue audits. The problems were eventually escalated to ATHOC Senior IT 
Management, while the requested information with regards to the physical IT device 
layout at venues became gradually available before TR-2. However, by that time the 
Games-ISS team had already chosen to strengthen the logical ISS controls of Games IT 
devices, thus leading to an overall more costly solution.
The collaboration between the Games-IS and ATHOC IT organizations was also 
problematic when the Games-ISS and Admin-ISS teams were joined into one 
operational team, the TOC-SEC group. Due to the inadequate number of Games-ISS 
experts that would cover all necessary shifts during operational phases - and later 
Games-time, the Admin-ISS team was gradually integrated into the Games-ISS one. 
However, the addition of new ATHOC-ISS team members initially created great 
operational confusion and poor ISS incident management practices. This was greatly 
attributed to the lack of ATHOC-ISS training on the Games-ISS incident management 
process, requirements and controls. Therefore, prior to TR-2 the relevant training 
was delivered to all TOC-SEC members, and indeed ISS incident management 
performance improved.
However, poor ISS incident management practices were identified to be caused by a 
number of additional reasons. The Technical Rehearsals demonstrated that Games-IS 
functions and the IT-Helpdesk often classified and assigned ISS incidents 
inaccurately. In addition, ISS incident management collaboration between the TOC- 
SEC group and the Venue-IT groups was mostly poor, with little communication 
between them. Both these ISS issues were addressed during the ISS training sessions, 
when the Games-ISS team members had the opportunity to present in person the ISS 
policies, procedures, incident management process, roles and responsibilities. These 
sessions were often interactive, and the training audience was encouraged to raise 
questions and give examples from their personal experience. During these sessions it 
was also possible for the Venue-IT workers to meet various members of the Games- 
ISS team, which was suggested to have improved communications between the TOC- 
SEC and Venue-IT teams. According to the Games-ISS Risk Analyst,
“after the security training presentations the Venue-IT teams can put a face 
to a name. The next time that they have a security problem, they will be less 
hesitant to call us and directly communicate with us. It is good for us too,
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since we also get to meet the people that are working at venues. The security 
training presentations and the occasional venue audits that we do are the 
only ways for us to meet the people working at the competition venues. [...] 
When you are on the phone with someone from a venue and you are trying to 
resolve a problem, it makes things a bit easier if you have actually met before 
the person you are talking with. Knowing what the venue looks like also 
helps” (i.e. Appendix-A3:85).
However, there was one problem with regards to ISS incident management 
performance that the Games-ISS team did not seem to address. This was related to 
the inadequate duplication of TOC-SEC team skills and responsibilities, particularly 
with regards to the management of Games-ISS network controls. Each of the three 
TOC-SEC shift teams covered three roles, namely the TOC-SEC Duty Manager (1-per- 
shift), the Games-ISS and Admin-ISS Administrators (2-per-shift), and the Games-ISS 
and Admin-ISS Incident Analyst (2-per-shift). However, as seen in Table 4.15 below, 
the expertise of the Games-ISS experts was not well distributed and duplicated 
among shift teams. This resulted into the poor allocation of team workload and ISS 
incident management activities - especially so when there were multiple and 
simultaneous ISS incidents that needed to be investigated and resolved. The outcome 
was that certain shift members were stressed while others were too relaxed, and ISS 
monitoring was often neglected. Possibly more important, however, was the fact 
that ISS network and system problem management skills were not duplicated. As 
such, during TR-2 it was demonstrated that Shift-#3 could not resolve any network 
ISS problems. Instead, they had to either wait for the next shift, or had to keep 
another ISS Administrator on-call.
Although the above problems were made evident across all Test Events and Technical 
Rehearsals, no substantial action was taken by the Games-ISS team; even after the 
Technical Rehearsal Officers' (TRO) Manager documented and communicated to 
senior Games-IS management that the structure of the TOC-SEC team needed to be 
revised. The Games-ISS Manager suggested that “ there is little  we can do and change 
now. We do not have enough time to train everyone in everything. But this should 
not be a major issue. By Games-time the entire environment will be fixed and 
stable. We do not expect any major network and system security configuration 
changes” (i.e. Appendix-A3:88).
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Table 4.15: Games ISS experts, roles and responsibilities o f the A2004 TOC-SEC shift 
teams.
TOC-SEC Role & Responsibilities
Skills of TOC-SEC Members
Shift #1 Shift #2 Shift #3
ISS Duty 
Manager
ISS incident
response
management
Experienced Some experience Minimalexperience
External team 
communication 
& escalation
Experienced Some experience Minimalexperience
ISS network & 
system problem 
management
Some experience No experience No experience
ISS
Administrator
ISS network & 
system problem 
management
Experienced in 
network problem 
management
Experienced in 
network problem 
management
Experienced in 
system problem 
management
ISS incident 
response Some experience Experienced
Minimal
experience
Intrusion
detection
monitoring
Experienced Experienced Some experience
ISS Incident 
Analyst
Intrusion
detection
monitoring
Some experience Some experience No experience
ISS incident 
response Some experience Experienced
Minimal
experience
Update on ISS 
alerts & 
vulnerabilities
Experienced Experienced Minimalexperience
Further ISS risks that were identified were related to the wrong configuration of ISS 
and Games IS devices. The continuous operational changes, new IS(S) requirements 
and significant logistical operations prior to each round of Test Events and Technical 
Rehearsals led to a number of errors and omissions, often causing stress and tension 
within and between teams. This was aggravated by the lack of adequate device 
configuration checks by the Venue-IT teams, resulting in the eventual creation of 
Venue-IT configuration checklists, as well as the creation of related checklists for the 
Games-ISS team at the beginning of each operational shift.
As examined earlier, the problematic configuration of ISS devices and controls 
escalated to its worst with regards to the im plem entation of ACLs, leading to the 
stigmatization of the ISS technology and Games-ISS team . Meanwhile, the real ISS 
risks - namely the problematic and uncoordinated configuration of ACLs by the
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Games Network team and the lack of adequate ACL version control and assurance 
checks by the Games-ISS team - were attenuated.
In addition, during the Technical Rehearsals it was identified that the mis- 
configuration and disconnection of Games-ISS devices generated inadequate ISS 
monitoring alerts. Thus, the Games-ISS team decided to formally add regular checks 
in the shift activities of both the TOC-SEC and Venue-IT teams. These checklists were 
communicated across the necessary persons and groups via email communications 
and formal training sessions.
Finally, the various rounds of operational rehearsals pointed to a few performance 
problems of the Games-ISS devices. Specifically, the Games-ISS monitoring platform 
repeatedly failed, impeding the Games-ISS team from monitoring communications 
both within and at the perimeter of the Games network. This was considered to be a 
significant problem for the operations of the Games-ISS team, not however directly 
affecting the reliability and performance of the Games critical services. Technical 
tests were defined in collaboration with the technology provider and eventually this 
problem was fixed.
An instance, however, where a Games-ISS technical control directly impacted the 
performance and reliability of Games-IS critical services was in relation to the 
interaction of the anti-virus technology and the OVR (On-Venue-Results) system. 
From the early stages of the TE-3 it was identified that whenever the anti-virus 
server pushed new definitions to all Games-IS devices, OVR devices failed and 
stopped working. The OVR devices had to be manually restarted to operate normally 
again. This was quickly identified as a problem that could not be fixed, and it was 
therefore agreed that OVR devices would have a dedicated anti-virus solution, where 
the related server would push new anti-virus definitions on a weekly basis only after 
a Change Request was raised and agreed with the OVR system owners. As such, 
operational and performance problems would be avoided, and definition updates 
would be restricted to periods when the systems were not supporting a Games sport 
event. It was also agreed that following TR-2 no further anti-virus updates would 
take place on the OVR systems, unless an emergency was identified and a Change 
Request was approved.
Overall, during the period of ‘Operational Rehearsal’ the process of trial-and-error 
considerably assisted the process of ISS risk identification, indicating that ISS 
communications and management became increasingly problematic as soon as the 
organization moved to a decentralised operational model. In addition, as the
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organizational operations and structure became greater in size and complexity, 
continuous changes were required with regards to the ISS management controls, in 
order to accommodate a dynamic environment. This high degree of repetition and 
change often led to errors and omissions, raising stress and/or frustration levels 
which created tense inter- and intra-organizational relations and interactions. 
Hence, this organizational environment frequently led to the amplification or 
attenuation of ISS risks. Direct communication of the Games-ISS experts with their 
target audience, and the direct involvement of the ISS experts in assurance activities 
and processes often assisted with the improvement of the overall ISS management 
levels and practices. However, even ISS experts demonstrated to be prone to biased 
judgements and occasionally downplayed or amplified ISS risks.
4.3.4.4 Organizational ISS reliability and operational preparedness
The findings from the organizational ISS reliability and operational preparedness 
questionnaire during the second phase of ‘Operational Rehearsals’ are considered in 
more detail below (i.e. Appendix-A10).
Up to TR-1: February to March 2004
Following the completion of the TE-2 in January 2004 and the end of the 
‘ Implementation and Testing’ phase of the Games IS(S) projects, no improvement 
was observed with regards to levels of reliable organizational ISS design. All related 
ISS controls demonstrated partial and immature implementation, with the IT- 
Helpdesk Manager allocating the lowest scores out of all his colleagues, suggesting 
that his team had a very poor understanding of the Games-IS interactions, ISS needs 
and status of implemented controls. The highest ranking control across all 
questionnaire respondents was related to the implementation of component 
redundancy for all critical IT assets.
However, with the approaching first Technical Rehearsals (TR-1: March to April 2004) 
and their completion, some improvement was suggested by most Games-IS groups. 
The Games-ISS group, however, did not consider any improvement to have taken 
place. The persisting ISS problems with the secure Third Party connectivity, the 
secure build of Games-IS devices, and the Games network configuration problems, 
indicated to the Games-ISS team that the implementation of the necessary 
organizational ISS design controls remained inconsistent. The only other
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organizational role that did not consider any improvement to have taken place by the 
completion of TR-1 was the IT-Helpdesk Manager.
Contrary to controls of organizational design, the controls of reliable ISS operational 
management demonstrated a steady improvement during the period leading up to 
the TR-1, and an overall greater level of maturity. The role that suggested the 
greatest improvement was that of the IT-Helpdesk Manager, who observed an 
increasing collaboration and coordination between his team and the Games-ISS team 
with regards to the enforcement of the Games-ISS operational procedures.
However, controls of reliable organizational ISS culture did not fare as well as those 
of operational management. Instead, throughout the period leading up to the TR-1, a 
deterioration was observed. This was attributed by all Games-IS members to the 
increasing number of organizational employees and the lack of any ISS training and 
communication controls to integrate them into the existing organizational ISS 
culture. Questionnaire respondents identified that Games-IS employees - particularly 
those operating from venues or the newly-joined ones - were often bored or did not 
feel confident to make any decisions. In addition, the Games-ISS team members 
identified that the ISS policies and procedures were still poorly understood by all 
Games-IS groups and external partners, with compliance levels remaining relatively 
low.
During the same project phase, both ISS anticipation and containment controls did 
not demonstrate any particular improvement. This was a period of continuous 
changes and updates of existing controls, with Games-IS(S) team members often 
perceiving no change in levels of organizational and operational maturity and 
stability.
Prior to TR-2: April to June 2004
During the last rounds of TE-3 and prior to TE-4 (June 2004) the maturity of reliable 
organizational ISS design controls improved significantly. The end of the TE-3 
signalled for the various Games-IS teams the need to finally achieve some level of 
stability, with ISS technologies, policies and procedures, and communications 
becoming increasingly consistent and clear. The only related control that continued 
to demonstrate low maturity was related to the elimination of single points of 
failure. Such risks were identified by the Games-ISS team members to be both 
technological and procedural, such as the insecure build of devices and the non- 
compliance of Third Parties with the Games network secure connectivity procedure.
D E Afxentiadis (2010) PhD Thesis, London: LSE 208
In addition, the IT-Helpdesk Manager identified that his team was still lacking 
adequate understanding with regards to the interactions, criticality and ISS controls 
of the Games network and applications. This was greatly due the increasing size of 
his team during this period, and the lack of any formal ISS - or otherwise - training. 
Indeed, it was not until late May of 2004 that the Games-ISS team started delivering 
a series of audience-specific ISS trainings.
On the other hand, the maturity levels of the reliable ISS operational management 
controls remained overall stable during this period, with a considerable number of 
related controls demonstrating maximum maturity, especially so with regards to the 
maturity of the Games ISS policies and procedures and the establishment of 
mechanisms that supported learning via mechanisms of trial and error.
With regards to controls of reliable organizational ISS culture, these also 
demonstrated an improvement, especially so during the period just prior to TR-2. All 
questionnaire respondents identified such an improvement, greatly attributing this to 
the delivery of formal ISS training. In addition, levels of routinization appeared to 
have dropped as operations picked up pace and Games-IS workers were better 
informed and prepared with regards to there IS(S) responsibilities.
Overall, throughout the project phase leading up to TR-2 both ISS anticipation and 
containment controls improved considerably, especially so as the final round of the 
TE-3 was completed and the Games-IS project management team demanded 
organizational and operational stability.
After TR-2: June 2004
Following TE-4 and TR-2 all ISS controls of organizational reliability and operational 
preparedness demonstrated increasing levels of maturity.
Once again, the organizational ISS design control that demonstrated the highest 
level of maturity across the questionnaire respondents was related to the presence of 
component redundancy built into the IT infrastructure for all critical assets. In 
addition, all teams demonstrated improved levels of understanding with regards to 
the interactions, criticality and implemented ISS controls of Games applications, 
systems and network. The most notable improvement was that recorded for the IT- 
Helpdesk team. Therefore, perceptions of organizational ISS design reliability levels 
converged.
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Similarly, and in fact demonstrating even greater levels of maturity, the operational 
ISS management controls improved significantly by the end of the ‘Operational 
Rehearsals’ period, with all Games-IS functions agreeing on their assessments. The 
lowest score was given by the Games-ISS Risk Analyst who suggested that the 
decentralisation of decision-making authority remained problematic as venue 
operators often hesitated to resolve problems themselves and re-assigned their 
resolution to the central TOC teams.
With regards to controls of a reliable organizational ISS culture, these also 
demonstrated increasing levels of maturity and consistency, with the members of 
Games-ISS team allocating the highest scores and the Games Operations and IT- 
Helpdesk teams allocating the - relatively - lowest ones.
Finally, both ISS anticipation and containment controls demonstrated improvement, 
resulting in similar levels of maturity.
4.3.5. A2004 Games-ISS project ‘Event-time’
With the completion of the A2004 Games IS(S) ‘Operational Rehearsals’ project phase 
in June 2004, the project organizational environment entered a final period when the 
status of operational IS(S) settings and controls were verified. Olympic competition 
and non-competition venues were gradually security ‘ locked down’ , while functional 
teams gradually moved to a fully operational work mode of shifts.
As the A2004 Games-time approached (13th - 29th August, 2004), there was decreasing 
emphasis on the activities, deliverables and controls anticipating ISS risks. Instead, 
there was an increased attention towards the efficient containment of IS(S) 
incidents, and the capture of all relevant information required for the effective real­
time risk and incident management decision making.
Games-time was a period when operational Games IS(S) scale and complexity 
reached their peak, and all related preparations were put to the test. As the focus of 
the organization shifted towards the management and containment of IS(S) incidents, 
so did the researcher’s attention.
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4.3 .5 .1  Gomes-ISS deliverables , controls and incidents
With the completion of the Games-ISS ‘Operational Rehearsals’ the ISS testing 
activities did not entirely term inate. Various ISS tests and checks were conducted at 
this stage of the project by the Games-ISS team in collaboration with a number of 
other Technical and Operational Games functions168. In addition, some further Venue- 
ISS Audits and ISS training sessions were conducted.
As for ISS incidents that were detected during this period, these demonstrated 
significant similarity to problems detected at earlier project phases. Prior to the 
Games, most ISS incidents were in fact change requests of ISS-device configurations, 
while some mis-configurations were also detected and corrected. In addition, Third 
Parties and Games-IS partners also demonstrated non-compliance to certain Games- 
ISS policies and procedures. With the assistance of the Venue-IT teams, these 
problems were - in their m ajority - tim ely addressed.
Finally, the Games-ISS incidents that were detected during Games-time did not have 
any severe impact on the Games-IS services, and were overall contained. These are 
summarised below in Table 4.16.
Table 4.16: Games-ISS incidents during A2004 ‘Event-time ' (13th-29th August, 2004).
Type of Games-ISS Incidents No. of Games-ISS Incidents/ No. of Total Games-ISS Incidents
Severity 2 (major impact) Games-ISS incidents 1/101 (1%)
Severity 3 (minor impact) Games-ISS incidents 38/101 (38%)
Severity 4 (investigation-only) Games-ISS incidents 62/101 (61%)
ISS control configuration change/correction 29/101 (29%)
Unauthorised/out-of-ordinary Games network traffic 22/101 (22%)
Account management policy errors Et violations 21/101 (21%)
Wrong Games device configuration and build 8/101 (8%)
Unauthorised device disconnection/connection 5/101 (5%)
ISS hardware malfunctioning 5/101 (5%)
Physical security violations 5/101 (5%)
Games network intrusion/spoofing attacks 2/101 (2%)
Accreditation policy violations 1/101 (1%)
Other 3/101 (4%)
168 E.g. some technical test were conducted to ensure the correct configuration of Games-ISS 
ACLs, the security of several critical Games applications and systems, and the secure build 
and BIOS settings of Games-IS devices.
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4.3.5.2 Contextual noise - organizational politics, culture and project 
phase challenges
During the period immediately prior to the A2004 Games and during the 17 days of 
the event the Games-IS(S) organization experienced an almost complete shift from 
functional organizing to venue and operational organizing. Games-IS operations were 
completely decentralised, while the operating environment reached its greatest 
scale and complexity, yet demonstrated relative stability (i.e. Table 4.9).
The Games-ISS team continued some of its functional activities during early July 
2004, yet by the end of the same month it was joined by the Admin-ISS experts and 
was completely transformed to a 24-by-7 operational structure of three TOC-SEC 
shift teams (i.e. Table 4.15). Its operations were not decentralised to the same 
extent as for other Games-IS functions, since the TOC-SEC monitored all ISS activity 
centrally from the TOC. However, the Games Technical and Operational experts 
operating from the competition and non-competition venues acted as TOC-SEC 
assistants with regards to installing and configuring Games-ISS devices and controls at 
venues. In addition, they were greatly delegated the compliance monitoring of ISS 
operational policies and procedures, such as the Third Party Connectivity Procedure 
and the Secure Laptop Policy.
The physical lock-down of Olympic venues from mid-July 2004 onwards, signalled 
that security controls were becoming stricter, and coincided with increased levels of 
compliance with the Secure Third Party Connectivity policy and procedure. Yet, the 
lock-down of venues and the increased ISS alertness of Venue-IT teams also raised 
the TOC-SEC’s attention to a further risk with regards to the non-compliance of 
Olympic IT Partners (i.e. SWATCH) with the Secure Laptop policy169.
The immense logistical project of preparing within a matter of a few days the IT 
infrastructure of all A2004 Games venues also led to several errors and omissions, 
with IT devices being shipped to the wrong venue, or IT devices (including ISS 
devices) being wrongly built and configured.
Therefore, during the period immediately prior to the A2004 Games, as well as 
during the Games, the majority of ISS problems were related to the incorrect build of
169 In brief, SWATCH had assumed that since they were a Games-IS trusted partner, they did 
not have to comply to the Games-ISS Secure Laptop policy. This led to some last minute 
tension and negotiations between Atos Origin and SWATCH. They finally agreed that some of 
the Secure Laptop checks would be implemented, while non-compliance to some of the 
secure-build requirements would have to be accepted since there was inadequate time to 
change all of these.
D E Afxentiadis (2010) PhD Thesis, London: LSE 212
Games devices by the Software Distribution team170, which had inconsistently 
security hardened Games devices and inconsistently implemented device BIOS 
restrictions. In addition, mistakes with regards to the incorrect configuration of ACL 
and port security controls on the venue switches by the Network engineers persisted.
Overall, what appeared to significantly improve prior/during the A2004 Games was 
the compliance level of the procedural ISS controls. Technical and configuration 
errors appeared impossible to completely eliminate. Yet, these errors did not create 
tension between the TOC-SEC team and the other functional/operational teams as 
had happened previously. Problems were resolved in a collaborative and mostly 
efficient manner. The urgency of the ‘ live* Games did not allow for such political 
arguments.
Instead, during the particular project period tensions seemed to increase within 
operational teams, whether that was the various Venue-IT and TOC-IT teams. 
Similarly, increased tension was observed within the TOC-SEC team, particularly 
between different shift teams. Team loyalties seemed to shift from a functional (i.e. 
Games-ISS team) level to an operational (i.e. TOC-SEC shift team) level.
TOC-SEC team #2 and #3 (i.e. Table 4.15) often expressed their frustration with 
regards to the inequitable distribution of Games-ISS skills and administrative 
privileges. They both expressed that
“ the TOC-SEC shifts had to be rearranged and all shifts should have 
administrative access to all Games-ISS management platforms. But it seems 
that all [the Games-ISS Manager/TOC-SEC team-#1 Duty Manager] cared about 
was to keep the best security engineers on his team” (i.e. Appendix-A3:94).
In addition, arguments were often observed between individuals across TOC-SEC 
teams, especially between persons that held the same role across shifts. 
Relationships between shift-teams became more competitive and it appeared that - 
to one extent or another - they all wanted to avoid being blamed for any ISS 
problems and poor ISS incident management practices. The Games-IS Chief Integrator 
later noted that
“ this is normal behaviour. Some shift teams will always be stronger than 
others, and none of them wants the extra workload or responsibility. Keep in
170 The A2004 Games Software Distribution team was a function of the Games-IS Operations, 
Central Operations group (i.e. Appendix-A7), along with the IT-Helpdesk, PC-Factory, and IT- 
Training.
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mind as well that for most Games-IS workers their employment contract will 
end by the end of the Games, and if they are to get a contract renewal they 
have to ensure that nothing happens on their watch. They are all competing 
for a future job against their colleagues” (i.e. Appendix-A3:96).
It thus appears that in terms of their future job security each Games-IS(S) worker was 
more threatened by their teammates, than by the members of other teams.
The sense of competition between the Games-ISS TOC-SEC members was particularly 
evident with regards to the several Atos Origin Games-ISS marketing and promotional 
presentations that took place during this period. The Games-ISS members competed 
with one another for an opportunity to make one of these press 
presentations/interviews and thus also promote their own contribution to the 
project.
Furthermore, both during Games-time and later in the completed A2004 ISS Risk 
Management document171 it was made evident that the members of the TOC-SEC 
team attenuated the ISS risks and problems caused by their own operations, and 
amplified the errors and ISS risks caused by other operational groups, or beyond the 
TOC-SEC team’s jurisdiction - for example, the physical security problems. Such 
behaviour was particularly driven by the Games-ISS Manager.
Finally, during this period it is worth noting that significant levels of routinization, 
boredom and tiredness were observed both at competition venues and the TOC, 
particularly during the evening/early hour shifts (i.e. 19.00-7.00). IS(S) monitoring 
and checks often did not take place and after 12-hours on shift teams were often 
keen to leave than stay behind and ensure thorough shift hand-over. Routinization 
was greater for the less skilled TOC-SEC members that relied on their more 
experienced and skilled colleagues to carry out all necessary ISS management and 
monitoring activities. Such routinization often led to a delayed incident management 
response.
4.3.5.3 Parameters and mechanisms of ISS risk amplification
The ‘Operational’ phase of the A2004 Games-IS(S) project was a time when the focus 
of every Games-IS function was on the logistical preparations of the 60 operational 
Olympic venues and the smooth execution of the ‘event’ . The goal was for the
171 I.e. footnote #164.
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Games-IS(S) infrastructure to invisibly and reliably support the A2004 Games. 
Therefore, the m ajority of ISS risk signals that were witnessed during this period 
w ere originated from Games-time ISS events and incidents (i.e . Table 4 .16 ). These 
Games-time ISS incidents also signalled to the Games IS(S) organization the extent to 
which their event preparations were adequate and their prior ISS risk perceptions 
valid. The areas of ISS risk identified during this project are summarised below in 
Table 4.17.
Table 4.17: Games-ISS risks identified and communicated during the ‘Operational' 
(July to August 2004) project phase.
Games-ISS Risk /  Incident(s)
1 Mis-configured Games ISS technical controls.
2 ISS vulnerabilities and design flaws of critical Games applications.
3 Problematic ISS incident allocation and escalation procedures among ISS non-experts.
4 Problematic physical security despite some improvements after venue lock-down.
5 Non-compliance of SWATCH with the Games Secure Laptop  Policy.
6 Violations of Games ISS account management policies.
7 Problematic TOC-SEC incident management communications and coordination.
8 Inadequate duplication of skills and administrative privileges across TOC-SEC shift teams.
9 Lack of adequate ISS assurance checks with regards to the correct configuration of the Games-ISS technical controls.
10 Attempts to connect unauthorised devices onto the Games network.
11 Unauthorised disconnection of Games devices.
12 Performance problems/ malfunctioning of Games-ISS technical controls.
All of the above ISS risks were identified both prior and during the A2004 Games, 
although often during Games-time there was a d ifferent urgency to their 
management. The same ISS risks that were tolerated to an extent during the 
pro ject’s preparation phase, were amplified during Games-time and had to be 
urgently managed. For example, the mis-configuration of Games-ISS controls by 
either the Games-ISS team  or the Technical teams was a common problem, yet this 
was far less tolerated during Games-time.
In fact, such ISS problems led to tensions between or within teams. While during the
project preparation phases entire functional teams were responsible of implementing 
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and configuring a particular IS(S) control, during Games-time this responsibility 
became the responsibility of specific individuals, according to their operational roles. 
Thus, errors and omissions often led to personal arguments during Games-time.
In addition, there appeared to be a tendency across the various functional or 
operational teams to hide any IS(S) risks identified at the last minute, in knowledge 
of the inability to change the IT infrastructure and in fear of being blamed for any 
omissions. This phenomenon was exposed after the Games, when Games-IS 
employees felt less threatened from admitting to errors and ‘hidden’ IS(S) risks.
Therefore, ISS risks related to the poor design practices of Games applications, or 
the inconsistent or wrong implementation of Games network ISS controls were 
attenuated during Games-time, in hope that any related incidents would be quickly 
detected and contained. Even within the TOC-SEC team knowledge of ISS risks was 
greatly departmentalised, and it was only after the completion of the A2004 ISS Risk 
Management document and the completion of the A2004 Games event that a more 
complete picture of ISS problems was available.
This departmentalised knowledge of Games IS(S) problems and controls also had an 
impact on the efficiency and effectiveness of incident management practices, via 
the slow detection of problem causes, the slow resolution of incidents, and the 
inadequate or excessive allocation of Games-ISS incident management resources.
However, the interaction between Venue-IT experts and the TOC-SEC team improved 
during Games-time, demonstrating a close coordination and collaboration in the 
detection and resolution of ISS incidents. This resulted in improved ISS incident 
management practices. The TOC-SEC team was better equipped to identify centrally 
problems related to the configuration of Games-ISS network controls, the 
unauthorised connection of devices on the Games network, the violations of 
account management policies, and the performance problems of Games-ISS 
devices. On the other hand, the decentralised Venue-IT teams could locally detect 
any non-compliance problems to procedural and physical ISS controls. Furthermore, 
the Venue-IT teams played a key role in verifying any ISS problems detected by the 
TOC-SEC team, and containing or resolving these locally. Therefore, the Venue-IT 
teams often acted as an effective ISS communication channel to the various IS 
partners and customers at the venue.
The contribution of Venue-IT teams to the enforcement of ISS management controls 
was particularly useful in detecting and managing the ISS problem related to the last- 
minute device connectivity requirement of IT Partner, SWATCH. Although SWATCH 
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had been communicated and trained on all Games-ISS operational policies and 
procedures - including the Secure Laptop policy - they had mistakenly assumed that 
they could connect their laptops onto the Games network without prior ISS 
compliance checks from the ISS and Venue-IT teams. Although SWATCH put 
considerable pressure on the Venue-IT teams to grant them access to the Games 
network, the Venue-IT personnel declined their requests and timely escalated the 
matter to the TOC-SEC team and senior project management. The problem was 
finally resolved with a formal agreement between Atos Origin, ATHOC IT and 
SWATCH, where the latter would comply with the majority of the Games Secure 
Laptop requirements, while the Venue-IT teams would conduct all necessary and 
agreed compliance checks.
Apart from the above observations with regards to specific ISS risks identified 
immediately prior and during Games-time, a number of further observations were 
made by the researcher with regards to the ISS risk attention and sense-making 
processes. As noted earlier, attention was raised towards the ISS controls of risk 
containment, such as the improvement of incident management communications and 
practices. The Games ISS Incident Management policy and procedure were updated 
prior to the Games, in order to provide clearer guidance to the classification and 
escalation of Games-ISS incidents. Moreover, during Games-time it was made evident 
that the lack of TOC-SEC duplicated administrative privileges on the Games-ISS 
controls was creating problems with regards to the efficient management of ISS 
incidents. Hence, this was addressed by allowing a member of each TOC-SEC shift 
team to have full access to the Games-ISS management controls. The fact that this 
known problem was not addressed prior to the Games is perhaps indicative of the 
Games-ISS Manager’s false confidence in the stability and correct configuration of 
Games-ISS controls during Games-time.
The delayed detection and resolution of several wrong control configuration ISS 
incidents can be also attributed to the false confidence that TOC-SEC members had 
in the skills of their colleagues and the adequacy or effectiveness of ISS assurance 
controls. Related ISS incidents during Games-time indicated that complacency and 
boredom often resulted in mistakes, which were often hidden from other teams.
It is also interesting to note here that - similar to previous project phases - boredom 
was acknowledged by all respondents to the researchers’ Maturity of Reliable ISS 
Organization and Operations questionnaire, yet little was done to address this issue. 
Games IS(S) personnel were rarely reprimanded for not paying full attention to their
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operational management and monitoring responsibilities. The Games-IS Chief 
Integrator suggested that
“everyone gets bored at some point when on shift. Especially the night shifts. 
Nobody really gets told off, because we all feel bored and tired at times. [...] 
Yes, this can lead to problems; especially as the Games approach their 
conclusion and we all tend to get a bit more relaxed. On the last two days of 
the Games we had a few severity-1 and -2 incidents and nobody addressed 
them until hours later, because most people were not at their posts 
monitoring what is happening” (i.e. Appendix-A3:96).
Another observation with regards to ISS risks during Games-time was related to 
expected risks, yet their unexpected interaction. As stated earlier, all ISS risks and 
incidents identified during Games-time were previously known and, therefore, partly 
expected. What, however, was not expected was the way in which a technical 
risk/incident could be combined with a procedural and behavioural ISS risk, thus 
leading to the amplification of the total risk experience. For example, the ISS 
incident summarised in Appendix-A11 was a combination of a wrong Games-ISS 
control configuration, the poor incident management and communication practices 
within the TOC-SEC team, the inadequate duplication of skills and administrative 
privileges across TOC-SEC shifts, and the lack of adequate and effective ISS assurance 
checks.
ISS incidents such as these often amplified perceptions of risk or indicated that 
perceptions of risk had been previously attenuated. This is demonstrated in the 
responses to the researcher’s Maturity of Reliable ISS Organization and Operations 
questionnaire considered below. For example, although overall ISS containment 
controls improved prior to Games-times, a number of ISS incidents raised awareness 
over certain risks (e.g. the lack of Games ISS skills duplication) and led to 
particularly low ISS reliability scorings. This can be greatly attributed to the 
contextual noise at the time, where the upcoming Games decreased error tolerance 
levels and the increased availability of ISS risk information amplified risk 
perceptions.
Similarly, although prior to the event it was acknowledged that the Games 
applications suffered from certain design and security flaws, these were then 
assessed to be overall acceptable and containable. However, after the Games and 
with a series of critical Games application failures, the same risks were scored higher 
and the reliability of application ISS controls - although no application security
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incident took place - was scored lower. Clearly, the contextual noise of the Games 
and the realization that IS design risks can interact and compromise the availability 
of IT services, also affected assessments with regards to the security of Games 
applications.
Overall then, it is observed that immediately prior and during Games-time increased 
attention was given to the fine-tuning of ISS risk containment controls. The lack of 
adequate time to make any further significant changes to the Games-ISS 
management controls implied that newly identified risks could not be entirely 
corrected, but restricted.
In addition, the approaching ‘Event’ made the organization less tolerant to mistakes, 
which often led to the amplification of ISS risks. However, the imminence of the 
Games also made functional/operational teams more cooperative and any last 
minute problems were addressed in a coordinated, results-focused manner. The 
escalation of any such problems to senior project management also speeded up 
related decision-making.
However, tension and the allocation of blame increased within teams. This also 
applied to the TOC-SEC team, which often demonstrated an orchestrated effort to 
hide risks from non-experts and resolve problems internally. Such tension and any 
associated mistakes were often aggravated by the increasing levels of tiredness and 
boredom, and the inequitable distribution of responsibilities and skills within teams.
Finally, it is worth emphasizing that Games IS(S) configuration changes did not stop 
before or during the A2004 Games, demonstrating the constantly changing and 
complex business requirements, while associated errors and omissions also persisted. 
In fact, the interaction of various such errors and ISS risks often led to unexpected 
outcomes and the amplification of ISS incidents and risks.
4.3.5A  Organizational ISS reliability and operational preparedness
As summarised in Appendix-A10, after the A2004 Olympic venue lock-down and the 
freeze of the Games IS(S) environment and soon after the completion of the A2004 
Olympic Games event, a number of Games-IS(S) team representatives were asked - as 
previously - to score the level of organizational ISS reliability and operational 
preparedness.
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The researcher expected that the August 2004 findings would indicate the greatest 
level of ISS control reliability, while the September 2004 findings would reflect ISS 
risk perceptions after these had been put to the test during Games-time. The actual 
responses to the Maturity of Reliable ISS Organization and Operations Questionnaire 
are summarised below.
Just before the A2004 Olympic Games (early August 2004)
The maturity level of reliable ISS organizational design controls did not demonstrate 
any significant change from the period following the completion of TR-2. The only 
improvements were suggested by the Games-ISS Architect and Games-IS Technical 
Team Manager who argued that after the final round of Technical Tests and 
controlled configuration changes, their understanding of the Games systems and 
network interactions, interdependencies, ISS needs and implemented controls had 
improved.
With regards to the maturity level of reliable ISS operational management controls, 
this also demonstrated a small improvement with a number of Games-IS functional 
managers suggesting that attention to operations had improved along with the 
degree to which decision making migrated to where expertise was.
However, it is interesting to note that during this period the Games-ISS Risk Analyst 
who was predominantly occupied with collecting a variety of ISS risk information and 
drafting the A2004 Games ISS Risk Management document172, did not entirely agree 
with her colleagues. She suggested that the key IS(S)personnel was not adequately 
duplicated where operations were critical, pointing out that TOC-SEC team-#3 
demonstrated a particularly poor performance with regards to ISS incident 
management practices. She also questioned the effectiveness of the organization’s 
formal mechanisms with regards to enhancing ISS learning from trial and error 
activities. Specifically she suggested that
“ formal mechanisms are in place, but these are not always effective. For 
example, TR-2 demonstrated that the operational model of the TOC-SEC team 
needs to change, yet it has not. The TR-2 also indicated that across all shifts 
there must be at least one Games-ISS expert that has full access to the 
Games-ISS monitoring and management tools. This has not changed either” 
(i.e. Appendix-A3:93).
172 I.e. footnotes 164 and 169.
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Yet, the rest of her team members and organizational colleagues did not seem to 
acknowledge this issue as a problem.
Similar to ISS controls of reliable operational management, all Games IS(S) team 
representatives suggested that the maturity level of reliable ISS organizational 
culture remained overall stable prior to the Games. According to a number of 
respondents minimal improvement was demonstrated in areas such as the degree to 
which Games-IS personnel was encouraged to question normal system, network and 
people activity, and to elaborate on their ISS incident response capabilities.
Once again, the only questionnaire respondent that suggested that the organizational 
ISS culture had deteriorated was the Games-ISS Risk Analyst. She argued that the 
latest Venue ISS Audits had demonstrated the ineffectiveness of the Games-ISS 
training efforts with regards to particular target groups, such as Third Parties, IT 
Partners and IT volunteers.
Overall, with regards to the maturity level of Games ISS anticipation and 
containment controls, almost all respondents suggested that this had slightly 
improved. The only exception to this assessment was the Games-ISS Risk Analyst.
Immediately after the completion of the A2004 Olympic Games (early September 
2004)
Following the completion of the A2004 Olympic Games, all respondents to the 
researcher’s questionnaire suggested that all types of reliability ISS controls did not 
demonstrate any improvement during Games-time. Quite the contrary, all types of 
ISS reliability controls were assessed as less mature than prior to the Games, 
indicating perhaps that prior to the event the Games IS(S) personnel were more 
confident of the controls’ maturity. The actual event and the problems encountered 
during this, either amplified perceptions of ISS risk or attenuated confidence in the 
effectiveness of ISS controls.
Thus, with regards to the ISS controls of reliable organizational design the majority 
of questionnaire respondents agreed that the clarity over the Games applications, 
systems and network interactions, interdependencies, ISS needs and implemented 
controls had been overestimated prior to the A2004 Games event. The area where 
the reliability of ISS controls appeared to have been overestimated the most was 
related to the Games applications. The Games-IS Chief Integrator suggested that:
“ prior to the Games, the technical area that we were most confident about
was the Games applications. They had been used before in the Salt Lake 
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Winter Olympics and we did not face then any major problems. What changed 
the most in the Athens Games was the network architecture and design, and 
this was everyone’s greatest concern. But it turned out that the network 
controls performed better than all the rest. The applications that we had 
trusted the most gave us the greatest trouble” (i.e. Appendix-A3:96).
It is interesting to note that during Games-time no ISS incident was experienced with 
regards to the Games applications, but rather there were severe problems with 
regards to their performance under the great load of Games-time user requests. 
Nonetheless, the above perception expressed by the Games-IS Chief Integrator was 
shared among the various Games functions and the ISS reliability levels of the Games 
applications demonstrated a reduction.
The above perception with regards to the poor understanding of the Games 
applications also explains the lower score in September 2004 with regards to the 
adequate component redundancy that was built in the IT infrastructure for all critical 
assets.
Controls of reliable ISS operational management also demonstrated lower levels of 
maturity after the Games. Questionnaire respondents suggested that during Games- 
time it was demonstrated that there was inadequate duplication of key IS(S) 
personnel where operations were critical. It was suggested that this often impacted 
the efficiency and effectiveness of incident management practices. In addition, the 
Games-IS Operations Team Manager suggested that the Games-ISS policies and 
procedures were not communicated to all parties as effectively as assumed prior to 
the Games. This assessment was made in reference to the laptop connectivity 
problems that were encountered at the last minute with SWATCH.
Finally, with regards to controls of reliable ISS organizational culture the majority 
of questionnaire respondents identified that the levels of routinization increased 
during Games-time. In fact, they acknowledged that this phenomenon often resulted 
in reduced vigilance and a delayed response to incident management requests.
Overall then, immediately prior to the A2004 Olympic event all ISS reliability controls 
- aside from the ISS containment controls - did demonstrate their greatest level of 
maturity. However, with the completion of the Games, although the event was 
considered to be overall successful from an IS(S) point of view, the problems 
encountered during the event led to lower ISS control reliability scores than prior to 
the Games. This applied to both ISS anticipation and containment controls.
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4.3.6. A2004 Games-ISS project ‘Closure*
The overall successful completion of the Games IS(S) projects was concluded with a 
series of After Action Review (AAR) reports and meetings that lasted a few days. 
Among other Games-IS topics that were addressed by this formal mechanism of 
learning and information collection, the performance of the Games-ISS function and 
TOC-SEC operational team were also considered.
All members of the Games-ISS team attended an AAR meeting and had to complete a 
related report which addressed a number of Games-ISS topics as considered below.
Firstly, all Games-ISS team members agreed that the implementation of the ISS 
controls was more challenging that initially expected. This was greatly attributed to 
poor activity coordination with non-ISS teams, especially the Games Network team. 
The Games-ISS Manager suggested that
“ the relationship with the Games Network team was very difficult. There was 
an unclear reporting on the status of their ongoing activities, and we often 
had to substitute the Network team in the investigation of difficult network 
issues. These problems have created tensions and feelings of injustice within 
the Games-ISS team” .
He identified that the cause of these problems was that
“ the majority of the Network team members were not experienced, leading 
to many wrong configurations. Also, the decision-making and -tracking 
processes were very obscure” (i.e. Appendix-A3:95).
The Games-ISS team members, however, identified that their relationship with the 
rest of the Technical teams had been relatively good, and these teams had been very 
proactive in terms of ISS.
An ISS control implementation area that was identified as problematic by all Games- 
ISS experts was related to the Access Control Lists (ACLs). The Games-ISS Manager 
argued that
“all ACLs at venues were implemented as planned. Nevertheless, the efforts 
required to define, implement and test the ACLs has been much greater than 
expected, requiring management attention and support to be completed” 
(i.e. Appendix-A3:95).
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Several reasons were identified as responsible for this situation: a lack of accurate 
data flow requirements; the inability to test early due to the delayed readiness of 
venues and the late start of some applications, forcing the Games-ISS team to 
frequently re-deploy ACLs; and the lack of a centralised management system.
Furthermore, the Games-ISS team also addressed their interaction with the Games 
IT Integration team. The latter group was supposed to work with the Games-ISS 
team to determine the ‘ordinary’ Games traffic flow, thus determining the ACL 
requirements. The Games-ISS experts suggested that there was an initial disconnect 
between their team and the Integration team. This was identified to improve after 
TR-1, when joined tests were organized between the two teams. In addition, all 
Games-ISS members agreed that there was a gap between the technical teams and 
non-technical teams of the project. As stated by the Games-ISS Manager,
“ the IT Integration and Operations teams do not speak the same language as 
the Technical and Security teams. Cross-functional testing can definitely help 
in creating a common language and fine-tuning security controls” (i.e. 
Appendix-A3:95).
With regards to interactions with the Games IT Integration team, the Games-ISS team 
also considered the issue of system and application stability. They agreed that the 
application security and performance tests had been inadequate in relation to 
excessive legitimate traffic, resulting in the failure of certain Games systems during 
event-time.
In relation to the implementation of procedural and training ISS controls, the 
Games-ISS team identified that account management issues should be addressed in 
greater detail, while more thorough auditing procedures should be added for both 
technical and non-technical policy statements. They also identified that there was a 
need to increase the number of venue Games-ISS visits for auditing and training 
purposes. The Games-ISS Manager suggested that
“communication with the Venue-IT teams is key to the success of any ISS 
investigation performed at venues. [...] Their training has helped strengthen 
their collaboration with us. More venue visits should be organized for ISS 
auditing and training purposes. The ISS audits should also ensure that 
partners’ equipment is considered” (i.e. Appendix-A3:95).
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During the AAR meeting the Games-ISS team also discussed the ISS monitoring 
practices during Games-time and the implementation of the SIM solution. The 
Games-ISS Manager suggested that
“we aimed to implement a SIM solution in order to filter, aggregate and 
correlate the security alarms generated by the Games IT infrastructure. The 
implemented system has received approximately 5 million alarms from which 
it  has extracted 450 high alerts and 22 critical ones. We feel that the solution 
has performed very well and that we have achieved our objectives. [...] A SIM 
solution should be definitely implemented at Games events. In the future 
Games we need to fine-tune the correlation rules with the help of the 
Technical teams” (i.e. Appendix-A3:95).
However, not all team members agreed with the above view. The majority of Games- 
ISS team members suggested that they rarely used the SIM solution to monitor the 
Games IT environment during Games-time. The reasons for this were their relative 
unfamiliarity with the solution and the fact that alternative IT monitoring solutions 
had been used throughout the project preparation phases.
During the AAR Games-ISS team meeting, the participants also addressed issues 
related to Game-IS operational procedures. With regards to the change management 
process they all agreed that change requests should include a section describing all 
interdependencies, since in several instances the Games-ISS/TOC-SEC team approved 
new functionality without knowing there was a resulting ISS control configuration 
change requirement. Furthermore, the Games-ISS team agreed that there was 
inadequate change management coordination after a change had been approved. No 
quality checks were implemented.
Similarly, the Games-ISS team also identified a number of problems in relation to the 
configuration management process. They highlighted their last minute discoveries 
prior to the Games with regards to the insecure and inconsistent build of certain 
devices, while they argued that their assurance activities were impaired by the lack 
of a central repository which could track versions of the different configurations they 
managed. The Games-ISS Manager recommended that
“we need to implement a number of things; a central repository to store 
configurations; a central auditing system to check the configurations in place; 
and a global configuration management system. We also need to organize 
more system audits and tests” (i.e. Appendix-A3:95).
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Following the numerous account management policy violations that took place during 
Games-time, the team also reviewed the account management process. They all 
agreed that there were inadequate account management controls to support the 
complexity of the Games environment. In addition, matters were aggravated by the 
fact that there were too many people who joined the organization at the last 
minute, with too many different roles, each requiring several types of access.
Finally, during the AAR meetings that followed the conclusion of the A2004 Olympic 
Games event, the Games-ISS team reviewed issues related to the TOC-SEC staffing 
and shift schedules, as well as the collaboration with the Admin-ISS team. All team 
members agreed that the 24-by-7 shift schedule with a 12-hour shift for each team 
was not adapted to the real level of Games activity. Night-time activity was 
significantly less to that of the day-time shift, therefore inefficiently utilising the 
team’s resources.
With regards to the team’s collaboration with ATHOC’s Admin-ISS team, the Games- 
ISS Manager suggested that
“ joining the Games- and Admin-ISS teams was expected to allow the Games- 
ISS experts to leverage resources and improve operational effectiveness. Time 
was invested in training each team, yet the return was very small. The 
Games-ISS solution was so complex that there was not enough time to get the 
Admin-ISS experts up to speed. [...] The OCOG’s ISS team should not be joined 
with the Games-ISS team in the future. Instead, Atos Origin employee 
volunteers should complement the Games-ISS team” (i.e. Appendix-A3:95).
Although the majority of the Games-ISS experts agreed with this view, the two 
members of the second TOC-SEC team suggested that they had a relatively 
productive collaboration with the Admin-ISS experts on their shift. They argued that 
bringing in Atos Origin employee volunteers at the last minute would not add any 
valuable expertise to the TOC-SEC team as there would be inadequate time to train 
them on the Games-ISS solutions. Instead, they suggested that there should be 
indeed greater ISS expertise duplication within the Games-ISS team; perhaps a more 
costly solution, but a more security effective one.
All above ISS issues and lessons learned were recorded and made available to Atos 
Origin’s Executive Major Events organization that would proceed with organizing and 
delivering the next Olympic Games’ IS infrastructure. The Games-ISS project was 
relatively successfully completed, the last goodbyes were said, and two of the seven 
Games-ISS team experts continued on to work in the next Olympic Games event.
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4.4  Emergent issues
As presented in Chapter 3 of this study, this research focuses on understanding the 
organizational processes of change that establish reliable ISS operations in a major 
event context. This study adopts a contextualist analysis perspective which identifies 
vertical and horizontal levels of analysis and the interconnections between those 
levels through time. Therefore, the research’s empirical findings have considered the 
Games-ISS project organization’s deliverables, controls and incidents, the contextual 
surroundings, the identified and managed ISS risks, and the organizational reliability 
levels as these were identified across linearly structured project phases.
This section of the study considers any emerging patterns with regards to the above 
parameters of vertical analysis. It aims to horizontally and vertically summarise 
findings prior to proceeding to the research’s Discussion section, where these 
findings are then analysed in terms of the three levels of organizational risk 
encounters,173 while SARF and High Reliability Theory predictions are contrasted with 
actual results.
4.4.1. Emergent issues on the A2004 Games-ISS project deliverables, controls 
and incidents
With the commencement of the A2004 Games-ISS project two issues were dominantly 
evident. Firstly, the project initiated later to the related Games-IS Integration 
project. This implied that several of the project IT infrastructure foundations174 had 
been put in place prior to the Games-ISS analysis, design and implementation 
activities. Secondly, it  was clear that the local OCOG and the IOC had not 
considered previously the strategic scope and value of an Olympic ISS plan. Provisions 
of ISS services were not covered in the METER contractual arrangement between the 
TOC, ATHOC and their international TOP IT sponsor, SchlumbergerSema.
The above two structural and contextual factors determined the set of Games-ISS 
deliverables upon project commencement. Intense negotiations took place on a 
senior management project level, defining an Olympic ISS Strategy and the 
interactions between the Games- and Admin-ISS teams, as well as the Games-ISS
173 As presented in all previous chapters of this study, the concept of ‘organizational 
encounters with risk’ is introduced by Hutter and Power (2005b), and it refers to the ongoing 
process of organizational risk identification, sense-making and re-organization.
174 E.g. the Games application’s design requirements and the Games network architecture.
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expert and the rest of the Games-IS Integration project functions and organizational 
structure.
Efforts were made by the Games-ISS expert to jointly address Olympic ISS issues with 
ATHOC. Yet, the lack of adequate leadership and coordination mechanisms from 
ATHOC’s side, and the lack of binding contractual agreements between ATHOC and 
SchlumbergerSema led to a shift in project focus, and the Games-ISS expert 
concentrated on the ISS practices of the Games systems and network, which was also 
considered of greater criticality.
The need to do so was stressed further by the visible implications the late 
involvement of a Games-ISS expert had on the Games-IS Integration project. The lack 
of strategic consideration of ISS issues within the Games-IS infrastructure had led to 
increased project costs and/or a compromised solution security and reliability.
Therefore, the deliverables and controls implemented during the Games-ISS project 
‘ Initiation’ and ‘Analysis and Design’ stages changed from an Olympic-wide focus to a 
Games-network one. Planning and design activities - the majority of which were 
implemented only once - dominated the early Games-ISS project phases, while 
interactions with the Games-IS functions increased. The implementation of any 
Games-ISS controls during the early stages of the project was conducted by Games-IS 
Technical teams with the guidance of the Games-ISS experts. However, no ISS 
assurance controls were yet implemented and no operational ISS policies were yet 
created and provided.
It was with the expansion in size of the Games-ISS team and its shift towards a 
project implementation mode that the Games commenced implementing Games-ISS 
management controls, ranging from ISS policies and procedures, to an ISS metrics 
framework and Games network ISS technical controls. The implementation of Games- 
IS(S) controls peaked prior to the first A2004 Games operational rehearsals and was 
greatly dependent on the construction readiness of the Olympic competition venues, 
which was problematic. A delay in venue readiness, implicated the timing of control 
implementation and the opportunity to conduct adequate tests prior to operations.
The majority of the Games-ISS deliverables and controls that commenced during the 
project ‘ Implementation’ phase continued throughout the ‘Operational Rehearsals’ 
too. The increased interactive complexity and the involvement of additional 
organizations in the Games IS(S) preparations implied that ISS controls had to be 
continuously revised. The late delivery of competition venues also implicated the 
extent to which tests could be conducted and assurance controls timely 
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implemented. In addition, the operational rehearsals operated as a mechanism of ISS 
risk attention, raising awareness over ISS issues that had previously not been 
considered, planned for and managed.
Interactions with other Games-IS functional groups and organizations became more 
tense as the operational rehearsals activities moved to their second phase of 
Technical Rehearsals, and operational and organizational size and complexity 
increased. The heavy workload of every function implied that prioritization was not 
always similar for all involved parties. Mutual adjustment mechanisms were no longer 
adequate to coordinate activities, nor was the standardization of processes. ISS 
assurance controls aimed to verify the standardization of outputs. This was 
particularly difficult to achieve with a lack of centralised management controls, such 
as system and network configuration systems. Also, the increasingly decentralised 
organization structure implicated the extent to which the Games-ISS team could 
manage ISS behaviours, processes and technologies across competition venues. 
Reliance on the Venue-IT teams increased, while training and audit ISS controls 
proved significant tools in establishing a working relationship with them.
The second phase of the Games-IS ‘Operational Rehearsals’ also meant the gradual 
integration of the Games- and Admin-ISS experts into one TOC operational team. This 
change in organizational structure primarily aimed to allow the Games-ISS experts to 
leverage resources and improve operational effectiveness. However, the 
effectiveness of this control was later debated. The great operational complexity of 
the Games-IS(S) environment impaired the effective transfer of knowledge to the 
Admin-ISS experts that had no practical experience with regards to the management 
of the Games network and ISS controls.
Games IS(S) operations peaked during the Games ‘Operational’ phase, when 
interactive complexity was relatively high, yet stable. However, although the Games- 
IS(S) project ‘Operations’ phase was meant to coincide with a ‘freeze’ of the Games 
network/IS environment, IS(S) tests and last-minute configuration changes continued, 
as well as a number of ISS assurance checks.
During Games-time, ISS project deliverables were reduced to a minimum, while no 
new Games-ISS controls were implemented, merely updated as required. The ‘Event’ 
project phase was a period when almost full attention was given to the efficient and 
effective management of Games IS(S) incidents.
The ISS incidents experienced and identified during this period were greatly similar 
to events experienced during the project’s ‘Operational Rehearsals’ phase, indicating 
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two things. Firstly, the prolonged period of operational testing and technical 
rehearsals was indeed an effective process to identify Games IS(S) problems. 
Secondly, the fact that these ISS incidents were repeated, yet contained during 
Games-time, indicated that certain ISS risks were hard to manage and eliminate. 
Nonetheless, their effective containment during Games-time avoided any major ISS 
disaster175.
Overall, Games-ISS planning and baseline-definition project deliverables reached 
their peak during the project ‘Analysis and Design’ , and ‘ Implementation and 
Testing’ phases. The Games-ISS planning deliverables that were revised most 
frequently and throughout the project’s lifecycle were related to the Games ISS 
incident management requirements and processes.
On the other hand, Games-ISS management controls were mostly implemented during 
the project’s ‘ Implementation and Testing', and ‘Operational Rehearsals’ phases. 
The latter phase, was greatly dominated by the implementation and fine-tuning of 
Games-ISS controls that were dependent on the work activities and behaviours of 
other Games-IS functions and collaborating organizations. This inter-dependency and 
need of coordination often created tensions and the delayed or patchy 
implementation of Games-ISS management controls. This was the project period 
when ISS assurance controls and processes were of critical importance.
Finally, Games-ISS project incidents took place throughout the Games-ISS 
‘Operational Rehearsals’ , often leading to significant breaches of security and a 
compromise of the Games network IS services’ reliability and availability. Games-ISS 
incidents continued into ‘Games-time’ , yet problems were overall contained - 
although with varying levels of effectiveness and efficiency. The ISS incidents that 
took place indicated that perhaps the greatest challenge for this project was the 
coordination of Games-ISS management activities with other groups, and the 
adequacy of ISS assurance controls.
175 The same could not be wholly argued for the rest of the Games-IS project, since a number 
of high severity incidents during Games-time did impair the performance, reliability and 
availability of certain Games-IS services. However, this is not discussed here as it is not within 
the scope of this study.
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4.4.2. Emergent issues on the A2004 Games-ISS project contextual noise
Across the A2004 Games-ISS project lifecycle it was made evident that the evolving 
organizational structure, culture and politics often determined the outcome of ISS 
management efforts, and vice versa.
Firstly, the poor appreciation by the IOC and ATHOC with regards to the strategic 
need and value of ISS management implied that this was not a Games-IS deliverable 
that was explicitly included into the METER contract176. This resulted in the relatively 
delayed involvement of an ISS expert in the Games-IS Integration project and the 
delayed initiation of the Games-ISS project. This was aggravated by the numerous 
initial negotiations with regards to the budget to be allocated to the Games-ISS 
project, as well as which organization would cover this cost.
In addition, when the project was initiated there was an unclear definition of ISS 
management roles and responsibilities within SchlumbergerSema, as well as between 
ATHOC and SchlumbergerSema. As such, considerable time and resources were spent 
during the early stages of the Games-ISS project in order to create an Olympic-wide 
ISS strategy and clearly allocate roles and responsibilities across and within 
organizations.
Furthermore, the relatively late initiation of the Games-ISS project implied that 
Games-ISS design and configuration requirements were provided after most Games-IS 
applications, systems and network had been implemented, or their design 
foundations had been set. This often resulted in the delayed implementation of 
Games IS(S) solutions that were often costly, or with compromised security levels.
Aside from the implications of the late project initiation, the Games-ISS project was 
greatly dependent on the collaboration and coordination of its experts and activities 
with various other groups and organizations.
With regards to the collaboration of the Games-ISS project function with ATHOC and 
the Admin ISS experts, this evolved throughout the project's lifecycle. Despite initial 
intentions by the Games-ISS experts to coordinate the various Olympic ISS initiatives 
with their ATHOC colleagues, it was soon made clear that this would not be possible. 
The relatively poor skills, work coordination and leadership practices of ATHOC 
delayed ISS management decision-making. Hence, once the Olympic ISS Strategy was
176 The METER contractually bound the TOP Olympic sponsors to the IOC, requiring the TOP 
sponsors to provide a set of free Olympic services in exchange for corporate and solution 
marketing opportunities generated from the Olympics.
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defined between ATHOC and SchlumbergerSema, the Games-ISS experts became 
increasingly disengaged with the activities of the Admin-ISS team.
Yet, the Games-ISS project remained dependent - to an extent - on the deliverables 
and organizational culture of ATHOC. For example, ATHOC never provided the 
Games-ISS experts with their business ISS requirements and Games-IS asset criticality 
assessments. This resulted in the Games-IS organization basing their decisions on 
related assumptions. In addition, ATHOC was responsible for the timely preparation 
of the competition venues and their physical security controls. The delayed delivery 
of Olympic venues implied that there was less opportunity to test Games IS(S) 
systems at the venue. In addition, with less time to install and configure the Games 
IS(S) controls at venues, SchlumbergerSema’s/Atos Origin’s venue logistical 
preparations were made harder, often leading to errors and omissions. Little time 
was left to conduct all necessary checks prior to (test) operational phases.
Furthermore, the last minute enforcement of Olympic venue physical security 
controls meant that the Games-ISS experts often had to make assumptions with 
regards to these. With a ‘no space for error’ approach, the Games-ISS experts opted 
to assume poor physical security and hence strengthen the logical security of Games 
IS(S) systems. This was clearly a more costly option.
The Games-ISS experts also expected ATHOC’s support with regards to the 
communication of operational ISS policies to Third Parties and other IT partners. It 
was hoped that this approach would add a greater degree of formality to these 
communications, and thus improve compliance levels.
Finally, ATHOC was responsible for the timely provision of appropriately skilled 
Games IS volunteers. Delays in the identification and provision of such volunteers 
meant that several of them did not receive any Games-IS(S) training, nor did they 
have desktops at the venues to work from. As an effect they often had to share 
Games-IS credentials with other users in order to be able to do their job.
The groups, however, that the Games-ISS team had to collaborate with the most 
were the other Operations, Technical and Integration functions of the Games-IS 
Integration project. While interactions were initially informal and within an 
environment of relaxed team-working, this changed as the Games-ISS project entered 
its ‘ Implementation and Testing’ phase. Teams had to collaborate closely and timely 
coordinate their deliverables as they were greatly dependent. As the first Test Events 
approached, venuisation led to an increased workload for all teams, each of which 
had different priorities. Stress levels increased and often tensions developed 
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between teams. The lack of adequate and accurate information often led to errors 
and operational problems.
Such tensions were aggravated as the Operational Rehearsals progressed and further 
Games-ISS controls and restrictions had to be implemented. Negotiations extended 
beyond the accurateness and necessity of Games-ISS controls. They often became 
political debates of power and blame allocation between teams.
Thus, the Games Integration team did not particularly collaborate with the Games- 
ISS team until the later stages of project preparation as they assumed that their re­
used applications were secure and reliable. The Games Operations team, on the 
other hand, collaborated with the ISS experts just before the commencement of 
‘Operational Rehearsals’ , when organizational focus shifted towards operations. This 
was frequently a problematic relationship as the Operations professionals did not 
always appreciate the need for various technical ISS controls and the reasons behind 
any operational ISS problems. In addition, the problematic configuration and change 
management processes also generated various miscommunications and coordination 
problems. These issues also affected interactions with the Technical teams, which 
varied across project phases and across Technical specialists. The interaction with 
the Games Network team was the most problematic, particularly as the latter group 
grew in size and new uncoordinated, inadequately skilled and trained engineers 
joined the team.
Tensions, however, were often overcome after issues were escalated to senior 
project management, which was overall committed to Games-ISS. In addition, the 
introduction of further ISS assurance controls also helped towards timely detecting 
errors. As for tensions across Games-IS teams during Games-time, the urgency and 
criticality of the Event meant that there was little opportunity to allocate blame, 
and focus shifted to the efficient and effective resolution of a crisis.
Apart from collaborating with Games-IS functional teams, the Games-ISS experts also 
had to coordinate Games-ISS controls with Venue-IT teams during project 
operational phases. The implementation of Games-ISS technical and procedural 
controls across the Olympic venues was solely dependant on the Venue-IT teams, 
none of which had any particular ISS skill and experience. As such, the collaboration 
with these teams was often problematic, particularly so with regards to the 
management of ISS incidents and the implementation of ISS assurance controls. 
There was poor decentralisation of ISS problem solving practices, which increased
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the TOC-SEC team's workload and left them with little time to conduct any ISS 
monitoring.
However, the above changed over time as further practical experience was obtained 
by the Venue-IT teams and role-specific ISS training was delivered to them. In 
addition, the venue ISS audits improved collaboration between the Games-ISS experts 
and the Venue-IT workers, raising their overall technical and procedural ISS 
awareness.
In addition to the various Games-IS Integration project teams, the Games-ISS experts 
also had to collaborate with a number of external organizations, such as other IT 
partners (e.g. SWATCH) and IT customers (e.g. broadcasters).
Collaboration with IT Partners was occasionally problematic as they had their 
individual practices and greatly retained their organizational and operational 
autonomy. IT Partners were involved in all Games-ISS meetings and communications 
that were relevant to their activities and deliverables, while they also joined in the 
various rounds of ‘Operational Rehearsals’ . However, as demonstrated earlier, 
coordination was not always ideal. ISS incidents occasionally indicated poor 
communication between organizations and a wrongly assumed level of trust. They 
also indicated that Games-ISS assurance controls with regards to IT Partners had 
been more lax throughout the project lifecycle.
Collaboration with Third Parties was even more problematic, particularly during the 
project preparation phases when they repeatedly did not comply with the Games-ISS 
secure device connectivity and build requirements. This was greatly due to a 
relatively lax enforcement of these requirements by the Games-IS(S) organization, 
which was concerned with dissatisfying the Olympic revenue providers. In addition, 
the lack of adequate checks from the Venue-IT teams also aggravated the problem. 
However, by Games-time compliance levels improved significantly and no problems 
were identified.
From the above it is evident that venuisation and the approach of the Games added 
momentum to the delivery of Games-ISS controls. There was a greater incentive to 
make and coordinate decisions, and efficiently resolve problems. In addition, 
venuisation changed Games-ISS communications and collaboration patterns across 
teams and organizations.
In fact, venuisation and the Games also altered collaboration patterns within the 
Games-ISS team. A change from a functional (Games-ISS) to an increasingly
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venue/operational team structure of shifts (TOC-SEC) created new roles and 
responsibilities, often distracting the team members from their work and reducing 
their motivation levels. Therefore, during the early phases of venuisation, stress 
levels increased and difficulties were experienced with regards to prioritizing Games- 
ISS tasks. Further on, as operational rehearsals progressed and operational 
complexity increased, so did the number of changes and levels of associated 
frustration. Finally, during Games-time, internal Games-ISS tensions were not 
reduced, especially so as the inequitable distribution of skills and administrative 
privileges aggravated these. It was observed that Games-ISS colleagues were 
increasingly competitive and did not acknowledge their mistakes. Concerns of future 
job security increased as the project approached its end.
A further observation made during operational phases and Games-time was the 
existence of boredom and tiredness, particularly during the night shifts. As examined 
in section 4.3.5 these two phenomena often led to errors and omissions. In addition, 
the logistical scale and complexity of preparing the IT infrastructure across the 
venues before the Games also led to a number of errors, which were detected 
throughout the Games ‘Operational' project phase. However, in most cases, such 
errors did not create tension between teams during Games-time. Problems were 
resolved collaboratively and relatively efficiently. The urgency of the ‘ live’ Games 
did not allow for political arguments.
Finally, it is worth noting that the sudden and great increase in Games-IS 
employees also affected the organizational culture and the effectiveness of Games- 
ISS communications. During the second phase of project ‘Operational Rehearsals', 
numerous new employees joined the organization in order to support IT operations at 
venues. Such employees often had little appreciation of the organizational culture, 
the operations of the centrally based project functions such as Games-ISS, and the 
centrally managed policies and procedures. This phenomenon increased the work 
coordination challenges both within Games-IS functions and in between functions177. 
The growing number of involved IT volunteers from TR-2 onwards, further increased 
challenges with regards to the creation of an organizational ISS culture, the delivery 
of operational IS(S) training and the implementation of account management 
controls.
177 This was particularly demonstrated with the Games Network team and the Venue-IT teams, 
which lacked efficient mechanisms to deal with the quick expansion in workforce.
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As indicated in the case of the Admin-ISS experts who joined the TOC-SEC team from 
TR-2 onwards, the transfer of tacit knowledge and experience was impossible within 
tight timeframes and with the operational complexity of the Games IS(S) solution. 
The identification of ISS risks and the resolution of related problems remained 
activities almost exclusively conducted by the more experienced Games-IS(S) team 
members.
Overall, the horizontal analysis of the Games-ISS contextual noise indicates that the 
event organization's activities, size, and operational complexity all affected the 
Games-ISS interactions and communications. Evolving political debates and dynamics 
affected the effectiveness of Games-ISS management controls, the patterns of work 
coordination and communication.
4.4.3. Emergent issues on the parameters and mechanisms of A2004 Games- 
ISS risk amplification
Throughout the preparation and ‘ live’ stages of the A2004 Games-ISS project a 
number of ISS risks were identified, assessed and managed. This section aims to 
summarise all the ISS risks formally identified throughout the project’s lifecycle (i.e. 
Table 4.18) and examine (a) how these progressed over time, and (b) the extent to 
which these were reliably managed during Games-time.
During the ‘ Initiation’ of the Games-ISS project no ISS risks per se were identified. 
However, from past experience (i.e. SL2002) the Games-ISS expert made a number of 
Games-ISS project recommendations. Firstly, ISS was an issue that had to be dealt 
strategically and holistically. It was communicated that ISS attacks were common and 
these could compromise the reliability of the Games-IS operations. Therefore, 
Games-ISS objectives should be aligned to business requirements, while the initiation 
of such a project should not be delayed as this could lead to costly solutions or the 
compromise of overall Games security.
From the Games-ISS ‘Analysis and Design’ stage until the ‘Closure’ of the project a 
number of ISS risks were identified and formally communicated178 within the Games- 
ISS team and across the Games-IS organization. The vast majority of these ISS risks 
were repeatedly identified across various stages of the Games-ISS project, and their
178 ‘Formally communicated’ refers to ISS risk communications made within and outside the 
Games-ISS team in formal decision-making meetings, ISS training sessions, ISS documents and 
ISS bulletins. ‘Informal communications’ would consist of daily, spontaneous discussions 
among Games-IS(S) members.
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reliable management was often not achieved until Games-time. Achieving the 
desired levels of Games-ISS risk anticipation and containment required a series of 
repetitive and evolving efforts. These have been considered in more detail in section 
4.3 of this study.
Table 4.18 below summarizes the ISS risks that were identified by the Games-IS(S) 
organization, and tracks when these were formally (i.e. X) and informally (i.e. x) 
acknowledged. Observations with regards to the patterns of ISS risks that were 
repeated, formally and informally communicated, and effectively and reliably 
managed are considered below.
One of the first Games-ISS risks to be identified in the A2004 environment which also 
persisted throughout the project’s lifecycle was related to the lack of adequate and 
effective Olympic venue and TSA physical security controls(i.e. Table 4.18:4). This 
was an ISS risk that was consistently and formally identified and amplified by Games- 
ISS experts. The minimal improvement from one project stage to the next, and the 
fact that this was an issue outside the Games-ISS team’s jurisdiction, led to its 
amplification in order to raise attention and motivate change. Yet, during ‘Closure’ 
the risk was not considered. It was not perceived as a lesson to be learned since it 
was outside the Games-IS(S) organization’s jurisdiction. Hence, after Games the risk 
was attenuated. It is therefore evident that at different stages of the project the 
same risk was either amplified or attenuated. The reliable management of this ISS 
risk and associated controls was the responsibility of ATHOC, yet it affected (a) the 
logical Games-ISS controls chosen, (b) the cost of the Games-ISS solutions, and (c) 
the establishment of Games-ISS procedural controls (e.g. the Venue ISS audits). Thus, 
the dependency on another organization was acknowledged by the Games-ISS experts 
from early on. The risk was anticipated and alternative ISS controls were designed 
and implemented to contain it.
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Table 4.18: A2004 Games-ISS risks formally (X) and informally (x) identified and communicated throughout the A2004 Games-ISS 
project lifecycle
Identified ISS Risk Analysis & Design
Implementation 
a Testing
Operational
Rehearsals Event Closure
1 Lack of an Admin and Games networks ISS strategy. X - - - -
2 Lack of a holistic approach to managing ISS. Games-ISS addressed as a purely technical issue. X - - - -
3 Lack of adequate Admin network ISS management efforts & controls. X X - - -
4 Lack of adequate and effective Olympic venue and TSA physical security controls. X X X X -
5
Lack of a centralised, integrated, and resource-effective ISS 
monitoring solution - SIM monitoring capability required. Too 
many and unmanageable ISS alerts.
X X - - X
6 Delayed involvement of Games-ISS experts in Games-IS ‘Analysis and Design’ , and ‘ Implementation’ project phases. X - - - X
7
Lack of adequate Games network ISS management technical 
controls. Unauthorised activity on the Games network. Internal 
communications not controlled and restricted.
X X X X -
8 Lack of a Games network ISS architecture identifying different levels of trust. X X - - -
9
Inadequate appreciation of Games-ISS roles and responsibilities 
across the Games-IS organization. Not appreciated as a common 
responsibility with regards to both ISS risk anticipation and 
containment. Lack of audience-specific ISS operational policies 
and procedures.
X X X X X
10 Lack of clear ISS technical requirements covering concerns of critical asset and service redundancy and loose-coupling. X X X - -
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Identified ISS Risk Analysis ft Design
Implementation 
& Testing
Operational
Rehearsals Event Closure
11
Lack of adequate ISS assurance controls. Inadequate and 
ineffective means to measure and monitor the performance of 
ISS controls.
X X X X X
12 Lack of ISS containment incident management controls andprocesses. X X - - -
13
Inadequate attention to the secure configuration of Games 
systems and network devices by various Games IS (Technical fit 
Operational) functions.
- X X X X
14
Unknown physical security controls at venues, implicating ISS 
management decisions with regards to the appropriateness of 
logical ISS controls.
- X X - -
15 Lack of adequate Third Party secure connectivity and device build requirements. - X X - -
16 Lack of strong access and authorisation controls for internal users on Games applications and systems. - X X X X
17 Inadequate controls managing and monitoring unauthorised devices on the Games-network. - X X - -
18 Inefficient allocation of ISS incident management resources. - X X X X
19
Inadequate means to assess and understand the location, 
extent and impact of a detected ISS vulnerability. Poor 
containment controls.
- X X - -
20 Inadequacy and problematic implementation of malicious software protection controls. - X X X -
21 Inadequate consideration of ISS threat posed by IT volunteers. - X X - -
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Identified ISS Risk Analysis & Design
Implementation 
& Testing
Operational
Rehearsals Event Closure
22 Inadequate incorporation of ISS controls into Games-IS Operations team activities and procedures. - X X -
X
23 Inadequate incorporation of Games-ISS function into the Games- IS change management procedure. - X X X X
24
Inadequate customization of Games-ISS management and 
monitoring devices, leading to too many ISS incidents and false- 
positive alerts.
- X X - -
25
Lack of a centralized Games-IS configuration management 
process and tool/database that would support accurate ISS risk 
decision-making and a means to standardise Games-IS 
configurations.
- X X X X
26 Inadequate knowledge with regards to the ordinary communications within the Games network. - X X X X
27 Inconsistent compliance to ISS policies and procedures. Poor communication and enforcement of ISS policies and procedures. - - X X X
28 Inadequate ISS hardening of Games systems and applications. - - X X -
29 Inconsistent compliance to Third Party secure connectivity and device build requirements. -
- X - -
30 Insecure build and ISS management controls of laptop devices connecting legitimately onto the Games network. - - X X
-
31 Inadequate device configuration checks, resulting in many misconfiguration errors. - - X X X
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Identified ISS Risk Analysis & Design
Implementation 
& Testing
Operational
Rehearsals Event Closure
32 Ineffective Games-ISS communication and incident management coordination practices with Venue-IT workers. - - X
- X
33 Problematic performance of Games-ISS monitoring platform. - - X - -
34 Inadequate alarms generated by illegitimately disconnected and misconfigured Games-IS devices. - - X X
-
35 Poor ISS incident management collaboration and coordination within the TOC-SEC team. - - X X X
36 Inadequate duplication of Games-ISS expert skills within TOC- SEC shifts. - - X X X
37 Problematic ISS incident profiling and resolution assignment bynon-ISS experts. - - X X
-
38 Problematic performance of Games OVR systems interacting with the Games-ISS anti-virus management controls. - - X X -
39 Problematic compliance of Games-IS IT partners to Games Secure Laptop policy. - - - X -
40 Problematic coordination of ISS control implementationactivities with other Games-IS functions. - -
- - X
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A further ISS risk that persisted across the project’s stages was related to the lack of 
adequate Games-network ISS management technical controls. Throughout the 
project it was acknowledged that unauthorised activity (i.e. not business related and 
approved) took place on the Games-network (i.e. Table 4.18:7). This was in fact 
anticipated by the Games-ISS experts who designed and implemented Games network 
service segregation and traffic restriction controls. However, this risk was attenuated 
by the Games-IS Technical and Operations teams, that often translated such controls 
as proof of a distrusting, and overly-suspicious work environment. The 
implementation of related restrictions was often interpreted emotionally, leading to 
tensions between the Games-ISS experts and other Games-IS functions. The Games- 
ISS team, on the other hand, did not particularly amplify the risk as they did not wish 
to worsen tensions. Commitment from senior and executive project management was 
key in easing these tensions and indicated that such controls were necessary. After 
the Games and during the AAR meetings, this ISS risk was only indirectly 
acknowledged (i.e. Table 4.18:40). This indicates that risk amplification/ attenuation 
phenomena that were related to mechanisms of (dis)trust and the effectiveness of 
ISS communications throughout the project were hesitantly - if not at all - addressed.
Another persistent ISS risk was the inadequate appreciation of Games-ISS roles and 
responsibilities across the Games-IS organization. It was not appreciated that ISS was 
an organization-wide/common responsibility with regards to both ISS anticipation and 
containment (i.e. Table 4.18:9). It appears that the persistence of this risk was 
greatly related to the continually growing size of the Games-IS organization, as well 
as the degree of venuisation. Prior to the operational rehearsals of the project, this 
risk was greatly attenuated by the Games-IS Operations team and functions that had 
little interaction with the Games-ISS experts. In addition, the Technical teams, which 
acknowledged that ISS management was not the sole responsibility of the Games-ISS 
function, did not uniformly appreciate the criticality of this issue and addressed this 
as a secondary priority. Senior management commitment was required to stress the 
criticality of coordinating ISS management control efforts across Games-IS(S) teams. 
In addition, the tacit knowledge obtained through venuisation also improved risk 
appreciation levels.
The lack of adequate ISS assurance controls (i.e. Table 4.18:11) was another ISS risk 
that was repeatedly identified throughout the project’s lifecycle. However, despite 
the fact that this risk was consistently acknowledged, it was greatly attenuated, not 
only by Games-ISS laypersons, but also by the majority of Games-ISS experts. This 
was particularly evident among experts of a strong technical background. Although 
ISS incidents of identified errors and omissions raised awareness of this ISS risk, the
high workload of the Games-IS(S) staff often left them with little time to do 
adequate checks. Also the findings of the ISS Metrics Dashboard were only 
communicated to senior project management, and even then this was not done 
consistently. The ISS metrics were not even communicated internally to the Games- 
ISS team. Neither were the detailed results of ISS policy compliance and Venue ISS 
audits. Priority was always given to further technical control customization, not 
assurance of their accuracy, relevance and uniformity. However, this ISS risk was 
greatly acknowledged after the completion of the Games, when it was observed that 
during Games-time the majority of ISS incidents were related to errors and omissions 
that could have been prevented if ISS assurance controls were more effective. This 
ISS risk was amplified after the Games, stressing that this is a common responsibility 
across the organization.
Related to the lack of effective ISS assurance controls, was the persistently 
inadequate attention to the secure configuration of Games systems and network 
devices by other Games-IS functions (i.e. Table 4.18:13). Attention to this risk was 
raised after the first Test Events, when the Games-ISS experts amplified related ISS 
incidents and requested a uniform security upgrade of all Games systems. However, 
the problem persisted. The continuous configuration changes caused by an evolving 
understanding of business needs and ‘ordinary' Games-IS activity, led to a secondary 
prioritization of ISS by Games-IS teams. Thus, the risk was attenuated by Games-ISS 
laypersons. On the other hand, the Games-ISS team often assumed that Games-IS 
technologies were indeed securely configured/built. The ‘Operational Rehearsals’ 
indicated that this was not the case. ISS testers were recruited on the ISS team, yet 
the tests were not exhaustive. The lack of an automated means to check system 
security configuration resulted in inaccurate results, which were greatly dependant 
upon what the various Games-IS teams expected, not what they knew for certain.
The risk was amplified again after the Games, since there were many 
misconfiguration ISS incidents - including within the Games-ISS team.
A further ISS risk that was repeatedly identified in the Games-ISS environment was
the lack of strong Games-IS access and authorisation controls (i.e. Table
4.18:16).This was a risk that was consistently attenuated by the Games-ISS experts
and laypersons. Although the risk was identified from the early stages of ‘Testing’
and ‘Operational Rehearsals’ , the Games-ISS team delegated responsibility of its
management to the IS Integration team and various Technical team functions. The
Games-ISS experts did not conduct checks on this until the later stages of the
‘Operational Rehearsals’ , when little time was left to fix the majority of related
vulnerabilities. In addition, there was no overarching, centralised ISS policy on this 
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issue, but rather it was addressed individually per technical system group. The 
reasons for this risk attenuation can be perhaps traced back to the fact that the 
A2004 Games IS applications had been successfully used in previous major events. It 
was, therefore, assumed by the entire Games-IS organization that they were reliable.
In reality this was not the case. Furthermore, the prioritisation of Games systems’ 
availability had an impact on the extent to which confidentiality and integrity 
security controls were adequately considered.
The inefficient allocation of ISS incident management resources was an additional 
ISS risk that was repeatedly identified throughout the project (i.e. Table 4.18:8). The 
role of effective ISS incident management practices was considered significant for 
the Games-ISS experts and operations-focused Venue-IT and IT-Helpdesk teams. 
However, it  was not addressed until venuisation and operational rehearsals 
commenced. In addition, the first Test Events amplified this risk and demonstrated 
that ISS incidents were often incorrectly identified and allocated to the wrong party 
for resolution. This problem improved throughout the ‘Operational Rehearsals’ 
phase, indicating that the risk’s presence was greatly due to the inadequate levels of 
tacit, experience-based knowledge. However, the problem was not completely 
eliminated. As the organization grew in size and the new members did not receive 
any formal ISS incident management training until prior to TR-2, the risk persisted. 
Despite this and the worrying findings of venue ISS audits, which indicated that ISS 
training was a contributing factor to poor decentralised ISS incident management 
practices, the Games-ISS experts inadequately addressed this. They relied on 
experienced Games-IS members to mentor the new ones on the Games-ISS policies 
and procedures. The risk was attenuated as the event preparations workload 
increased and focus was put on ISS anticipation controls. The problem was once again 
formally acknowledged by the Games-ISS team after TR-2 and the Games. During 
these phases it was made particularly evident that Games-ISS laypersons as well as 
the majority of Games-ISS experts had so far focused their efforts on ISS anticipation 
controls, attenuating the significance of the existing ISS incident management 
policies and procedure. By the end of the Games, the Games-ISS team formally 
acknowledged that consistent and thorough ISS incident management procedures and 
communications with Venue-IT staff significantly reduced this risk.
Another ISS risk that persisted across project phases was related to the inadequate
and problematic implementation of malicious software protection controls (i.e.
Table 4.18:20). This risk was formally identified during Test Events, when it  was
made evident that the anti-virus solution (a) caused performance problems on the
OVR systems, and (b) was inconsistently implemented on laptop devices connecting 
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onto the Games network. The risk was addressed quickly by the Games-ISS team by 
creating a dedicated anti-virus solution for the OVR systems that would not interrupt 
their operations, and by establishing a Secure Laptop policy. Yet, beyond establishing 
a set of ISS anticipation controls, the respective containment controls were not that 
effective. ISS assurance checks were limited or their findings inadequately 
communicated179. The need to consistently monitor this risk was attenuated by the 
Games-ISS experts. As an effect, ISS containment controls and checks were also 
neglected by ISS laypersons180. Despite the fact that this ISS risk was experienced 
during Games-time it was not addressed in the After-Action-Review (AAR) meetings. 
The lack of adequate attention by the Games-ISS experts was attenuated, thus 
avoiding the allocation of blame.
The inadequate incorporation of ISS controls into the Games-IS Operations team 
activities and procedures (i.e. Table 4.18:22) was a further ISS risk that was 
repeatedly acknowledged. This was an issue that was not addressed until 
venuisation. In addition, the first rounds of Test Events also demonstrated that 
procedural Games-ISS controls had been attenuated and inadequately considered by 
the Operations team. This risk was gradually addressed as communication and 
coordination activities improved between the Games-ISS experts and Operations 
team staff, and operational rehearsals demonstrated the nature of the problem. 
Therefore, the management of this risk was gradually addressed through a learning 
process of continuous feedback.
Closely related to the above ISS risk was the inadequate incorporation of the Games- 
ISS function into the Games-IS change management procedure (i.e. Table 4.18:23). 
Initially, the Operations team attenuated the impact of change management 
decisions on the activities of the Games-ISS function. As above, this was a risk that 
was also addressed gradually, where venuisation and operational rehearsals 
supported a process of learning and fine-tuning. However, even during Games-time it 
was made evident that the overall change management process was problematic, 
often having an impact on the Games-ISS team's functions. Thus, this risk was also 
formally acknowledged by the Games-ISS team after the end of the Games.
Another persistent procedural ISS risk which was related to the activities of the 
Games-IS Operations team, was the lack of a centralised Games-IS configuration 
management process and tool (i.e. Table 4.18:25). During the initial stages of
179 E.g. ISS metrics, Venue ISS Audits.
180 E.g. Venue ISS staff, IT partners and Third Parties. 
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‘Testing’ and ‘Operational Rehearsals’ it was made evident that Games systems and 
network devices were not securely configured and this had to be urgently addressed.
The risk was then amplified by the Games-ISS experts via a Risk Assessment exercise, 
and was later delegated to the various Technical and Operations teams to address. 
Throughout ‘Operational Rehearsals’ it was made evident that configuration errors 
persisted and security controls were inconsistently implemented. Regardless, a 
centralised Games-IS configuration process and tool were not implemented. The risk 
was attenuated as it was expected that the trial-and-error process of ‘Operational 
Rehearsals’ and the existing ISS assurance controls would suffice to detect any 
problems. The ISS risk was once again formally identified after the Games, since 
several misconfiguration errors during Games-time raised awareness within the 
Games-ISS team. Allocating the blame on the lack of a centralised configuration 
management tool was also convenient for the Games-ISS team which did not want to 
accept that their ISS assurance controls had been ineffective. However, it is worth 
noting that where automated controls were present, compliance to ISS policies was 
indeed easier to check and problems were usually timely identified.
Closely related to the above ISS risk, are the inadequate device configuration 
checks, resulting in many misconfiguration errors (i.e. Table 4.18:31). Several of the 
Games device misconfiguration problems detected during the early stages of 
‘Testing’ and ‘Operational Rehearsals’ were later attenuated by the Games-ISS 
experts because they expected that the Games Technical teams would have 
addressed these. It was assumed that since the Technical and Operations teams had 
been communicated what they should do, they simply would. The great workload of 
the Games-ISS team led them to delegate this responsibility, while not conducting 
adequate ISS assurance checks. With the completion of the Games, the ISS experts 
acknowledged the persisting risk, since during Games-time several ISS incidents were 
related to poor device configuration checks. Once again, this was an issue of poor ISS 
assurance procedures and controls. It appeared that, given the high project 
workload, such checks should have been automated as much as possible.
One more ISS risk that persisted throughout the project was the inadequate
knowledge of ordinary communications within the Games network (i.e. Table
4.18:26). This was an ISS risk that affected the accuracy of ISS technical controls and
generated great tensions between the Games-ISS experts and the Technical and
Operations teams. It was a risk that was amplified by the ISS experts, blaming system
owners of not knowing what communications their systems generated. On the other
hand, the ISS laypersons - particularly the Technical team staff - consistently
attenuated this risk, since the implemented ISS controls restricted their 
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communications and available services to what was strictly business-necessary. In 
addition, the ongoing changes in the Games-IS infrastructure meant that defining 
‘ordinary* Games network traffic was not an easy task. Great coordination was 
required, which clearly was missing since not all teams - especially the Operations 
and IS Integration teams - could not appreciate the ISS and network traffic 
implications of a configuration change. This risk was formally acknowledged by the 
Games-ISS team during the AAR meetings, since during Games-time a few ISS 
incidents were related to previously unknown ‘ordinary* Games-network traffic. The 
fact that several of these incidents were caused by the departmentalised knowledge 
of ‘ordinary’ traffic within the Games-ISS team was not discussed and, therefore, 
attenuated.
The inconsistent compliance to ISS policies and procedures (i.e. Table 4.18:27) was 
another ISS risk repeatedly identified by the Games-ISS team. The ISS policy 
compliance and venue ISS audits identified that the reasons behind this was the 
inadequate training and communication of Games-IS functions and IT Partners with 
regards to the ISS policies. The problem was particularly intensified with increasingly 
decentralised operations and a growing organizational size. However, the findings of 
these audits were attenuated within the Games-ISS team that was primarily 
concerned with implementing and fine-tuning technical ISS controls. Compliance 
levels improved after the delivery of Games-ISS training, yet the problem was not 
completely removed. For example, the non-compliance of SWATCH to the Secure 
Laptop policy immediately prior to the Games, indicates that coordination, 
communications and ISS assurance checks had been ineffective. Although the 
SWATCH incident was not addressed after the Games - hence attenuated - it was 
nonetheless acknowledged that in the future greater and more frequent efforts 
should be made to effectively communicate and check compliance to ISS policies and 
procedures.
Finally, two more ISS risks that persisted throughout the project were related to the
poor incident management collaboration and coordination within the TOC-SEC
team (i.e. Table 4.18:35) and the inadequate duplication of Games-ISS expert skills
within the TOC-SEC shifts (i.e. Table 4.18:36). During ‘Operational Rehearsals*,
particularly from TR-1 onwards, it was made evident that the TOC-SEC team
encountered problems with regards to collaborating and coordinating efforts in
relation to ISS incident resolution. This was partly due to their inadequate knowledge
of the related procedures, as well as due to the problematic duplication of Games-ISS
expert skills within the TOC-SEC shift. Problems were intensified as additional
Admin-ISS team members joined the team. Team-internal training sessions and TR- 
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practice helped to identify any problems and provide future recommendations. Yet, 
by the time that these problems were identified181 there was little that could change 
in the operating model of the TOC-SEC team. Acknowledging that, members of the 
TOC-SEC team - particularly the Games-ISS Manager who had defined the structure 
and composition of the various TOC-SEC shifts - attenuated the associated ISS risks. 
This resulted in a number of problems during Games-time, which created tensions 
within the team. However, even after the Games, this issue was only briefly 
discussed and once again attenuated, thus avoiding the allocation of blame on the 
Games-ISS team or any of its members.
Having considered the ISS risks that persisted across the Games-IS(S) project, it  is 
also worth making a few more observations. Firstly, the vast majority of persistent 
ISS risks were related to procedural controls of ISS management. Even ISS risks that 
had a stronger technical or ISS culture element to them also had a significant 
procedural element, which was often attenuated and neglected.
In fact, several of the ISS risks that were procedural in nature required time and 
practical experience to be effectively managed; a learning process was required182. 
In addition, the majority of persisting risks could have been resolved or better 
contained if more effective ISS assurance controls were in place.
Another observation made is related to the nature of ISS risks identified across 
different project phases. Therefore, the first round of Testing/Operational 
Rehearsals (i.e. TE-1) stressed the inadequacy of technical ISS controls. As more 
TEs/TRs took place a number of procedural issues were also made evident. Further 
on, as the organization grew quickly in size and there were increasing organizational 
work and communication/coordination problems, it was also identified that several 
ISS culture and communication problems were present183.
In addition, apart from the persistent ISS risks identified above, a few more risks 
were also amplified/attenuated. For example, the poor ISS design of the Games 
applications was inadequately and too late addressed. This risk remained hidden
181 I.e. a couple of months prior to the Games.
182 E.g. the problematic ISS incident management practices.
183 E.g. coordinating work and communicating ISS messages to growing Network and 
Operations/Venue-IT teams
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until the later stages of the project, while it was not addressed at the end of the 
Games, despite the Games-time performance problems.
Furthermore, the fact that ISS training was not effective during the ‘Operational 
Rehearsals’ period184, was not adequately acknowledged either. Yet, this risk caused 
various problems and was related to various other ISS risks185.
The late detection of the SWATCH devices that were not compliant to the Games-ISS 
Secure Laptop policy (i.e. Table 4.18:39) was another problem that remained 
hidden and was not addressed during the AAR meetings. This was an incident 
indicating that the communication and coordination with SWATCH had been 
inadequate, while lacking effective and timely ISS assurance controls.
Another ISS risk that experienced contradicting amplification and attenuation forces 
was related to A2004 IT-volunteers. After the initial detection of this risk during TE- 
1 and the departure of the first Games-ISS Risk Manager, this was never again 
considered. Although the TE-1 incident led to the amplification of the risk by the 
Games-ISS Risk Manager, this was greatly attenuated by ATHOC and senior Games-IS 
project management. This was an ideological hidden risk, where the Games-IS and 
ATHOC organizations did not wish to question the motivation of A2004 IT-volunteers. 
IT-volunteers were a rare commodity, while the Olympic project was greatly 
dependant on them. As such, no further formal ISS checks and controls were 
established to anticipate and contain such risks. The fact that no additional IT- 
volunteer related ISS incidents were detected during Games-time further attenuated 
this risk.
Boredom and routinization was another ISS risk that was acknowledged, yet not 
addressed by any of the Games-IS teams. This problem was considered to be 
unavoidable and it was therefore attenuated, despite the fact that it led to several 
important errors and omissions.
Finally, it is worth noting that upon project ‘Closure’ the Games-ISS team greatly 
attenuated the fact that the SIM solution was greatly not used during Games-time 
due to the team’s technology unfamiliarity. Instead, during the AAR meetings, the 
implementation and use of the SIM were recorded as a success story.
184 I.e. almost a year went by for ISS trainings to be repeated.
185 E.g. inconsistent compliance to ISS policies by Venue-IT teams. 
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4.4.4. Emergent issues on the A2004 Games-ISS project organizational 
reliability and operational preparedness levels
Within a project environment where there was no “space for errors” , the objective 
of the Games-IS Integration and Games-ISS projects was to provide highly reliable 
operations during Games-time. The process of change from project ‘ Initiation’ to 
project ‘Event-time’ was one that aimed to ensure that during Games-time 
unexpected incidents could be both anticipated and contained, thus not 
compromising the availability of the Games-IS infrastructure.
As such, apart from closely observing the daily activities and interactions of the 
Games-IS(S) organization, the researcher also questioned representatives of various 
Games-IS project functions with regards to their assessments of the organizational 
and operational levels of Games-ISS reliability (i.e. Appendix-A10). The questionnaire 
was perhaps not exhaustive but aimed to investigate over time how perceptions of 
ISS reliability changed across the Game-IS organization. The longitudinal findings of 
these questionnaires, which were often further discussed with the respondents, are 
summarised below.
Firstly, with regards to the levels of reliable ISS organizational design, these 
improved over the project’s lifecycle from non-existent to relative maturity and 
reliability. The only two periods when reliability levels appeared to decrease were 
after the first Test Events186, and with the completion of the Games. Questioning the 
respondents of such assessments indicates that major operational rehearsals and/or 
the A2004 Games signalled to various persons and functions that the reliability of 
several ISS organizational design controls had been overestimated. Examples where 
this happened are related to the extent to which various functions clearly understood 
the Games-IS technological interactions, ISS needs and implemented controls, and 
the extent to which they understood the various single points of failure and IT 
infrastructure component redundancy requirements.
Controls of reliable ISS operational management were the ones that demonstrated 
the steadiest of improvements over the project’s lifecycle. Great rates of 
improvement were demonstrated during the earlier stages of the project, when little 
operational activity was evident. However, as ‘Operational Rehearsals’ took place, 
the reliability growth rate was more stable since constant changes and fine-tuning 
activities took place. As for the A2004 Games event, it  demonstrated to the 
questionnaire respondents that several necessary ISS policy and procedure
186 i.e. August 2003.
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communications had not been made, while operational personnel and skills were not 
always adequately duplicated.
The controls of reliable ISS organizational culture were the ones that demonstrated 
the greatest levels of fluctuation throughout the project. Prior to the first Test 
Event, when Games-ISS control implementation activities were initiated, assessments 
of a reliable ISS organizational culture dropped. This perhaps indicates that the 
project shift from ‘Analysis and Design’ to ‘ Implementation and Testing' created 
tensions between Games-IS functions that were reflected in the questionnaire 
responses. Increased levels of work and requirements of greater coordination 
indicated that not all Games-IS functions had the same ISS priorities. This low in 
levels of reliable ISS organizational culture changed immediately prior to the first 
Test Events, as venuisation demanded that teams collaborate more closely and 
better appreciate the tasks and responsibilities of each Games-IS function.
The levels of reliable ISS organizational culture did not decrease again until the 
period of intense venuisation activities, when preparations were made for the first 
round of Technical Rehearsals. The project drive to implement all Games-ISS 
technical controls prior to Technical Rehearsals generated, once again, tensions 
between the Games-ISS experts and the other Games-IS functions. These were 
particularly evident with regards to interactions with the Technical teams that were 
responsible of correctly and timely implementing several of the Games-ISS controls.
With regards to controls of reliable ISS anticipation, these overall improved 
throughout the Games-IS(S) project preparation phases. The only project period 
when ISS anticipation controls appeared to deteriorate were after the completion of 
the first Test Event, when all Games-IS functions - apart from the Games-ISS experts 
- suggested that they had previously overestimated these. The first Test Events 
signalled that more collaborative work had to be conducted in order to implement 
reliable ISS anticipation controls.
Finally, with regards to controls of reliable ISS containment, although these 
improved over time, they also fluctuated across the project’s lifecycle. Therefore, 
with the transition from ‘Analysis and Design’ to ‘ Implementation and Testing’ ISS 
containment controls demonstrated a drop in levels of reliability. This indicated that 
as the need for containment controls was appreciated, it was also acknowledged that 
their current level was relatively poor. Immediately prior to the first Test Events, 
however, as ISS containment efforts increased, they demonstrated their greatest 
growth rate. Beyond that, the reliability of ISS containment controls fluctuated,
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reflecting the organization’s overall capacity to effectively contain ISS problems and 
incidents and learn from past mistakes. Perhaps surprisingly, the organization’s 
capacity to contain ISS problems was slightly reduced prior and during Games-time, 
when it was observed that several older problems were repeated and ineffectively 
contained and corrected.
Overall, it is observed that ISS reliability assessments were not only based on the 
actual maturity of ISS controls, but also on the contextual noise of the project. At 
periods of intense negotiations between groups, ISS reliability levels appeared to 
deteriorate. Fluctuations in the levels of ISS reliability were also observed around 
major project milestones. Thus, as the Games-IS(S) projects moved from ‘Analysis 
and Design’ to ‘ Implementation and Testing’ , working patterns and priorities 
changed, and so did assessments of Games-ISS reliability. Similarly, prior to the 
Technical Rehearsals, negotiations increased and tensions were reflected in reliable 
ISS organizational culture assessments. Finally, prior and during Games-time, the 
criticality of the project stage and the ‘no space for errors’ mentality meant that the 
reliability of various ISS controls was reassessed.
One last comment with regards to the findings of the reliable ISS questionnaires 
should be made with regards to discrepancies and similarities between the Games-ISS 
experts and the rest of the Games-IS functions. Throughout the project lifecycle it is 
evident that the Games-ISS experts overall shared similar views, while the greatest 
and most consistent difference in ISS reliability assessments was between the Games- 
ISS team and the Operations and IT Helpdesk teams. The greatest similarities were 
observed between the Games-ISS team and the Technical team, despite the various 
intense debates that occasionally took place among them. This perhaps indicates 
that the teams that had a similar professional/technical background often shared 
similar views.
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4.5 Conclusion
The above chapter has presented the empirical findings of this study which have 
been interpreted by utilising the contextualist research method presented earlier in 
section 3.3.3. The research findings have been analysed in detail across the A2004 
Games-ISS project phases, while emergent issues have been also identified. These 
are related to the ways that the project and organization scope, structure, 
contextual surrounding and nature of ISS risks have determined the change processes 
of ISS risk communication and amplification, and the eventual levels of A2004 Games- 
ISS operational and organizational reliability (i.e. section 3.3.1).
The next chapter of this study will consider the ways in which the major-event 
organization under review ‘encountered’ ISS risks, and will overall assess the 
organization’s capacity to reliably manage ISS risks. Any insights that can be 
potentially applied to other similar organizations or the processes of ISS risk 
amplification and reliability management will be also considered.
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5. Discussion - Encountering Risk
5.1 Introduction: organizational encounters with risk
As suggested in Chapters 1 and 2 of this study, information systems security (ISS) is a 
topic that has entered the strategic agendas of organizations, yet can be very costly. 
Hence, there has been an increased appreciation and utilization of risk management 
practices with regards to ISS187.
Risk management is a process of attention, sense-making and re-organization, where 
behaviours and formal management controls change. This process of organizational 
and behavioural change is labelled by Hutter and Power (2005b) as ‘organizational 
encounters with risk’ . As argued earlier in this study, the process of risk management 
or the ‘organizational encounters with risk’ is a process that is inherently subjective 
and interpretive, which will be determined by - and will also determine - the context 
within which it is applied.
Meanwhile, extensive literature has indicated that certain organizational structures - 
and their corresponding IS - do not only face heightened operational reliability 
requirements, but are also more prone to errors, accidents and disasters188.
As presented in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 of this study, the organizational environment and 
IS of a major event organization is often one of high reliability requirements. In 
addition, the scale and complexity of such mega organizations and their IT 
infrastructure endeavours, as well as the great levels of interdependency among 
project deliverables implies that mega project/event organizations are also prone to 
error and disaster.
Therefore, as also defined in Chapters 1 and 3, the aim of this research was to 
investigate closely the ISS risk management efforts of a major event organization and 
interpret the organization’s capacity to reliably manage ISS risk. Adopting a 
contextualist and longitudinal case-study analysis approach, the researcher 
presented in Chapter 4 the activities, risks/risk events and context of a major event 
ISS project, namely that of the Athens 2004 (A2004) Summer Olympic Games. The ISS 
risks detected and managed during the mega-project’s lifecycle were identified (i.e.
187 I.e. Dhillon, 2007.
188 I.e. Perrow, 1984, 1992; Sagan, 1993.
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Table 4.18) along with the perceptions of key project participants in relation to ISS 
control reliability. As discussed above (i.e. section 4.4), these findings indicate that 
both perceptions of ISS risk and reliability levels are subjectively determined by a 
number of factors such as: (a) the evolving organizational structure and work 
coordination and communication patterns; (b) the organizational context and 
culture, including the political negotiations, motivations and expectations between 
and within groups and opinion leaders; (c) the nature of the identified ISS risks and 
controls; and (d) the operational phase of the organization which determines 
whether ISS management controls and risks/risk events are perceived as ‘routine’ or 
‘emergency’ ones.
As argued by Walsham (1993) and supported in Chapter 3 of this study, a process of 
change - such as the organizational encounters with (ISS) risk - can be conceptualised 
with a number of metaphors. The conceptual framework utilised for the purposes of 
this research is the SARF which links context and process via the metaphor of 
amplification/attenuation. This is a metaphor that according to its proponents 
appreciates the dynamic organizational interactions/communications both at a social 
and individual level, and across the various contextual levels of risk perception (i.e. 
Fig.3.4)’8’ .
The process of amplification is a dynamic one of feedback and iteration (i.e. Fig.3.5), 
and its proponents suggest that its investigation and understanding can lead to the 
improvement of appraisal, evaluation, management and communication of risk. 
Extending this argument, the researcher aims to also consider the ways in which 
understanding of the amplification process and organizational encounters with risk 
can improve ISS reliability levels of inherently risky mega-event/project 
organizations.
Therefore, Chapter 5 considers the processes of A2004 Games-ISS risk attention, 
sense-making and re-organization, and compares perceptions of ISS reliability levels 
to actual events and research observations. The aim is to understand the parameters 
and mechanisms of A2004 Games-ISS risk amplification and consider if any problems 
could have been predicted to further increase levels of operational and 
organizational reliability. Lessons to be learned for other similar organizations, the 
organizational encounters with risk and the mechanisms of organizational high 
reliability will be also considered.
189 According to Renn and Rohrmann (2000) the various contextual levels of risk perception 
include the cultural, political, cognitive-affective, and heuristic levels.
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5.2 ISS risk attention in a major event context
According to Hutter and Power (2005b: 11) ‘risk attention* involves the process and 
mechanisms of risk identification, recognition and definition. It is not a merely 
cognitive issue at the level of the individual, but is also “socially organized by a wide 
variety of institutions which support prediction and related forms of intervention 
around the possibility of future events” .
The mechanisms and institutions of risk attention will not only determine what is 
communicated and the sustainability of one’s attention; they will also determine the 
accuracy, completeness and accessibility of the communicated information.
Hutter and Power (2005b) agree with Freudenburg (2003:115) who suggests that 
“ certain things always need to be forgotten for any cognitive system to work: there is 
no way of paying full attention to everything” . They thus suggest, similar to the SARF 
proponents, that risk events/incidents tend to have substantial institutional 
consequences and are effective mechanisms of risk attention. Whether the identified 
risks/risk events will be normalised190 or amplified depends on a number of factors 
relating to the process of sense-making (i.e. section 5.3).
The conceptualisation of ‘organizational encounters with risk’ suggests that 
organizational structures, communication channels and technologies determine the 
process of risk attention. From a reliability management point of view they also 
determine the extent to which attention is given to the unexpected and 
appropriately escalated and communicated.
The above conceptualisation of risk attention overlaps with that of the SARF and the 
first stage of amplification, namely that of information communication which covers 
factors such as the sources of risk information and the channels of information (i.e. 
Fig.3.5).
5.2.1. A2004 Games-ISS sources of risk information
Following the researcher’s analysis of the ISS risks that were identified during the 
A2004 Games-IS(S) project (i.e. section 4.4 and Table 4.18), a number of 
observations can be made with regards to the sources of risk information.
190 The ‘normalization of deviance' (i.e. Vaughan, 2005) is considered in section 2.3.4 of this 
study.
D E Afxentiadis (2010) PhD Thesis, London: LSE 256
Firstly, the sources of risk information varied across different project phases. 
Therefore, during the ‘Analysis and Design’ stage of the project ISS risks were 
identified by the Games-ISS experts utilizing their knowledge of ISS best practices 
and previous Olympic ISS experience (i.e. SL2002). The majority of risks identified 
during this stage were usually of a strategic nature and were greatly related to the 
ISS interaction, roles and responsibilities of ATHOC and the IT TOP Sponsor. This 
reflects the contextual noise during the particular project phase, when ISS project 
negotiations were primarily of a strategic focus and with senior/corporate 
management across ATHOC and SchlumbergerSema.
As the project progressed into ‘ Implementation and Testing’ the preparation 
activities of venuisation required the Games-ISS experts to collaborate more with 
other Games-IS functions, particularly the Technical teams. Once again, the majority 
of ISS risks were identified by the Games-ISS experts and the utilization of the 
Games-ISS Baseline. Risk communications were directed to a less extent towards 
senior management, but primarily towards Games-IS function management. Risk 
communications were primarily conducted via informal social/work networks.
With venuisation and the initiation of Test Events the sources of risk information 
changed once again. The Games-ISS experts remained the main source of risk 
information, yet they now utilised ISS management and monitoring technologies to 
detect Games-ISS risks. Therefore, the project phase determined the tools/methods 
used to detect ISS risks and collect related information.
In addition, the fact that ISS management and monitoring technologies were used to 
detect ISS risks implied that during the early stages of ‘Operational Rehearsals’191 the 
majority of identified risks were primarily of a technical nature. In parallel, the 
utilization of a semi-automated IS(S) incident management system also determined 
how ISS risks were identified, classified and communicated. In fact, the presence of 
such an incident management system assisted with sustaining attention to ISS risks, 
and ensuring thorough cross-functional investigation of these.
With the growing scale of the organization and its operations, the Games-ISS experts 
increasingly utilised indirect methods to communicate ISS risks. Informal social 
networks of communication were utilised only with those groups that Games-ISS 
experts directly interacted with. For the rest, ISS risk messages were communicated 
to function managers, who were responsible of informing their team members 
accordingly. However, as considered in Chapter 4, this was not always an efficient
191 Or the ‘Testing’ phase of ‘ Implementation & Testing’ (i.e. August 2003 - January 2004).
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mechanism of risk communication. This was demonstrated via persisting ISS problems 
- especially procedural ones, and the findings of ISS audits.
In fact, with increasing levels of organizational maturity and stability, a further 
source of ISS risk information was that of ISS assurance controls'92. Such controls did 
not only detect purely technical ISS risks, but also procedural and 
cultural/communication ones. In addition, ISS audits and training operated as 
mechanisms of ISS layperson awareness, encouraging them to improve the detection 
and reporting of ISS problems to the Games-ISS experts. Hence, the personal ISS 
experience of laypersons was directly communicated to the Games-ISS, improving the 
reliability levels of ISS anticipation and containment controls.
Thus, as ‘Operational Rehearsals’ progressed, an ongoing ISS risk learning process was 
facilitated, which was primarily supported by the personal experience of Games-ISS 
experts, and later laypersons. Operational complexity was increasingly experienced 
and appreciated, leading to conscious efforts to coordinate ISS risk identification and 
definition activities. Hence, during the later stages of ‘Operational Rehearsals’ 
Games-ISS laypersons were also involved in the detection of ISS risks. As ISS roles and 
responsibilities were increasingly understood across the A2004 Games-IS organization, 
it was observed that Technical experts, Operations team staff and Venue-IS staff 
played a significant role in detecting (and managing) ISS risks. In particular, Venue-IS 
staff had a key role in identifying procedural ISS risks across the increasingly 
decentralised organizational structure.
A further observation made with regards to the mechanisms of ISS risk attention is 
that during project phases that represented major milestones193, the sources of risk 
information became more varied and accordingly the identified risks were greater in 
number. This potentially indicates that ‘emergency’ operations raised levels of ISS 
vigilance, coordination and communication.
Finally, it  is worth noting that of all Games-ISS risks identified throughout the 
project’s lifecycle (i.e. Table 4.18) the vast majority of these were identified during 
the ‘Testing’ and ‘Operational Rehearsals’ phases. It is, thus, demonstrated that the 
trial-and-error process of Test-Events and Technical-Rehearsals was the most
192 Games-ISS policy compliance audits, venue-ISS audits, the regular collection of ISS metrics, 
and the completion of ISS vulnerability tests, all operated as additional sources of risk 
information.
193 I.e. prior to the first Test Events (TE-1: August 2003); with the completion of TE-2 and the 
‘ Implementation and Testing’ phase (January 2004); prior to the Technical Rehearsals (TR-1: 
April 2004 and TR-2: June 2004); and finally prior to the Games (July-August 2004).
D E Afxentiadis (2010) PhD Thesis, London: LSE 258
effective mechanism of identifying ISS risks, facilitating ISS risk attention through 
personal experience.
5.2.2. A2004 Games-ISS risk information communication channels
Similar to the sources of risk information, the related communication channels also 
varied across different project phases. During the initial stages of project ‘ Initiation’ 
and ‘Analysis and Design’ the communication channels were primarily formal and 
documented, with a central role played by the SchlumbergerSema ISS expert194. The 
involvement of a professional information broker was key in raising senior 
management ISS awareness and defining the strategic objectives of the A2004 
Games-ISS project.
As the project progressed, the interaction of the Games-ISS expert/professional 
information broker and the various Games-IS functional managers increased via the 
utilization of informal communication channels. Mutual adjustment mechanisms 
were used to share ISS risk information and establish ISS roles and responsibilities. 
However, as the organization grew in size and operational complexity, formal 
communication channels were increasingly utilised in order to establish standardised 
ISS practices and structures of accountability. Therefore, ISS risks were increasingly 
communicated via documented and formally approved ISS policies and procedures, 
while decision-making meetings were increasingly formalised. The Games-ISS experts 
continued to play a critical role in the process of ISS risk communications, with the 
Games-ISS Risk Manager195 clearly adopting the role of an opinion leader.
With the initiation of Test Events individual senses were increasingly used to detect 
and classify ISS risks. As organizational levels of ISS awareness and culture matured, 
increasing members of the Games-IS organization used their personal experience to 
detect, and make sense of ISS risks. During operational project phases, the semi- 
automated IS incident management system represented the most significant method
194 The SchlumbergerSema ISS expert later adopted the role of the Games-ISS Risk Manager.
195 The first manager of the Games-ISS team (he resigned in December 2003, following the 
Atos Origin acquisition of the Major Events division of SchlumbergerSema) was highly 
respected and trusted for his ISS expertise and management skills. Trust in his competence 
was demonstrated by Schlumberger senior/corporate management, his team members and 
colleagues. Similarly, members of other interacting organizations (e.g. ATHOC, SWATCH, 3rd 
Parties) also demonstrated to trust the Games-ISS expert. He was, thus, an opinion leader 
that played a key role in the ISS risk amplification processes.
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of ISS risk communication, while the degree of physical proximity to the Games-ISS 
experts also determined the means of ISS risk communication. Therefore, if ISS 
laypersons were located in the Technology Operating Centre (TOC) alongside the 
TOC-SEC team, communication was often implemented via informal social networks.
On the other hand, ISS issues detected across the decentralised venues were formally 
communicated via the IS incident management system.
In addition, social affiliation between members of the Games-ISS team and the 
various Games-IS functions and Venue-IS teams also determined the channels of ISS 
risk communication. Thus, Technical teams that collaborated closely with the 
Games-ISS experts often utilised informal social networks of communication. 
Similarly, informal communication networks were utilised more frequently by staff 
that were longer with the organization.
It is also interesting to note that different communication channels were used for 
different risk information audiences. Therefore, inter-organizational ISS risk 
communications were more formal to those internal to the Games-IS organization.
This was clearly demonstrated with Third Parties and ATHOC, where any detected ISS 
risks were communicated to them via formal meetings, memos, documents and 
policies. The same risks were communicated via more informal social networks 
internally to the Games-IS organization.
Another factor that determined the ISS risk communication channel was that of the 
contextual noise. It was observed that at periods of tension - either due to risk 
ambiguity or time-pressure - opinion leaders and senior management had to engage 
in the risk debates in order to resolve any problems and conclude any negotiations.
Thus, the greater the intra- or inter-organizational tensions and risk ambiguity, the 
greater the need for escalation and the use of formal ISS risk communication 
channels.
Furthermore, the type of ISS risk also determined the utilised communication 
channel. Hence, technical ISS risks were primarily reported via the IS incident 
management system, as well as informal social networks. On the other hand, 
procedural risks were often identified via individual senses and ISS assurance checks, 
and required formal communication channels in order to effectively communicate 
these. It was proven that indirect communication196 was an ineffective mechanism.
196 ‘Indirect communication’ refers to cases where the communication of an ISS risk (and 
associated controls) was delegated to another party/communication channel. E.g. ISS risks 
that were communicated to Games-IS staff by their function managers and not directly by the 
Games-ISS experts.
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Instead, direct communication via ISS training and audits proved to be particularly 
effective and had a considerably positive impact with regards to raising reliability 
levels of ISS operational management and organizational culture controls. In 
addition, in cases where the risk was ‘uncertain’197 formal communication channels 
were utilised first, while where an ISS risk was ‘ambiguous’ informal communication 
was used first, seeking the views of peers.
Finally, risk communication channels were determined by the extent of ‘ routine’ or 
‘emergency’ operations. During routine project phases communications were often 
made via informal social networks, thus supporting a continuous process of mutual 
adjustment. Similarly, indirect communications were utilised during routine project 
phases. During ‘emergency’ phases, however, the same risks were often allocated a 
higher severity and were communicated via multiple communication channels - both 
formal and informal. The utilization of multiple risk communication channels 
increased levels of ISS reliability.
5.2.3. Reflections on the SARF mechanisms of ‘ risk communication’
In the current study, the SARF has been utilised to link the context and process of 
organizational change with regards to ISS risk management198. However, this study 
has also highlighted a number of issues with regards to the very mechanisms of risk 
communication suggested by this conceptual framework.
Firstly, as has been repeatedly suggested in this study, the research findings verify 
that organizational structures, communication channels and technologies determine 
the process of risk attention (Hutter and Power, 2005b). Yet, although the SARF 
highlights that communication channels are key with regards to the filtering and 
communication of risk information and signals, it does not explicitly consider how 
organizational structures and available technologies affect the process of risk 
communication.
In the current study, Mintzberg’s (1979, 1981) scheme of organizational context199 
had to be incorporated into the SARF analysis in order to define these factors and 
how these affect the ‘contextual noise’ of the SARF risk communication process.
197 I.e. Appendix-A2, IRGC (2005) and Klinke and Renn (2006).
198 I.e. section 3.3.2.1.
199 I.e. section 3.2.2 and Table 3.1.
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Thus, the researcher suggests that future utilization of the SARF could benefit from 
the incorporation of conceptual frameworks that highlight the structure, situational 
factors and technologies of organizations.
Also, the findings of the current research indicate that in addition to the ‘signal 
value’ of a risk200, classifying the type of a risk can provide clarity with regards to its 
nature, and subsequently guidance with regards to its communication. Therefore, as 
suggested by Renn (2008) and the IRGC (2005) risk governance framework201, simple, 
complex, uncertain and ambiguous risks may not differ in terms of their risk 
information source, yet will often require different methods of communication. This 
underlines further the importance of the risk communication channel - both medium 
and method. As argued by Hutter and Power (2005b), the sense-making of risks
initiates with the processes of risk attention and communication.
Thus, the researcher also suggests that further studies are conducted into the ways 
in which the characteristics/type of a risk will interact with the channel of risk 
communication, and how this will subsequently affect the process of risk 
interpretation and potential amplification.
With regards to the above observations and elements of interest relating to the
utilization of the SARF, the findings of this study indicate the following:
Firstly, it has been demonstrated that the more complex and uncertain a risk is, the 
more a repetitive process of (ISS) risk learning is required in order to gradually 
improve levels of risk information completeness and accuracy.
To that direction, repetitive processes of trial-and-error202 can - over time - improve 
the effectiveness of risk attention and communication. Although research findings 
indicate that trial-and-error practices will in the short-run increase levels of risk 
ambiguity203, they also have the ability to reduce levels of complexity and 
uncertainty. The mechanism to achieve this appears to involve an inevitable element 
of risk amplification or attenuation. In addition, it appears that a few of the factors 
necessary to improve processes of risk attention are related to (a) the organization’s
200 I.e. As this is defined by Slovic et al (1980), section 3.3.2.1 and Fig.3.6.
201 I.e. Appendix-A2.
202 Such as the operational rehearsals in the A2004 Olympic Games.
203 Risk ambiguity is not only related to the nature and impact of the (ISS) risk. It is also 
related to the cost/resource and power restructuring implications that its management may 
have. This explains why ‘simple’ risks can also be ‘ambiguous’ risks (i.e. Renn, 2008).
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‘ability’ and ‘motivation’204 to pay attention to new or reoccurring signals of failure 
and risk; and (b) the involvement of opinion leaders and accountable authority 
figures in the negotiations that will direct risk decisions.
Therefore, this research has indicated that certain types of (ISS) risk will require an 
iterative and monitored process of risk information filtering and communication prior 
to resolving problems of risk complexity and uncertainty, and adequately justifying 
ambiguous risk interpretations and organizational responses. The iterative and 
reflexive character of any trial-and-error learning process is a key success factor to 
the process of risk attention and communication as certain risk signals - especially 
near-misses - will have the tendency to be normalized or attenuated.
In addition, this study had indicated that personal experience - potentially via 
controlled processes of trial-and-error - and direct risk communication are more 
effective means to raise risk attention than indirect communications205. This is 
particularly relevant for complex and ambiguous risks.
The current research has also highlighted the importance of technologies in raising 
attention to risks. Particularly in organizations of great scale and operational 
complexity, technologies that can centrally monitor risks and risk signals206 can 
greatly contribute towards addressing risk complexity and uncertainty, thus avoiding 
phenomena of risk amplification or attenuation. However, this study has also 
underlined that organizational risk expectations are frequently built into 
technologies207. In agreement with a number of scholars208, the researcher suggests 
that the configuration of risk management and monitoring technologies needs to be 
frequently reviewed and questioned if an organization is to remain sensitive to
204 I.e. Chaiken and Stangor (1987) and section 3.3.2.1.
205 I.e. section 4.4.3: Examples include ISS risks of poor physical security, poor 
implementation of ACL controls, and poor compliance with ISS policies at competition venues. 
All these ISS risks were greatly mitigated after direct communications between the ISS- 
experts and laypersons took place.
206 E.g. the A2004 Games-IS(S) SIM solution, centrally managed and/or monitored change 
management, configuration management and incident management solutions.
207 A number of related cases are presented in sections 4.3 and 4.4. E.g. in the A2004 Games 
the centrally monitored change-management system did not initially incorporate the ISS 
function as this was not viewed as necessary by the Games-IS Operations team. Also, the 
Games-ISS SIM solution did not raise alerts for incidents of legitimate traffic beyond the 
acceptable traffic-load threshold, and did not raise alerts for devices that were illegitimately 
unplugged.
208 I.e. Weick and Sutcliffe (2007) and Vaughan (2005).
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operations and avoid risk-signal simplification and normalisation. Therefore, similar 
to human cognitive mechanisms of risk attention and classification, organizational 
technologies require an iterative, reflexive process of customization and fine-tuning.
A further point relating to the SARF process of risk communication relates to the 
number of available risk communication sources and channels within a particular 
organizational context. The findings of the current research indicate that an increase 
in risk information sources does not necessarily lead to the avoidance of risk 
amplification phenomena; quite the opposite. As risk information sources and 
communication channels increase in number and type, they initially lead to greater 
ambiguity; partly because different actors interpret and frame the risk information in 
different ways according to their interests, motivations and occupational/skills 
background. Therefore, the legitimacy and trustworthiness of a risk information 
source and communication channel are issues of concern in the process of risk 
communication and amplification.
In addition, it  was observed that under conditions of routine operations the more 
complex the nature of an (ISS) risk, the greater the ambiguity that was generated by 
the increasing numbers of risk information sources and communication channels. 
Under emergency conditions, however, more risk communication channels were 
considered necessary and utilised - in line with high reliability management 
practices.
Finally, this research has indicated that different communication channels were used 
for different risk information audiences. Where physical proximity, social and 
occupational affiliation was great, informal communication channels were utilised. 
Formal communication channels appeared to be more appropriate for inter- 
organizational risk communications and communications related to escalated and 
ambiguous ISS risks. Also procedural and cultural ISS risks appeared to be more 
ambiguous - and in fact attenuated - and required formal risk communication 
channels that allowed for elaboration and feedback209.
209 E.g. interactive ISS training and ISS audits; formal and informal meetings. 
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5.2.4. Reflections for other organizations and reliable mechanisms of ISS risk
attention
Consideration of the A2004 Games-ISS risk attention mechanisms points to a number 
of insights, not only for the specific organization, but also for other organizations of 
similar characteristics. In addition, some conclusions can be drawn with regards to 
the reliable mechanisms of ISS risk attention.
Firstly, the analysis of the research findings indicates that an organization’s structure 
and ways of working210, its culture and political negotiations, the nature and type of 
ISS risks211, and finally the circumstances under which risk are identified212, are all 
factors that affect the mechanisms and efficiency of risk attention.
Secondly, the research findings demonstrate that the rate and scale of organizational 
change also affects the reliability levels of risk attention processes (i.e. section 4.4).
The exponential growth in organizational scale and operational complexity of a major 
event organization poses considerable challenges to the mechanisms of risk 
attention. Therefore, the data analysis of this study indicates that ISS risk 
information sources and communication channels must remain flexible and prepared 
to adjust to organizational changes. Direct ISS risk communications should be utilised 
wherever possible, while where indirect communications are used, these should be 
regularly monitored for effectiveness. In addition, regular audience-specific ISS 
training and audit activities can greatly increase effectiveness and reliability of ISS 
risk identification sources and communication channels. Moreover, ISS assurance 
checks can be particularly valuable for the identification of ISS risks, especially 
procedural ones that are otherwise often ignored. Lastly, the researcher suggests 
that centralised processes of ISS monitoring, incident management, configuration 
management, and change management can operate as effective ways to detect ISS 
risks and non-compliance, while also creating structures of accountability. Hence 
organizations that share the characteristics of major-event structures can benefit 
from investing in such solutions.
Furthermore, the findings of this research have demonstrated that within an 
organization of great interactive complexity, the practical experience and tacit 
knowledge gained through trial-and-error and operational simulation activities can
210 As defined by Mintzberg (1979, 1981) and summarised in Table 3.1.
211 As defined by Klinke and Renn (2006), IRGC (2005) and summarised Appendix-A2.
212 The circumstance under which a risk is identified and made sense of refer to conditions of 
time pressure, or not; and great visibility/exposure, or not (i.e. Finucane et al, 2000).
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considerably improve the reliability of risk identification and classification processes. 
Therefore, in the case of the A2004 Games the repetitive Test Events and Technical 
Rehearsals were the most effective mechanisms of identifying (ISS) risks, 
appreciating complexities, uncertainties and resolving ambiguities. Through this 
process of continuous learning and attention to operations organizational and 
operational reliability improved considerably.
An additional factor that greatly supported the mechanisms of ISS risk detection, 
reporting and classification was that of the various IS(S) incident management and 
monitoring technologies. However, such controls appear unable to reach their full 
potential until these are adequately customized213. In a complex and uncertain 
environment such customization can be only achieved through experience and 
practice. This stresses further the need for operational testing. The optimization of 
IT solutions that support the detection and communication of ISS risks is a learning 
process that requires considerable time and resources. Mechanisms to capture and 
transfer such experience214 can greatly assist towards achieving greater returns on 
investment and increasing levels of operational reliability.
A further observation made with regards to mechanisms of risk attention is related to 
the increasingly decentralised operations of a (major event) organization. It was 
demonstrated that as decentralisation levels increase, so must the number of 
alternative sources and communication channels of risk information. Therefore, in 
agreement with high reliability theorists215 it is suggested that there must be risk 
information source and communication channel redundancy. ISS assurance checks can 
support such redundancy levels, since they not only detect new risks, but also ensure 
that sensitivity to operations is maintained. ISS assurance checks and the effective 
communication of their findings can retain reliable risk attention levels.
Closely related to this observation is the recommendation by High Reliability 
theorists Weick and Sutcliffe (2001, 2007) to use high reliability audits and 
questionnaires - such as the one used by the researcher for the purposes of this study 
(i.e. Appendix-A10) - in order to improve sensitivity to (a) high reliability failures, (b) 
deviances from related organizational objectives, and (c) differences in perceptions 
across different individuals and functions. The current study has shown that High
213 E.g. Games-ISS SIM solution.
214 E.g. AAR reports and focus group meetings; trial-and-error/simulated operations exercises; 
setting performance objectives and regularly monitoring and evaluating these.
215 I.e. Sagan, 1993; Weick and Sutcliffe, 2001.
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Reliability audits/questionnaires can indeed assist processes of ‘risk attention’ , yet 
responses often appear to contradict actual behaviours. For example, in the A2004 
Games-IS(S) project the adequate duplication of critical personnel and skills was 
identified as an operational risk, yet little was done to address this. Such cases, 
underline the role of the organization’s contextual noise216.
A further research observation with regards to reliable mechanisms of organizational 
risk attention is related to the impact of routinization and tiredness. The research 
findings (i.e. section 4.3.5) indicate that these factors can greatly affect 
organizational sensitivity to operations217 and should not be downplayed by 
organizations that remain in an ‘emergency’ or ‘operational/live’ state for prolonged 
periods. The duplication of human resources and skills is of great importance - 
especially so where operations are critical.
Finally, it is observed that ‘ambiguous’ risks218 often lead to inter- and intra- 
organizational tensions that can lead to blame-allocation structures, hindering 
processes of continuous learning and the reporting of suspicious activities. Therefore, 
tensions can impact negatively mechanisms of (ISS) risk attention and levels of 
operational management and organizational culture reliability. Decision-making with 
regards to ambiguous risks needs to be deferred to experts or authority figures - 
especially so where there is no luxury of time and risk management resources. ISS 
commitment of senior management and opinion leaders can considerably assist with 
the quick resolution of ISS risk debates and the allocation of attention to new or 
evolving ISS risks.
216 Although High Reliability questionnaires can capture and communicate the status of 
related controls, their effectiveness is restricted by a number of factors: (a) the responses 
will be subjective, affected by the organization’s contextual noise (i.e. section 4.4.4); (b) a 
significant and diverse sample of respondents is required; (c) questionnaire responses will 
have to be elaborated during interviews; (d) responses need to be monitored over time.
217 I.e. Weick and Sutcliffe, 2001.
218 I.e. Klinke and Renn (2006), IRGC (2005) and Appendix-A2.
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5.3 ISS risk sense-making in a major event context
According to Hutter and Power (2005b: 18)
“ risk encounters will be mediated by sources of ‘knowledge' and by practices 
which may amplify or attenuate organizational sensitivity and ‘inventive’ 
responsiveness to disturbing events. Accidents and crises provide the most 
extreme challenge to existing frames of interpretation; near misses [...] may 
be suppressed by routines which are hard-wired into organizational memory. 
[...] Each risk encounter will be mediated by the legacy of organizational 
culture and its associated habits and always poses the problem of an 
alignment between human perception, conceptualization, assessment and 
management capabilities, and the risk ‘event’ itself” .
Therefore, they suggest that ‘sense-making’ is the process where organizational 
actors transform new encounters with risk into acceptable managerial practices.
However, according to Jasanoff (2005) organizational encounters with risk can result 
in the suspension of sense or in multiple competing sense or epistemologies.
“ Facts and explanations may not be readily produced if the answer to the 
question ‘what happened?’ is difficult and contested. [...] The need to 
allocate responsibility will drive institutionally acceptable explanations and 
solution sets” (Hutter 8tPower, 2005b:21).
Short (1992:7) agrees and suggests that “ individuals and organizations sometimes act 
not because they understand risks, but because they feel they must act” .
In addition, explanations may encode blaming or learning, may persist or may be 
short-lived. Jasanoff (2005) suggests that some explanatory tropes recur while others 
are ignored. She also highlights the significance of preferences for forms of 
explanation which fit existing policy response possibilities219.
Hutter and Power (2005b:24-25) further suggest that
“who does the sense-making is critical. [...] Sense-making will vary across 
different groups. Styles of explanation may vary across different issues and
219 According to Jasanoff (2005) risk event explanations can vary between short-run political 
explanations or a more systemic problem; preferences for technical/mechanical-type 
explanations rather than organizational and procedural failures; explanatory emphases on 
systems or on individuals; and finally, there are different explanations provided according to 
different cost implications.
D E Afxentiadis (2010) PhD Thesis, London: LSE 268
patterns of blame may not be consistent across even similar risk events. [...] 
Different groups have differential capacities to make sense of what has 
happened. Inequalities and dispersion in provision, access and experiential 
understandings are significant aspects of sense-making in organizational 
encounters with risk” . They conclude that “sense-making activity is the 
organization’s encounter with itself” .
Utilizing the SARF (i.e. section 3.3.2.1) key points are considered with regards to the 
social and individual stations of Games-ISS risk amplification/attenuation, and the 
mechanisms of sense-making. Reflections for other organizations and reliable 
mechanisms of sense-making are also considered.
5.3.1. A2004 Games-ISS social stations of risk amplification
Given that prior to the ‘ Initiation’ of the A2004 Games-ISS project none of the 
Games-IS project functions, IT partners and customers had strategically considered 
the issue of ISS, it came as no surprise that the Games-ISS team was initially the main 
source of ISS risk information. Accordingly, the Games-ISS experts were the ones that 
controlled the communication of ISS risk information and determined which ISS issues 
should receive greater attention, amplified or attenuated.
Therefore, in agreement with Hutter and Power (2005b) who suggest that different 
groups have different capacities to make sense of a risk depending on their access to 
risk information and experiential understanding220, the Games-ISS team was the main 
social station of risk amplification.
Hence, the Games-ISS experts often amplified ISS risks for which they considered 
that urgent response was required. For example, they amplified the need to security 
harden Games-IS devices after the completion of TE-1, effectively framing this risk 
through a risk assessment and hacking scenario demonstration. This raised awareness 
across all Games-IS functions that had to implement the necessary controls, as well 
as the project’s senior management that had to authorise the increased project 
costs.
Similarly, the Games-ISS experts often amplified ISS risks that they considered to be 
outside their jurisdiction/control, yet had an impact on their activities. Thus, poor 
physical security of Olympic venues and TSAs was repeatedly communicated to
220 I.e. section 3.2.1 and HERO by Rosa (2003). 
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ATHOC and the Admin-ISS team. Indecision from the latter organization implied that 
the risk was persistently amplified throughout the project’s lifecycle. Involving the 
Admin-ISS team in the Venue-ISS audits was an effective means to communicate the 
related risk concerns to the responsible organization. On the other hand, with the 
completion of the Games, the same risk was completely ignored during After-Action- 
Review (AAR) meetings since this was an issue beyond the responsibility boundaries 
of the Games-IS(S) organization.
In fact, it was regularly observed that an ISS risk was not persistently amplified or 
attenuated. Across different project phases the same risk was amplified, then 
attenuated; or vice versa. The Test Events played a key role in raising awareness of 
ISS risks and often amplifying these. For example, the first Test-Events (TE-1) 
demonstrated to Games-ISS experts, Technical and Venue-IS teams that the secure 
connectivity of Third Parties onto the Games-network had been completely 
overlooked. The great workload of venuisation preparations prior to TE-1 had hidden 
this ISS risk. Yet, this quickly changed when problems were made evident during TE- 
1. However, the same problem was once again attenuated between TE-1 and TE-2, 
when the implementation of other ISS controls221 was stressed. Therefore, the great 
workload, complexity and number of ISS issues that had to be simultaneously 
addressed and coordinated, often led to the attenuation of several ISS risks222. The 
pressures of major project milestones often led to either the amplification or 
attenuation of risks.
However, patterns of amplification/attenuation did not only vary across project 
phases, but also across groups. Therefore, the risks associated with the insecure 
connectivity of laptops onto the Games-network was amplified in relation to Third 
Parties, yet remained completely hidden in relation to IT Partners, such as SWATCH. 
The trust shown towards Games-IS IT Partners operated as a risk attenuating 
mechanism, resulting in the lack of ISS assurance checks for SWATCH devices and the 
non-compliance of these.
Trust operated as a mechanism of amplification for a number of other Games-ISS 
risks. Thus, during the initial stages of the project, the trust shown towards the 
Games-ISS expert by senior/corporate management implied that he often operated
221 I.e. the implementation of port security and ACL controls.
222 Another instance where that happened was in relation to the provision of frequent and 
audience-specific ISS training.
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as an opinion leader on matters of ISS risk management, determining the respective 
ISS decision-making processes.
However, as sources and mechanisms of ISS risk communication changed with 
venuisation and Test-Events, so did the processes of sense-making. Experiential 
knowledge increased awareness with regards to a number of IS(S) risks not only for 
the Games-ISS experts, but also ISS laypersons. The need to implement stronger 
access and authorization controls, security harden Games-IS devices, and implement 
a number of network segregation and connectivity controls were but a few of the ISS 
risks that were identified after the first Test-Events. What was also made evident 
was that collaboration with other Games-IS functions, partners and customers had to 
improve, while laypersons had to incorporate ISS controls into their technologies and 
procedures. Although this risk message was amplified by the Games-ISS team, it was 
attenuated by the majority of lay-groups. The extent to which ISS was common 
responsibility was an ambiguous issue. Ongoing operational rehearsals operated as a 
learning mechanism, gradually demonstrating to ISS experts and laypersons alike the 
extent to which Games-IS solutions and processes were interlinked and complex.
Therefore, although certain ISS risks were ‘simple’ in nature, the implementation of 
related ISS management controls was often ambiguous and, thus, greatly negotiated. 
For example, the security hardening of Games-IS devices was unanimously accepted 
as a necessary ISS control, yet its implementation was greatly problematic and 
contested among Games-ISS experts, system owners and the Operations team. 
Similarly, it was widely agreed that port security had to be implemented on the 
Games-network, yet its implementation was patchy, often leading to tensions 
between the Games-ISS experts and the Network specialists. The frequency with 
which such controls had to be updated and the extent of resulting errors and 
omissions further aggravated tensions between teams and often led to the allocation 
of blame. Yet, the lack of a centralised configuration management system and the 
inadequate ISS assurance controls were never acknowledged as risk contributing 
factors; only after the project was completed.
Overall, it appeared that whenever an ISS risk implied that further resources223 had 
to be utilised, related problem factors were attenuated. Similarly, the lack of 
procedural controls was also attenuated. Despite the fact that during the early 
stages of the Games-ISS project the ISS expert stressed the need to adopt a holistic 
approach to Games-ISS, it appeared that even among ISS experts greater attention
223 I.e. people, technologies etc.
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was given to technical ISS risks and controls. The predominantly technical 
background of most ISS experts, and the continuous need to update and customise 
the Games-ISS technologies, implied that procedural ISS risks were attenuated within 
the experts’ team. Hence, several ISS risk events were justified by providing solely 
technical failure explanations, rather than procedural and communication ones. In 
addition, risk events were also blamed on the lack of technical and management 
skills within other teams, and rarely did any Games-IS(S) team admit to its own 
inadequacies with regards to effective risk communications and coordination 
practices.
However, blame structures did not remain stable across the project’s lifecycle. While 
during the early project stages no blame culture was observed, the operational 
rehearsals and the increasing demands to optimize the Games-IS(S) operations 
changed this. ‘Testing’ implied that teams had to interact more and coordinate their 
activities. This was particularly the case for the Games-ISS team that could not 
understand ‘ordinary’ and acceptable Games activity without the collaboration of 
other project functional teams. However, as the workload for all increased, 
prioritization of activities differed among groups. Thus, the Games-ISS team 
frequently amplified ISS risks, while Technical and Operations teams attenuated 
these. This ambiguity led to tensions and blame allocation. Problems had to be 
frequently escalated to senior project management for resolution. Senior 
management, which was overall committed to ISS, operated as a further station of 
social amplification, thus often putting an end to persisting and blame-allocating 
negotiations.
Blame-allocation structures changed once again immediately prior and during the 
Games. A shift from functional organizing to venue/operational organizing meant 
that social groupings changed; and so did respective loyalties. Tensions increased 
within operational teams; especially across different shifts. On the other hand, the 
time and visibility pressure of Games-time operations meant that such tensions were 
often short-lived and focus was given on the efficient resolution and containment of 
IS(S) incidents. Therefore, risk amplification/attenuation stations did not persist 
during Games-time.
Another observation made after the Technical Rehearsals and during the Games was 
that functional teams increasingly co-aligned their ISS risk perceptions and 
behaviours. The reduced levels of ambiguity and uncertainty, and the increased 
levels of environment stability meant that ISS experts and laypersons were better 
prepared to commonly address ISS risk events. Risk explanations and decisions were
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increasingly decentralised and deferred to expertise, whether that was the TOC-SEC 
team or the various Technical and Venue-IS teams.
In fact, improved collaboration between ISS experts and laypersons also stressed - 
although at a late stage of the project - the significance of ISS procedural and 
communication/training controls. Such controls were not only an effective 
mechanism to ensure compliance to ISS policies and procedures, but were also a 
useful means to make sense of the benefits and costs of ISS controls, as well as the 
nature of the managed ISS risks224.
Overall, it is observed that the Games-ISS team mostly operated as a social station of 
amplification. Meanwhile as ‘Operational Rehearsals’ revealed the complexity, 
uncertainty and ambiguity of various ISS risks, negotiations across Games-ISS experts 
and lay-groups also intensified. These led to even more frequent phenomena of risk 
amplification and attenuation, often resulting in the allocation of blame and the 
escalation of ISS decisions to senior project management. As, however, the 
environment became increasingly stable phenomena of risk amplification and 
attenuation reduced.
Nevertheless, some ISS risks remained hidden to both ISS experts and lay-groups. The 
insecure design of Games-IS applications, the insecure build of SWATCH laptops, the 
inadequate ISS access and authorisation controls, routinization, and the persisting 
configuration errors of Games-IS(S) devices, were all ISS risks that were normalised 
by the entire Games-IS(S) organization. This attenuation was either due to great 
levels of trust in technologies, procedures or groups, or because certain risk events 
were considered unavoidable and often materialised as near-misses that did not 
receive adequate risk attention.
5.3.2. A2004 Games-ISS individual stations of risk amplification
In addition to the social stations of amplification, the sense-making process of 
Games-IS(S) individuals was affected by a number of factors. As indicated for other 
parameters of the risk amplification process, the situational factors of the 
organization played a significant role.
224 E.g. Venue-ISS audits not only indicated the levels of Third Party ISS policy compliance, 
but also demonstrated that the reason for their persisting non-compliance was the lack of 
Venue-IS staff ISS training.
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Firstly, the smaller the size of the organization, the greater the extent of mentoring 
offered by Olympic-experienced personnel and managers. This direct communication 
provided guidance with regards to individual roles and responsibilities, and the 
prioritization of activities. Thus, during the ‘Analysis and Design’ project phase there 
were several opportunities for Games-IS(S) individuals to learn from past Olympic 
knowledge and informally discuss this with colleagues. Individuals were affected by 
prior attitudes and experience. Similarly, with the arrival of the SchlumbergerSema 
Games-1SS expert - who had prior Olympic experience - considerable trust was 
demonstrated towards him, which increased levels of ISS risk attention by other 
teams.
As initial ISS communications took place in an informal, team-working environment, 
ISS risk perceptions were debated with no tensions. The Olympic-experienced Games- 
ISS Manager was often sought to provide guidance and ISS risk communications 
appeared to have the desired effect and response.
However, with venuisation and growing levels of organizational size and operational 
complexity, ISS risk sources and communication channels changed. This affected 
individual processes of sense-making. As workload increased, the ‘ability’ of ISS 
laypersons to follow ISS risk messages without distraction and their ‘motivation’ to 
process these225 decreased. In parallel, opportunities of ISS mentoring decreased as 
the Games-ISS experts had to turn their attention from planning and design to 
implementation.
The complexity of operational rehearsals and the associated performance pressure 
and visibility implied that laypersons’ ISS risk attention deteriorated further. The 
Games-ISS Manager had to increasingly stress certain qualitative aspects of the risks, 
and frame ISS risk information as he considered fit in order to generate the desired 
ISS risk management responses. Therefore, the Games-ISS Manager consciously 
operated as an individual station of risk amplification226. Of the amplified ISS risks
225 As considered in section 3.3.2.1, according to Chaiken and Stangor (1987) ‘ability ’ refers 
to the physical possibility of the receiver to follow the message without distraction.
‘Motivation’ refers to the readiness and interest of the receiver to process messages.
226 Risks that were amplified included among others the unmonitored use of IT-Volunteers, the 
insecure build of Games-IS devices, and the insecure connection of Third Parties on the 
Games-network.
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the majority were effectively communicated and led to the recommended ISS 
controls227.
However, the effectiveness of amplified risk communications did not persist. With 
the increasing demands for ISS practices across Games-IS functions, tensions started 
surfacing between teams. Despite indications that there was significant unauthorised 
activity in the Games-network, Games-IS individuals reacted to ISS messages which 
communicated that network perimeter controls were not adequate and additional 
internal-network restrictions would have to be implemented (i.e. selection bias). The 
performance problems of Games-IS operations caused by the mis-configured ISS 
technical controls further aggravated tensions. As a result, Games-ISS laypersons 
frequently stigmatised Games-ISS technologies and eventually the Games-ISS team. 
Any operational problems that were directly or indirectly caused by the 
implementation of an ISS control were considered representative of ISS-expert 
activities (i.e. representativeness bias). Such blame and stigmatization messages 
were particularly amplified by the managers of the Technical and Operations teams 
that had engaged in a power-struggle with the Games-ISS experts and manager. The 
intervention of senior project managers often contributed towards alleviating such 
tensions, thus acting as effective individual stations of ISS risk amplification/ 
attenuation.
In addition, it was observed that the greater the size of a functional team was228, the 
less effectively ISS risk messages were communicated to its members. This was due 
to the fact that ISS risk messages were indirectly communicated to them via their 
respective function managers. Yet, most function managers operated as individual 
stations of risk attenuation, giving a low priority to ISS risk communications and 
coordination activities. It appeared that direct communication with ISS laypersons 
was a more effective way to sustain their ‘ability’ and ‘motivation’ to follow and 
process an ISS risk message without distraction. Therefore, the extent to which 
individuals - and social groups - attenuated/amplified Games-ISS risk messages also 
depended on the risk information communication channel. The greater the direct 
contact with the ISS-experts, the more each individual used their own criteria to 
make sense of ISS risk messages. Otherwise, in an increasingly decentralised 
organization, individuals had to depend primarily on their immediate colleagues and
227 Nonetheless, some risk events were attenuated. E.g. the ISS risk posed by IT-Volunteers 
was greatly attenuated by ATHOC’s IT Department Manager (i.e. selection bias).
228 E.g. Network team, or Venue-IS team.
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to a lesser extent on their personal experience in order to interpret ISS risk 
messages.
The effect of direct communication between Games-ISS experts and laypersons was 
demonstrated by the positive impact that audience-specific ISS training sessions had 
prior to TR-2 and the Games. Such interactive communications addressed ambiguous 
risks and strengthened individual interactions between ISS experts and laypersons, 
improving considerably the effectiveness of procedural ISS controls across the 
decentralised organization.
However, it is worth noting that Games-ISS experts also demonstrated biased 
judgements. On a number of occasions they attenuated ISS risks, particularly 
procedural ones. Given the predominantly technical background of most ISS experts, 
attention was primarily given to technical ISS risks. Only in hindsight (i.e. hindsight 
bias) did they acknowledge the value of ISS assurance controls, change and 
configuration management processes, and direct communications with other teams.
In addition, during Games-time it was particularly evident that the Games-ISS 
Manager often acted as an individual station of risk attenuation with regards to errors 
and omissions of his team. In fact, the great visibility of IS(S) activities during Games- 
time implied that a failure to admit personal/team-internal errors was an attitude 
observed across teams. Thus, several near-misses were never adequately recorded 
and communicated.
5.3.3. Reflections on the SARF mechanisms of ‘ risk interpretation*
In the current study, the SARF has operated as an effective heuristic tool in order to 
investigate the process of organizational risk sense-making. In parallel, this study has 
brought to the fore a number of issues relating to the SARF mechanisms of risk 
interpretation and amplification.
Firstly, this research has shown that risk sense-making starts with the process of risk 
attention; in SARF terms, risk interpretation starts with risk communication. The 
number and type of risk signals, information sources and communication channels, 
are all factors that influence how an individual and/or group classifies and 
communicates risks. As suggested by Jasanoff (2005) a great number of risk signals 
can lead to risk ambiguity and multiple risk explanations, or the suspension of sense. 
Similarly, who owns/controls a risk communication channel, and the language and 
classification categories built in risk-detecting technologies, are also factors that
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affect the initial stages of risk interpretation. Therefore, the findings of this research 
have indicated that direct communication can increase social affiliation and improve 
the alignment of risk perceptions. In addition, identifying who owns a risk detection 
technology and communication channel can also point to potential risk amplification 
stations. ‘Framing’ of a risk starts with the choice of a risk communication channel.
Secondly and as also argued in section 5.2.3, the type of (ISS) risk will also affect the 
process of risk interpretation. For example, ambiguous risks will lead to competing 
interpretations and epistemologies. Also the more complex and uncertain a risk is, 
the more risk narratives and stories will emerge229. These will be affected by the 
interests, motivations and social affiliations of the various risk interpretation/ 
amplification stations, their occupational background and risk experience, and their 
organizational roles, priorities and activities at specific points in time. Even ‘simple’ 
risks can be ambiguous since their reorganization can imply a change in existing 
organizational structures of resource, workload and power allocation.
Risk ambiguity can also lead to the allocation of blame, and the stigmatization of 
technologies, people and functions. In fact, the effect of stigma and blame appear to 
ripple and lead to further rounds of amplification. In the A2004 Games case-study, 
such self-generating cycles of risk amplification would not terminate until 
organizational opinion leaders and authority figures concluded the risk negotiations 
with a finite - in the medium run - decision.
A further parameter that appears to influence the process of risk interpretation is 
that of the organizational structure and situational factors. For example, under 
periods of heightened time pressure and operational exposure there was an increased 
incentive among organizational actors/groups to collaborate, yet they also relied 
more heavily on heuristic mechanisms of sense-making - especially so where there 
was a lack of necessary expertise. Therefore as Short (1992) suggests, individuals and 
organizations sometimes act because the feel they must; not because they 
understand risks. This type of risk sense-making behaviour appeared to reduce in the 
A2004 Games-IS(S) environment as more experience was obtained through trial-and- 
error exercises. Thus, as long as lessons learned from operational rehearsals were 
recorded, communicated and monitored via further rounds of tests, the 
organization's levels of operational reliability appeared to improve over time. ISS 
risks became less complex and uncertain, and as an effect levels of risk ambiguity 
were also reduced. Repetitive rounds of risk amplification were eliminated and the
229 I.e. Wiedemann et al (2003).
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organization gradually achieved the desired level of operational maturity and 
stability.
At this point it is worth noting two more issues that this research has underlined. 
Firstly, a need has been identified to further investigate the ways in which processes 
of effective learning can affect organizational encounters with risk. Directions can be 
drawn from High Reliability theory230, as well as the research in the field of risk 
communication and ISS awareness and training231.
In addition, this study has shown that although organizational stability and 
operational maturity - which imply efficient risk anticipation and containment 
practices - can help reduce phenomena of risk amplification and attenuation, they 
can also lead to the reduced sensitivity to operations and the normalization of new 
or reoccurring risks. Expectations of organizational and operational stability can hide 
hazards232.
Relating to the topic of hidden risks, the researcher argues that most SARF studies 
have historically focused on cases of risk amplification. Yet, in environments of high 
reliability requirements, risk attenuation is equally - if not more - important. Thus, 
some of the factors that this research has identified as risk attenuating ones include 
the following: (a) a plethora of - especially conflicting - risk signals; (b) a heavy 
workload that does not allow for ‘able’ and ‘motivated’ risk attention233; (c) the 
increased cost and power-threatening implications of a related risk reorganization; 
(d) the amplification of other risks that attract all attention; (e) the inevitability of a 
risk; (f) the complexity and political fragmentation of a risk problem; (g) the lack of 
effective risk monitoring mechanisms; and (h) the threatening of existing worldviews.
A further risk amplification or attenuation mechanism identified by the SARF is that 
of ‘trust’ . This study has shown that trust can operate as both a risk amplifying and 
attenuating factor, while ‘distrust’ operates solely as a risk amplifying factor. In 
fact, distrust can lead to stigmatization ripples, creating structures of blame.
Related to the topics of stigma and blame, it is interesting to note that in the A2004 
Games-IS(S) environment, such phenomena were relatively short-lived. The
230 I.e. Cooke and Rohleder (2006); Weick and Sutcliffe (2001, 2007); Sagan (1993).
231 I.e. sections 2.3.3 and 2.2.2 respectively.
232 I.e. Kasperson and Kasperson (1991).
233 I.e. footnote-112, and Chaiken and Stangor (1987) on the ‘ability’ and ‘motivation’ criteria 
for risk information selection.
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organizational culture of continuous improvement and learning, and the pressing 
need to timely resolve problems implied that blame structures and stigma effects did 
not persist. Learning prevailed over blame234 in the medium/long run. This stresses 
further the above research argument with regards to the significance of effective 
organizational learning processes.
One final observation with regards to the SARF mechanisms of risk interpretation 
relates to the fact that most SARF studies tend to focus on one risk at a time. Yet, as 
this study has shown, in reality different risks occur simultaneously, competing for 
risk attention and sense-making cognitive and organizational resources. This 
condition adds to the ambiguity, complexity and uncertainty of risks leading to 
processes of risk amplification that extend beyond the ‘here’ and ‘now’ . Thus, the 
researcher suggests that it is necessary to consider the ways in which risks interact 
with one another.
5.3.4. Reflections for other organizations and reliable mechanisms of ISS risk 
sense-making
Reviewing the processes of risk sense-making in the A2004 Games-IS(S) project 
organization points to a number of observations with regards to the processes of ISS 
risk amplification and an organization’s efforts to reliably assess, interpret and 
communicate ISS risk.
Similar to the mechanisms of (ISS) risk attention it is evident that the organizational 
structure, ways of working and situational factors, all affect the process of sense- 
making for both individuals and social groups. The degree of operational complexity 
and decentralisation has implications on the nature of ISS risks235, the channels of 
communication, and the process of risk interpretation.
In addition, the project phase and associated contextual noise affect how risks are 
interpreted and whether sense is suspended or multiple competing senses are 
generated. Therefore, during phases of great workload and interactive complexity, 
priorities differed across groups and individuals and resources were often over­
utilised. This led to political debates across different Games-IS groups. Within such
234 I.e. Jasanoff (2005).
235 According to Klinke and Renn (2006) and IRGC (2005) risks are classified into simple, 
complex, uncertain and ambiguous. Each type of risk determines the ISS risk management and 
communication approach (i.e. Appendix-A2).
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an organizational context, encounters with ISS risk led to their amplification or 
attenuation, supporting the various pre-existing negotiations. Simple ISS risks were 
transformed into ambiguous ones since risk debates were frequently not related to 
the nature of the risk and its potential impact, but to the capacity of various 
individuals and groups to manage it. Risk explanations encoded blaming rather than 
learning.
The subjectivity of the ISS risk and control reliability assessments was also 
demonstrated by the ISS reliability questionnaires (i.e. Appendix-A10). The responses 
to these questionnaires indicated that ISS reliability assessments are not only 
dependent on the availability of information, political context and project phase236, 
but on a number of additional factors. Teams and individuals that work closely 
together share similar ISS risk views, while the ‘motivation’ and ‘ability’ to process 
ISS risk information also depends on the clear specification and prioritization of roles 
and responsibilities, the types of skills and occupational experience of each person.
Furthermore, while it appears that the Test-Events initially fuelled ISS risk debates, 
they gradually facilitated the reduction of ISS risk complexity and uncertainty levels, 
thus also resulting in lower levels of ISS risk ambiguity. As indicated by the findings of 
the ISS reliability questionnaires, ISS experts and laypersons increasingly aligned their 
risk assessments.
The case-study data analysed above also indicate that different groups and 
individuals opted for different forms of risk explanation. These also varied across 
different project phases. Therefore, short-run political explanations were preferred 
to systemic ones throughout the project’s lifecycle. It was only at the end of the 
project that systemic ISS risks were acknowledged. Similarly, Games-ISS experts and 
laypersons opted for technical explanations of failure, rather than procedural and 
organizational ones. Finally, the cost implications of varying risk event explanations 
also determined the process of amplification/attenuation237.
236 Major project milestones affected attention and sense-making processes, either amplifying 
or attenuating risks. In addition, routine Vs emergency ISS risk and reliability assessment 
circumstances also affected the process of sense-making.
237 For example, risk signals related to the inadequate use of ISS assurance controls, a lack of 
centralised and automated configuration and account management systems and processes, 
and the lack of adequately duplicated ISS personnel were all attenuated. This was partly 
because of the cost implications of effective risk management solutions. Instead, it was often 
preferred to explain the above ISS risks by blaming teams and individuals for incompetency.
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The diverse risk explanations witnessed by the researcher are also attributed to the 
varying ability of different case-study groups and individuals to make sense of what 
happened. In fact, by the end of the A2004 Games-ISS project the ISS experts 
acknowledged that cross-functional tests and communications significantly supported 
the attention and sense-making ISS risk processes. Thus, the researcher suggests that 
identifying the organization’s social and individual stations of amplification/ 
attenuation can be helpful in directing ISS communication efforts and supporting the 
reliable management of ISS risks. In addition, monitoring the effectiveness of 
communications can be critical in the timely application of corrective action.
Finally, the above analysis indicates that centralised ISS management and monitoring 
processes and technologies can help ISS risk transparency and decision-making in an 
increasingly decentralised environment. Although such solutions may initially appear 
as unnecessary238, scalability challenges will soon require that such processes and 
technologies are in place. Poor coordination and ISS assurance activities lead to 
increased complexity, uncertainty and ambiguity. In addition, the utilization of a 
formal process and tool to gather past information and knowledge can facilitate more 
effective and efficient learning - both within the lifespan of a single project, as well 
as across similar projects.
238 Due to the efficient informal mechanisms of mutual adjustment. 
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5.4 ISS reorganizing in a major event context
The process of reorganization involves the creation of new formal and informal risk 
management controls and structures. According to Hutter and Power (2005:30) 
reorganizing activity embraces “ the reform of concepts and language as well as the 
mechanics of practices” . It is not just a single response to an encounter with risk but 
an unfolding and continual process which “embodies one or more implicit 
explanations of the failure” . They suggest that “ the process is continuous because 
reorganizing is always a source of risk, as well as its solution” .
Reorganizing actions can be counterproductive if done in haste, and can be simply 
ignored if they are perceived as too expensive. Hutter and Power (2005b:30) suggest 
that
“a chronic difficulty for reorganizing activity is that of being able to 
demonstrate clearly the benefits of risk management. [...] Reform processes 
where benefits are difficult to demonstrate must attach themselves to widely 
held beliefs and values in the institutional environment” .
According to Kasperson et al. (2003) the fundamental and perhaps irresolvable 
difficulty for organizations is to be ‘optimally’ responsive to risk alerts by utilizing 
some form of ‘screening’ to avoid both over- and under-investment in protective 
measures.
Generally, it is agreed that organizational responses will tend to be conservative, 
reflecting the fact that “ instituted community blocks personal curiosity, organized 
public memory, and heroically imposes certainty on uncertainty” (Douglas, 
1987:102).
Hutter and Power (2005b:27) further suggest that formal/procedural compliance 
failures will “ typically fail to stimulate any re-organizing activity and become 
dominated by other concerns. Only in retrospect do they come to have overriding 
significance” .
They also argue that near misses are less powerful engines of change than actual 
accidents and disasters. Reorganization processes are usually reactions to adverse 
events, yet precautionary attitudes can drive ‘anticipatory’ responses.
Finally, Heimer et al. (2005) suggest that reorganizing involves contests over the 
direction of change, the legitimacy and expertise of the various participants, and 
negotiation over the rules. The nature of a risk and risk event and the process and
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context of attention and sense-making will determine the institutional and social 
behaviour responses, the risk ripple effects across space and time, and the overall 
impact on the organizational levels of reliability.
5.4.1. A2004 Games-ISS risk institutional and social behaviour responses
According to the SARF, the process of risk amplification leads to a number of 
institutional and social behaviour responses, such as a change of attitudes, political 
and social action, organizational response, and social protest. In the A2004 Games- 
IS(S) project a series of factors affected responses to the ISS risk amplification 
process.
The ongoing Test Events facilitated a gradual understanding of ‘ordinary’ Games-IS(S) 
activity, which led to new technological controls as well as repeated updates of 
several ISS policies and procedures. However, revisions in procedural ISS controls 
were ineffectively communicated to both Games-ISS experts and laypersons. As such, 
attitudes were frequently slow to adapt to new ISS risk understandings, policies and 
procedures. Related improvements came mainly via practical experience. Overall, 
the increasing size and decentralisation of the organizational structure often 
restricted the communication of ISS risk interpretations, and thus limited 
reorganization activities239. The fact that procedural changes could not be always 
centrally monitored implied that they were less effective to technological changes.
The research findings also indicate that with regards to ambiguous ISS risks senior 
project management had to engage in the related negotiations, define acceptable 
and necessary ISS risk solutions, and thus motivate reorganization. Their involvement 
was particularly effective in cases where the ISS sense-making process implied an 
increase of project costs, and where the ambiguity of certain risks or the ambiguous 
rules of change240 created social protest and tensions between teams.
Furthermore, it was observed that near major project milestones there were greater 
pressures to proceed with reorganizing IS(S) controls. Given that most project 
milestones were aligned to technological deliverables, reorganizing pressure 
increased with regards to technical ISS controls. However, procedural ISS risks and
239 The A2004 Games-ISS metrics and venue ISS audits demonstrated that new ISS policies and 
procedures were inconsistently implemented across different business units (i.e. venues).
240 I.e. Heimer et al. (2005).
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controls were often ignored241. Attention to procedural risks remained inadequate to 
generate a significant change of attitudes until relative technical stability was first 
achieved. Such delayed attention and communication resulted in many of the 
detected problems remaining unresolved.
In fact, many of the IS(S) problems detected just before or during the Games 
remained purposefully hidden as individuals and groups did not wish to be blamed for 
any errors and oversights. It was only when risks materialised that risk-related 
information was communicated in order to facilitate effective containment 
controls242.
Apart from the ways in which the evolving organizational structure and activities 
affected ISS reorganization, the cultural and political context of the project also 
influenced the organization’s ability to reliably reorganize its operations. When the 
organization was in the ‘Analysis and Design’ project phase, reorganization was 
easier - due to the smaller size of the organization, yet less frequent. Each team 
operated in relative isolation, making a number of assumptions in their planning 
activities. As operational complexity and interdependence increased - exponentially, 
reorganization activities were hard to coordinate. Opinion leaders often clashed and 
the lack of automated, centrally-managed tools to implement changes meant that 
errors and omissions were observed across the decentralised organization. These 
generated further frictions, and blame structures emerged.
In fact, costly reorganization recommendations were frequently ignored and existing 
project resources had to be stretched out to cope with the increasingly challenging 
organizational environment. Thus, although changes did take place throughout the 
project’s lifecycle, these were inconsistent and led to a relative stagnation of ISS 
reliability levels. Therefore, the availability of adequate project resources - people 
and IT - determined the effectiveness of ISS risk reorganization activities.
With regards to how risk characteristics affected the process of ISS risk 
reorganization, the more ambiguous a risk or its rules of change, the more 
reorganization delayed. This distracted attention and resources from other 
simultaneous reorganization activities.
241 E.g. Third-Party and IT Partner ISS compliance, ISS training etc.
242 I.e. section 4.3.5 and ISS incidents related to the delayed detection of: (a) of non- 
compliant IT Partners SWATCH; (b) mis-configured Antivirus solution impacting the 
performance of the OVR systems; and (c) insecure Games applications.
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Complexity and uncertainty of ISS risks was addressed more gradually through the 
ongoing process of testing and simulation. Understanding of ‘ordinary’ Games-IS(S) 
activity was incremental and therefore readjustment of controls was also ongoing 
and repetitive. However, the lack of an effective means to monitor and manage 
configuration changes impacted the ability to effectively reorganize for complex and 
uncertain ISS risks. As such, many of these problems persisted, resulting in increased 
risk ambiguity levels.
Reorganization activities were also incremental during routine project phases. It was 
observed that although project phases of increased time pressure and exposure 
aggravated organizational tensions, they also motivated the greatest and most 
coordinated efforts to reorganize.
Also, as noted earlier, the degree to which attitudes changed depended on the skill- 
set, Olympic experience and occupational background of different persons. Olympic 
experienced staff collaborated more readily with the ISS experts to address ISS risks 
and implement new controls. In addition, Technical team staff was more 
appreciative of the need to implement certain technical ISS controls243 than 
operations-focused teams. Similarly, the Games-ISS experts - with a mostly technical 
background - were keener to implement technical changes than procedural/ 
communication ones. It was only the ISS experts with a more strategic appreciation 
of ISS that were also keen to change their informal and formal processes of working. 
Finally, it  was observed that individuals’ and teams’ ISS risk expectations also 
affected the type and degree of risk institutional and behavioural changes244.
Overall, it is observed that ISS risk reorganization was a continuous process of 
learning and readjustment. Perceived and actual levels of ISS reliability improved 
only gradually and mostly around major project milestones.
243 E.g. Access Control Lists (ACLs) and Games-IS device security hardening controls.
244 E.g. Games applications had been previously used - successfully - in the Salt Lake (SL2002) 
Olympic Games. As such most Games-IS(S) groups and individuals expected Games 
applications to be problem-free. Most errors were normalised and a consideration of the ISS 
aspects were delayed (i.e. during the latter phase of ‘Operational Rehearsals’). It was only 
after the Games - in hindsight - that the ISS problems of Games applications were 
acknowledged.
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5.4.2. A2004 Games-ISS risk ripple effects and impact on levels of ISS 
reliability
The Games-ISS risk attention and sense-making processes not only impacted the 
reorganization of these risks and their controls, but often had spatial and temporal 
ripple effects that implicated the organizational and operational levels of ISS 
reliability. The various types of ripple effects observed included the following:
Firstly, the amplification/attenuation of one ISS risk could lead to the parallel 
reduced or increased attention towards other ISS risks.
Similarly, amplification of a certain aspect of an ISS risk could lead to the 
attenuation of other aspects. For example, with regards to the secure connection of 
laptops onto the Games-network, the non-compliance of Third Parties was amplified. 
This increased attention towards the particular group led to the attenuation of the 
same risk with regards to IT-Partners such as SWATCH.
Furthermore, the amplification/attenuation of ISS risks impacted the workload of 
particular teams or individuals, while it also had an impact on the degree of 
collaboration and communication among different teams. Such ripple effects directly 
impacted the levels of organizational ISS reliability.
The amplification process of ISS risks also had an impact on project costs and 
resource utilization. This, in turn, impacted the extent to which senior project 
management was involved in the project’s decision-making and had to demonstrate 
their ISS commitment.
As seen in cases such as the one related to the need to implement Games-network 
segregation controls (e.g. ACLs), risk amplification processes also led to the 
stigmatization of technologies and teams. Where stigmatization led to the loss of 
trust, further rounds of amplification/attenuation were generated. These expanded 
over time and across different risk areas. In addition, increased/decreased 
confidence in ISS controls often led to the decreased/increased attention to other 
aspects of the same risk245, or other ISS risks altogether.
A further ripple and impact of the amplification process was related to complex and 
uncertain ISS risks. Where such risks were amplified/attenuated, the level of risk
245 E.g. increased confidence in the reliability of technical ISS controls lead to the increased 
attention to procedural ISS controls.
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ambiguity was also impacted. This in turn affected the levels of organizational 
tensions with regards to the risk’s nature and management.
The amplification/attenuation of ISS risks also affected the extent to which the 
overall role and responsibilities of Games-ISS experts were made visible to other 
functions and individuals. It also affected the extent to which laypersons appreciated 
their own ISS responsibilities.
Finally, a risk's amplification was observed to result into the increase/decrease of 
the physical dimension of the particular risk, or another related one. For example, 
the amplification of the poor physical security at venues led to the security 
hardening of Games-IS devices.
5.4.3. Reflection on the SARF mechanisms of ’risk response’
Further to insights relating to the SARF mechanisms of risk communication and 
interpretation, the current study has also highlighted a number of issues with regards 
to the SARF’s mechanisms of risk response.
Firstly, the findings of this study show that - as proposed by the SARF - the process of 
risk amplification is indeed repetitive, with various rounds of feedback. This appears 
to be especially the case in organizational contexts of great operational complexity 
and high reliability requirements, where ISS risk reorganization is supported by a 
continuous process of learning and readjustment.
The above observation is directly related to the type of risks (i.e. Appendix-A2) that 
are encountered by an organization, as well as the organization’s structure and 
situational factors. Therefore, as also highlighted for the SARF processes of risk 
communication and interpretation, ambiguous risks appear to require management 
methods that support the integration of stakeholder involvement and 
communication. Such negotiations also benefit from the presence of opinion leaders 
and accountable authority figures that are willing to decide on the direction of 
reorganization in case of inconclusive risk debates. This is particularly the case 
within an organizational context where there is inefficient time and resources to 
deliberate for long periods.
Complex and uncertain (ISS) risks, on the other hand, appear to require several 
rounds of risk communication, interpretation and response prior to the organization 
reaching a reliable and mature level of risk handling. Both these types of risk can
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significantly benefit from (a) defining clear organizational risk objectives, (b) an 
effective process of organizational learning that continuously feeds new results and 
risk understandings into the organization’s routine operations, and (c) a variety of 
risk information sources and communication channels. The role of technology and 
(ISS) risk assurance controls can be particularly important in facilitating this process 
of continuous learning and organizational reflexivity.
In fact, this study has shown that the effectiveness of risk response/management 
efforts depends on retaining organizational attention on the identified risk beyond 
the stage of risk sense-making. By endorsing a risk management decision through 
appropriate communications, and the monitoring and evaluation of risk control 
effectiveness, organizational behaviours and practices can indeed change.
However, the current case-study indicates that even organizations that aim for highly 
reliable operations require several rounds of ‘risk encounters’ in order to effectively 
respond to identified risks. As suggested earlier in this research, the organizational 
structure, context and situational factors (i.e. Table 3.1 and section 4.4) will greatly 
affect the organization’s capacity to effectively and reliable anticipate and/or 
contain (ISS) risks. For example, in an organization whose situational factors246 
change too frequently - such as in a major-event/project organization - reorganizing 
will be hindered by the time consuming process of adapting human behaviour, 
language and the mechanics of practices.247 As several scholars have noted248, 
organizational responses will be conservative and instituted community will block 
change. Also, reorganizing actions that appear to be done in haste will not allow 
organizational members/groups to become familiar and appreciative of these, 
leading to a loss of trust and/or ‘motivation’ to incorporate new controls into 
existing practices.
Furthermore, the findings of this research verify existing arguments249 that formal 
and procedural compliance failures will typically stimulate reorganizing only in 
retrospect of a major accident, since such failures tend to fundamentally question 
existing institutionalised ways of working and organizing.
246 I.e. age and size, technical system, environment, and power factors of the organization 
(Mintzberg, 1979, 1981).
247 I.e. Hutter and Power (2005b).
248 E.g. Douglas (1987), Sagan (1993), Vaughan (2005).
249 I.e. Hutter and Power (2005); Vaughan (2005); Sagan (1993).
D E Afxentiadis (2010) PhD Thesis, London: LSE 288
Hence, the findings of this research also indicate that risk reorganizing and response 
are closely related to establishing effective structures of organizational learning and 
change management. Such centrally managed and monitored systems can greatly 
improve the organizational encounters with risk250, providing risk response 
coordination and transparency. In addition, this research has verified that learning 
from (ISS) incidents can indeed be an effective means to stimulate risk reorganizing, 
since it supports an organizational sense-making process of defining what is 
‘ordinary’ and acceptable activity251.
Reliable structures and technologies of organizational learning and change 
management are also closely linked to an organization’s ability to demonstrate 
clearly the benefits of risk management controls and response252. Therefore, the 
researcher supports that effective and reliable organizational responses to risk 
require practices and structures that will be able to assure, measure and monitor the 
effectiveness of risk controls. As suggested in sections 2.3.2 and 2.3.3 of this study, 
in order to handle ‘systemic’ risks interdisciplinary and integrative mechanisms of 
risk governance are required253, where the role of context, risk communication and 
coordination processes are brought to the fore.
A final reflection with regards to the SARF process of risk amplification and risk 
response relates to the methodology used for the purposes of this research. The 
researcher suggests that a longitudinal, case-study research methodology provides a 
‘bounded system’ 254 in order to study the process of risk amplification. Kasperson et 
al (2003) have identified that SARF research often suffers from limitations with 
regards to risk response ripples and impacts being unbounded, in the sense that their 
magnitude or persistence over time is not well known. However, the case-study 
investigated in this research is one of specific time and space boundaries, while the 
organizational encounters with ISS risk are investigated from the project ‘ Initiation’ 
to its ‘Closure’ . The implications of this ‘bounded system’ include that risk ripples 
and impacts are considered over the two year period of the A2004 Games-ISS project, 
supporting an in-depth analysis of the research elements of interest (i.e. section 
3.3.1) across vertical and horizontal dimensions of analysis. This research has shown
250 I.e. Sagan (1993); Weick and Sutcliffe (2007); Cooke and Rohleder (2006); Vaughan (2005).
251 I.e. Cooke and Rohleder (2006); Spagnoletti (2006).
252 I.e. Hutter and Power (2005b); Power (2008); Renn (2008).
253 I.e. Klinke and Renn, 2006; Renn, 2008; IRGC, 2007.
254 I.e. Creswell (1998).
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that the processes of risk amplification and response are indeed iterative, while risk 
ripples and impacts extend to other risks and controls, as well as over time. Hence, 
reflecting on the SARF processes of risk amplification and response, the researcher 
suggests that studies that utilise the SARF can benefit from its application within a 
‘bounded’ research environment.
5.4.4. Reflections for other organizations and reliable mechanisms of ISS risk 
reorganizing
Having reviewed the process of ISS risk reorganization within the A2004 Games-IS(S) 
environment it is verified that the nature of a risk/risk event and the process and 
context of risk amplification will determine institutional and social behaviour 
responses as well as the organization’s capacity to reliably manage ISS risks.
With the completion of the A2004 Olympic Games event - despite a number of issues 
that were identified to require future improvement - the Games-ISS project was 
labelled as a ‘success’ ; by both Games-ISS experts and laypersons255.
Keeping in mind that ISS reliability assessments are partly subjective256, while the 
related research questionnaire257 was not necessarily exhaustive, it is interesting to 
note that by Games-time organizational and operational ISS reliability levels were 
indeed at their most mature; in striking contrast with findings 17 months earlier in 
the project lifespan. This indicates that achieving mature levels of reliability was an 
ongoing learning process of reorganization.
Similarly, the organization’s capacity to reliably anticipate and contain ISS risks 
during Games-time was an outcome of the ongoing processes of risk amplification 
which - as examined above - were affected by a number of factors such as: (a) the 
organizational structure and situational factors; (b) the contextual noise; (c) the 
expectations, motivations and obligations of various stakeholders in the ISS 
management process; (d) the characteristics and type of ISS risks; and (e) the routine 
or emergency circumstances of the risk amplification process.
255 In fact, a number of laypersons suggested that by the end of the project, one of the 
greatest lessons learned was related to the significance and role of ISS practices in a major IS 
integration project, such as the A2004 Olympics.
256 As discussed in section 4.4.4.
257 I.e. Appendix-A10.
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The above factors also determined the lessons learned by the Games-IS(S) 
organization after the event’s completion. As examined in section 4.3.6, not all ISS 
problems were acknowledged with the completion of the Games. Indeed, 
formal/procedural compliance failures were acknowledged in retrospect258, yet 
organizational forces ‘normalising’ ISS incidents and near misses persisted. Lessons 
learned still embodied specific explanations of failure which reflected each 
individual’s and team’s expectations, future motivations and obligations.
It is, therefore, suggested that formal knowledge-transfer and After-Action-Review 
(AAR) practices can be particularly useful across such projects. Yet, one should 
remain mindful of the tendency to ‘normalise’ risks and risk events - even in 
retrospect. Lessons learned in a past project should not restrict one’s future 
attention only to the risks identified previously. It is only via the critical investigation 
of organizational encounters with risk that an organization’s capacity to reliably 
manage ISS risk can be understood; and perhaps, to an extent, predicted.
258 I.e. Hutter and Power, 2005b:27.
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5.5 Conclusion
The above chapter has considered the parameters and mechanisms of risk 
amplification in the A2004 Games-ISS project environment. The aim was to improve 
understanding of an organization’s capacity to reliably manage - and predict - ISS 
risks, while critically reviewing the key SARF concepts. Observations and insights 
have been extended to other organizations of similar practices and/or operational 
objectives.
It has, therefore, been shown that similar to several contemporary organizations, 
major event/project organizations are environments that encounter the unexpected, 
yet need to demonstrate reliable organizational structures and operations. Thus, 
they must remain ‘mindful’259 of organizational and individual tendencies to 
‘normalise’ risk events. They need to regularly monitor and evaluate their controls of 
ISS reliability, seeking to understand their internal- and external-facing processes of 
risk amplification.
Hence, the researcher has argued that within an organizational context of high 
reliability requirements, the process of risk attenuation is equally important to that 
of amplification. This point is underlined by the research findings which indicate that 
despite reliable processes of risk organizing, failures appear inevitable in the longer 
run.
After a detailed consideration of the A2004 Games-IS organizational efforts to 
reliably manage ISS risks, the researcher leans towards Sagan’s (1993) suggestions 
with regards to the limitations of high reliability criteria and practices.
Specifically, Sagan suggests that although highly reliable ways of working and 
organizing can significantly improve organizational risk and safety management 
efforts, the structure of an organization - including its high interactive complexity 
and tight-coupling - will present limitations to such efforts. Sagan argues that the 
organizational learning from risk signals and events will be restricted for several 
reasons, including the ambiguity of incident causation; the politicised environments 
in which incident investigation and sense-making takes place; the human tendency to 
cover up mistakes; and the secrecy both within and between competing 
organizations.
259 ‘Mindful management’ is a term proposed and investigated by Weick and Sutcliffe, 2001.
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Therefore, the findings of this study stress a number of issues, along with future 
research directions:
Firstly, there is a need to conduct further research with regards to effective learning 
and knowledge transfer mechanisms within and between organizations and projects.
Such investigations can also address the ‘performance paradox’ identified in the 
fields of mega project/event management260, thus improving highly reliable 
practices.
In addition, this research has shown that SARF predictions are restricted by a number 
of factors, such as the dynamic, continuous and not-always-visible interactions of 
different risk amplification process mechanisms, and the great number and context- 
specific parameters involved into the process of risk amplification. Although 
organizational context and risk decision-making history add great insight into the 
process of risk amplification, such an understanding is difficult to achieve because of 
physical - time and space - restrictions.
Furthermore, it is the researcher’s view that the SARF needs to consider more 
explicitly the organizational structure and technologies of an organization, since 
these play a critical role in the organizational encounters with risk261. In addition, 
risks cannot be considered in isolation since they interact not only in terms of their 
physical impact, but also in terms of how they affect risk perceptions and responses.
Nonetheless, investigating and understanding the amplification process and 
organizational encounters with risk can improve efforts to reliably manage (ISS) risks.
By understanding the mechanisms of risk identification and communication, the 
processes and stations of amplification262, and the limitations to risk reorganizing, 
attention can be drawn to the obstacles of a highly reliable organization and 
operations. Meanwhile, such a deep understanding can also provide justification for 
organizational choices with regards to the appropriateness (and cost) of (ISS) risk 
management controls.
Hence, what is overall underlined by the above research insights is that organizations 
can no longer solely rely on deterministic and technical, risk-calculating practices.
(ISS) risks have been shown to be multi-dimensional and greatly context-specific. In 
addition, errors are part of organizational life and it  is unrealistic to aim for their
260 I.e. section 2.4.1.
261 I.e. Vaughan (2005).
262 I.e. including their interests, motives and behaviours.
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complete elimination. The risk management objective of contemporary organizations 
has shifted from dry risk-calculating statistics to structures and processes of (ISS) risk 
assurance and governance263. Inclusive risk governance frameworks - such as that 
suggested by the IRGC (2005, 2007) - aim to establish organizational structures and 
processes of assurance that are able to demonstrate that reliable and due diligence 
risk management controls are in place.
Beyond that shift towards practices of (ISS) risk governance, the balance of how 
much to spend on risk management will be a persisting debate 264. Understanding the 
process of risk amplification can direct such decisions. However, the researcher 
suggests that the extent to which an (ISS) risk is amplified or attenuated is not as 
important as the extent to which an organization can demonstrate that it reliably 
anticipates and contains risk. Further research in the particular field is considered 
necessary.
263 I.e. sections 2.2.2, 2.3.2 and 2.3.3.
264 I.e. Kasperson et al (2003).
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6. Conclusion
6.1 Recapitulating key ideas
6.1.1. Research objectives and findings
Commencing this research with an investigation in the fields of ISS and organization 
theory two issues were particularly evident. Firstly, ISS risk management practices 
are essential to any contemporary organization that aims to securely handle its 
information, while being able to demonstrate its reliable and trustworthy operations 
to its partners and service/product customers. Secondly, corporate and governmental 
IS infrastructures are becoming increasingly complex and interconnected, with a 
near-zero tolerance for failure. As such, contemporary organizations are increasingly 
required to deliver highly reliable and secure information management practices. An 
operational ISS failure can have a disastrous impact on their legitimacy and survival, 
as well as detrimental implications for their stakeholders and the wider public.
In addition to the above observations, investigation into contemporary challenges of 
organizing indicated that corporations and governments increasingly organize their 
activities in mega-infrastructure projects and events which, however, have 
historically performed poorly. Thus, mega-project/event organizational structures 
and IS infrastructures not only appear to be prone to accident and failure, but also 
have a low risk tolerance level. Yet, the implementation of IS(S) infrastructures in 
mega-event/project organizations has been inadequately - if at all - investigated, 
while related tools and methodologies are not available for practitioners who have 
great demand for these. Hence, researchers265 have increasingly suggested that there 
is a need to consider factors that challenge the successful performance and delivery 
of mega-project/event organizations and IS infrastructures. They have pointed out an 
urgent need to identify the methodologies, approaches and processes that will 
ensure highly reliable operations of mega-project organizations.
Therefore, the objective of this research was to investigate and understand ISS risk 
management practices and challenges in a mega-project/event context, which is 
prone to accident, yet has a low risk tolerance level. More specifically, by adopting a 
sociological and interpretivist approach with regards to the investigation of ‘risk’ , 
the researcher aimed to understand how ISS management practices, risk perceptions 
and behaviours can affect a mega-event’s capacity to deliver highly reliable IS
265 I.e. Silvers, 2008; Flyvbjerg et al, 2003. 
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operations. The focus was not one of testing hypothesis, but an ideographic one that 
sought to understand the causes and related patterns of behaviour leading to the 
reliable, or not, ISS operations. Such an approach is particularly relevant in the case 
of subject matters such as the one under investigation, that still have a lot of 
maturing to do.
In order to answer the research question a cross-disciplinary approach was adopted, 
bridging concepts and approaches from across three different research fields, namely 
information systems security (ISS), technology hazard/risk management and major- 
events management. It was suggested that in order to understand the organizational 
capacity to manage ISS reliably, closer attention should be paid to the structural, 
political and cultural context of the organization. The perceptions of risk and ISS 
behaviours that the organization aims to manage need to be considered across 
various levels of analysis - both vertical and horizontal266. Such in-depth 
understanding could lead to an improvement of organizational ISS risk 
communications and controls.
Thus, the methodological approach adopted was that of a longitudinal case-study, 
while the data collection and analysis efforts were focused around the following 
elements of interest: the structural, cultural and political context of the major-event 
organization under study; the expectations, obligations and motivations of the 
different mega-event stakeholders; and the nature and type of ISS risks. The 
objective was to consider how the above factors impacted ISS risk perceptions, 
behaviours and management efforts across ‘routine’ and ‘emergency’ circumstances, 
as well as with regards to delivering highly reliable ISS operations.
The above elements of research interest were considered both vertically and 
horizontally, thus assessing the organizational capacity to learn and improve ISS 
behaviours and practices over time. In line with proponents of the socio- 
organizational approaches to ISS and technology hazard/risk management, it was 
proposed that the investigation and understanding of the organizational encounters 
with (ISS) risk can inform and thus improve ISS reliability management efforts of 
inherently risky major-event/project organizations.
266 The vertical elements of research interest are presented in section 3.3.1. The horizontal 
dimension of research analysis refers to ‘time’ . Also see section 3.2.2.
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The findings of this research were numerous and applied beyond the strict 
boundaries of the organizational context under study, namely the Athens 2004 
(A2004) Olympic Games-ISS project.
With regards to the management of ISS it was identified that the evolving 
organizational structure, culture and politics often determined the outcome of ISS 
management efforts, and vice versa.
It was also made evident that the delayed strategic involvement of ISS experts in the 
IS megaproject led to increased project costs and/or the compromised ISS reliability, 
as well as increased levels of ISS risk ambiguity. It was found that ISS is not a merely 
technical issue, but a strategic one that has to interact with various other 
organizational functions and groups. These observations stress the need for 
leadership and effective coordination mechanisms with regards to the reliable 
implementation of an ISS infrastructure and project. The presence of persisting ISS 
risk uncertainty in a ‘no-tolerance-for-failure’ organization will lead to increased ISS 
costs in the long run.
With regards to the process of ISS risk amplification and the implications on ‘mindful’ 
(i.e. highly reliable) ISS management, the research findings indicated that both 
perceptions of ISS and reliability levels are indeed affected by a number of factors: 
the evolving organizational structure, work coordination and communication 
patterns; the political negotiations, motivations and expectations between and 
within groups and opinion leaders; the nature of the identified ISS risks and controls; 
and the operational phase of the organization which influences whether ISS 
management controls and risks/risk events are perceived as ‘ routine’ or ‘emergency’ 
ones.
Furthermore, it was made evident that involvement of all stakeholders in ISS risk 
management decisions is not always productive and necessary; this greatly depends 
on the type of risk. Challenges with regards to stakeholder involvement are 
intensified in a major-project/event environment as the organizational structure, 
activities, and context change with great speed. As such, it  is not always possible to 
detect and involve all ISS risk stakeholders in a timely and effective manner; 
decisions often have to be made without everyone’s involvement and agreement.
The research findings also highlighted that ISS assurance controls are a significant 
means to ensure not only ISS compliance, but also improve coordination efforts 
across different organizational functions and ISS stakeholders. ISS assurance controls 
can raise overall ISS awareness and foster a reliable ISS organizational culture. In
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addition, centrally managed and monitored organizational processes267 can greatly 
improve ISS risk transparency and coordination efforts across teams, while supporting 
the enforcement and monitoring of ISS controls. However, the research also 
demonstrated that procedural and communication aspects of ISS risks are often 
overlooked, and only in hindsight do they receive adequate attention.
Instead, it was identified that within an interactively complex, tightly coupled 
organizational environment, considerable resources need to be spent on mapping 
‘ordinary’ IS(S) activities. Continuous testing, an effective after-action-review 
learning process, training and other centrally managed procedures (as discussed 
above) can help to that direction. Yet, exceptions to ‘ordinary’ activities do occur, 
and project and ISS staff need to mindfully address these, making sure that any 
newly identified ISS risk is reliably anticipated and contained. Attention should be 
given to ISS risk expectations that may lead to the normalization of ISS risk signals. 
However, in agreement with Turner (1978), it was demonstrated that most ISS risks 
and risk events were persistent ones that had an ‘incubation period’ of early 
warnings and near misses.
In fact, it was demonstrated that the reliability levels of the risk attention and 
sense-making processes were greatly affected by the rate and scale of organizational 
change in the case-study environment. Hence, ISS risk information sources and 
communication channels require to remain flexible and prepared to adjust to 
organizational changes. The research findings highlighted the benefits of direct ISS 
risk communications, while where indirect communications are used, their 
effectiveness requires to be regularly monitored. In addition, it  was shown that 
regular audience-specific ISS training and audit activities can greatly increase 
effectiveness and reliability of ISS risk identification sources and communication 
channels.
Moreover, this study has highlighted the significance of the various IS(S) incident 
management and monitoring technologies in detecting, reporting and classifying ISS 
risks. However, such controls appear unable to reach their full potential until they 
are adequately customized. In a complex and uncertain environment such 
customization can be only achieved through testing and practice. The optimization of 
IT solutions that support the detection and communication of ISS risks is a learning 
process that requires considerable time and resources. Therefore, the researcher has 
argued that mechanisms to capture and transfer such experience can greatly assist
267 Such as change, configuration and incident management processes. 
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towards achieving greater returns on investment and increasing levels of operational 
reliability.
Finally, the current study has demonstrated that ambiguous ISS risk often lead to 
inter- and intra-organizational tensions, blame-allocation structures, while hindering 
processes of continuous learning and the reporting of suspicious activities. Decision­
making with regards to ambiguous risks requires to be timely deferred to experts or 
authority figures. In addition, centralised ISS management and monitoring controls 
and technologies can further support ISS risk transparency and decision-making which 
can facilitate the effective management of ambiguous ISS risks268.
Apart from the above observations, the current research highlighted a number of 
additional findings related to major-events/projects and other organizations of 
similar structural characteristics.
Overall, it was demonstrated that a project’s scope and context directly influence 
ISS activities and processes of risk attention, sense-making and reorganization. In 
addition, it was made evident that ISS management activities greatly depended on 
the practices, skills and risk perceptions of other functions and stakeholders. Within 
an environment of great complexity and interdependence the delay or problematic 
implementation of one project deliverable can impact other ISS risk profiles and 
associated controls.
It was also demonstrated that within a major-event organization, practical 
experience and the tacit knowledge gained through trial-and-error and operations 
simulation activities can considerably improve the reliability of risk anticipation and 
containment practices. In fact, the reliable operations of a major-event/project 
organization imply that skills and resources - including those related to IS(S) - need 
to be duplicated269. However, such a control is costly, which explains the heavy 
reliance of several major events on inexperienced volunteers that join the 
organization at the last-minute. Such a choice greatly impacts the risk profile of a
268 Although centralised ISS management and monitoring solutions may initially appear as 
unnecessary, scalability challenges - especially within an organization that quickly expands its 
size and operations - will soon require that such processes and technologies are in place.
269 In line with high reliability arguments in favour of redundancy, the findings of this research 
indicate that within organizations of an increasingly decentralised structure, the alternative 
sources and communication channels of risk information need to also increase. Similarly, 
human resources and skills need to be appropriately duplicated where operations are critical, 
as routinization and tiredness can severely impact the reliability of risk attention 
mechanisms.
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major-event organization, and should therefore be timely taken into consideration. IS 
volunteers need to be (ISS) trained and gradually incorporated into the organization’s 
operations, while their access and authorisation privileges need to be closely 
monitored. As indicated above, direct ISS communication and training are effective 
ISS communication channels and should formally and gradually target the growing 
numbers of major-event staff/volunteers. It is interesting to note, however, that due 
to the great reliance of major-events on volunteers the ISS risks posed by them are 
greatly attenuated, representing an ideological hidden risk270.
It was also noted that in a major-event context clear direction and strong leadership 
from senior management or experts are critical success factors. The scale and 
complexity of major-events blurs the greater picture for most teams and individuals, 
leading to tensions and inappropriate prioritization of project activities. Leadership 
and the effective communication and monitoring of ISS risks among different 
functions are key in avoiding ISS errors and tensions.
Effective communication and collaboration with the decentralised (venue-based) IS 
teams can also greatly improve the enforcement of ISS controls, the anticipation and 
containment of ISS risks. As for collaborating with other not-contractually-bound 
partners, consistent efforts are required in order to communicate to them the ISS 
risks and necessary controls. Effectiveness of communications and compliance to ISS 
controls must be regularly evaluated and monitored.
Finally, after-action-review (AAR) and transfer-of-knowledge processes are vital and 
should be implemented soon after a risk event271, while lessons learned need to be 
monitored over time. Cross-functional AAR meetings are also helpful in raising 
attention to ISS risks. However, there will always be a tendency to amplify/attenuate 
risk events in retrospect. As such, where possible, an impartial third party should 
monitor these processes.
270 I.e. Kasperson and Kasperson (1991).
271 I.e. prior to the normalization of failure explanations. 
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6.1.2. Research contributions
Similar to the findings of this research it is suggested that this study has made a 
number of contributions across the fields of ISS, technology hazard/risk management, 
and major-event/project management.
With regards to the field of ISS, this study has considered the concept of ‘ reliable ISS 
management’ , suggesting that organizational theories of ‘high reliability’ and 
‘mindful organizing’ can be applied to the field of ISS. This linkage of inter­
disciplinary concepts can be utilised to assess the effectiveness of ISS management 
controls in organizations of near-zero tolerance for failure. Furthermore, this study 
has integrated concepts from across disciplines, such as sociology and psychology, 
while putting forward the case of ISS risk assurance and governance practices.
In addition, this research has investigated the still maturing behavioural aspects of 
ISS within a specific context, focusing on means of effective ISS risk communications 
and decision making that can lead to greater ISS compliance levels. In line with 
suggestions from a number of ISS researchers272, this study has also considered ways 
to create an effective ISS culture that is integrated with the organization’s work 
culture and structure.
Finally, this study has utilised the SARF in order to investigate ISS incidents and risk 
events with a theoretically founded methodology.
In relation to research contributions to the field of ISS hazard/risk management, the 
use of the SARF supports the need for holistic risk management and communication 
methodologies that are founded on solid theoretical underpinnings, which can 
facilitate the improvement of ISS practices. Using SARF as the conceptual framework 
to link the organizational context with the process of change resulting from ISS 
management practices, it supports the analysis of ISS risk perceptions and behaviours 
across a number of contextual levels (i.e. Fig.3.4). As identified in Chapter 2 of this 
study this is an area that has been inadequately explored, yet can greatly benefit the 
effectiveness of ISS management controls and communications.
272 I.e. Jones and Ashenden, 2005; Jain, 2006; Mishra and Harris, 2006; D’Arcy and Hovav, 
2006.
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Hence, SARF points to potential mechanisms of ISS risk amplification/attenuation. 
The research analysis indicates that risk information sources and communication 
channels273 affect organizational processes of risk attention and sense-making. 
Similarly, the research data analysis indicates that the organizational structure, 
activities and contextual noise interact to determine how ISS risks/risk events are 
perceived, interpreted and eventually result in behavioural and formal, 
organizational changes with regards to the reliable management of ISS risk. Thus, 
stigmatization, trust, and the characteristics of ISS risks274 are indeed detected to 
amplify/attenuate risk perceptions, and determine the organizational explanations of 
failure275.
Furthermore, this research demonstrates that consideration of the high reliability 
criteria in determining an ISS management strategy and tactical activities can 
significantly improve processes of organizational reflexivity; despite the process’s 
subjectivity. This can support an ongoing process of learning and improvement.
In fact, the current study shows that similar to any other organizational practices of 
risk management, the management of ISS is a continuous learning process of, ideally, 
gradual optimization. This learning process is complex and ambiguous, conditioned 
by culture and the organizational context. Similarly, learning from ISS errors is a 
continuous process which cannot be easily forced into univocal, totalizing causal 
narratives. Instead, learning from errors is a process that needs to be ‘mindfully’ 
sustained. This research has demonstrated that an organization’s capacity to reliably 
anticipate and contain ISS risks is an outcome of the ongoing process of risk
273 As indicated in Chapters 4 and 5, risk information sources and information communication 
channels differ across different project phases, organizational structures and situational 
factors
274 I.e. procedural, technical, organizational/communicational and simple, complex, 
uncertain and ambiguous.
275 E.g. In an organization of strongly technical expertise, there is indeed a tendency to stress 
the technical aspect of ISS risks and ignore more communicational and procedural aspects of 
the same risk.
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amplification which - as examined above - was affected by a number of factors276. 
These factors also affect the organization's capacity to learn from errors277.
A further contribution of this study relates to the observation that ISS experts and 
laypersons alike are prone to biased judgements of ISS risk. However, this finding 
does not negate that there is a hierarchical epistemology of risk278. A number of 
factors determine the degree of bias, such as occupational background and 
organizational/contextual experience, cost and political implications, and proximity 
to risk. Nonetheless, in order to identify the interplay and overall impact of these 
factors one must closely investigate the organizational structure and context.
In addition, this research has indicated that ISS risk management practices within an 
organization are influenced by a number of other administrative functions of the 
organization279, which are not necessarily applicable only to major-event/project 
organizations. Therefore, some degree of generalization is possible with regards to 
ISS risk management findings of this research.
Research contributions specific to the field of major-event/projects include the 
investigation of ISS and ISS risk management practices within the particular context; 
an area that has previously not been considered in-depth, yet has been identified to 
be of critical importance to the success of a major-event/project.
Thus, this research has investigated the ways in which the organizational demands 
and challenges of a major-project/event can impact ISS management practices. It
276 This study has identified that the following factors influence an organization’s capacity to 
reliably manage ISS risks: a) the organizational structure and situational factors; (b) the 
contextual noise; (c) the expectations, motivations and obligations of various stakeholders in 
the ISS management process; (d) the characteristics and type of ISS risks; and (e) the routine 
or emergency circumstances of the risk amplification process.
277 As examined in section 4.3.6 of this study, not all ISS problems were acknowledged with 
the completion of the A2004 Games. Although, formal/procedural compliance failures were 
acknowledged in retrospect, organizational forces ‘normalising’ ISS incidents and near misses 
persisted. Lessons learned still embodied specific explanations of failure which reflected each 
individual’s and team’s expectations, future motivations and obligations.
278 I.e. section 3.2.1 of this study.
279 For example: human resources, procurement, and financial management, as well as 
marketing and promotional activities. Within a context of projects and events, the 
management of time and work activities will also greatly influence ISS risk management 
practices - from the capacity to pay ‘mindful’ attention to ISS risks/risk events, to the way 
these are ‘mindfully’ interpreted and change organizational behaviours, and finally to the 
degree that the organization provides ‘mindful’ explanations of failure which result to an 
improvement of high reliability ISS management practices.
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has demonstrated the subjectivity of ISS management processes, the ways in which a 
project’s scope and context interact with efforts to manage ISS risks reliably, and 
stressed that communication and procedural ISS controls are often neglected, yet can 
be cost-effective and critical to the success of reliable ISS practices. Furthermore, 
this study had highlighted the challenges that organizational and operational 
scalability present for ISS management practices. Meanwhile, it has also stressed the 
significance of decentralising the enforcement of ISS management controls, yet 
maintaining centralized monitoring and management of some ISS risk controls and 
processes280.
With regards to scalability challenges, this study has also underlined that ISS risk 
communications need to adapt flexibly to the organization’s requirements. ISS risk 
communications with the various project functions and stakeholders need to become 
increasingly formal, yet as direct as possible. Yet, this study has demonstrated that 
practical real-life experience cannot be easily communicated to other members of 
the organization. Therefore, ISS training and practice are necessary. ISS training 
should focus on real life examples, while trial-and-error/simulation learning 
processes must be available. The effectiveness of ISS communications needs to be 
frequently evaluated and accordingly adapted.
Finally, with regards to research contributions to the field of major-events/projects, 
this research has stressed the great levels of interactive complexity and 
interconnectedness within such environments, and suggests that the utilization of 
project/event management models such as EMBOK can facilitate the detection of 
interdependencies among different project administrative functions and domains of 
knowledge. This can assist planning activities.
280 E.g. change management, configuration management and ISS assurance management 
controls.
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6.2 Research considerations and future directions
6.2.1. Reflections on the research conceptual framework
As examined in section 2.2.1 of this study, research in behavioural ISS is often 
accused of a descriptive nature, not supporting the generation of predictive rule- 
sets. In addition, it is suggested that such type of ISS research is often inconclusive, 
partly due to the individual and situational differences which moderate the impact of 
various countermeasures. Thus, a need to contextualise any behavioural findings and 
associated solutions has been suggested281.
Parallel to the above assertions, researchers282 have highlighted a need to expand the 
immature body of IS(S) literature that adopts a sociological/organizational and 
behavioural approach to ISS, with the utilization of an integrative risk conceptual 
framework.
Guided by these observations the researcher has sought to utilize an integrative risk 
framework that appreciates the dynamic nature of organizational encounters with 
risk, and supports an in-depth contextual analysis across various levels. In addition, 
the researcher supports the need to increase the use of interpretive approaches for 
the analysis of organizational risk experiences. Therefore, the SARF was chosen to 
focus primarily on the in-depth contextual description and understanding of the 
chosen case-study environment. Generating predictions and recommendations was a 
secondary objective of this study.
The particular conceptual framework remains largely unknown and under-utilised 
within the IS(S) field, potentially because of its non-explicit recognition of IT and its 
role in the organizational encounters with risk.
Yet, the particular framework has managed to provide a structured means to connect 
the process of ISS management to the organizational context. The SARF has 
supported an analysis across both vertical and horizontal levels, while bridging risk 
approaches and concepts from across different disciplines.
In addition, the utilization of the IRGC’s risk classification framework283 has further 
complemented the SARF’s classification of risks according to their signal value.
281 I.e. D’Archy and Hovav, 2006; Long Li, 2006.
282 E.g. Pattinson and Anderson, 2006; Jain, 2006; Smith et al., 2006; D’Arcy and Hovav, 2006.
283 I.e. IRGC (2005) and Appendix-A2.
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Moreover, the utilization of concepts from the discipline of organizational theory and 
specifically the High Reliability and Normal Accident theories has provided further 
focus to this research. Requirements for high reliability and mindful management 
have been utilised to assess the content of organizational change.
Overall, the conceptual framework utilised and proposed in the current study has 
facilitated the research’s objective, namely to understand in-depth an organization’s 
capacity to reliably manage ISS risks. However, a number of limitations have also 
been identified. Thus, the researcher suggests that the structures and situational 
factors of an organization and the way these interact with mechanisms of risk 
amplification are inadequately considered by SARF. In the current study these 
shortcoming were overcome by integrating into the analysis Mintzberg’s (1979, 1981) 
scheme of organizational context levels.
Furthermore, SARF studies do not appear to investigate extensively the dynamic 
interactions of risks that take place simultaneously within an organization. This 
research has demonstrated that this is possible and in fact necessary as the 
amplification of one risk can affect the amplification/attenuation patterns of 
another.
Finally, this research has stressed the significance of risk attenuation - especially 
within organizations of high reliability requirements.
6.2.2. Reflections on the research methodology
In agreement with views of Walsham (1993) and Pettigrew (1990), the current study 
has demonstrated that a longitudinal in-depth case-study approach is indeed an 
appropriate methodology to observe the patterns of risk behaviours and events that 
dynamically unfold over a period of time. This research method has allowed the 
researcher to explore the context, content and process of change, along with their 
interconnections through time. Multiple sources and loops of causation and 
connectivity have been revealed with regards to the process of ISS risk management 
within a major-event organization.
In agreement with Pettigrew (1990:280), the utilization of the particular 
methodology in this research has indicated that longitudinal case-studies assist “ the 
iterative process of inductive pattern generation and theory building” . Emerging 
issues and lessons learned have been highlighted at the final interpretive phase of 
the case study (i.e. Lincoln and Guba, 1985), while “ emerging conceptual and 
D E Afxentiadis (2010) PhD Thesis, London: LSE 306
theoretical ideas [have been] inductively derived from the case” Pettigrew 
(1990:280).
Case-study criticisms with regards to poor representativeness have been partly 
addressed by identifying lessons learned for other organizations of similar 
characteristics and reliable ISS requirements. Reflections were also highlighted with 
regards to the process and mechanisms of ISS risk amplification and reliable 
management. As Walsham (1993:15) suggests
“ from an interpretive position, the validity of an extrapolation from an 
individual case or cases depends [...] on the plausibility and cogency of the 
logical reasoning used in describing the results from the cases, and in drawing 
conclusions from them” .
6.3 Epilogue
Contemporary organizations increasingly structure and deliver their strategic 
objectives in the form of major-events and projects. With regards to the IS 
infrastructures that support such organizational structures, or are the end 
deliverable of such efforts, the secure handling of information is of critical 
importance to the success of such mega-projects.
Yet, this is a field that has been inadequately investigated, despite the potential 
organizational, economic and socio-political benefits and the simultaneous poor 
performance of such structures.
The in-depth, longitudinal investigation of an ISS project within a major-event 
context has demonstrated that high levels of interactive complexity and operational 
and functional interdependence, directly or indirectly affect ISS management efforts, 
decisions and communications. Principles of high reliability can indeed improve 
overall ISS performance and management of risk, yet the structural and cultural 
aspects of a major event project will amplify or attenuate risk perceptions and thus 
constrain the effectiveness of such controls. Therefore, there is a need to improve 
understanding of such factors, incorporating this into risk and risk control evaluation, 
management and communication practices.
By sustaining mindful and reflexive processes and structures of risk communication 
and interpretation, ISS assurance and governance practices will allow organizations 
to demonstrate that they can reliably anticipate and contain ISS risks.
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Appendices
A1 - Approaches to risk
Risk Approach Description Et References
1 Technical Risk Assessment
Traditionally adopted in the insurance industry and focuses on the 
‘expected value’ , which can be extrapolated from the statistical 
data about accidents in previous years. The resulting risk 
assessment is reduced to a single dimension representing an average 
over space, time and context. The focus is on cause-effect 
relationships.
Cohen, 1996; Bedford 6t Cooke, 2001; IAEA, 1995; Aven, 2003; Renn, 
2008; Dietz et al, 1996; Zinn & Taylor-Gooby, 2006a; Perrow, 1984; 
Fischhoff, 1995; Slovic, 1987b; Hattis & Kennedy, 1990.
2
Economic - 
Rational Actor 
Paradigm (RAP)
Based on the core concept of the rational actor and his/her 
subjective utility functions. A risk decision is, therefore, a decision 
with a range of possible outcomes with known probability for the 
occurrence of each stage. Statistical methods can lead to the 
rational decision about the reduction of risk.
Renn, 1992a; Jaeger et al, 2001 ; Renn et al, 2005 ; Renn, 2008 ; 
Coleman, 1990.
3 BehaviouralEconomic
Shows that people rely on a limited number of heuristic principles, 
which reduce the complex tasks of assessing probabilities and 
predicting values to simpler judgemental operations. Although these 
heuristics can be quite useful, they w ill sometimes lead to severe 
and systematic errors/biases, such as: the representativeness, 
availability and adjustment/anchoring bias.
The approach also identifies the significance of ‘framing’ . The 
framing effect takes place when there is a change of preferences 
between options as a function of the variation of frames. This 
phenomenon violates the assumption that people decide by 
referring to objective entities.
This approach also identifies the significance of risk communication 
methods. The central notion of the approach encompasses the idea 
that risk problems are fundamentally problems of ensuring that the 
right information is available and that lay people are able to use the 
information properly. In this view, risk problems are mainly 
problems of sufficient information and therefore need to be solved 
by the improvement of communication strategies. The approach has 
also identified the importance of trust, emphasizing the limitations 
on knowledge as the basis of trust.
Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Jaeger et al., 2001; Renn et al, 2005; 
Zinn, 2004a; Putnam, 1993; Frewer et al., 2003; Lewis & Weigert, 
1985; Elsher, 1998; Sunstein, 2003.
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4 Psychological
Focuses on explaining why individuals do not base their risk 
judgements on expected values. It identifies strong biases in 
people’s drawing inferences from probabilistic information, and has 
revealed different meanings of risk, depending upon the context in 
which the term is used. Therefore, psychological studies of risk 
have focused on the perception of risk and have indicated towards 
different risk connotations among individuals, groups and cultures. 
Risk perceptions are influenced by intuitive heuristics and 
judgement processes, contextual factors, semantic associations, 
trust and credibility.
Slovic, 1987b, 2000; Rohrmann 6t Renn, 2000; Loomes, 2005, 2006; 
Jones-Lee et al., 1995; Slovic et al., 2000; Weyman & Kelly, 1999; 
Williamson 6t Weyman, 2005; Bostrom et al., 1992; Taylor-Gooby, 
2004; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Pidgeon, 1998; Walker et al., 
1998; Taylor-Gooby & Zinn, 2005; Epstein, 1994; Loewenstein et al., 
2001, 2003; Forgas 2003; Frewer et al., 2003; Poortinga & Pidgeon, 
2004;; Hsee, 200; Kemp & Maxwell, 1993.
5
Reflexive 
Modernization Et 
the ‘Risk Society’
A sociological approach to risk. The central theme is to analyse risk 
perception and response within the overall framework of a cultural 
discontinuity giving rise to a new form of modernity. Proponents of 
this approach argue that in the pursuit of ‘goods’ modern industry 
and society also produce ‘bads’ , which can cross national 
boundaries and affect social groups indiscriminately. The outcome 
is a world risk society beyond the level of the risk management 
institutions of the nation state. The key cultural shift among the 
citizens of risk society is towards ‘ reflexivity’ - individuals are 
conscious of their social context and their own role as actors within 
in.
Beck, 1992b; Taylor-Gooby & Zinn, 2005; Boyne, 2003; Tulloch 6t 
Lupton, 2003; Bonfi, 1995; Zinn, 2004b; Elliott, 2002.
6 Systems Theory
A sociological approach to risk which suggests that systems can 
produce ‘objective’ knowledge about the world, but each observer 
is imprisoned in a social system that provides constructed meaning, 
rationality and identity. Therefore, this approach focuses on the 
internal order and systemic interactions with other systems in the 
outside world, which have generated the necessary communication 
media to serve their needs.
A key feature of this construction is the distinction between risk and 
danger. Hazards perceived as external threats to a system are 
called ‘dangers’ , while hazards that pose internal, and thus 
manageable, threats are called ‘ risks’ . The approach suggests that 
the potential for a specific phenomenon to be constructed as a risk 
in one system and a danger in another impedes communication 
between systems.
Luhmann, 1982, 1993; Renn, 2008.
7 Critical Theory
A sociological theory that focuses on the exchange of arguments in 
a discourse setting, which leads to consensus on the basis of mutual 
understanding of facts, values, experiences and normative 
assumptions. Therefore, with regards to risks, critical theorists 
support that the only viable solution to overcome the inequitable 
distribution of risks is to create a forum for open discourse. This 
process of discourse must be fair, transparent and truthful.
Habermas, 1970, 1989, 1991; Webler, 1995; Renn, 2008.
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8 Post-Modernism
A sociological theory that aims to provide evidence and indications 
for the hidden relationships between power and collective claims. 
Risk is not at the centre of post-modern thinking. What is seen as 
risks and what as benefits, and to what degree, depends upon the 
framing of social forces.
Jaeger et al, 2001; Rose, 1990; Foucault, 1991.
9 Cultural Theory of Risk
A socio-cultural approach to risk that focuses on the context of the 
group that determines which hazards attention is focused on; the 
acceptability or risk; and the reactions to risk that are legitimized. 
The focus on risk does not just serve the self-protection of the 
individual; it  can express wider socio-political interests and 
agendas. It, therefore, suggests that expert judgements of risk are 
also subject to cultural considerations.
Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982; Weyman and Kelly, 1999; Walker et 
al., 1998; Macgill, 1989; Zinn, 2004b; Williamson and Weyman, 
2005; Gaskell and Allum, 2001; Renn et al., 1992.
10
Social
Amplification of 
Risk Framework 
(SARF)
A sociological approach to risk which aims to capture the complex 
risk experience of both individuals and social entities, while the 
concept of ‘amplification’ includes both the intensifying and 
attenuating processes of risk.
The process of risk amplification/attenuation initiates with the risk 
signal which is interpreted via social interaction in order to form 
risk messages and hence perceptions. Such perceptions influence 
risk behaviour which, in turn, generate secondary consequences 
that extend far beyond direct harm to humans or their environment. 
These secondary effects can then trigger or impede demands for 
additional institutional responses and protective actions. The 
impacts may spread or ‘ ripple’ to other parties, locations or risk 
arenas.
Kasperson et al, 1988; Kasperson, 1992; Renn, 2008.
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A2 - IRGC risk characteristics and their implications for risk management and 
communication
Characterization
Management
Strategy Appropriate Instruments
Stakeholder
Participation
1. ‘Simple’ risk 
problems
Routine-based:
(tolerability/
acceptability
judgement)
(risk reduction)
Applying ‘traditional’ decision­
making
• Risk-benefit analysis
• Risk-risk trade offs
• Trial and error
• Technical standards
• Economic incentives
• Education, labelling, 
information
• Voluntary agreements
Instrumental
discourse
2. Complexity - 
induced risk 
problems
Risk-informed: 
(risk agent and 
causal chain)
Characterizing the available 
evidence
• Expert consensus seeking tools
• Results fed into routine 
operation
• Risk-risk trade offs
Epistemological
discourse
Robustness-
focused:
(risk absorbing 
system)
-*■ Improving buffer capacity of 
risk target through:
• Additional safety factors
• Redundancy and diversity in 
designing safety devices
• Improving coping capacity
• Establishing high reliability 
organizations
3. Uncertainty - 
induced risk 
problems
Precaution- 
based: (risk 
agent)
Using hazard characteristics 
such as persistence, ubiquity 
etc. as proxies for risk 
estimates. Tools include:
• Containment
• ALARA (as low as reasonably 
achievable
• ALARP (as low as reasonably 
possible)
• BACT (best available control 
technology)
Reflective
discourse
Resilience-
focused:
(risk absorbing 
system)
-*• Improving capability to cope 
with surprises
• Diversity of means to 
accomplish desired benefits
• Avoiding high vulnerability
• Allowing for flexible responses
• Preparedness for adaptation
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Knowledge
Characterization
Management
Strategy Appropriate Instruments
Stakeholder
Participation
4. Ambiguity- 
induced risk 
problems
Discourse-based
Application of conflict 
resolution methods for reaching 
consensus or tolerance for risk 
evaluation results and 
management option selection
• Integration of stakeholder 
involvement in reaching closure
• Emphasis on communication 
and social discourse
Participative
discourse
Source: adapted from IRGC, 2005:16.
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A3 - List of research interviews
# Date Interviewee (organization: role)
Interview  
Structure & 
Method
1 20 May 2002 IOC: Director of Technology Semi-structured
2 10 October, 2002 ATHOC: Quality & ISS (QIS) Section Manager Semi-structured
3 11 October, 2002 ATHOC IT Manager Semi-structured
4 14 October, 2002 SchlumbergerSema: ISS Risk Manager Semi-structured
5 13 November, 2002 ATHOC: IT Manager Semi-structured
6 15 November, 2002 ATHOC: Quality & ISS (QIS) Section Manager Semi-structured
7 22 November, 2002 ATHOC: Office Applications & Intranet Section Manager Semi-structured
8 22 November, 2002 IOC: Director of Technology Structured
9 25 November, 2002 SchlumbergerSema: Games-IS Chief Integrator Structured
10 29 November, 2002 ATHOC: Director of Games Network IS Structured
11 29 November, 2002 SchlumbergerSema: ISS Risk Manager Structured
12 11 December, 2002 SchlumbergerSema: ISS Risk Manager Structured
13 14 January, 2003 IOC: Technology Director and IOC Technology Manager Semi- structured
14 22 January, 2003 ATHOC: Games Results Manager Semi-structured
15 22 January, 2003 SchlumbergerSema: Games Results Supervisor Semi-structured
16 24 January, 2003 ATHOC: ISS Manager Semi-structured
17 27 January, 2003 ATHOC: ISS Manager Structured
18 27 January, 2003 ATHOC: Quality & ISS (QIS) Section Manager Semi-structured
19 31 January, 2003 SchlumbergerSema: ISS Risk Manager Semi-structured
20 4 February, 2003 ATHOC: Quality & ISS (QIS) Section Manager Structured
21 4 February, 2003 ATHOC: ISS Manager Structured
22 6 February, 2003 ATHOC: Quality & ISS (QIS) Section Manager Semi-structured
23 6 February, 2003 ATHOC: ISS Manager Semi- structured
24 10 February, 2003 ATHOC: Director of Technology (Energy, Telecoms, IT) Structured
25 11 February, 2003 IOC: Director of Technology Semi-structured
26 14 February, 2003 SchlumbergerSema: ISS Risk Manager Semi-structured
27 21 February, 2003 ATHOC: ISS Manager Semi-structured
28 21 February, 2003 SchlumbergerSema: ISS Risk Manager Semi-structured
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# Date Interviewee (organization: role)
Interview 
Structure a  
Method
29 27 February, 2003 SchlumbergerSema: UNIX Systems Team Expert Structured
30 7 March, 2003 SchlumbergerSema: ISS Risk Manager Structured
31 12 March, 2003 ATHOC: Quality and ISS (QIS) Section Manager Structured
32 13 March, 2003 SchlumbergerSema: ISS Risk Manager Structured
33 18 March, 2003 SchlumbergerSema: ISS Risk Manager Structured
34 18 March, 2003 ATHOC: Manager of Games network IS Structured
35 19 March, 2003 IOC: Technology Director Structured
36 21 March, 2003 SchlumbergerSema: ISS Risk Manager Structured
37 21 March, 2003 SchlumbergerSema: IS Integration Project Quality Manager Structured
38 1 April, 2003 SchlumbergerSema: ISS Risk Manager Structured
39 3 April, 2003 SchlumbergerSema: ISS Risk Manager Semi-structured
40 4 April, 2003 ATHOC: ISS Manager Semi-structured
41 8 April, 2003 SchlumbergerSema: ISS Architect/Analyst Structured
42 9 April, 2003 SchlumbergerSema: ISS Risk Manager Semi-structured
43 10 April, 2003 SchlumbergerSema: IS Integration Project Quality Manager Structured
44 11 April, 2003 SchlumbergerSema: ISS Risk Manager Semi-structured
45 16 April, 2003 SchlumbergerSema: ISS Risk Manager Semi-structured
46 17 April, 2003 SchlumbergerSema: ISS Architect/Analyst Semi-structured
47 5 May, 2003 SchlumbergerSema: ISS Architect/Analyst Semi-structured
48 9 May, 2003 SchlumbergerSema: ISS Risk Manager Structured
49 15 May, 2003 ATHOC: Quality 6t ISS (QIS) Section Manager Semi-structured
50 20 May, 2003 SchlumbergerSema: ISS Risk Manager Semi-structured
51 9 June, 2003 SchlumbergerSema: IS Operations Manager Semi-structured
52 23 June, 2003 SchlumbergerSema: ISS Risk Analyst Structured
53 8 July, 2003 SchlumbergerSema: Major Events Marketing VP Structured
54 8 July, 2003 SchlumbergerSema: ISS Risk Manager Structured
55 10 July, 2003 SchlumbergerSema: ISS Risk Analyst Structured
56 15 July, 2003 SchlumbergerSema:W2K Systems Expert 6t Team Lead Structured
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# Date Interviewee (organization: role)
Interview 
Structure 8t 
Method
57 16 July, 2003 SchlumbergerSema:Unix Systems Expert 6t Team Lead Structured
58 24 July,2003 SchlumbergerSema: ISS Risk Manager Structured
59 29 August, 2003 SchlumbergerSema: ISS Risk Analyst Semi-structured
60 4 September, 2003 SchlumbergerSema: ISS Risk Manager Structured
61 9 September, 2003 SchlumbergerSema: Games Systems Architect Semi-structured
62 12 September, 2003 SchlumbergerSema: ISS Risk Manager Semi-structured
63 15 September, 2003 SchlumbergerSema: ISS Network Analyst Semi- structured
64 15 October, 2003 SchlumbergerSema: ISS Risk Analyst Structured
65 17 October, 2003 SchlumbergerSema:Games-IS Operations Team Manager Structured
66 13 November, 2003 SchlumbergerSema: ISS Risk Manager Structured
67 26 November, 2003 SchlumbergerSema: ISS Risk Manager Structured
68 27 November, 2003 SchlumbergerSema: ISS Risk Analyst Structured
69 27 November, 2003 SchlumbergerSema: ISS Network Architect Structured
70 27 November, 2003 SchlumbergerSema: ISS Network Analyst Structured
71 28 November, 2003 SchlumbergerSema: ISS Systems Analyst Structured
72 13 January, 2004 Atos Origin: ISS Network Analyst Structured
73 15 January, 2004 Atos Origin: (new) Games ISS Manager Structured
74 22 January, 2004 Atos Origin: Games-IS Chief Integrator Structured
75 2 February, 2004 Atos Origin: (new) Games ISS Manager Structured
76 27 February, 2004 Atos Origin: ISS Network Architect Structured
77 10 March, 2004 Atos Origin: Games-IS Chief Integrator Semi-structured
78 19 March, 2004 Atos Origin/ KOEP:Games-IS Network Administrator Semi-structured
79 29 March, 2004 Atos Origin: Major Events Marketing VP Structured
80 4 April, 2004 Atos Origin: IT Helpdesk Manager Structured
81 16 April, 2004 Atos Origin: Games ISS Risk Analyst Structured
82 4 May, 2004 Atos Origin: Games-IS Chief Integrator Structured
83 14 May, 2004 Atos Origin: Games ISS Manager Structured
84 24 May, 2004 Atos Origin: Games ISS Network Analyst Semi-structured
85 25 May, 2004 Atos Origin: Games ISS Risk Analyst Semi-structured
86 2 June, 2004 Atos Origin: Games ISS Manager Structured
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# Date Interviewee (organization: role)
Interview 
Structure ft 
Method
87 12 June, 2004 Atos Origin: Games TRO Manager Structured
88 24 June, 2004 Atos Origin: Games ISS Manager Structured
89 24 June, 2004 Atos Origin:Games TRO Manager Structured
90 22 July, 2004 Atos Origin: Games ISS Manager (TOC-SEC team#1 Duty Manager) Structured
91 23 July, 2004 Atos Origin: Games ISS Risk Analyst (TOC-SEC team#2 ISS Incident Analyst) Structured
92 30 July, 2004 Atos Origin: Major Events Marketing VP Structured
93 4 August, 2004 Atos Origin: Games ISS Risk Analyst (TOC-SEC team#2 ISS Incident Analyst) Structured
94 18 August, 2004 Atos Origin: Games ISS Risk Analyst (TOC-SEC team#2 ISS Incident Analyst) Structured
95 9 September, 2004 Atos Origin: Games ISS Manager (TOC-SEC team#1 Duty Manager) Structured
96 9 September, 2004 Atos Origin: Games-IS Chief Integrator (TOC IT Duty Manager) Structured
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A4 - The five services provided by the IOC’s IT (TOP) sponsor for the A2004 
Games-IS
IS-Games
Integration
Project
Service
Service Description, Mission, Challenges & Approach
1 PartnerManagement
• The coordination of IS development, deployment and operations 
across a number of organizations, including ATHOC, other IT 
sponsors, suppliers and providers, consultants and volunteers.
• In A2004, partners included 10 IT sponsors and providers, the IOC and 
ATHOC. IT Volunteers supporting the Games-IS functionality were 
more than 3000 during Games-time.
• Partners had to seamlessly coordinate their activities, without 
compromising the required quality and exceeding the budgeted 
resources/cost. They also had to deliver an integrated Games-IS on 
time.
• The IT partners had no contractual relationship with one another. 
There was no hierarchical control. Yet common skills, policies and 
procedures had to be created.
• The operation of the A2004 Games-IS was greatly dependent on 
volunteers.
2 SystemsIntegration
• The integration of people, processes and technology supporting 
mission-critical operations of the Games. The integrated systems 
serviced the IOC, ATHOC, the various suppliers, providers, media, 
sports and event audiences.
• The integrated systems had to seamlessly support the business 
functions, providing reliable Games services.
• The project resources had to be effectively allocated. Delays in 
system delivery would compromise both the project budget and end 
deliverable.
• The A2004 mission-critical Games-IS infrastructure was great in size, 
comprising of 32 interfacing applications,900 servers, 10500 
workstations, and 4000 printers. Network devices consisted of 200 
routers, 1600 switches, 24 firewalls, and 130 intrusion detection 
systems. The Games IT-supported services had to be facilitated 
across 60 geographically dispersed venues. Integration of services 
had to take place across 10 IT partners, the IOC and ATHOC. The 
operation of the integrated Games-IS involved the role-specific 
training of 1000 IT personnel and 3000 IT volunteers.
• According to the Games-IS Chief Integrator, “ the single most 
important success factor is testing” (i.e. Appendix-A3:9)
3 ChangeControl
• Management of change in the Games-IS project had two aspects: (a) 
the exponential growth of Games -IS operations, people and 
technology, and (b) the tracking of defects across applications, 
hardware and configurations, which needed to be communicated to 
all appropriate parties, reaching a decision and implementing a 
solution within service-acceptable timeframes.
• There were various organizations and functional groups that had to 
be involved in the change management process. Roles and 
responsibilities across these parties had to be defined. Managing and 
implementing a change implied that a baseline had been set to 
which all relevant parties had agreed to.
• Not all changes had a home. Certain changes had to follow an 
escalation procedure.
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IS-Games
Integration
Project
Service
. . .
Service Description, Mission, Challenges & Approach
4 InformationSecurity
• The management of A2004 Games-ISS focused on ISS assurance, ISS 
architecture, and ISS operations. The evaluation of the overall ISS 
Posture was enabled via a combination of risk modelling and 
mitigation strategies.
• The A2004 Games were the first ones where ISS was a strategic 
priority. There was limited transfer of knowledge from previous 
events. A2004 ISS requirements had to be defined with a number of 
IS partners.
• ISS was a transversal activity which needed to be integrated with the 
rest of IT operations. However, lack of contractual hierarchy posed 
ISS compliance problems.
5 OlympicOperations
• Operations management involved five activity areas: (a) venue 
planning; (b) implementation; (c) central operations (e.g. helpdesk, 
staffing, procedures); (d) training; and (e) Games-times operations 
(i.e. facilities management; venue IT management, ATHOC and IT 
partner coordination; centralised management and monitoring from 
the Technology Operations Centre (TOC)).
• According to the Games-IS Chief Integrator, “ operational readiness is 
an outcome of lots and lots of testing; understanding what is normal 
and what is not in our environment; of training and policy and 
procedure awareness” (i.e. Appendix-A3:82).
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A5 - A2004 Games-IS high level system architecture and data flows
General Data Flow
j  Comp - Venue
OVR Systems
CIS Server iLocal Gateway
WA N
IDS Central Servers
C IS  DispacherMedals Server
GMS Servers
SMS 3M$ GMS
= = = =
Glossary:
• The OVR (On-Venue Results system) includes systems and data located across the 
different competition venues used to manage local systems such as timing or 
scoreboards.
• The CIS Server (Commentator Information System) is part of the IDS systems and 
provides real-tim e event results to producers, commentators and announcers 
located at the venues or at central locations such as the International 
Broadcasting Centre (IBC).
• Comp-venue refers to the 35 A2004 competition venues.
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• The CRS (Central Repository System) is part of the IDS systems and consolidates 
the information regarding the Games. It receives and stores the data, as well as 
creates new consolidated information for the rest of the IDS applications.
• The PDC is the Primary Data Centre facility.
• The IBC is the International Broadcasting Centre facility.
• IDS refers to the Information Diffusion System, which gathers and distributes
information related to the event to multiple clients. Among others, the 
information consists of the all the results, medals and records for the current and 
past Games.
• GMS refers to the Games Management System, which provides functionality to
assist in gathering information about the people attending the event and their
needs.
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A6 - The parts of the A2004 Games-IS project organization
Organization Games-IS Integration Project Role, Responsibilities & Deliverables
1 IOC
The IOC located and contracted all international sponsors and TOP 
partners that would contribute to the A2004 Games-IS Integration 
project. In addition, the IOC provided the project management 
framework - i.e. the Masterplan - by which they monitored the project 
progress, issues and risks. Monthly meetings were organized by ATHOC, 
where the latter organization along with all other Games-IS project 
partners would present to the IOC the project development and 
problems.
2 ATHOC
ATHOC was overall responsible for ensuring that the project was 
delivered as planned and defined in the Masterplan.
ATHOC contractually bound all other project partnering organizations, 
and was responsible of ensuring the smooth collaboration between the 
Games-IS project organization and the rest of the ATHOC functions, 
partners and Greek government.
3
International
Sport
Federations
(IFs)
The 35 IFs that participated in the A2004 Games, were responsible of 
providing their sport event specific requirements with regards to the 
rules of the field of play, timing and scoring, athlete/team qualification, 
and broadcasting. These requirements would be incorporated into the 
Games-IS application build, which would then have to be tested by IF 
members during various sports test events.
4
Schlumberger­
Sema/
Atos Origin284
SchlumbergerSema (or Atos Origin after January 2004) was the IOC’s TOP 
IT partner for the A2004 Games. Its responsibilities are summarised in 
Appendix-A4.
5 SWATCH
SWATCH was the IOC international sponsor for the A2004 Games Timing 
and Scoring (T&S) system. ATHOC managed the A2004 deliverables of 
SWATCH. SWATCH was responsible of delivering, testing and operating 
the Results Systems applications, which were to be integrated with the 
rest of the Games-IS solutions provided by SchlumbergerSema/Atos 
Origin.
6 XEROX
XEROX was the IOC’s international partner for document publishing, 
processing and supplies activities. ATHOC managed the A2004 XEROX 
deliverables. XEROX was responsible of printing and distributing 
information during Games-time, generated by the Games-IS applications. 
The production of accreditation badges was one of the key activities in 
which XEROX was involved in the Games-IS Integration project.
7 KODAK
KODAK was the IOC’s international partner with regards to the 
production of film , photographies and imaging. Such imaging was 
required by a number of Games-IS applications, including the GMS 
accreditation application. In A2004, the KODAK contract was managed 
by ATHOC.
284 The SchlumbergerSema/Atos Origin TOP contract with the IOC is historically the greatest 
sports- and event-IT contract of its type, covering in total 6 Olympic events, from the Salt 
Lake 2002 to the London 2012 Games.
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Organization Games-IS Integration Project Role, Responsibilities ft Deliverables
8 Panasonic
Panasonic, the IOC’s international sponsor of audio, TV, and video 
equipment, provided all necessary equipment across Olympic venues, 
according to ATHOC’s and SchlumbergerSema’s venue resource 
requirements. During A2004, the Panasonic contract was managed by 
ATHOC.
9 Samsung
Samsung, the IOC’s international sponsor of wireless communication 
equipment, provided all mobile/wireless equipment necessary the 
communication and coordination of Games-IS activities during the Event. 
The Samsung contract was managed by ATHOC in the A2004 Games.
10 OTE
OTE, the Hellenic Telecommunications Organization, was a grand 
national sponsor, providing the telecommunications infrastructure upon 
which the Games-IS operated. The OTE contract was managed and 
monitored by ATHOC.
11 KOEP
KOEP consisted an A2004 consortium of five Greek IT companies, which 
provided ATHOC with workstations, computer servers, and digital 
storage equipment. KOEP also sourced IT-skilled personnel for the 
Games-IS Integration project. KOEP contractual arrangements were 
made and managed by ATHOC.
12 IT Vendors
A number of IT vendors procured the Games-IS equipment and 
technologies. These included Dell, NetlQ, Cisco, Oracle, Sun 
Microsystems, CA, and others. Contracts were managed by 
SchlumbergerSema, and approved by ATHOC.
13 Media / Broadcasters
The Athens Olympic Broadcasting (AOB) was established as the host 
broadcaster of the A2004 Games, responsible of producing the 
International Television and Radio signal of the Games, and delivering it 
to the venues and the International Broadcasting Centre (IBC). AOB also 
provided the broadcast services and equipment to the Broadcasters. 
ATHOC fully funded and monitored AOB’s operations. AOB members 
(3700), broadcasters (12000) and Games commentators (1500) had to be 
accredited. This was a service provided by the Games-IS GMS 
Accreditation application. The AOB connectivity with the Games-IS 
network results and information had to be coordinated with 
SchlumbergerSema and SWATCH.
14 Volunteers
More than 3000 IT volunteers were required during A2004 Games 
operations. The volunteers were recruited by ATHOC by the end of April 
2004. All IT volunteers had to be trained by SchlumbergerSema/Atos 
Origin with regards to the Games-IS policies and procedures, their roles 
and responsibilities. Hundreds of IT volunteers also participated in the 
A2004 Games Test Events and Technical Rehearsals.
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A7 - A2004 Games-IS Integration project organigram
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A8 - A2004 Games-IS organization size
The Games-IS project organization consisted of a diverse organizational and cultural 
workforce, which expanded greatly in size during the later stages of the project.
The below graphs summarize this.
A8.1: Total Games-IS workers
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A8.3: No o f Games-IS Partner Staff
No of Games-IS Partner Staff
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A8.4: No o f Games-IS Volunteers
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A9 - A2004 Games-IS and Games-ISS project phase synchronization
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A10 - Maturity of reliable ISS organizations and operations questionnaire
The following questionnaire incorporates Weick and Sutcliffe’s (2001, 2007) idea that 
an organization’s operational reliability can be monitored with the use of 
audit/compliance checklists or questionnaires, providing useful information with 
regards to levels and perceptions of high reliability across organizational units and 
over time.
High reliability controls - and the associated questions - are categorised into 
anticipation (A) and containment (C) controls, while there are three areas of control, 
namely organizational design, operational management, and organizational culture. 
These are summarised in Tables 3.3 and 3.4.
The ‘Maturity of Reliable ISS Organization & Operations’ questionnaire was 
completed by various members of ATHOC and SchlumbergerSema across different 
project phases.
The questionnaire asked respondents to rate organizational ISS reliability of their 
work units, organizations and those of other groups/organizations. The questionnaire 
aimed to capture perceptions of organizational ISS reliability and operational 
preparedness across functional groups and over time.
The roles of the questionnaire respondents and the timing of questionnaire 
completion are summarised in Table A10.1 below.
Table A10.2 summarises the growth rates in the reliability of the Games-ISS 
management controls as assessed by the questionnaire respondents.
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Questionnaire: Maturity of Reliable ISS Organization a Operations
Organization/ Organizational ro le :__________________________________________
Date:__________________________________________________________________
How well do the following statements describe (the work unit/organization)? 
For each item, circle the number that best reflects your conclusion:
1 = not at all (immature), 2 = to a limited extent (relatively immature),
3 = to a great extent (relatively mature), 4 = yes (mature), DK = don't know.
Organizational Design
There is a clear understanding of the application
1 interactions, interdependencies, ISS needs and implemented 
controls.
2  There is a clear understanding of the system interactions, 
interdependencies, ISS needs and implemented controls.
 ^ There is a clear understanding of the network interactions, 
interdependencies, ISS needs and implemented controls.
4 There are no unnecessary feedback loops in the network.
5
6 There are no single points of failure.
Component redundancy is built in the IT infrastructure for all 
critical assets.
7 Resource buffers are built into the IT infrastructure.
8 Technical IS and ISS controls are duplicated and overlap 
where operations are critical.
g Management of IT infrastructure is/can be decentralised 
during operational phases.
2 3 4 DK
2 3 4 DK
2 3 4 DK
2 3 4 DK
2 3 4 DK
2 3 4 DK
2 3 4 DK
2 3 4 DK
2 3 4 DK
D E Afxentiadis (2010) PhD Thesis, London: LSE 328
Operational Management
A 1 
A 2 
C 3 
C 4
A 5 
A 6 
A 7
C 9
Management clearly communicates what the operational and 
ISS priorities are.
There are multiple and independent channels of 
communication during operational phases.
Key IS and ISS personnel are duplicated and overlap where 
operations are critical.
Decision-making authority is decentralized during 
operational phases.
Decision-making is centrally monitored during operational 
phases.
ISS operational policies and procedures are regularly revised 
in order to adjust to new business requirements and 
operational understanding.
Revised ISS operational policies and procedures are 
communicated to the necessary parties.
g IS and ISS learning is supported through a process of tria l and 
error.
Formal mechanisms are in place to enhance ISS learning 
from tria l and error activities.
1Q There is a variety of ISS error detection and reporting 
mechanisms.
A 11 IS and ISS personnel are encouraged to give undivided attention to operations.
^ 2  When ISS problems arise during operational phases, decision 
making migrates where expertise lies.
2 3 4 DK
2 3 4 DK
2 3 4 DK
2 3 4 DK
2 3 4 DK
2 3 4 DK
2 3 4 DK
2 3 4 DK
2 3 4 DK
2 3 4 DK
2 3 4 DK
2 3 4 DK
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Organizational Culture
A 2
A 4
A 5
C 7
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18 
19
Management clearly communicates that operational 
reliability, stability and security is a top priority.
Formal training and/or mentoring is provided with regards 
to the organizational and operational ISS priorities.
Regular training and/or mentoring is provided with regards 
to the organizational and operational ISS priorities.
ISS problems can be quickly identified and correctly labelled 
and assigned to the responsible party.
Operational ISS policies and procedures are well 
communicated and understood.
Structures of ISS decision-making authority are known 
during routine operation phases.
Structures of ISS decision-making authority are known 
during emergency operation phases.
A 8 There is no routinization during project preparation phases.
There is no routinization during operational phases.
Personnel are encouraged to pay close attention to signals 
of ISS failure.
Unauthorised activity and actions that must be avoided are 
clearly communicated.
Personnel are encouraged to question what normal system, 
network and people activity is.
Personnel are encouraged to seek the viewpoint and 
expertise of other organizational groups and individuals.
Inter-disciplinary and inter-departmental formal and/or 
informal meetings take place in order to discuss and clarify 
the reasons for any operational ISS deviations.
IS and ISS personnel are encouraged to expand their ISS 
knowledge and technical facility.
IS and ISS personnel are encouraged to elaborate their ISS 
incident response capabilities.
Formal and/or informal meetings take place to discuss ways 
to prevent new and avoid past ISS errors in the future.
There is a good understanding of each person’s ISS role and 
responsibilities.
There is a good understanding of each person’s IS and ISS 
skills and expertise.
2 3 4 DK
2 3 4 DK
2 3 4 DK
2 3 4 DK
2 3 4 DK
2 3 4 DK
2 3 4 DK
2 3 4 DK
2 3 4 DK
2 3 4 DK
2 3 4 DK
2 3 4 DK
2 3 4 DK
2 3 4 DK
2 3 4 DK
2 3 4 DK
2 3 4 DK
2 3 4 DK
2 3 4 DK
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Table A10.1: Reliable ISS questionnaire respondents and completion periods.
Games-ISS Project 
Phase
Questionnaire 
Completion Date
Completed by 
(Organization/ Role)
1-2 Analysis 8t Design
4 April 2003
Assessing the Admin-network:
• ATHOC: ISS Section Manager
• ATHOC: ISS Manager
• SLB: ISS Risk Manager 
Assessing the Games-network:
• SLB: ISS Risk Manager
• SLB: Games-IS Chief Integrator
• SLB: Games-IS Technical Team 
Manager
• SLB: Games-IS Operations 
Manager
• SLB: IT Helpdesk Manager
• SLB: Games-IS Integration 
Manager
10 June 2003
Assessing the Admin-network: as 
above
Assessing the Games-network: as 
above, and
• SLB: Games-ISS Architect
3-4 Analysis & Design/ Implementation
4 July 2003
Assessing the Admin-network: as 
above
Assessing the Games-network: as 
above, and
• SLB: Games-ISS Risk Analyst
1 August 2003 As above
4 September 2003 As above
3 October 2003 As above
5-8 Implementation / Operational Rehearsals 5 December 2003 As above
29 January 2004
As above
(Note: the Games-ISS Risk Manager 
was replaced by a new one)
4 March 2004 As above
9-12 Operational Rehearsals
5 April 2004 As above
4 May 2004 As above
4 June 2004 As above
13-14
Operational: pre-Games 5 July 2004 As above
Operational: Games- 
time 2 August 2004 As above
15 Closure 1 September 2004 As above
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Table A10.2: Monthly average m aturity  growth ra te  o f ISS high re liab ility  controls.
period
(month)
__________________ I
Organizational
Design
Type of IS
Operational
Management
S High Reliability
Organizational
Culture
r Control
Anticipation
Controls
Containment
Controls
June’03 + 1.10 + 2.06 - 0.79 + 1.07 - 0.94
July’03 + 1.13 + 1.18 + 1.32 + 1.25 + 1.26
August’03 + 1.35 + 1.72 + 1.80 + 1.75 + 1.79
September’03 - 0.98 + 1.13 - 0.99 - 0.96 + 1.09
October’03 - 0.88 + 1.08 + 1.01 + 1.06 - 0.95
December’03 + 1.02 + 1.07 + 1.16 + 1.10 + 1.08
January’04 + 1.24 1.00 + 1.12 + 1.12 + 1.08
March’04 1.00 + 1.06 - 0.99 1.00 + 1.02
April ‘04 + 1.10 + 1.03 - 0.97 + 1.01 1.00
May ‘04 + 1.33 1.00 1.00 + 1.07 + 1.06
June ‘04 + 1.04 1.00 + 1.08 + 1.05 + 1.04
July ‘04 + 1.04 + 1.03 + 1.01 + 1.01 + 1.05
August ‘04 + 1.00 + 1.00 + 1.00 + 1.00 - 0.99
September’04 - 1.00 - 1.00 1.00 - 1.00 - 1.00
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A11 - Games-time wrong anti-virus server configuration ISS incident
Date
■ . ■ • 
Shift TOC-SEC Team On Shift
. :........................; ' '
Description of ISS Incident Management Process
15 Aug, 
2004
7-19.00 TOC-SEC #2
• A competition Venue-IT team reports that:
“ suddenly the OVR285 redundancy server (server 
B) picked up all the services, with server-A 
rebooting on its own. This incident occurred 
yesterday as well, at the exact same time, i.e. 
2pm. This is the typical automated failover 
procedure in case of a network connectivity 
interruption. No ticket was opened yesterday 
since OVR services were not interrupted and no 
competition was taking place at the time. Yet, 
today with the occurrence of the exact same 
incident during competition time, the 
technicians at the venue are getting 
concerned. Can you please check your logs and 
investigate if  during yesterday and today there 
was a suspicious network connectivity problem 
that may have caused the initiation of the OVR 
server failover process?” 286
• The TOC-SEC ISS Incident Analyst communicates 
with the TOC-NET (i.e. Games-network) team to 
proceed with investigations, while the issue is 
also investigated by the TOC-SEC ISS 
Administrator.
No suspicious network activity is reported and the 
ticket is put on hold for the next TOC-SEC shift 
(TOC-SEC team-#3) to review in case they have 
any more information.
19-7.00 TOC-SEC #3
• The new shift does not find any further
information and closes the ticket without finding 
the cause of the problem.
285 The OVR (On-Venue-Results) systems were located across the different competition venues 
and were used to manage all the local timing and scoring venue systems. These systems were 
jo intly managed by SWATCH and Atos Origin technical personnel, and were considered highly 
critical for the success of the A2004 Games.
286 This is an excerpt from the ISS ticket log as recorded on the 15th August, 2004.
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Date Shift TOC-SEC Team On Shift Description of ISS Incident Management Process
16 Aug, 
2004
7-19.00 TOC-SEC #2
• While the Games-ISS Incident Analyst conducted a 
number of routine checks, she identifies that the 
Games systems have to be updated with new virus 
definitions as new viruses have been identified by 
the anti-virus solution provider. Conducting a 
check on the three Games anti-virus servers she 
identifies a number of problems:
(a) the anti-virus server that was meant to 
update its definition on a daily basis has not 
done so in over 10 days;
(b) the anti-virus server that manages all OVR 
devices does not have real-time definition 
update deactivated as was agreed at an earlier 
project stage287; and
(c) several Games devices are managed by the 
wrong anti-virus server.
• None of the TOC-SEC team-#2 members have 
administrative rights on the Games anti-virus 
servers. The required configuration changes can 
not take place until the TOC-SEC team-#1 is once 
again on shift. Thus, a severity-3 ticket is opened 
by the TOC-SEC team and internally assigned to 
the next shift. The ticket states:
“ the above corrections on the anti-virus 
servers need to be implemented ASAP. I also 
suspect that the still active real-time anti-virus 
updates on the OVR anti-virus server is what 
causes OVR systems at venues to fail at the 
same time everyday. I spoke with the Venue-IT 
Manager at the competition venue today, and 
he verified that the problem occurred today as 
well. During competition time such an incident 
could lead to the loss of data” 288.
19-7.00 TOC-SEC #3
• No action is taken by the TOC-SEC team on shift 
to investigate or fix the problem. The team 
members do not have the adequate skills and 
privileges to fix the problem.
17 Aug, 
2004
7-19.00 TOC-SEC #1 • The TOC-SEC team (#1) on shift overlooks the ticket and does not fix the problem.
19-7.00 TOC-SEC #2 • A frustrated TOC-SEC team (#2) on shift identifies that the problem has still not been fixed.
287 As identified during the ‘Operational Rehearsals’ phase of the A2004 Games IS(S) project 
(i.e. Section 4.3.4.3 and Table 4.14:18), the anti-virus definition updates impacted the 
performance of the OVR systems. Hence, it  had been agreed that a separate anti-virus server 
would be set up to manage only the OVR systems. This OVR anti-virus server would update the 
OVR device on a daily basis, but during non-operational hours, therefore not impacting the 
performance of the OVR systems. Thus, the real-time anti-virus definitions update was 
deactivated on the OVR anti-virus server; updates were done manually off-peak hours.
288 This is an excerpt from the ISS ticket log as recorded on the 16th August, 2004.
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Date Shift TOC-SEC Team On Shift Description of ISS Incident Management Process
18 Aug, 
2004
7-19.00 TOC-SEC m
• The Duty Manager and Games-ISS Incident Analyst 
of TOC-SEC #2 stay in the TOC after their shift 
has ended to ensure that proper hand-over is 
conducted and raise the next shift’s (i.e. TOC-SEC 
#1) attention to the problem and the urgency of 
its resolution.
• There is tension and the Games-ISS Incident 
Analyst from team-#2 openly blames her Games- 
ISS Incident Analyst colleague on team-#1 of 
unreliability and lack of professionalism.
The Duty Manager on the TOC-SEC #1 downplays 
the significance of the ISS incident and suggests to 
the ISS Incident Analyst from TOC-SEC #2 that: 
“ you are too eager and probably a bit tired 
too. Go home and get some rest. We w ill take 
care of this. There is no need to create trouble 
for all of us out of this. Nothing happened after 
all. Nobody needs to know about this. You 
don’t need to te ll the IT team at (the venue) 
what the cause of the problem was” .
• The TOC-SEC #1 on shift corrects the Games anti­
virus configuration problems.
19-7.00 TOC-SEC #2
• The Games-ISS Incident Analyst communicates 
with the Venue-IT team and verifies that the OVR 
system failover problem does not persist. The 
Venue-IT team verifies that the problem has not 
re-occurred. An explanation is not offered to the 
Venue-IT team with regards to the cause of the 
problem.
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